Ezumezu: African Perspectives on Logic, Transhumanism and AI Ethics

African logic or logic in Africa: Reflections on Chris Ijiomah’s harmonious monism

Dorothy Nwanyinma Oluwagbemi-Jacob — 2024-09-03

Reactions to Lucien Levy-Bruhl’s assertion that Africans were prelogical and contestations regarding logic that is peculiarly African abound. Amidst the view that logical principles are universal just as mathematical principles are and so do not need to be labelled African, Asian or Western, Chris Ijiomah, a Nigerian thinker, formulates the principle of harmonious monism as a peculiarly African logic. This paper aims to critique Ijiomah’s perspective. I reflect on the alternative logics of Innocent Asouzu and Jonathan Chimakonam, bringing them to bear on Ijiomah’s position. I bring the interculturality perspective to bear on inferiorizing other cultures’ informal logic. I urge the view that beyond claims regarding the existence of African logic, as Ijiomah has done, concerted efforts should be made to show how logic can be employed to address the problem of bifurcation in the modern world. The paper employs the method of content and critical analysis.

Ezumezu logic as a decolonial system of order

Scott L. Pratt — 2024-09-03

Logic is often taken as the study of the laws of thought such that, given certain premises and the laws of logic, certain conclusions follow necessarily. The “traditional laws of logic,” developed in European thought, have set the standard for what counts as correct reasoning and have been indispensable tools for the colonization of Africa and the Americas. In this paper, I will argue that Ezumezu logic developed by Jonathan Chimakonam and his colleagues can serve as an alternative to the received logics of Europe but can also serve as a resource to undermine the structures of the colonial system that has been imposed on Africa and the Indigenous peoples of America. To see the potential of such logics, I will argue that Ezumezu logic and the implied logics of Indigenous North America are instances of a larger decolonial system of order that frames both reason and agential action.

Disposition, logic and method in qualitative research: An inquiry in African philosophical psychology

Jonathan O Chimakonam — 2024-09-03

I argue in this essay that a) the disposition of a researcher could influence their method, b) and disposition as a psychological category could present a steep challenge in qualitative research, especially where logic and ethics are not given serious consideration in the formulation and deployment of a method. As a tool that drives research, a method is supposed to provide the parameters for objectivity and accurate examination of reality. This can inspire confidence that the outcome of a given research would be credible. But what are the chances that some of our cherished qualitative methods could lean more towards subjectivism than objectivism? I will examine the basic components of qualitative methods to determine, whether or not, a psychological underbelly exists, which, when not addressed, poses a steep challenge to the credibility of the research outcome. I will use the conversational method, a formulation in African philosophy, to demonstrate how to formulate and deploy a method to avoid the challenge of personal disposition.

Between Ifá’s complementary logic and Jaina perspectival pluralism

Emmanuel Ofuasia — 2024-09-03

In spite of the gap in emergence, geography and independence in the practices of the religious aspects of each of Ifá and Jainism, there are some unique philosophical components in the principles guiding the modus operandi of these two traditions that command intellectual attention. This investigation is pertinent following the recent need to emphasise aspects of humanity that exhibit common grounds and mutual understanding that inform how African and Eastern philosophies have contributed to world intellectual heritage. In this study, attention is given to the logic inherent in the principles of “binary complementarity” and “perspectival pluralism” in Ifá and Jainism respectively. Through the methods of hermeneutical and comparative analyses, this research argues that these unrelated traditions exhibit some similarities concerning how they are able to reconcile seemingly opposed realities without contradiction, thereby birthing a basis for complementary reflection with a pluralistic attitude. What this points out, in the end, is that rationality is indeed universal and not peculiar to a group.

Moral enhancement and freedom of choice: When does moral enhancement become devil enhancement?

Amara Esther Chimakonam — 2024-09-03

This essay contests the plausibility of David DeGrazia’s claim that moral enhancement would not significantly threaten human freedom. He argues that morally enhanced persons would necessarily fulfil the three conditions for free action: “‘A autonomously performs intentional action X if and only if (1) A does X because she prefers to do X, (2) A has this preference because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with and prefers to have it, and (3) this identification has not resulted primarily from influences that A would, on careful reflection, consider alienating.’” I employ two arguments to show the implausibility of DeGrazia’s argument. First, I introduce a thought experiment called ‘devil enhancement’ directed at enhancing immoral capacities as an analogy to the type of moral enhancement proposed by DeGrazia. This thought experiment will show that if devil enhancement impairs freedom of choice, moral enhancement will do the same. I situate my response within Afro-communitarianism. In particular, I evoke Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative account of personhood to argue that moral enhancement, like devil enhancement, will significantly threaten human freedom and undermine an individual’s ability to decide whether to comply or not with relevant social norms required to attain full personhood. Second, this inquiry raises the question: what is the probability that moral enhancement could result in devil enhancement? Given the incomprehensibility of enhancement technologies, namely the uncertainties surrounding their outcome, I contend that this probability is high. It is not clear what the result of enhancement technologies will be, and DeGrazia did not do enough to support his claims that the outcome would always be moral excellence.