Interface between formal and informal systems of horizontal accountability in Kenya's state-owned enterprises

Abstract

Recent studies on horizontal accountability between the executive and legislative bodies in Sub-Sahara African countries indicate that it is still constrained by limited capacity in terms of human resources, infrastructure and weak institutions. It is further compounded by negative cultural practices and hierarchies, restricted loyalty based on ethnic identity, collusive and predatory elite networks and lack of a deep culture of democracy and accountable governance. In Kenya reforms which have been going on for more than three decades have produced a system with strong institutions and formal systems which if used within a new culture of responsible, people driven and accountable system of governance, can increase the effectiveness of parliament and improve citizens’ livelihoods. However, reforms and institutional mechanisms on their own may not bring about the desired changes because in the case of Kenya there is a high level of reliance on informal mechanisms when groups of the elite in both the executive and in parliament, either independently or in alliance, find the use of formal mechanisms an obstacle to the advancement of their individual or collective interests. This has elevated informal over formal mechanisms of accountability thereby minimizing the outcomes of the reforms. This is very evident in the case of state owned enterprises, which by their organizational and governance architecture, are more prone to reliance on informal than formal mechanisms of control and accountability. This article sets out to investigate the reasons for this, using the National Cereals and Produce Board of Kenya as a case study.