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A Framework for a Game Theoretic Model for Cyber Treats Prevention


Solagbade P. Adisa
Caleb O. Akanbi
Ibrahim K. Ogundoyin

Abstract

The dynamic nature of cyber treats presents formidable challenges in thwarting and managing cyberspace. Conventional security measures often lag-behind swiftly evolving tactics employed by cybercriminals, necessitating a more proactive approach. This paper introduces a framework that advocates for the integration of game theory models to introduce strategies for preventing cyber threats. The framework explores how attackers and defenders interact in cyber fields using ideas from noncooperative non-zero-sum game theory and linear algebra. By comprehensively analyzing and modeling the decision-making processes of both parties, it becomes possible to implement proactive measures that fortify cybersecurity defense. Two distinct performance metrics—residual energy and success rate—were used to assess the model's effectiveness. The results show that, under realistic assumptions, the developed model achieved an excellent success rate of 99.65% and better residual energy compared to three other fixed-strategy defense systems. This implies that a noncooperative non-zero-sum approach can used to improve the system's defense against cyber threats.


Journal Identifiers


eISSN: 2579-0617
print ISSN: 2579-0625