

HUMANISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY*

By

Chris O. Ijiomah
Professor of Philosophy
University of Calabar
Nigeria

Email: christolyn2003@yahoo.com

1. Introduction

In a brief comment I will appeal first to common sense conditions of our time which motivate me as I think along the line of the subject of this work; secondly I will locate the basic thesis of this assignment.

On the first motivation, I assume a wide range of agreement that today in our culture, people more than ever before, face dilemma in the areas of our country's governance or administration. Are they to look up to the formerly educated or are they to follow the leadership of those who are not formerly tutored? The leadership disappointments our people have suffered in the hands of almost all creams of this population has in part been caused fundamentally by our leaders' insensitivity to the moral dimension of knowledge. To appreciate this situation is both a domestic and national necessity. To act otherwise is to call for damaging consequences unto the nation as this work will attempt to show. Thus there is a challenge to "ALL" on the use and task of knowledge. All are involved because every position is at least justified on the basis of its structural authority. In this light, every authority assumes a degree of knowledge commensurate to the exercise of such an authority. For any person who is in a position of authority to do well he must be conscious of the assumed justification of his position. The assumed justification is thus epistemic in nature.

The thesis of this essay therefore is an inference that for epistemology to be functional to our leaders and administrators at all levels, rational evaluation, justification or methodological excavation in epistemology must be built on the metaphysics of the subject matter of epistemology. It is only this that can bring to the consciousness of our

people the "is" of that base on which they can justify their leadership positions.

However, this work does not aim at developing a definite theory of knowledge. It simply interests itself in bringing to focus the missing base in our today study of epistemology. It will also touch on the problems of such an oversight. Even then, this research does not promise to be exhaustive by dealing with all the implications of the missing fundamental.

2. The Contemporary Trend and Its Problems in Epistemology

One of the great advantages of skepticism is that it ushers in epistemology which is traditionally known as theory of knowledge. But epistemology is not limited to theories of knowledge: instead it includes theories of non-knowledge. For example the knowledge of 'x' involves not only the content of 'x' but also the limits of 'x'. But to discuss the limits of 'x' is to find out what is 'x' and what is not 'x'. Here is the justification of our definition of epistemology as the theory of knowledge and non-knowledge.

From the contemporary stand-point according to John Pollock, epistemology as the theory of knowledge would seem most naturally to have knowledge as its principal focus. But that is not always the case. The theory of knowledge is an attempt to answer the question. "How do you know" but this question is about how one knows and not knowing per se. Thus epistemology has traditionally focused on epistemic justification more than on knowledge. Traditional epistemology might better be called doxastology (Pollock, 7; Chisholm as cited by Wolf, 239).

John Pollock seems to identify 'is' with 'what should be the case'. That a particular way of operation is said to be orthodox does not in essence justify the operation. It is only a sociological description of that process. Therefore the statement of Pollock that a people at a particular time did, for whatever reason, look at epistemology only from a justificatory and procedural point of view, is not self justifying. One cannot successfully philosophize on a phenomenon without touching on the nature of the being of that phenomenon. On the premise of the above argument, Pollock's statements are suspect. On the contrary John Kekes notes with dismay this very problem in contemporary epistemology. However, he does not attempt to redirect current epistemological efforts

to the right focus. What he still does is to tackle the problems of justification (87): this is shying away from the game.

Though this work agrees with Kekes premise, yet it adopts a direct approach to the matter. Following Kekes terminology, therefore this paper goes on to humanize epistemology. It does this by highlighting what it is to know which is the central point in epistemology. In so doing it shows that knowledge is practically a moral affair.

The traditional idea of knowledge which has been taken whole and entire by the contemporary epistemologist is that knowledge is a true belief. In other words one is said to know or has knowledge when one believes or accepts something and that thing turns out to be true, in a referential manner.

But Chisholm argues that knowledge is more than a true belief. For him there should be an addition of "justified" to "true belief". He finds this additional qualification in what he calls "the problem of Theaetetus" (90). He notes that traditionally knowledge is a justified true belief. This means that knowledge is a belief with evidence. Summarily therefore, what is called knowledge has to meet three conditions namely:

1. What is said to be knowledge must be true
2. The humans involved in knowledge process must accept what is said to be knowledge and
3. That what is said to be known must be evident for the knowing person.

This means that the person ought to have a reason to accept it (91).

This approach to conditions of knowledge has its problems: is truth understood in relation to correspondence, pragmatic or coherence theory? If one adopts correspondence theory he invariably inherits the empirical and conceptual interpretational problems. It is not my intention to pursue these problems. However, to show some of the complications in this conditional type analysis, Chisholm introduced "the problem of Gettier" which says that the evidence for what is supposed to be known may be false. In such a case knowledge is based on falsity and by a thinking that if evidence is the same as entailment, retrospectively, every knowledge would have a reason to be false. For example, if a man looks at a Clock that is not functioning, he says "the time is Four O'clock" because the long hand of the clock is at "12" while the short hand is at "4". Though the actual time may be four O'clock' the statement is incorrect because that information is based on the false assumption that

the clock is functioning. Because of this complication in Gettier's position, Chisholm avoids self-consciousness and ultimate evidence as conditions of knowledge. He, by implication settles to a position which claims that knowledge is in degree, depending on what conditions that are met. He calls

this the principle of objectivity. He puts it this way: one may know "H" without relating any evidence to "H": but more knowledge could be acquired if the evidencing proposition is not false, a greater knowledge is possessed if one grasps what makes "H" evident, that is if he is conscious of the evidence (100).

One thing is evident from the modern epistemologists' positions we have discussed. They simply queue with the traditional justificatory approach to the theory of knowledge. They never involve themselves in "what is knowledge". The modern trend therefore in final analysis misses the moral aspect of knowledge.

3. Metaphysical Approach to Theory of Knowledge

From what has been said it can be admitted that, at least, most of the contemporary epistemologists have not departed from the primary problem of the traditional epistemology. Their focus is still on justification, methodology, evaluation and other concepts structured on these. This approach does not seem to recognize the fact that it is the nature (what is) of an object that determines its justification, methodology and evaluation, if this approach does, it could have first started from the metaphysics of knowledge and secondarily gone to other aspects of the study.

The contemporary view of epistemology commits what I may call the scandal of metaphysics in that, such a theory gives less or no thought to what a thing is, before delving into what are its conditions. John Pollock in his bold-face attempt to support the non-metaphysical base of epistemology argues vigorously (7). His position is equivalent to arguing that once the conditions for X are established that the nature of X is revealed. This could not be correct since there is a wide difference between condition and generic types analysis. Condition-type analysis results from asking prior questions such as "what are the contextual conditions governing the proper use of the term X or what are the contextual conditions under which X might be said to existing". On the other hand generic type analysis aims at finding out the necessary conceptual or empirical components or feature of a thing. This answers

the question, “what is an X or what features make something an X?” A condition or criterion of anything is like “form” while what that thing is, is like “matter”. This work is thus saying that epistemology cannot be started from a formal mood (talking about propositions). It requires a fundamental discussion on the material mood (what something is). In this connection Robert Ackermann has this to say”

Indeed another question must be answered first: What is described when one speaks of human knowledge? Unless this question is answered, a study of epistemology is totally useless, since it would not be possible to distinguish those moments which represent, for example, the acquisition of nonsense(1).

It is true that Ackermann gives this fundamental remark, but in implementation he goes ahead to discuss all sort of paradigm cases of knowledge. This is not too far from what Theaetatus did when he was asked by Socrates to define knowledge. Theaetatus went on to give various examples of knowledge.

It is not only in the area of epistemology that the primacy of metaphysical foundation is advocated. M. E. Spiro reiterates that it is necessary before examining various approaches to the explanation of religion, to first agree about what it is. According to him what religion is must be agreed upon for there to be any reasonable discussion on it (85). Corollarily therefore, if one is unclear about what knowledge is, there is a possibility that the one may not recognize it even if he stumbles against it. Even, if the one possesses it, he may not be sure of the demands of what he has. In this case the situation of possession becomes morally worse than the state of non-possession. One of the implications of this is that epistemology and of course its main object fundamentally require a metaphysical investigation.

What those who focus their attention on justification, methodology and evaluation premise is that the process through which a thing is realized is the thing itself, this is pure psychologism. If they had thought otherwise, this over-emphasis could not have arisen. In a descriptive language, those epistemologists are committed operationalists. Perhaps it has not occurred to them that there is a difference between a process and that which is realized from the processes. Even in philosophy where the process and the produced world-

view acquire the status of philosophies, there is still a difference between them. In the above case the process can fall under analytic philosophy while the result or world-view is a normative philosophy. So, no matter how one looks at process/operation and result, the two are different. Thus, it is only when the product of operation, the world-view or the unquestioned belief is submitted to questions of status that justification, evaluation and methodology come in as matters of epistemology.

Having argued for the metaphysical foundation of epistemology we will start to address the question of “what is knowledge”. In Africa, to be more precise, among the Igbos, there are epistemic concepts which correlate with one another. A discussion on these correlations may expose the nature of knowledge or what we mean by “knowing” or still what Charles pierce calls fixing of belief (see chpt. II). In Igbo epistemic world-view, concepts such as Ako (wisdom or moral knowledge), Ama-mi-he (depositional knowledge or intelligence) and Uche (thought or thinking) make up the epistemic circle which in turn express the idea of knowledge as a continuum. Uche or Echiche is a receptacle in which there is a disposition or potency called, Ama-mi-he (intelligence). This disposition is an insight into the relationships among the components of any reality. This potentiality yet creates another insight for discriminating between independent realities. This disposition is a very relationship among the components of any reality. This potentiality yet creates another insight for discriminating between independent realities. That is why Fred. N. Kerlinger says that relations are the essence of knowledge (55). For him what is important in science is knowledge of relations among phenomena. Thus, we know that something is what it is only because we have related it to something else. He goes on to say that educational scientists can know about achievements only as they study achievements in relation to non-achievements and in relation to other variables. Kerlinger further says that the relational nature of knowledge is clearly seen even when seemingly obvious facts are analyzed. It is this manner of thought that made the early twentieth century philosophic minds to face the ideas of genesis and structure as processes of explanation. They agreed that the historical investigation of a reality is a necessary factor for its understanding; however, they accepted that the present structural relational understanding of the reality has a logical precedence over the former. This affected philology as found in the writing of De Saussure who put the synchronic over the diachronic theory

of language. This also affected psychology; the depth-psychologies of Freud, Jung and Adler interested themselves in the structure of human psyche (Delfgaauw, 17). Here is the genesis of analytic philosophy.


Coming back to the concept of Uche, it is only when “problems” disturb this receptacle that the content, intelligence or dispositional knowledge, becomes ionic through the agitation of Uche, thus the work of Uche is to produce a conceptionally analyzing disposition directed towards the problem responsible for the agitation of Uche.

There is yet another concept (or faculty) in the epistemic circle. It is Ako. It is the active or moral part of knowledge. It can also be called wisdom. It is wisdom or moral dimension of knowledge because its function is to humanize or moralize man by using the product of Uche to solve human problems. It is at this point of moralizing of human beings that a full circuit of knowledge is completed. At this stage what the circle represents is what the Igbo call Ako-na-Uche otherwise known as knowledge. Thus knowledge becomes the application of the contents of Uche to particular problems by Ako. Because mme-kpa-ahu(human problem) is not static, the whole knowledge is self-reconstructing.

It must be pointed out here that Ako is ambivalent. It can be positive (good) or negative (bad). When it at least aims at solving social problems, it retains its status. But when it is used selfishly or to cause confusion, instability and trouble, it loses its value and degenerates to Aghugho (teachery) as shown in the diagram below:

The Igbo Epistemic Circle

Moral dimension of knowledge



Drawing from what we have been saying we seek knowledge for two motives. First, the natural feeling of wonder (problem or astonishment) which accompanies our initial perception of things and

events prompts us to seek information about the relationship between the things and event intelligible and understandable. This is a possession of intelligence and it is a handmaiden of knowledge. At times it is called the knowledge for knowledge's sake. It is for the refinement of the intellect. This is only proximate to knowledge itself. In an ultimate sense knowledge is a power of a piece of information to minister to our human problem; it is used for the guidance and conduct of our lives, for the orientation of our activities and for the improvement of our condition

(Coffey, 8). Knowledge thus is a power in a piece of information and it is positive. This power is dynamic because human problems which it tackles are also dynamic. Thus knowledge is not a static fact as the traditional epistemologies would think. It is a process hence it grows by accumulation and at times by modification or even abandonment of what has earlier been accepted as true but which no longer satisfies the cognitive need of man. In the face of an inappropriate piece of knowledge, a new satisfactory one is accepted even if it is an orthodox in formation. It can be incorporated to a set of information that gears towards the satisfaction of human need. The unifying character of knowledge is its moralizing tendency.

From what has been said, knowledge is a potentiality that finds its full weight in actualization. It starts from a mere disposition and terminates in a behavioural act. So when I say that I know X, I mean that I have accepted that I have in my mind insight into a reality, 'X'. This insight gives one an ability to discriminate between this 'X' and other realities. Through this discrimination, otherwise called a relational understanding, I am able to solve human problems. Solving human problems is another way to individual realization or social actualization. So, if I say that I know chemistry, it means that in addition to the potentiality and confidence which I have, I show demonstratively that certain, chemical materials can be released for human good if certain relational organization is induced among chemical elements. Because of this, knowledge can be defined yet, in another way; it is disposition demonstrated behaviourally in a manner that is favourable to human welfare or to the solution of human problems. Does this definition trigger any kind of relativism or does it establish absolutism? It has already been said that knowledge is self reconstructing; it cannot therefore be absolute. Though it is relative but its relativity does to smark off individualism. It is only relative because it at each time emerges as a result of a particular social community problem. Every knowledge arises

from a contextual problem and returns to it. It is also relative as long as it is a selective penetration into a reality. This is so because it is a particular problem that determines a particular concomitant knowledge. Thus in the course of penetration into realities through knowledge, individuals and of course societies get admission into these realities through entrances that are relevant or meaningful to their problems.

4. The Moral Dimension of Knowledge

Now that we have discussed at length the “Whatness of knowledge”, we are justified to ask whether knowledge has a moral bottom?

Paul K. Conkin puts a part of the answer this way:

The body of existing knowledge may be studied for its purely formal consistency or contemplated in the beauty of its completed structure but this is a matter of logic or esthetics. It may be approached purely in terms of its application or use, but then it is a matter of morality and without some question of its reliability (it is) rather irresponsible morality (370).

It is this moral dimension that is the main focus of this work. Knowledge has a moral dimension in so far as it has significance for human realization or actualization. This dimension concerns itself with the qualitative rather than the quantitative nature of knowledge.

In a pragmatic sense the quest for knowledge begins at the cradle of problems. Without this nativity there will be nothing like knowledge. In other words every knowledge has an end, the solution of the problem that generated it. It is this problem solving that justifies it. This problem must however be seen from a communal point of view. One may argue that some problems are personal and could be the selfish interest of an individual. But we know that an individual becomes meaningful only in an organic complementary social realm. No man is ego solus. Therefore whatever experience a man has as an individual, invariably affects his social order. From this perspective, knowledge per excellence is established when the end of knowledge is a social purpose. Put in a positive formular, it becomes that “the degree of any knowledge is

directly proportional to its social services. If the purpose of any “knowledge” is thinned down to an individualistic or parochial scheme, it losses its effectiveness and educativeness and it becomes unknowledge. We are not saying that knowledge has no function for an individual. It does have, only in-so-far-as the individual serves as a means to humanity welfare. This is where we have parted with the contemporary epistemologists. These epistemologists have supplied us the sick half of knowledge but we must now fill it out with the healthy one and a half.

Even when one speaks of services of knowledge to an individual, one discovers that this service is only possible on the platter of morality. We shall expatiate on this position through the ideas of some psychologists. A H. Maslow's chief contribution to the study of personality psychology is his investigation into the actualized self. He assets that psychological (cognitive) health is achieved at a point of self-actualization (Weiken, 451). For W. Weiken, self-actualization is a need to fulfill one's potentiality. This potentiality is the dispositional aspect of knowledge that has not yet borne any fruit. If the disposition is not allowed to actualize itself, frustration crawls. It is true that the scripture tells us to deny ourselves (Lk. 9:23-25) but this self is not the self that rejoices in work; it is not the self that cherishes friends or families, perhaps it is not even the self that worries a bit about the future. But there is a self to be denied. It is the self that is contended with passivity: it is the self that is a spectator in life; it is the self that is indifferent to its potentialities and their realizations. A self that is not realized is worse than a self that is unborn. Permit us this poetic digression.

We suspect that Maslow will agree with us for he says that the apex of human mental activity is witnessed in what he calls self-fulfilment (Weiken, 372). This is the behavioural aspect of knowledge. It is that action of man that comes as a logical end of his true belief. From this, one can picture a cognitive triad: a problem generates a disposition in a person and he is educated to behave in line with that disposition in order that he could turn around to deal with that problem. This is why I did interpret the concept of education from the inner curve of the root words, educere and educate. The former means to lead out or expose that disposition which is within the educand. While the latter means to train to act according to the discovered disposition. This interpretation removes

the conflict between the naturalist and the formalist in child rearing and substitutes the conflict with complementarity (Ijiomah, 339-340). This is why Maslow insists that whatever a man can be he must be (46).

In what actualization implies, Maslow includes, (1) clear and efficient perception of reality (2) spontaneity, simplicity and naturalness and (3) ethical discrimination between means and ends and between good and evil (Weiken, 451). This illustration shows that knowledge is a tool meant to moralize the individual who owns it, otherwise it is something other than knowledge. It is this moralizing function of knowledge that makes Dewey to insist that cognitive propositions are instrumental and not initiative (Conkin, 371). One could thus say that knowledge helps man to take control of his environment. For knowledge to maintain this social function it has to adjust according to the needs that make people human beings. In this sense knowledge can be self-reconstructing.

There is yet another way to express the moral commitment that goes with the ability to know. According to R. M. Chisholm to know that 'h' is true involves in addition to true opinion, a certain right or duty with respect to 'h' (Wolf, 239). He uses the words duty, in terms of an action emanating from the state in which the knowledge has placed the knower. This means that every knowledge produces action and at the same time makes the owner of the action responsible for what he does. This explains why a mentally sick person as long as he is in the state of that disorder is not accountable for his action: he cannot articulate the knowledge (reason) that gives credence to this action. J. L. Austin explains the same commitment from what he calls performative functions of the phrase, 'I know' (Hudson, 174-175) the notion of performative explains that certain utterances amount to "doing" in appropriate circumstances. He worked out the classification of performatives in according with their functions. The phrase "I know" expresses an exercise of authority or right. "I know implies that I am well informed about an issue and therefore competent. Whatever I do about that issue has an authoritative status. Also when one says that he knows, he is by implication promising that whatever he does, in relation to what he knows should be adequate. In this circumstance the public can rely on what the one says and uses that to direct realities and public affairs. From this therefore, "to know" is an acceptable phrase only when it can be translated into action and the action satisfies human or public needs. To say that "I know" commits

human behaviours to a particular belief and direction.

The moral adequacy of knowledge is thus achieved when as a means, knowledge infuses an uncoerced community acceptance into those who are actively involved in the "knowledge public". This defines the moral task of knowledge. About the location of a moral task, our attention should be drawn to the fact that those relationships in which our actions do affect others and those relationships within which inter-dependence is required make up the domain of moral task of knowledge. This is why Bruce Raup says that a standard of action has moral validity only when a community for which the action is performed, freely and in common agrees that the action is the best as the community sees and experiences its application and implication (Raup, 35-41).

What we are projecting is that knowledge has both egocentric and sociocentric perspectives. An approach to knowledge other than this is to limit the concept. This is the view of Jonas F. Soltis when he remarks that, the earlier dominant view of epistemology is mainly egocentric (97). By this he means that such a view concentrates on the dispositional aspect of knowledge. Soltis adds that a new view considers not only the personal but also takes into account the cultural nature of knowledge. In this sense knowledge is defined as individual and social, personal and public constructions designed to make sense of and provide for effective action (98). It then means that a propositional stage in the knowledge process is a mere construction in the mind. But for it to be actualized it has to transcend the mind in form of human action to make human Excellencies effective. Though knowledge at a stage is a disposition of enlightenment, an apprehension of relational structures in a thing, yet it is motivated by social problems and needs actualization. Therefore for knowledge to assume its full status there must be a transition from the dispositional to the behavioural stage.

Soltis points out that this view can attract many criticisms. For example the critic may argue in the following frame of mind: if it is impossible to eliminate completely the subjective elements from knowledge, then knowledge is a social product that differs from one culture to another, therefore, every knowledge is relative and therefore no two theories can be compared nor their correctness or falsify be justified.

Ijiomah (1990: 5-10) dealt in details with some of these questions. For the purpose of this work it suffices to say that such

questions are premised on an assumption of egocentric view of knowledge. Soltis argues that knowledge has its object (realities). These realities are available to us only within the limit of our social environment. In other words, no one can develop any theory of knowledge beyond what his environment provides. Whether it is knowledge of acquaintance or description, the environment of one's active life determines the possibilities of his knowledge.

On matters of subjectivity, reality and incommensurability, Soltis adopts Michael Polanyi's position. According to Polanyi it is not one's immediate perception of things that is most objective. What is objective is the position held up to social and public inspection and argument for acceptance or rejection based on relevant ground (4). For Polanyi and Solti it is only a shared view that is objective. Soltis equally argues that what we think or know is in a very high degree sharpened by the language of our local environment. In this respect environment and one's culture colour his knowledge. This view avoids unbridled relativism by pointing at the fact that what might be relative to a smaller social community might melt away when that smaller community is considered from a larger group in which the smaller one belongs. This implies that relativity is in itself relative.

Briefly therefore, from the sociocentric perspective, knowledge is not just the state of the mind or what is contained in the brain or journals or papers, it entails what is acted out as humans take part in social activities (Soltis, 103). Thus knowledge is supposed to provide our needs, satisfy our wants, regulate our blood pressures, release the captives, mend the broken hearted and heal the sick: here lies its morality.

As we have occupied ourselves with the excavation of the moral dimension of knowledge, we should as a matter of balancing our discussion, at least briefly talk about the immoral aspect of the concept. Today, in our community the immoral dimension of knowledge seems to be gaining an upper hand over the positions of those who affirm the moral function of the same. The former knowledge's proper business is with technical and pedagogical means of raising the young. This position argues that the total context of knowledge is skill. In this sense no goal or purpose of knowledge goes beyond the material organization of man. Accordingly, knowledge has nothing to do with the spiritual, valuational and emotional aspects of man except in so far as it is deterministic to them. On the contrary A. S. Clayton says that such a position is a

separation of human essences from knowledge and that it is immoral (145-153). He called it immoral because it places knowledge within a value free context. Thus knowledge becomes a formalized notion which can be applied to any situation irrespective of what the recipients suffer.

Another immoral dimension of knowledge is met when people think that any given biological nature of man should be satisfied or photocopied into human knowledge. In other words, any manipulation of the mind even to steal, cheat, kill, etc., answers knowledge. But William Frankena calls this ability, mis-knowledge for it does not represent excellence.

5. The Advantages of Humanizing/Humanistic Epistemology

We have in this work attempt to locate an epistemic fact which is very problematic to contemporary epistemologists but helpful to social communities. The fact is that contemporary epistemologists focus their attention on the processes, evaluation or condition of knowledge at the expense of "what knowledge is". This has its behavioural implications, major among which is the attitude to deny knowledge of its substantive moral component. In such a situation a veil runs on the consciences of many in authority that they neither realize that knowledge is a fundamental justification for their 'position', nor do they accept that "knowledge" without a human purpose is unknowledge.

Our use of the notion of humanism is different from the western idea of the concept. The western humanism lays emphasis on the belief that man is the measure of all things and hence can do anything on the basis of his thinking capacity. In this attempt God has no room in human affairs. But in African humanism God is acknowledged as the Creator of all things, including man. Man's capacities are gifts from God. However in this African use, man's interest and nature has a centripetal force. Such a centrally pulling force proposes that something is call good by the degree to which it helps to developed human quality in human beings. It is called bad for the extent it retracts from helping man achieve his human nature. this is the way we use humanism in this work.

The analysis we have adopted in our metaphysics of knowledge has atleast two advantages: it can be used to throw light into the Socratic paradox of "virtue is knowledge", secondly, by hacking on the fundamental justification for leadership position, it challenges and directs our administrators.

On the first, a set theoretic membership "E" (not inclusion 'C') can be used to express "virtue is knowledge". Using 'V' and 'K' we have VEX. Thus to say that virtue is knowledge confronts us with many possible interpretations, namely, membership, identity and equivalence interpretations. Identity interpretation being recursive in nature has a problem of quick translation of knowing into doing. Equivalence interpretation has a similar problem with the identity interpretation at least functionally. The reason is that the formulation of equivalence theory in final analysis dissolves into a sheer identity theory, for example, $V \circ K$ is the same as $(V \supset K) \downarrow (K \supset V)$. Following this symbolism one can argue that if V can imply K and K can imply V then V and K are identical functionally. Therefore the problem of $V \circ K$ is a problem in $(V \supset K) \downarrow (K \supset V)$.

We are now left with the option of membership interpretation V E K. This interpretation says that virtue is just a member in a set called knowledge. This does not imply that he who has virtue has knowledge. It simply means that virtue is one of the factors or components that make up knowledge. As pointed out by Gould, Socrates used knowledge to mean confidence or practical ability. The either/or here is used in an inclusive manner. Thus Gould argues that knowledge as used by Socrates refers to both knowledge "that" and knowledge "how" (206). Confidence is interpreted as a dispositional ability while practical ability refers to behaviour.

Further to our argument, that Plato uses the notion of knowledge in a composite sense, one notices that in his Apology he talks about knowledge "that" (29a). To illustrate the other component part of knowledge, Socrates, in a circumvented manner to answer Memo's question on the way virtue could be acquired, says;

Virtue as something good is advantageous; yet for anything to be advantageous it must be rightly used, that is, used with knowledge and therefore virtue is knowledge either in whole or in part (87d, 89c).

The last part of this quotation gives credence to our position that virtue or morality is a necessary part of knowledge. The other part is the dispositional or intellectual (dispositional) and the active (moral) components of knowledge. Thus to say that virtue is knowledge is to

mean that virtue is only an element in knowledge.

Finally, from the fundamental justification of authoritative positions already discussed, leaders, administrators, heads of departments, etc., have a lesson to learn. It is that every position is rationally held only when the authority is justified on the basis of knowledge as we have used the word. That is, knowledge itself cannot be complete without the humanizing or moral side of the notion. The hypothetically syllogistic implication, therefore, is that a leader who is not moral has no justification for his position.

Works Cited

- Ackermann, R. *Theories of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.
- Buchler, J. (ed). *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*. New York: Dover Publishers, 1995.
- Chisholm, R. M. *Theory of Knowledge*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1989.
- Clayton, A.S. "Education as a Moral Enterprise" in *Educational Theory*. pp.145-153
- Conkin, P.K. *Puritans and Pragmatists: Eight Eminent American Thinkers*. New York: Dodd Mead Company, 1968.
- Delfgaauw, B. *Twentieth-Century Philosophy*. N.D. Smith (Trans). Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969.
- Hudson, W.O. "Is Religious Education Possible?" in *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*. Langford and O'Connor (Eds). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
- Ijiomah, C.O. "Applying Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics to Selected Aspects of Nigerian Education". An Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Calabar, 1991.

- . . . "Evaluation of Third World Values: The Dilemma of Detached Scholarship" *Academia Digest*, Vol. 1 No. 3, 1990.
- Kekes, J. "Recent Trends and Future Prospects In Epistemology" *Metaphilosophy*. Vol.8 No. 2 and 3, April/July, 1977.
- Kerlinger, F.N. *Foundations of Behavioural Research*. London: Holt Rinchart and Winston Inc. 1986.
- Maslow, A.H. *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
- Plato, *Apology*. 29A
 Plato, *Meno*. 87d, 89c
- Polanyi, M. *Personal Knowledge*. New York: Harper and Row, Torch Books, 1964.
- Pollock, J.L. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*. London: Century Hutchinson, 1987.
- Raup, B. "The Moral Dimension of Education" in *Educational Theory*.
 Spiro, M.E. "Problem of Definition and Explanation" in *An Anthropological Approach to the Study of Religion*. London: Tavistock Publications, 1961.
- Viatos, G. *Platonic Studies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Weiken, W. *Psychology, Themes and Variations*. California: Pacific Grove Publications, 1989.
- Wolf, R.P. *Philosophy: A Modern Encounter*. New Jersey: Princeton Hall Inc. 1971