Influence of Political Economy Mechanisms on the International Climate Agreements: A Review and Case Studies

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Abstract

This study examined the political economy mechanisms influencing International Climate Agreements (ICAs) and the negotiating states. Using the climate policy trajectories of the U.S and India, the study demonstrates that domestic political economy factors are what determine the behaviour and commitments of states in international climate negotiations. These factors include but not limited to the features of a nation's domestic political landscape such as its internal political system, economic structures, environmental vulnerability, and social institutions. These factors interplay to modify and constrain states' decisions on both domestic and foreign matters. Several agreements have been made over the years based on the consensus of member states but their commitments and implementations have also continued to widen and vary due to these varying political economy factors. For sustainable success to be made in ICAs, stakeholders are required to pay attention to these factors since its aggregate influence play a critical role in determining the success of global GHGs mitigation and adaptation campaigns. It was therefore recommended that ICAs could be better achieved when efforts to assist member states in dealing with their political economy challenges are incorporated in negotiating plan.

Keywords: Domestic Politics, Climate Policy Trajectory, Realism International Relations Theory, Greenhouse Gases.

INTRODUCTION

Despite over two decades of climate change negotiations, it has not been easy convincing all states to agree on mechanisms to mitigate the emission of Greenhouse Gases. Even though the 2015 Paris Agreement succeeded in getting states to sign a binding international agreement on climate change mitigation and adaptation, it lacks the power to compel sovereign states to implement the agreement. Recently, some states like the United States have pulled out of the agreement while some others are sluggish in implementing agreements. This suggests that agreement alone may not be enough to combat the global problem of climate change. Several reasons have been given for this variance behaviour towards international climate agreements (ICAs), one of which is the conflicting interest of negotiating states (Hale *et al*., 2013; Andresen, 2015).

The major concern here has been: what factors determine a state's position in ICAs and whether international cooperation is sufficient to elicit action on mitigation at the state levels? Two international relations schools of thought exist here: the realist thinkers and the liberal institutionalists thinkers. While the realists argue that it is the domestic politics of individual states, and not international cooperation that determine states' commitments towards climate change

mitigation, the liberal institutionalists are of the view that international organisations can get states to cooperate towards providing a common solution to climate change (Fearon, 1998; Sprinz and Weiß, 2001; Habib, 2011). These latter scholars have succeeded in influencing policymakers to believe that setting up international climate institutions, organising international climate conferences, and signing up to international climate treaties are sufficient to influence states to commit to addressing the issue of climate change. However, it appears that this has not yielded the desired result. For instance, so far, the inability of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to influence states to implement ICAs (not signing agreements) suggests that the liberal institutionalism theory may not be sufficient to explain what determines state's behaviours towards ICAs.

We attempt to provide further explanations to the above discourse, by looking at the influence of political-economic mechanisms on ICAs. Political Economy is conceptualized as the study of production and trade and their relations with law, custom and government; and with the distribution of national income and wealth. Some of these factors include the nature and strength of the internal political system, economic structures, environmental vulnerability, and social institutions. We argue that these peculiar features of individual states have more influence in determining actions and behaviour towards ICAs, more than international institutions. Overall, the review aims to critically examine how the features of a nation's domestic political landscape influence its behaviour and stand in ICAs, and also how these domestic forces influence a state's commitment to implement climate agreements.

By examining the occurrences of the 1997 Kyoto protocol and Paris climate conference 2015, and by exploring the climate policy trajectories of United States (U.S) and India, two notable emitters of GHGs, and key actors in ICAs from developed and developing countries respectively, we hope to unpack the underlying reasons why some countries are more ready, willing, and able to comply and execute ICAs more than others.

The paper proceeds in five sections as follows. The first section provides a theoretical framework by examining the assumptions of the realist international relations theory on ICAs- which explains the sources of actors' interests and choices, and their extent of commitment to international agreements. The second section examines the relevance of political-economic mechanisms in the global politics of ICAs. The third section explores how domestic political economy factors influence the behaviour of states in ICAs. In the fourth section, the paper provides an empirical case study analysis that illustrates how these factors have influenced the behaviour and position of the U.S and India in ICAs. The fifth and final section provides a concluding summary and recommendations of the review.

Realist's assumptions on International Climate Agreements

We apply realist International Relations thinking in the analysis of this discourse. Realism is a traditional international relations theory that views the state as the principal actor in international politics (Fearon, 1998). It defines states as sovereign, autonomous, self-interested, and rational unitary actors whose decisions, actions, or behaviours cannot be determined by the international system (ibid). One prominent assumption of this theory is its view of the international system as anarchical, i.e. lacking in central authority (Evans, 1993; Bueno, 2002). As a result of this lack of central authority, the realists argue that international agreements can only be enforced through

state powers- which are determined by the domestic political economy. Its emphasis on the capability of states suggests that no state will like to spend its resources in enforcing International Climate Agreements (ICAs) unless it has a direct material benefit that serves their self-interests (Roger *et al*., 2015). Therefore, states may sign up to ICA, but in effect, it is not the signing of an agreement that will determine their action but their domestic interests and power relations with other states. Based on this assumption, we view ICAs as a symptom of state action/behaviour and not the real cause.

This state-centric realist view about ICAs has however been opposed by liberal institutionalism theory - a modern theory of international relations that emphasizes global governance and international organizations (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Tsebelis, 2002). Although the advocates of this latter theory agree that ICAs are influenced by the self-interest of negotiating states, however unlike the realists who have a pessimistic view of ICAs, the liberal institutionalists believe that international cooperation is not only capable of influencing state actions, but can also enhance the efficiency of individual states towards tackling the problem of climate change. Their idea is that it is more difficult and expensive for states to address a global problem such as climate change individually, hence setting up global institutions will harness common strength to address the challenge (Hale, *et al.,* 2013; Falkner, 2015). But unfortunately, the failure of past ICAs such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Summit to meet these goals casts a doubt on the practical validity of this theory to explain what influences states' action towards climate change decisions.

Furthermore, the realists doubt if international cooperation in climate change will be sustainable in the long run because of the uncertainty that pervades state cooperation with other states. According to Victor (2006), sovereign states are usually suspicious of each other because they are uncertain about the true intention of other states. As the primary goal of every state is survival and protection of its sovereignty, international inversion either through cooperation or legally binding climate agreement is often viewed as a potential threat (Victor, 2006). Therefore, the probability that states will comply with ICAs is thus not dependent on global cooperation but on the commitment of states to protect domestic political interests. The extent of this influence will depend on the strength of domestic political factors. Before looking at how domestic political-economic mechanisms influence ICAs, the succeeding section critically reviews the relevance of political economy in explaining the dynamics of ICAs.

Relevance of Political Economy on International Climate Agreements

Several studies have demonstrated the relevance of domestic political economy in ICAs. Dietz *et al.* (2013) and Roger *et al*. (2015) for instance illustrated the relevance of domestic political economy in understanding how the interests of states are defined, why states reject or accept some international agreements, why different states apply different strategies towards international cooperation, and what factors will likely motivate or compel states to obey and implement international agreements. Fearon (1998) postulated that the outcomes of international agreements are primarily a product of domestic political factors. However, the applicability of domestic politics in explaining the dynamics of international politics was popularised in international relations theory by Robert Putman in 1988. In his seminal article "*Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*", Putman demonstrates the connection between domestic politics and international politics by showing how the interest of domestic groups influence the agenda of national governments during international negotiations (Putnam 1988).

Following Putman's explanation, it could be seen that the behaviour and decisions of negotiating states at international agreements could be constrained by domestic political forces. This also depicts the dilemma faced by the Heads of Government (HoG) leading a team of negotiators. They are faced with a double game responsibility of satisfying domestic interests, and at the same time maintaining a good reputation for their country on the international stage. In most cases, however, Putnam (1988) and Olmstead and Stavins (2012) all posit that they may want to use international agreements to achieve domestic goals or at least ensure that international agreements do not jeopardise domestic interests. The tension between achieving domestic interests and international agreements become more heightened when it comes to the issue of climate change due to its peculiar nature.

One argument that has always been used by liberal institutionalists to advocate for ICAs is the transboundary nature of climate change and the 'public bad' implications of its impacts. For example, Habib (2011) writing from a liberal institutionalists perspective argues that the problem of GHG emission and its impact is so viral that it cannot be addressed by one single country, hence the need for global cooperation. However, while acknowledging the importance of global cooperation in tackling the issue of climate change, two missing links exist with this kind of explanation. First, it neglects the fact that states are rational unitary actors, and as such will first consider their domestic interests before global interests. Where a state prioritises economic growth over environmental stewardship, (which is the situation in most cases) any ICA that will affect the economy may not succeed in such a state. This view was supported by Underdal and Hanf (2000) who contend that signing up to ICAs does not necessarily mean that states will comply with the agreement.

It is possible that most state will sign up to ICAs just to maintain a good foreign reputation and avoid being perceived as enemies of global progress. When it comes to actual implementation, domestic interests will be considered first. The second missing link with Habib (2011)'s assertion on ICAs is that it does not consider the formational processes of international institutions. It is worthy to recognise that global institutions are not devoid of states' influences, since they are made up of representatives from member states. This follows Sprinz and Weiß (2001)'s finding that domestic political interests of member states always come to play in international institutions, as head of governments always pushes for their domestic interests. Therefore, in the end, most resolutions of international climate institutions are nothing but a refined interest of individual states, especially that of the rich and powerful states with hegemonic powers.

Another relevance of political economy in ICAs has to do with the performance of the head of governments representing a state in international climate negotiations. According to Dietz *et al.* (2012), the scope and effectiveness of the head of governments will be greatly determined by the political system from which he operates. For instance, the level of power vested in his office, the decision-making process of his country, the strength of public and political pressure groups in his country, etc will all go a long way in determining how far a Head of Government can go in representing the interest of his country at international climate negotiations (Evans, 1993; Bang *et al.*, 2015). The next section examines specific domestic political factors and how they interplay to influence the behaviour of states in ICAs.

How domestic political mechanisms influence the behaviour of States in ICAs

Domestic political mechanisms refer to all internal political, economic, social, environmental and institutional factors, interests, or needs that interplay to define and constrain states' decisions on both domestic and foreign matters ((Fearon, 1998; Bang, 2015; Roger *et al*. 2015). On economic domestic political factors, Carter (2002) contends that since the primary goal of every government is to build and develop the economy, any international environmental policy or agreement that will undermine this primary goal will receive less attention from the government. Sprinz and Weiß (2001) writing from a realist position asserts that no serious government will sacrifice economic development for environmental protection. Furthermore, Steinberg and Vandeveer (2012) argue that the seemingly serious participation of some industrialised countries in ICAs stems from their realisation of the fact that in the long run, the devastating effect of climate change will negatively affect their economy. Hence the underlying driving force for active participation in ICAs by most industrialised countries may not be because they are concerned for environmental protection, but for the long-term effect on the domestic economy (Brenton, 2013; Gupta, 2010). This situation was very evident in the U.S and India's case study as shall be seen in the next section.

Another vital element of political economy that influences state's behaviour in ICAs is the nature of the political system of the negotiating states (Sabatier, 2007). The head of government representing states in ICA often relies on local support to push for a local environmental agenda. If a political system where they come from is democratic, then it is expected that the agenda will most likely represent the views of the majority, all things being equal. But if he comes from an authoritarian, monarchical, or feudalistic political system, his agenda will most likely reflect the views of an individual or just the central government, who according to Tsebelis (2002) often set policy agenda and impose it on all levels of government including private sectors and civil societies.

Should the central government in such a political system accept the outcome of ICAs, then the implementation and enforcement will most likely be easy since the central government does not need ratification from any parliament. But on the other hand, should the central government not be comfortable with the ICA, the implementation may as well be 'dead on arrival, as there may not be room for internal negotiations. More so, the influence of Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) and other civil societies who are supposed to champion global environmental concerns are limited in such a political environment. For instance, In China, Christoff (2010) found that China's unitary system of government, which by nature gives little room for opposition and public scrutiny, somehow contributed to the weakness and poor performance of ENGOs and other civil societies in the country. This situation which characterises China's political system was found to be responsible for their poor participation and commitment to ISO 14001, a global voluntary environmental standard for the management of the environmental system (Christoff, 2010; Stensdal, 2015).

But in modern democratic states, the implementation of any proposed ICA is not just a prerogative of the central government. In essence, it must have the consensus of other arms of government especially the legislative, and in some cases public referenda (Volgy and Schwarz, 1991; Scrggs and Benegal, 2012). Thus, domestic acceptability of ICAs is a prerequisite to its success at the national level. The extent of acceptability will however depend on the strength of other domestic variables such as clear cut separation of power between the executive and legislative, the strength

of lobbying polluting industries, the influence of domestic ENGOs, etc (Leeds, 1999; Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013).

Furthermore, even where an ICA has been ratified by the majority of the legislative or received public endorsement, it may not automatically translate to successful implementation (Hale *et al*., 2013). This is because, it also has to contend with the interest of big industries, and other special pressure groups who often devise enough leeway to either delay or circumvent implementation at the local or domestic level. The influence of powerful polluting industries does not only play out at the domestic level, Abbot (2012) opined that they also influence the outcome of the negotiating process. This they do by funding some ENGOs who participate in negotiations to protect and defend their interests. This action of domestic political forces more clearly demonstrates what transpires at ICAs than theories that do not take into consideration the influence of political economy.

One other way through which political economy influences ICAs is through the threat of voluntary defection (i.e., withholding of signature), where some countries with common domestic interests threaten to withdraw from agreements if their interests are not protected. This scenario for example played out in the Kyoto protocol, where countries like China, Brazil and India threatened a voluntary defection should the richer industrialised countries refuse to bear the responsibility of financing climate change mitigation (Anderson, 1998; Grubb *et al*., 1999; Hovi *et al*, 2012).

The outcome of this threat according to Anderson (1998) was the transformation of the Kyoto accord from a global agreement to mitigate GHG emission by all countries to a treaty that requires only rich industrialised countries to bear the greater cost of mitigation. This has been attributed to be one of the reasons for the failure of the Kyoto protocol as some rich industrialised countries like the U.S were not comfortable with the agreement, preferring for an all-inclusive commitment of all countries in mitigation. This, however, demonstrates how common domestic political interests could influence the outcome of international climate agreements.

The influence of political-economic mechanisms does not only affect the outcomes or the implementations of ICAs, it also determines the behaviour or position of states during international climate negotiations. According to Dietz (2012), states' behaviour in ICAs is rooted in their domestic need and capacity to implement ICAs. This need-capacity hypothesis posits that the behaviour of a state in ICA could be explained by deducing information on their degree of vulnerability, and abatement cost.

The account categorised countries negotiating in ICAs into four groups: pushers, draggers, intermediates, and bystanders. Pushers are countries whose ecological system is highly vulnerable to climate change, but they have low abatement cost. Such countries will most likely push for the signing of ICAs as it will help them to combat their ecological vulnerability. On the other hand, countries with low vulnerability to climate change and high abatement cost will most likely feel reluctant to sign up to ICAs because of the less domestic need for it and also considering their capacity to implement the high abatement cost. Hence, they act as draggers. Intermediate countries are both highly vulnerable to climate change, and also have high abatement cost. Such countries will be caught in between pushers and draggers. The cost-benefit ratio of signing the agreement will thus determine whether they will support the pushers or the draggers. Finally, countries that are neither vulnerable to climate change nor have high abatement cost will simply be indifferent about signing ICAs, hence they participate as bystanders (Sprinz and Weiß, 2001; Dietz, 2012).

The above explanation very succinctly demonstrates how domestic political needs and capacity to implement agreement influences states' behaviour and positions during ICAs. Further exploration of what constitutes domestic political interests, and how they influence the behaviour of states in ICAs reveals that the dominating interest in a state will influence how the state behaves in an ICA. This 'interest-based account as postulated by Sprinz (2003) identified two variables that constitute domestic political interests: polluter interests and victim interest. Polluter interest represents the welfare gain from continuous GHG emission. Countries dominated by polluter interests are most likely to act as draggers in ICAs.

During the Kyoto protocol, Hovi *et al.* (2012) reported that some countries dominated by polluter interests such as U.S, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, etc. made efforts to frustrate the inclusion of GHG emission reduction in the treaty. Although this has been achieved in the 2015 Paris agreement, yet the dominating influence of polluter's interests was still very evident as these same polluters could not allow for a legally binding agreement. They rather push and vote for a weak and voluntary agreement that allows the implementation to be at the mercy of states (Green, 2016). Victim interest on the other hand constitutes the welfare loss from pollution caused by GHG emissions. Countries with dominant victim interests will most likely push for a legally binding climate agreement (Sprinz, 2003).

The combination of these two interests accounts for the aggregate position of states in ICAs. To explore the practical implications of these state-specific domestic political influences on ICAs, the next section examines the climate policy trajectories of the U.S. and India.

Climate policy trajectory of United States

Over the years, the U.S climate policy trajectory has been characterised by two contrasting scenarios: active participation in ICAs, and poor performance in agreement implementation (Rabe, 2008; Skodvin, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). Several reasons have been given for this. But the most prominent one is the fear of negative consequences of reducing GHG emission on their domestic economy (Fisher, 2006; Bang, 2015). Bang (2015) in his analysis of the country's behaviour in ICAs found that the U.S, as a global leader in the production of fossil fuels such as crude oil, coal, and gas, which are sources of GHGs emissions, seem to be more interested in protecting their domestic economy which runs on these polluting fossil fuels, than in protecting the environment. Currently, U.S. is the second-highest emitter of GHG in the world, surpassed only by China (Bang, 2015). Although the country is vulnerable to climate change (McCright and Dunlap, 2011), which is expected to make them more committed to ICAs, Skodvin (2010) noted that being vulnerable to climate change could not drive the country to rank the economic growth over environmental sustainability. Apart from non-responsiveness to their vulnerability, it appears the country is an exception when it comes to the influence of other domestic factors which are supposed to enhance commitment to ICAs. For instance, U.S has well-organised ENGOs, which are expected to push and advance the course of environmental stewardship. In addition, their advancement in the use of more energy-efficient production technology places the country at an advantage of low abatement cost. However, irrespective of all these advantages, the America's real commitment to ICAs still appears shallow (Bang *et al*., 2015).

Fisher (2013) in his study of America's climate policies attributed her lukewarm behaviour in implementing ICAs to their domestic political priorities. The country in line with the realists' explanation prioritises economic well-being over environmental concerns. In what he termed 'the

paradox of U.S climate policy', Fisher (2013) wonder how the country, upon being the world's highest contributor to the science of climate change still opposes any legally binding agreement to reduce GHG emissions. This scenario has been the case of the US over the years. However, there is a difference between a scientist who knows and worries about the devastating effect of climate change on the environment and a politician who cares more about economic policies and their effect on the next election.

Apparently, the politician who has more influence on policymaking is likely to prioritise economic wellbeing over environmental wellbeing. The temporal nature of climate change further complicates the problem. For instance, climate change impacts are often long-term, probably with more serious implication for the future than the present. However, remedial policies and actions are supposed to be taken now before the problem manifests or escalates. But politicians most times tend to focus on short-term concerns such as the immediate cost of mitigation, which they often claim are not favourable to their current economy.

Another domestic political factor that explains U.S behaviour in ICAs is the nature of the country's political system (Skodvin, 2010; Scrggs and Benegal, 2012). The U.S runs a democratic and parliamentary political system that is much decentralized, with a well-defined separation of power. For instance, while the U.S congress cannot force the president to sign an ICA, the president also cannot force Congress to ratify any signed agreement. This separation of power in the U.S political system has always played out in the country's climate change policies. For example, Fisher (2013) noted that while President Clinton's administration which has ambitious environmental targets signed the Kyoto protocol, it was unable to convince two-third of the U.S Senate to ratify the agreement. This led to the death of the Kyoto protocol in the U.S. It is also worthy to note that before the signing of the Kyoto protocol, the U.S. Senate had already passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution which declared that the U.S will not be part of any ICA that will have a negative impact on the country's economy or any agreement that excludes active commitment of developing countries.

While the Byrd-Hagel resolution received 95:0 votes in the U.S Senate, the Kyoto protocol received zero votes. And even if it was to receive any vote, it will be a herculean task to convince 67 senators who will make up the two-thirds votes needed to ratify the agreement. Conventionally, senators in the same Democratic Party with President Clinton would have been expected to support their party executives and vote along party lines. But a 95:0 collective vote of the Senate not to ratify any agreement that will harm the U.S, irrespective of their political differences and partisan loyalty further confirm the strong influence of domestic economic interest in ICAs, and how a state's political system could affect ICA (Fisher, 2013).

Apart from the influence of the domestic political system, Bang (2015) is of the view that the U.S climate policy is also greatly influenced by public perception. The U.S general public, including major polluting industries, perceived that reducing the emission of GHGs has high abatement cost which will negatively affect the domestic economy. As a result, the country is dominated by polluter's interests. Although Rabe (2008) noted that Clinton's administration provided an incentive in form of a tax discount for polluting countries to reduce GHG emission, his efforts were counterbalanced by the more pro-economic growth congress who seem to be on the side of the polluting business industries. Following the interest-based account and the need-capacity explanation of states' behaviour in ICAs, The U.S could be described as draggers in ICAs because of 1) dominant polluter interests, and 2) perception of high abatement costs. Even though the U.S

vulnerability to climate change does not theoretically place them as draggers, their excess concern about the effect of abatement cost on the domestic economy seems to outweigh their sense of environmental consciousness.

However, in the immediate past, President Obama's administration has attempted to change the U.S climate policy from a less environmentally conscious one to a more environmentally committed one (Bang, 2015). In 2010, Obama proposed the enactment of federal climate law. But this was opposed and blocked by a majority of the U.S senators. To further his efforts towards changing the lukewarm U.S climate policy, in 2013, Obama employed his executive power to enact a Climate Action Plan aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from domestic industries. However, domestic political issues such as concerns for energy security and sustained low energy price are still two major challenges facing the implementation of this new policy (ibid). While some states in the U.S seem to accept a change of policy, some other fossil fuel-producing states have strongly rejected it. This division among states still represents domestic political barriers to the implementation of any new climate policy.

More recently, the expressions and actions of former President Donald Trump further confirm the powerful influence of domestic political interests in ICAs. Few months after assumption of office, President Trump announced that the U.S is withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, describing the agreement as one that "disadvantages the U.S to the exclusive benefit of other countries". Two major domestic political factors seem to have driven Trump's decision. First, Trump wanted to assert the country's dominance, sovereignty, and unwillingness to be influenced by external governments. This was as a result of his claim that climate change is a hoax perpetuated by competing economic countries like China to hamstring the US economy. By this declaration, Trump confirms Victor (2006) assertion that sovereign states are usually suspicious of each other. Thus, he viewed the Paris climate agreement as a potential threat and as an international inversion of U.S sovereignty.

Sequel to the need to protect U.S domestic political autonomy, another factor that may have driven Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement is economic interest, which he seems to rank above environmental concern. Trump obviously knows that a bulk of the U.S economy runs on fossil fuel, and views the Paris agreement as a threat to the US economy. Trump's action further confirms the realist viewpoint that no state will be willing to spend its resources in enforcing ICAs that does not serve their self-interests in terms of direct material benefits.

Although Trump's declaration has been met with stiff oppositions within and outside the U.S, the division represents another strong domestic challenge to the implementation ICAs. To successfully implement ICAs or new climate policy requires commitment from all stakeholders including the federal governments, states governments, legislatures, ENGOs, and private businesses. While the federal government provides the oversight function with the support of the legislatures, the individual states will do the real implementation with the support of ENGOs and the commitment of business owners (Hovi *et al.,* 2012). Any friction between these stakeholders will surely constrain the implementation of the climate agreement.

Climate policy trajectory of India

India, like other developing countries, has three major challenges with climate change. First is the reality that the country is highly vulnerable to climate change (Dubash, 2013). Second is the

country's low capacity to deal with climate change as a result of poor resource availability, which is also needed to address other more immediate and critical issues such as poverty and food insecurity (Atteridge et al., 2012). The third challenge is how the country with its large and growing population will combine economic growth and GHG emission reduction (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012). Currently, India is the third world's third-largest emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2) (Philips and Newell, 2013). Research projections have it that the country will emit about 5.5 billion tons of CO2 annually by 2031. Although this is almost the same annual amount currently being emitted by the U.S, India is facing a lot of international pressure to reduce further emissions (Gallucci, 2015).

Furthermore, India's energy demand is rapidly increasing at an annual rate of 5.8%, and the major source of this energy is coal, a leading source of GHG emissions (Sunil and Trude, 2015). Another major source of GHG emission in India is paddy rice production which emits methane (Dholakia et al., 2013). These two sources of GHG emissions are at the same time major sources of economic growth for the country. While coal is being used mostly by business industries, paddy rice production employs a majority of the working population. Consequently, the country has a dominant polluter interest.

These two major sources of GHG emissions and economic growth has always been a major source of controversy between India's domestic interests and some international environmental organisations (Sunil and Trude, 2015). For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Indian Center for Science and Environment- a leading domestic ENGO in India have always been at loggerheads over India's GHG emissions. While the former ENGO wants India to reduce its emissions from paddy rice production, the latter ENGO which works for the Indian government where it receives most of its funding defends it, stressing that methane from paddy rice production does not contribute to GHG emission as much as coal and oil in U.S. Besides, they argue that paddy rice production has been a major source of food security, poverty alleviation, employment generation, and economic growth which are more pressing and critical issues to the country (Sunil and Trude, 2015). This implies that like the U.S, India is not ready to sacrifice its domestic economic priorities for global environmental protection.

A prominent future that characterised the Indian climate policy trajectory is their refusal to contribute to the financing of climate change mitigation (Galluci, 2015). India, just like most states from the global South have always blamed the global North for causing global CC, and so expects them to shoulder the responsibility of mitigation cost. They also perceive ICAs to come with high abatement cost which they seem not ready to bear (Sengupta, 2012).

The above scenario in India's climate policy trajectory is reflected in their behaviour and position during international climate negations. According to Sunil and Trude (2015), although India is highly vulnerable to climate change, they have never pushed for global committed action against climate change. Following the need-capacity hypothesis, India's high vulnerability to climate change and high abatement cost places them as an 'intermediate state' in international climate negotiations. As such, they are more reactive and passive in pushing for ICAs (Tankha and Rauken, 2015). While they do not oppose ICAs because they are also vulnerable, they are however very careful not to support any agreement that will have any negative effect on their domestic economy. Hence, according to Philips and Newel (2013), their negotiating teams are constrained to only participate and monitor events during negotiations, and only respond when issues contrary to

India's domestic interests are raised. Therefore, just like the U.S, the domestic economic concern is what determines India's behaviour and commitment to ICAs.

Furthermore, just like the U.S, the influence of ENGOs in determining India's position in ICAs is low. However, unlike the U.S ENGOs who are organised but whose influence is counterbalanced by rich and powerful polluting industries, the Indian ENGOs are weak due to poor funding. Tankha and Rauken (2013) found that most Indian ENGOs receive their funding from two major sources: the Indian national government and business industries from abroad. It is therefore expected their views will always be shaped by the funding sources, who unfortunately prioritise economic welfare over environmental welfare.

On the role of domestic industries in influencing ICAs, the lobbying influence of domestic industries in India is also low. According to Sengupta (2012), this is because most industries in India are publicly owned following the domestic economic restructuring in the 1980s. Hence, their views are already aligned with the views of the government and the general public who prioritise economic growth. Therefore, no need for them to lobby, unlike in the U.S where the executive government may be pro-environmental as in the case of Clinton and Obama's administration, so the polluting industries have to lobby the legislatures not to ratify stringent climate agreements signed by the executive.

Another contrasting domestic political scenario between the U.S and India is that, unlike the U.S case, there is no conflict of interest between India's federal executive government and the parliament. Both arms of government hold the same view that global climate change mitigation should be the responsibility of industrialised states, and that India will not be part of any ICA that will jeopardise their domestic economy (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012). This cohesion between India's executive and legislatures may not be unconnected with the little separation of power between the executive and legislatures. Although India runs a parliamentary democracy, historically, the ruling party always has the majority in the parliament, and unlike the U.S, the parliamentarians vote along party lines. So whatever agreement signed by the executive easily receives endorsement from the parliament (Atteridge *et al.,* 2012).

Additionally, another factor that explained India's passive behaviour in ICAs is their suspicious perception of UNFCCC and ICAs. According to Dubash (2013), India does not trust that UNFCCC has their interest at heart. Their suspicion is based on how the country's scientists and other scientists from the global south were marginalised in the selection of scientists that prepared the first and second IPCC reports. The country believed that the outcome of those reports and in fact most international climate cooperation organised by the United Nations (UN) reflects a global north agenda. Even though the third IPCC report included quite a number of scientists from India, they were selected on a personal basis without consultation with the Indian government. Hence, the Indian government views their selection as biased and does not reflect the country's position. As a result of this occurrence, most UNFCCC is not perceived in India as a sincere global concern for the environment but one that projects a global north agenda (Dubash, 2013). This evidence once again confirms the realists' assertion that ICAs is characterised by uncertainty and mistrust which makes states to be suspicious of international cooperation.

Apart from the issue of mistrust and uncertainty of ICAs, another domestic factor that explains the behaviour of India in ICAs is the internal administrative politics of the country. According to Sunil and Trude (2015), India does not have an experienced team of negotiators in ICAs. This he claimed

is because of the short-term role given to their negotiating team at the domestic level. Senior staff of the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forestry where most of the negotiating team are drawn from always have a short-term duration of the assignment in the ministry before their jobs are terminated. Hence, there is no continuity and experience in international climate dealings. Although this explanation may not fully explain India's passive behaviour in international climate negotiations, it nevertheless demonstrates how domestic political factors could affect a state's behaviour in ICAs.

CONCLUSION

Following the realist international relations school of thought, this review has critically examined how far global politics of international climate agreements can be influenced by the political economy of negotiating states. Using the climate policy trajectories of the United States and India, we have demonstrated that domestic political factors such as economic interests, political system etc, are what really determine the behaviour and position of states in international climate negotiations, and their commitment to the implementation of the agreements. While not denying the need for global cooperation of climate change debates, it is, however, apparent that the ability of international climate institutions to address the climate change challenges will be greatly shaped by the political economy of member states who will implement the agreements. For example, although an agreement was reached at the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP21), the implementation of the agreement is still entirely a prerogative of individual states, and as such subject to the influence of pollical economic factors of such states. Given the fact that political economy influences states commitment to international climate agreements, it would be logical therefore to conclude that the success of international climate cooperation will, to a very large extent, depend on the domestic political interests of member states.

Member states that enter into international agreements for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions are sovereign states who have domestic challenges ranging from political, economic, social and environmental issues that require the assistance of the international community as well. In this case, negotiations and agreements should also encompass plans to assist member states, where necessary and permissible, in dealing with those peculiars challenges which in return shall improve the performance of and commitments to the international climate agreements globally.

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