

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Humanitarian Aid and Long-Term Peace and Development in Central Equatorial State and Further: Post 2005: An Overview and Analysis

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Abstract

Humanitarian aid is aimed at mitigating the suffering of people, alleviating poverty, and laying a firm foundation for sustainable peace and development. This paper assesses the impact of humanitarian aid in two counties of Central Equatoria State of South Sudan. Data was gathered through in-depth interviews of key informants. Stratified purposive interviews were conducted in Juba and Kajokeji Counties. Two focus group discussions, one in Juba and one in Kajokeji, including workshops and application of grounded theory where data is constantly compared for validity. Secondary data was gathered from various academic and policy institutions. Method for analysis included process of data reduction, data display analysis, interpretation and observation. Processes of recovery and development require humanitarian principles but the policy-makers in the government underestimated the challenges in the process for delivery of humanitarian aid. Lack of full practice of good governance made the administrative institutions ineffective in process for office administration.

Keywords: *Constitution, civil society organization, governance, humanitarian aid, protection.*

1. Introduction

This paper reviews and analyses the process for provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria State based on primary and secondary data. The paper is in two time periods: interim period (2005-July 9th 2011) and post-independence period (from 2011-2020). The aim of the paper is to investigate how the activities in the process for providing of humanitarian aid have been conducted. While the interviews were conducted in Central Equatoria State, focusing on Juba and Kajo Keji Counties in Central Equatoria as case studies, information on the other states was obtained in Juba from working officials, university students and interviews with civil society organizations from those states, including meeting with panellists in 9 workshops. Data from the 9 attended meetings with the panellists and interviews show similar humanitarian situations in the other States of South Sudan. Policies that the national government designed for provision of humanitar-

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
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ian aid in Juba and Kajokeji Counties were applicable to the ten States of South Sudan, causing more suffering to people in places such as Bentiu and Jonglei State. South Sudan was known as Southern Sudan until it became a separate country from Sudan on July 9, 2011. Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) administered Southern Sudan from July 9 2005 to July 9, 2011. This was the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which prepared Southern Sudan for the referendum that led to the separation of Southern Sudan from Sudan.

The paper investigates whether the process of humanitarian aid was effective in alleviating poverty and laying a solid base for building long-term peace. Effective provision of humanitarian aid is important for achieving the goal of post-war recovery. It can lead to reduction of poverty, as part of the process for conflict resolution. Its effectiveness will relieve distress in post-conflict communities, and help in easing the management of violence, exclusion, and conflict (Weismann, 2004). However, success in the process of peace-building in Central Equatoria State and further will also be determined by the capability of the National Government in providing core functions of security, law and order, public services, and mobilization of revenue for long-term development. The humanitarian aid, as part of the process for peace-building, is to facilitate better performance of the function of the National Government in establishing the policies required for its agenda of National Development, which includes effective process in provision of humanitarian aid. A failure in the process of peace-building increases chances for renewal of conflict, and the continuity of a system of fragile government, as it is at the time of this study.

2. Conceptual framework

Humanitarian aid is vital. Its activities help in recovery after conflict.



3. Methodology

This study gathered information on local knowledge from people who are generally affected directly and indirectly by conflict in South Sudan, particularly at the grassroots. The study lasted five months, but it was on and off because of insecurity. The study gathered information by notes-taking on observed and encountered situations, recording events, through conversation and meetings, and written information (documents, product and artefacts). This is in line with what is proposed by (Miles and Huberman, 1994 6-10 ; Alexander, et al, 2014 7-9). Primary sources included interview with government administrators, peace-building actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (HNNHCR) and South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Juba.

Interviews were also conducted with members of local and international organizations who have experience in activities of peace-building. These included members of women unions, youths and civil society organizations, and community leaders.

Secondary literatures on process of peace-building are drawn from the available resource centres such as the University of Juba library, electronic libraries, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and in Agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (Accord) in Juba. The process also involved making comparison and asking questions throughout the sampling process (Berg, 2001 30-35). The interviews were aimed at supplementing the secondary data. The interviews have also helped the researcher to get first-hand information, and to have insight from the key informants directly engaged in the issues being studied, and in the processes for decision-making in the National government.

Prior to data gathering, a letter of introduction and approval from the University of Ha-wassa and the University of Juba were obtained for easy of undertaking of the study for academic purpose. The approvals from the universities were used for legal purpose and contact for conducting interviews with key informants.

Interviewees for this research were selected from key informants involved in activities of humanitarian aid such as staff in the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, People of age 18 and above, males and females, working and non-working-class of different occupations and office holders. Among them include academics, community leaders, members of organizations of civil society, church members, women and youth associations and staff in peace and reconciliation commission among others. Data was also generated from one focus group discussions in Juba County (11 people) and one in Kajokeji County (7 people). Workshops were held to serve as a means of triangulation for reliability and validity of the collected data, and for plugging in information gaps from the other States of South Sudan. 9 interviews and 9 workshops were attended.

Purposive sampling provided data on the process for provision of humanitarian aid the study reviewed and analysed through data reduction, data display, observation and interpretation to have result. The paper review and analyse data on the process for provision of humanitarian aid during the interim time (2005- 2010), and the period after the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The major direct limitations to this study were due to denial of access to interviewees and the fear to provide information by interviewees because the national security prevent freedom of expression. More data would have been obtained in a conducive security environment.

4. Results and discussion

The objective of the process for provision of humanitarian aid is to ensure that basic human needs are met in South Sudan. The provision of humanitarian aid is one of the requirements in the pillars of peace-building in South Sudan. It has been noted by (UN-HCR, 2020 ; Bagshaw, 2012 ; Sphere project, 2004), that the process of peace-building requires effective application of provision of humanitarian aid through the following four humanitarian principles: (1) humanity - issues of human suffering are to be addressed to protect life of people and for respect of human beings; (2) neutrality – humanitarian workers in theory are not supposed to engage in any political activities, but conditions in work environment sometimes makes this principle difficult to obey; (3) impartiality – activities for humanitarian aid are to be carried out based on priority and not on nationality,

religion, race and gender, or differences in social class; (4) independence – activities for humanitarian aid need to be free from politics, economic interest, and military influence.

There is concern in Central Equatoria State, and in South Sudan as a whole, in the process of peace-building, which includes the process to deliver humanitarian aid: how the process was conducted, the choice of the institutions to work with through practice of good governance, and the activities that need support, and the sequencing of the activities for delivery of humanitarian aid, and the impact of such processes on communities in Central Equatoria State and further. The paper sheds light to this concern (OECD, 2008). The next section will look at the process of humanitarian aid for post conflict recovery in Juba and Kajo Keji Counties of Central Equatoria State and further.

5. Process of humanitarian aid for post conflict recovery in Central Equatoria State and further

This section reviews and analyses data on Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) priorities for funding of post conflict recovery in Southern Sudan. In the Interim period (2005-2010), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) made effort in supporting activities for post-conflict recovery through dissemination of information and engagement of communities in activities for conflict transformation (Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019). The United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF) provided support for social services such as infrastructure, activities for local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic education, promotion of humanitarian principles and compliance to values of human rights. The UNDP, UNICEF and many other United Nations (UN) agencies have been working in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) before the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 (Agensky, in Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019; Cochrane, 2020).

Between the year 2008 and 2010, both Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the donor communities were engaged in budget planning to meet the priorities of Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) for post-war reconstruction. The views of the donor communities in 2010, based on analysis of conflict in Southern Sudan in post Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were that, conflict was possible in Southern Sudan because of some of the following issues: (a) historical under-development, (b) lack of inclusivity in the process of decision-making for policies (c) urban - rural bias, and (d) the system of centralization in the Government (Bennett et al, 2010).

It has been noted by (Bennett et al, 2010) that the Government revised its priorities for post-war reconstruction in the year 2010 to include; security, to develop effective and efficient armed forces to safeguard security of the country, and to fully implement the resolutions of Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Roads: to rehabilitate roads to promote development in activities for socio-economic recovery and private sectors. Primary health-care: to provide primary healthcare units to improve the status of health of communities. Basic education: to provide equitable access to facilities for education. Water: to increase access to clean water and facilities for sanitation. Production: to improve livelihood and income of communities who live in rural areas of Central Equatoria State and further (ODI, 2010; Bennett et al, 2010). Priorities such as security and roads are connected to activities for humanitarian aid. They facilitate easy access to provide humanitarian aid to people in need of recovery from effect of conflict.

This paper observes that there have been differences in opinion between the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in Juba, and the donor communities, over the budget to pay for the priorities required for post-conflict recovery in South Sudan at large (see table 1). The government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in the year 2010 and the donors estimated the required funding as listed in the table 1

Table 1: Priorities and estimates of required fund by GOSS and Donors

Priorities	GOSS estimates	Donor's estimates
Security	US\$ 438 million	US\$ 12 million
Road	US\$ 184 million	US\$ 39 million
Primary Healthcare	US\$ 52 million	US\$ 94 million
Basic Education	US\$ 99 million	US\$ 27 million
Water	US\$ 28 million	US\$ 25 million
Production	US\$ 29 million	US\$ 47 million

Source: (Bennett et al, 2010)

There are differences in demand between the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the donor countries, over the estimated budget in table 1. This was based on the priority of demanded items, including the recovery work done since 2005-2009. Creating such differences (accountability).

Table 2 shows the donor countries that contributed for the budget in Table 1

The level of expenditure of the budget varies by donors - from Belgium's high of 93%, to 58% for the United States. The percentage of grants by the United States, that was expended, has been low because of the many very large multi-year projects with complex phases of design, which were funded by the United States (Bennett et al, 2010)

As many of these large projects were executed using contractors, the rate of disbursement (as contractors are paid in arrears, while the UN agencies are paid in advance) is considerably slower than for grants. The table shows variation in the way donors respond to funding for humanitarian aid, based on high demand for humanitarian need, priorities and interest of the donors. This makes funding for humanitarian aid limited, which does not lead to effective process for provision of humanitarian aid.

Table 2. The donor countries that contributed for the budgeted amount for Southern Sudan, 2005-2009

Donors	Budget for Southern Sudan (US\$ Million), excluding US\$ 1 billion for United Nation Mission In Sudan	As percentage of the total by donors	Percentage of which reported expended
USA	1,730	42.7%	58%
EC	487	12.0%	90%
Netherland	486	12.0%	70%
UK	480	11.9%	88%
Norway	277	6.8%	99%
Canada	230	5.7%	69%
Sweden	158	3.9%	88%
Denmark	103	2.5%	79%
Germany	94	2.3%	79%
Belgium	8	0.2%	93%
Total	4,052		73%

Source: Bennett & Pantuliano et al, 2010

The impact of large projects on overall expenditure reduced the US's share of expended funds to just over one-third of the expended funds. Although the share of the US is reduced, it was still more than twice that of any other single donor, if other aid programmes of the United States are taken into account.

During the Interim Period (2005-2011), other major actors in the process for provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria State and Southern Sudan included the World Food Program (WFP), the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), The International Organization for Migration (IOM), Community Leaders, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and other church organizations such as the Sudan Council of Churches and Islamic Relief Agency etc. The figure given in 2019 by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), of the organizations operating in the whole country, was 177, of which there was 84 NNGOs, 77 INGOs, 7 UN Agencies and 9 others. The figure for registered organizations working in South Sudan later rose to 194 (Cochrane, 2020).

Humanitarian organizations during the interim period were providing both food and non-food items to refugees returning from the neighbouring countries of Southern Sudan and internally displaced people (SIDA, 2019; Balikuddembe, et al, 2014 ; OCHA, 2014). The next section will presents result and discuss data and literature on return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons during the Interim time (2005-July 9th 2011).

5. Return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people, and those in Protection of civilian areas (POC) Returnees

Data from the fieldwork and from the UNHCR in 2006 has shown that, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, more than two million refugees and internally displaced persons returned to Southern Sudan. The number provided by UNHCR for both refugees and internally displaced returning to Southern Sudan in 2006 was 20,996 million people (UNHCR, 2006). UNHCR and IOM in the process for return of refugees and internally displaced, was overwhelmed by large scale number of internally displaced persons. The agencies responsible for their process of return had insufficient logistics. There was requirement for more logistics. Apart from the World Food Program (WFP), the other agencies of United Nations halted their support to spontaneous returnees before the end of 2008, because of lack of funding (Duffield, 2008). Yet the number of organised returnees was less than 13% compared to returnees who organised for their own transport (Spontaneous Returnees). There have been 60,000 organised IDPs, 482,000 spontaneous IDPs and 140,000 registered refugees return in 2006 (UNHCE, 2006)

The following are some of the priorities for provision of services required by returnees and local residents for them to cohesively live together: security, good services, economic and support to livelihood. But all these required priorities had been lacking in Central Equatoria State and in other parts of Southern Sudan (interview with member staff of Central Equatoria State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2016, Juba). Based on the UNHCR evaluation report in 2008, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees during the interim period appeared not to have adequately incorporated a program of protection into its process of operation for returnees (Duffield, 2008). The immediate needs of the returnees had been addressed through provision of a package for three months of supply of food aid by WFP and non-food items for household supplied by UNHCR, UNICEF and other provisions of logistics by other agencies of the United Nations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), but these services had also been poorly provided because the component and quality of the package provided was based on the process of assumption than need assessment. For example, the agencies involved in program for return of internally displaced persons from Khartoum, and reintegration in Southern Sudan did not fully realise the scale and complexity of the operation situation, to assist internally displaced persons in the process for return and reintegration.

As noted by a staff of UNHCR, the work started well, but when staff realised the enormous amount of the work needed, with less logistics, many staff bowed out, leaving the internally displaced persons in a state of limbo, forcing them to find their own ways to Southern Sudan through spontaneous return (Duffield, 2008, p. 20). Before the independence in 2011, the process in stages of verification and of registration of organized returnees at the point of departure was taking many months – bypassing timelines and predictability of the assistance needed by the returnees at the time of arrival to their final destination in different locations in Southern Sudan. As such UNHCR office could have been more predictable and more engaged in process of return and integration. This could be achieved by provision of more protection input to inter-agency effort during the planning stage, with good coordination responsibility on monitoring of returnees on route to Southern Sudan, and in major final locations of their return (Duffield, *ibid.*)

In doing so, UNHCR could more significantly contribute to continued monitoring of the outcome of the process of return and integration, the fulfilment of long standing commitment vis - vis the humanitarian donors community, and consolidation of its position as a prime interlocutor in search for solution to resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons in Southern Sudan. Similarly, it was important to examine issues of local integration from the perspective of internally displaced persons (Duffield, *ibid.*).

The returnees were provided with non-food items such as tents and cooking utensils, while the food items included cooking oil, lentil and maize grain as well as medicine during their time of arrival into transit centres. They were given food ration for three months but no medicine on departure from transit centres to their final location. The ration of food for three months was not enough for them to reintegrate fully into communities in their final location. Further, the UNHCR staff rarely have follow-up visit to the permanent settlements of returnees, to evaluate if they have settled well into their final locations, as part of their requirement for protection, and whether their work was satisfactorily conducted. They only followed up when they were requested by the returnees themselves (Duffield, *ibid.*; UNHCR, 2006, *Opp.*, *Cit.*).

There was a problem in coordinating the work of humanitarian aid between the actors; the non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and the government agency-South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), because of lack of willingness from the side of the National Government. This was due to practices of corruption by elites in the National Government, leading to lack of sufficient finance, denial of humanitarian aid access to the suffering population by the SPLA forces, poor infrastructure in road to facilitate speedy work of humanitarian aid, particularly during the rainy seasons, and that caused delay in the process to deliver humanitarian aid to places such as Leer and Bentiu, and it forced the beneficiaries to suffer from starvation (Emma & Jūssica, 2019). As such, there was displeasure by the National Government in the work of humanitarian aid to help the post-conflict community of Central Equatoria State and further. However, the National Government did not consider that the restrictions of access for humanitarian aid by both sides of the army (Sudan people's liberation army and Sudan people's liberation army in opposition (PLA / SPLA/IO) to the suffering communities in Southern Sudan is a violation of the practice for good governance, and of respect for value of human rights.

The limitation to full effective work of humanitarian aid, other than by UNHCR and IOM between 2006 and 2008, regarding the return of refugees and internally displaced people, was due to unfavourable condition that made it extremely difficult for provision of effective humanitarian aid. Returnees have suffered secondary displacement by the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013. As noted by (Lauren, 2013), more than 63,000 displaced persons took refuge in the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)' protection of civilian (POC), and 121,600 others were internally displaced outside the (POC) (Lauren, 2013; Nyadera, 2018). The researcher will discuss more on that later. The following section will discuss the process for reintegration of the returning refugees and internally displaced persons.

6. Reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons

This section discusses the result of the process of reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. The process was achieved to some extent in Central Equatoria and in the other States, but there existed insufficient follow-up programs to evaluate how well the returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) were resettled to their communities. In the evaluation of UNHCR in 2008, (Duffield et al, 2008) noted that there were problems in the process to reintegrate internally displaced persons and refugee returnees to places such as Western and Central Equatoria State, because of land mines that required clearance. It was also pointed out that the available land for resettlement required the agreement of the local communities. This was also confirmed in the (interview with a staff member of South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba). Therefore, the process of reintegration for returning refugees and internally displaced persons was only successful to some extent. The reintegration process was unevenly distributed because some returnees were left out in the process, and there was food shortages and lack of shelters because of lack of enough operation funds. But at the end of May 2006, 58,000 internally displaced persons from Khartoum planned to return to Southern Sudan (UNHCR, 2006; Duffield et al, 2008).

The problems of reintegration are captured by the following statement by a respondent during field interview; the CPA created discrimination, disunity, tribalism and nepotism instead of peace and stability. A female respondent commented that; *the only benefit from the CPA is the freedom of movement and the ability to meet again with relatives. A former soldier commented that; before the CPA they had high hope for the country to deliver services, but they have become disillusioned and marginalised by the National government..... The expectations that men marry and provide for their families have created feeling of frustration and stress, particularly those expectations from relatives and friends are enormous but there has been inability to deliver or to meet such expectations* (interview with member of civil society organization, 2016, Juba; interview with member of women union, 2016, Juba; interview with a former combatant, 2016, Juba). Comments by these respondents show lack of adequate delivery of services during process of reintegration of returnees. There was lack of access to economic opportunities and there was competition over scarce resource - making it difficult to meet expectations of relatives and friends for support. There was greater understanding and acceptance of people from different background to settle in Juba as a capital city, and particularly because of their skills for employment.

The community in Juba however has been experiencing and reflecting economic changes in their living standards. The urban poor people with no skills for work have been slowly pushed to the outskirts of the inner city, and the well-off people with skills for work occupied the centre. Increase in inequality in living standards between the well-off and poor people in the capital, Juba, have created a feeling amongst many poor people that they are not benefiting from the process for provision of humanitarian aid (interview with a member of displaced persons, 2017, Juba)

This study finds that there was lack of understanding by workers in the process to provide humanitarian aid to communities in need. Provision of humanitarian aid, as one of the pillars in the process of peace-building, requires knowledge in the following issues: (a) the understanding by the actors in process of peace-building that bad process of reintegration of returnees may result in destabilising communities, and in exacerbating tension. For example, conflicts over the issue of natural resources such as water, as in

Kajokeji County. Such tensions in communities can be exploited by the politicians in the National and State governments for personal interests. For that, it is vital to consider activities for development of the process of peace-building with reference to recognition of the key drivers of conflict. (b) To consider appropriate geographical placement of the work of humanitarian aid to avoid the areas which are most prone to violence, and (c) to have the provision of support necessary for institutions to encourage peaceful relation in communities (Bennett et al, 2010).

There was high need for more provision of humanitarian aid for example to communities in places such as Akobo and Pibor, with 200, 000 people in need, and Jonglei State, with 201,000 people in need (McCallum & Okech, in Pantuliano et al, 2013). The idea to reduce funds from donors was proposed as safeguard during the austerity time in 2012 (Conway, 2013 ; Bennett et al, 2019). As such, reliance on organised reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons have strengthened the view of actors in process for provision of humanitarian aid on the ground, for the need for more logistics (Bailey & Harragin, 2009 ; Bennett et al, 2019 ; Wageman & Langholtz, 2017).

The little progress that had been made in the process to deliver humanitarian aid by the United Nations (UN) agencies combined quick recovery impact in institutions for development of the local government, paid for by donors such as Norway and Canada, but the process was not much effective (Conway, 2013). There were no relationship between process of delivery of humanitarian aid to demonstrate effective work in process of recovery, and the efforts to strengthen the capacity and ownership of Central Equatoria State and further governments through the civil society organizations. There was lack of coordination. The process of recovery in humanitarian aid appeared to have undermined the credibility of the governments of Central Equatoria State and further, because the objectives to expand the presence and visibility of activities in humanitarian aid have not been fully met during the interim time, due to lack of coordination and capacity building (Conway, 2013). The next section will discuss result of the process for provision of humanitarian aid in post 2011 in Central Equatoria State and further in South Sudan.

8. Provision of humanitarian aid in the post-independence period

The primary aim for humanitarian aid is to respond to recovery problems in post-conflict Southern Sudan at large. However, this paper found that in Kajokeji County for example, activities for provision of humanitarian aid, did not contribute to effective provision of basic services such as water and sanitation, education and health (interview with commissioner, Kajokeji County ; Village Assessment report, 2013).

In the context of intra-conflict in Central Equatoria State and further in 2013, there were no returnees but there were 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 2 million people seeking refuge again in the neighbouring countries (Omer, 2018). The non-governmental organizations working in humanitarian aid / agencies of the United Nations, and the donor community have been concerned with lack of progress in the implementation of the peace agreement in the country. The programs for funding of government building shifted to provisions of activities for protection, and that also created bad relationship between the international community and the National Government of South Sudan (there was lack of trust between the two). Life of internally displaced persons and particularly those communities who live in the remote rural areas of Juba became polarized further by the presence of armed groups.

The insecurity situation after December 2013 made provision of humanitarian aid difficult. As noted by (Balikuddembe et al, 2014), there were 26 recorded incidents of confiscation of relief assets, occupation of humanitarian premises, physical assault of the staff of different humanitarian agencies, and restriction to provide humanitarian services to reach the communities in need. Six humanitarian compounds were raided and properties were looted, fourteen humanitarian staff was beaten by members of national security, and six schools were occupied by the military forces (Balikuddembe, et al, 2014). All of these activities against humanitarian agencies were conducted by the military and national security forces and it made the process to provide humanitarian aid not effective.

Oxfam, and other non-governmental organizations working in the provision of humanitarian aid tried to meet the immediate need of the communities affected by conflict in Western Bahr el Ghazal region in 2017 (Emma & J□ssica, 2019). The project provided cash transfer, food vouchers, rehabilitation of borehole, and distribution of goats. The project also equipped communities with skills, knowledge and assets, to earn money for themselves to build their resilience for future. Yet the program faced difficulty to work effectively because it lacked sufficient practices for coordination, collaboration, cooperation and communication within a framework of multi-stakeholders - States, communities (civil society organization), aid agencies, private sectors, non-governmental organizations, National and Local actors (Erol, 2018). The project was forced to stop because of conflict. Further, the increasing population that require humanitarian assistance made provision of services not enough to cater for all people in need, and there were conflicts in various areas such as Jonglei and Upper Nile States (interview with member of civil society organization, 2017, Juba ; Erol, 2018).


As noted by (Balikuddembe et al, 2014), humanitarian aid agencies have been facing problems of denial of access to deliver aid to people in need because of the violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against some of the workers in humanitarian aid, which consisted of harassment or intimidation, attacks, robbery, hijacking of properties, arrest, abduction, and commandeering of vehicles of humanitarian agencies (Balikuddembe et al, 2014).

The violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against the humanitarian aid workers extended country-wide to places such as Jonglei and Upper Nile states. This is a violation of the United Nations resolution A/RES/82, where full access and no hindrance to humanitarian aid and other services is a precondition for effective process for provision of humanitarian aid, whether in armed conflict or in natural disaster. Prevention of access to provide humanitarian aid has led to less effective process to deliver humanitarian aid (Balikuddembe, Op. Cit.). Yet the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan has provided for freedom of movement for foreign travellers, and for repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people.

The conflicts that erupted in December 2013 and July 2016 created more internally displaced persons in search for protection in United Nations compounds in South Sudan. Hence, internally displaced persons, by conflict, came to include those in the United Nations protection of civilian (POC) camps. The report of the IOM in 2016 painted a worrying situation for the internally displaced number of people in POC; the number for Juba town was 38,874, Wau town was 42,384, Bentiu town was 101,570, Malakal town was 33,057 and Melut town was 700 IDPs (IOM, 2016). Yet activities for provision of humanitarian aid was being hindered by the SPLA and SPLA-IO (IOM, ibid). The increasing number of internally displaced persons and those who received humanitarian aid is shown in figure


1 for the number of internally displaced persons by conflict and figure 2 for those who managed to receive aid. Figures 1 and 2 shows the changes in the figures of internally displaced people during the first eight months of the conflict that broke out in December 2013. Figure 1 shows the conflict intensified for the first two month, from December 2013 to January 2014. This was when Dr. Riek Marcher was no more in Juba with its forces. The situation was reducing to normal. Fighting increased when forces of Dr Riek Marcher regain strength, and that also increased the number of internally displaced people from February to July 2014.

Figure 1: The number of Internally Displaced Persons by Violence in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Figure 2: People Reached by humanitarian aid agencies in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014, more than in the interim period.



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Speedy access to provide humanitarian aid facilitates the key operations of movement of humanitarian goods, and aid workers where they are needed to implement distribution, provide health services and to conduct the needed activities for humanitarian aid to benefit the affected communities (Balikuddembe & Ejeta 2014). However, there were challenges that made the provision of humanitarian aid not so effective in Central Equatoria State and further. These challenges are discussed in the following section.

9. Challenges in the process for provision of humanitarian aid after 2013

Data from the field work shows that the challenges in the process for provision of effective humanitarian aid include the following: the bureaucratic policies of the National Government created delays in getting working visas for the aid workers, approval of travel permit to affected areas and clearance of relief goods (interview with member of staff, Central Equatoria State relief and rehabilitation commission, 2017, Juba). The National government for example does not fully respect humanitarian principles by allowing temporary corridors to facilitate easy access for humanitarian aid to reach the people in need. This is particularly in violation of the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention and the additional protocol of 1949, which was accepted by South Sudan in 2012. The SPLA/SPLA-IO sometimes commandeers humanitarian vehicles and boats (Balikuddembe & Ejeta 2014).

The other challenges include rainy seasons in South Sudan. From the months of July to December every year, roads to key locations of need for humanitarian aid are sometimes cut off. Access to such areas becomes minimal or impossible. This is a physical challenge for humanitarian aid workers during rainy seasons- high cost for humanitarian aid during rainy season. High risks of movement during rainy seasons make some humanitarian aid workers face problems of looting, ambushes, and destruction of humanitarian aid assets, leading to fluctuating prices and continued increase in cost for humanitarian operation (interview with member of staff, Central Equatoria State relief and rehabilitation commission, 2017, Juba).

The companies providing humanitarian freights services increase the transport charges, and it makes it difficult for some humanitarian agencies to distribute aid items to many people in need. The affected people may get cut off from receiving aid services such as health, food and facilities for education. This has happened in Central Equatoria as well as in other states such as Jonglei, Warrap, Lakes, Unity, and Upper Nile. It is because of lack of development of good system of infrastructure all over the country (Balikuddembe & Ejeta 2014).

A well-researched design for implementation of humanitarian aid is a vital requirement regarding the events to be carried out, the environment in which the work is to be taken, and location of head offices of the providing agencies, field staff, donors, and national and local government stakeholders. At the same time, successful implementation of activities in the process for provision of humanitarian aid in post conflict communities would require understanding of the nature, scope, and practical relevance of the programs for recovery. Success of activities in the process for provision humanitarian aid would require collaboration of stakeholders, time, reliability of the donor in funding for both short and long-term, and recruitment of skilled staff with required knowledge, and long-enough duration to provide for continuity of the activities in the process for provision of humanitarian aid (Kopinak, 2013 ; Oxfam, 2019).

The researcher considers that the foremost step in activities in the process for provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria State and further would be promotion of cooperation and collaboration between stakeholders, to invest in provision of services such as food, education and health. The process would be effective through flexible transition to enhance sharing of ideas- participatory approach. It will also be cost effective to beneficiaries and the donors, because participants in the provision of humanitarian aid will have a chance to learn new skills from one another. According to (Prentice et. al. 2020)), the

benefit of participatory process leads to first, development of social network - a chance to meet other people, make new friends and increase connection or network. Second, learning comes in different forms - through participation; people will learn many new skills, have openness to other new experience and have confidence to learn. Third, participants will develop self-efficacy - people will believe on their capability to do things that influence events that affect their lives- how people feel, think and motivate themselves (Prentice et. al. 2020).

This study shows that there was lack of consideration by the National government in the work of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria State and further. The National government did not consider that increase in well-being of beneficiaries, and the quality of their live, is to be determined by the frequent use of the following associated concepts; commonality, united effort and partnership or harmonious purpose team work for effective results (interview with a member of staff, Central Equatoria State relief and rehabilitation commission, 2017, Juba). These concepts are not limited to process for provision of humanitarian aid, it includes armed forces that hinder access for effective provision of humanitarian aid to people in need. These associated concepts have the following four characteristics, cooperation, coordination, collaboration and communication.

All the four characteristics above are vital in the process for effective delivery of humanitarian aid. It can be argued that the quality of information that has not been shared, trusted, respected and valued, is doomed to fail. The process for provision of humanitarian aid was not effective enough to contribute to process of peace-building to prevent reoccurrence of conflict. Hence, the diverse mandates that add to successful four concepts above would require on-going patience, diplomacy, transparency, listening, classifications, confidence, and no assumptions.

10. Conclusions

There will be no effective process for provision of humanitarian aid when there is conflict. This paper reviewed data on the process for provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria State. The study uses purposive sampling to gather information from various sources. provision of humanitarian aid represents commitment to support vulnerable communities in Central Equatoria State and beyond. This commitment cannot be effectively realised while conflict continues. But even after the attainment of peace, careful planning is important for the effective provision of humanitarian aid.

Long-term peace can be consolidated by building the capacity and the legitimacy of the authorities in governments. This can be by provision of basic services, consideration of problems of security, policing and provision of rule of law, in order to have sustainable stability.

The National government did not encourage respect for principles of humanitarian aid to produce effective results. Such a failure has led to violation of humanitarian principles and disrespect for values of human rights. It has prevented the efforts to deliver effective humanitarian aid for recovery to people in need. The practices for harassing, arrest and confiscation of properties of humanitarian aid works has effects. Prevention of access to provide humanitarian aid, to communities in need in South Sudan at large, would justify the reason why the process for provision of humanitarian aid was not effective enough, to contribute to efforts to prevent reoccurrence of conflict after 2011 in South Sudan.

Conflict of Interest

This research paper is part of my original PhD dissertation. It is not published anywhere and there is no conflict of interest.

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