A Critical Analysis of Jurgen Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality: Exposing Some of its Unadmitted Ethical Assumptions

Abstract

This paper defends the claim that Habermas’s distinction between the moral and
the ethical depends on some un-stated assumptions that he is not willing to accept.
One of the assumptions concerns the presumption of the equality of the discourse
participants; the other implicit assumption in his discourse theory of morality
concerns the issue of reciprocity and symmetrical power relations. He takes each
discourse participant as free to initiate a dialogue and to challenge the validity
claims of discourse participants. Such assumptions undermine Habermas’s
commitment for ethical neutrality and his rejection of the substantive notions of
truth. He argues that although our everyday interactions are pervaded by
distortions and asymmetrical power relations there are operative principles such
as reciprocity and symmetrical power relations inherent in language. The question
precisely is: why should we take the principles that are inherent in language for
granted? It appears as though Habermas has a pre-given reason to endorse the
principles in question. By disapproving the use of threat, coercion and intimidation
in the process of argumentation, and instead by insisting for the employment of,
among others, symmetrical relation, Habermas is affirming the claim that humans
are beings that command each other’s respect. But the question precisely is, why
do they command each other’s respect? It appears that we cannot commit
ourselves to this claim without affirming a given ontology of the human and
Habermas is exactly doing that.