

Satisfaction With The Status Quo: Why has Religious Terrorism not yet Gained Ground In Chad?

Helga Dickow

Abstract

Chad is one of those countries touched by Islamist violence that has originated mostly from its neighbours. However, thus far Chadian Muslims and Christians have demonstrated a positive attitude toward religious cohabitation. Survey data from a unique dataset of five Chadian cities confirm the population's willingness to accept peaceful coexistence as well as a high level of religiosity. However, the data reveal Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among wealthier respondents who received either an Islamic-based primary education or have a first university degree. This combination is an unusual result. These respondents also show the highest support for authoritarian structures and the Chadian leadership. This leads to the conclusion that Islamist fundamentalism is most prominent among those persons who benefit most from the present regime.

Keywords: Chad, cohabitation, religion, Islamist fundamentalism

Résumé

Le Tchad est l'un des pays touchés par la violence islamiste provenant principalement de ses voisins. Cependant, jusqu'à présent, les musulmans et les chrétiens tchadiens ont fait preuve d'une attitude positive envers la cohabitation religieuse. Les données d'enquête provenant d'un ensemble de données unique de cinq villes tchadiennes confirment la volonté de la population d'accepter une coexistence pacifique ainsi qu'un haut niveau de religiosité. Cependant, les données révèlent des attitudes fondamentalistes islamistes parmi les répondants les plus riches qui ont reçu une éducation primaire islamique ou qui ont un premier diplôme universitaire. Cette

<https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/contjas.v9i2.6>

Helga Dickow (helga.dickow@abi.uni-freiburg.de) is a senior researcher at the Arnold Bergstrasser Institut in Freiburg, Germany. Her research interests include politics and conflict in the Sahel region, especially in Chad and religious coexistence and conflicts.

The author would like to thank the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation for funding a research project about laicism in Chad in the framework of the special research programme "Islam", and Valerie Møller, Yonatan N. Gez and Rainer Hampel for their valuable comments and suggestions on the draft article.

Dickow, H./Satisfaction with the status quo: Why has Religious Terrorism not yet Gained Ground In Chad?

combinaison est un résultat inhabituel. Ces répondants montrent également le plus grand soutien aux structures autoritaires et au leadership tchadien. Cela conduit à la conclusion que le fondamentalisme islamiste est le plus important parmi les personnes qui bénéficient le plus du régime actuel.

Mots clés: Tchad, cohabitation, religion, fondamentalisme islamiste

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century — particularly since the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the advance of jihadi Salafist groups in northern Mali in 2013 — increased political and scholarly attention has been directed towards the security crisis and the rise of Salafism and Salafist radicalism in the Sahel. Salafism and Islamic reformism are nowadays an integral part of the religious landscape in the Sahel. Detailed studies on Islam and Islamic reform and various Islamic movements show their diversity in Africa (Westerlund and Rosander 1997; Levtzion and Pouwels 2000; Soares and Otayek 2007; Adebayo 2015; Loimeier 2013) and especially in the Sahel (Triaud 2000; Afzal Upal and Cusack 2021) — a region traditionally dominated by Sufi Islam (Rosander 1997; Loimeier 2001; Solomon 2015; Loimeier 2016).

Research on the place of Salafism in the context of so-called “religious violence” in the Sahel largely reaches similar conclusions. Studies on the origins of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Thomson 2012; Ekhomu 2020; Thurston 2017) and other jihadist/Salafist groups in Mali (Briscoe 2014) point to dissatisfaction with the political order as the driving force behind violent activities. Scholars, in particular, have framed processes of radicalization and exacerbation of Salafist jihadism in terms of current conflicts between these groups and the state (Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa, Uzodike et al. 2012; Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Benjaminsen and Ba 2019) or in terms of tensions between factions including ethnic rivalries (Dowd and Raleigh 2013; Jourde 2017). Indeed, as Jourde (2017) points out, sharing ethnic origin can play an essential role in recruitment to jihadist movements.

Studies on the appeal of Salafi movements in the Sahel show that bad governance, injustice, and perceived discrimination are key factors that encourage joining such groups, especially among the youth (Agbiboa 2013; Onuoha 2014). Likewise, economic aspects such as poverty and unemployment play an important role (Ayegba 2015; Ewi and Yenwong–Fai 2017). Individual biographies also highlight deprivation and poverty as decisive factors in radicalization (Seli 2018). Similarly, Estes and Sirgy (2013) describe the cycle of frustration that culminates in turning to jihadi Salafism. In other words, it is held that abusive governments, bad governance, poverty, neglect of border regions, frustration, corruption, injustice, deprivation — in short, the lack of a self-determined future — drive particularly young men into the arms of these movements (UNDP 2017; Ismail 2013; Bøås 2014). In some cases, jihadi Salafist movements fill in for the absent state, and integrate themselves into local communities, providing infrastructure and shelter (Ghanem 2017).

Interestingly, all these explanations perceive increased tendencies towards Salafi jihadism to be fuelled by factors other than religious conviction. From this perspective, religion may even be thought of as a convenient ploy mobilized by leaders of Salafi movements, who strengthen their constituency on the backs of local discontent (UNDP 2017; PNUD 2017; International Crisis Group 2019).

Against these established explanations, another line of recent scholarship reverses the perspective. Rather than focusing on the weakness of states or poverty as permitting the rise of Salafism, this new line of scholarship emphasises the abuses and overbearing presence of the state, which results in violent reactions (Raineri 2020). At the same time, states' capability to impose their authority on religious affairs in some Sahelian states can result in them being better equipped to contain jihadist expansion (Idrissa 2017; Elischer 2021). Particularly, some Sahelian states, such as Chad, possess both relatively strong institutions and a determination to keep religious actors at arm's length from the political process; whereas in Niger, reformist Salafi movements have been gaining power both within and outside the formal political sphere (Sounaye 2009; Sounaye 2017; Elischer 2021). While there is certainly some degree of external influence, it is important to note that key actors come from within Sahelian societies, and that their longing for moral renewal have gone hand in hand with their loss of confidence in state institutions (Sounaye 2017).

The country of Chad is a case in point. It is one of the countries in the region to have a substantial Christian minority in a predominantly Muslim society. There are no reliable and up-to-date statistics on religious affiliation at the national level, as the country's last national census of 2009 avoided releasing these sensitive statistics (Gez et al. 2021). According to the Pew Forum (2010), the country consists of 54% Muslims and 40% Christians. In terms of security, the country suffers attacks by Boko Haram, mainly in its border regions in the Lake Chad area (International Crisis Group 2017; Dickow 2020). In 2015, there were a few attacks in the capital N' Djamena, allegedly perpetrated by Boko Haram (Eizenga 2015). For about thirty years and until the recent and sudden death of its long-time president Idriss Déby Itno in April 2021 (Dickow 2021), the country has been ruled by an authoritarian regime (Dickow 2014; Hansen 2021). Despite its oil-production, Chad is one of the world's poorest countries (United Nations Development Programme 2020).

This article explores why jihadi Salafism has not (yet) found a foothold in Chad, in contrast to its neighbouring countries – even though it meets the various assumptions just outlined. Building on the work of Idrissa (2017) and

Elischer (2021), I complement the discussion about the centrality of strong state control over religious institutions and cultural hegemony of Islam. I draw on an opinion survey conducted in five Chadian towns from 2015–2016, through which I identified groups within Chadian society according to their propensity for religiosity and their fundamentalist tendencies. Drawing on the data, I illustrate that the part of the population with the highest religious fundamentalist attitudes and tendency to proclaim themselves Salafists show the biggest support for the authoritarian president. This contrasts the declared mission of political or jihadi Salafists as defined by Wiktorowicz (2006; 2001: 111–146) and Wagemakers (2020: 30)¹ to fight political leadership in Muslim states (Kassim 2015). The data further show that Muslim respondents with high fundamentalist attitudes are most likely to have benefited economically during the Déby era. Interestingly, the data reveal high willingness for cohabitation by both Muslims and Christians in a country that was gripped for decades by a civil war between Muslim– and Christian–dominated ethnic groups (Centre Al-Mouna 1996; Yacoub and Gatta 2005; Debos 2013; Hansen 2021).

A word on “religious fundamentalism” is appropriate here. Starting from a belief–based definitions, which shaped American Protestantism, the notion has come to include processes of social change and experiences of marginalisation. In the “Fundamentalism Project”, Marty and Appleby (1991–1995) draw on manifestations of fundamentalism from across the world, showing a line linking fundamentalism and militantism. Similarly, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) and Altemeyer (1996) see a link between fundamentalism and authoritarianism. However, such alleged connections are the subject of debate and are not universally shared by scholars (Hood et al. 2005). Appleby (2011) describes religious fundamentalism as religiosity that “is shared by individuals, movements, groups, and political parties that claim adherence to a religious tradition and are dedicated to defending that tradition from marginalization, erosion, privatization, and decline” (p. 236–237). He and other scholars like Rosander highlight the fact that fundamentalism (or Islamism) is not to be understood as a “return to tradition” (Rosander 1997:5) but an “appropriation of elements of ‘traditional’, on the one hand, and ‘secular modernity’ on the other” (Appleby 2011: 238).

Terms such as fundamentalism, modernity, and tradition are all highly loaded and open to cultural interpretation, and are largely treated from a Western gaze.² Problematization of contested concepts and false dichotomies

1 Wagemakers (2021) distinguishes between quietist, political and jihadist Salafis.

2 It is therefore relevant to mention that Marty and Appleby’s conceptualization of fundamentalism draws on empirical research from a plurality of religions and country case studies to identify transversal patterns on worldwide fundamentalist dynamics.

such as tradition versus modernity is therefore necessary at this point. Historically, based on the assumption that “progress” could only be achieved by following European culture (and religion), the Western conception of modernity legitimized asymmetrical power relations in colonial and post-colonial Africa, and indeed continues to do so today (Mamdani 1996).³ Conversely, this particular iteration of modernity gave self-legitimacy to Western scholars to transfer their idea of “tradition” to societies in the South. One needs to only think about the decades-long debate on “witchcraft and modernity” started by Evans-Pritchard in 1937 (Kroesberg-Kamps 2020). Citing the terms tradition and modernity in the context of this text, I would like to underline that I am well-aware of its problematic connotations. In my exchange with Chadian interlocutors, I noted their unprompted articulation of a dualistic division between tradition and modernity. This intuitive distinction often emerged when describing behavioural patterns within one’s own family across generations, and especially with regard to religion. The various iterations of these key concepts, as well as the loaded positionality of their mainstream articulation, have been taken into account in the development of the questions and items notably, with regard to religious fundamentalism, as will be seen in the survey section.

Organization of the paper

First, I outline the state of religious coexistence in Chad as an introduction into its complex society. This is followed by a section on Islam and politics in Chad, and the changing religious landscape in the Sahel, where Salafism has become a dominant force. After thus presenting the context, the rest of the article is dedicated to presenting my survey on attitudes towards politics and cohabitation in Chad and its findings. I begin by describing the project design, introduce the sample, and finally focus on the results with special attention to statistically identified religious, fundamentalist and Islamist respondents. In the conclusion, I outline the need for more survey-based research in the Sahel, to gain a better understanding of Salafi tendencies within the population.

Religious coexistence in Chad

The history and composition of the Chadian population have a major influence on its present-day society. With regard to both religious and ethnic affiliation, the population is highly stratified. In the beginning of the 14th century, several

3 A case in point is that of *Franceafrique* (Verschave 1998; Borrel et al. 2021).

waves of migration from the Arabian Peninsula to the Sahel, dominated by traders and herders, paved the way for Islamization – mainly in the North and centre (Zeltner 1979; Magnant 1992; Coudray 1992). Missionary activities and French colonisation furthered Christianisation in the South initially (Centre Al-Mouna 1996; Centre Al-Mouna 2000; Doutoum 1983; Coudray 2001). Today, the territorial distribution of the two main religions reflects the different migration routes that have shaped the Chadian society, that is, the North, East and Centre are Muslim, while the South is primarily Christian. Unsurprisingly, ethnic and religious affiliations tend to overlap; some ethnic groups are predominately or completely Muslim, while others are predominantly Christian. This distinction led to the binary juxtaposition of “Northerners” and “Southerners” – a somewhat superficial division that, it should be stressed, is not accepted by all Chadians. Nevertheless, it is widely used as common shorthand classification of people’s religious and ethnic belonging.

Religious affiliation and proximity to political power played a decisive role after the French colonisation and in the aftermath of the civil war (Buijtenhuijs 1978). The newly independent state and its administration were originally controlled by Christians from the South. However, after the end of the civil war in 1979, power shifted to predominantly Muslim ethnic groups (Gatta 1985; Coudray 1994: 659; Buijtenhuijs 1987; Nolutshungu 1996). Since then, conflicts over political and economic power have emerged within the mainly Muslim-dominated groups and even within the ruling clan. Since the end of the civil war, relations between Muslims and Christians are often strained, though a rather fragile equilibrium prevails (Ladiba 2011). The older generation, which experienced the civil war first-hand, seems especially inclined to maintain peaceful coexistence.⁴

The politics and economy of the thirty years rule of Déby widened social differences. It can be characterised by short-lived hopes for democratisation and economic recovery, followed by rapid disillusionment. Déby’s promise of democratisation was quickly curtailed by an authoritarian regime (Hansen 2017). Equally, the long-hoped-for oil production that started in 2003 soon became a curse in neighbouring Sudan (Patey 2010) and other countries. It allowed high-level corruption, and enabled the political elite to become rich while the majority of the population struggled to survive (Clausen and Attaran 2011). Just before his death, Déby had won elections that would have allowed him a sixth term in office (Dickow 2021).

4 Journalist, Christian, 22 November 2016.

Since independence, all the Chadian constitutions — also the transitional charter of 2021 in place since Déby's death and its revised version of 2022 — enshrine laicism and thereby lay the legal foundation for religious coexistence. Muslims and Christians are free to perform their religious duties and rites. The high holidays of both religions are public holidays. Furthermore, until the declaration of the constitution of 2018 which gave Déby more power and mandates, certain unwritten rules governed Chadian politics and maintained a certain equilibrium between the religious groups: Representatives of both religions were at the top of the state. The prime minister originated in most cases from the South and was a Christian, while the president a Muslim (Dickow 2005). During his tenure of office, President Déby carefully watched over religious affairs in order to anticipate and avoid destabilisation. Déby belonged to the minority ethnic group Zaghawa, whose members are all Muslims. Since taking power in 1990, he controlled the mostly Tijaniyya-orientated Committee for Higher Islamic Affairs (CHIA) and nominated the Committee's head by presidential decree. The more Salafist-orientated association Ansar al Sunna Al Mohammidiya was (once more) dissolved in 2015, under the pretext of combatting Islamist terrorism.⁵ The Christian religious leaders were also advised to respect the earthly authorities. For example, in 2012, an Italian Catholic bishop was expelled after voicing disapproval of bad governance.⁶

Cohabitation is not free of tensions, especially at the local level, when economic competition involves perceived or actual deprivation, threatening the centuries-old and well-defined division of economic roles among the various ethnic groups (Kimitene 2013). Conflicts between Muslim nomadic herders and Christian peasants are sometimes described as conflicts between followers of different religions, while the underlying causes are more likely to be competition over scarce resources, namely water and land, and for political power (Ehiane and Moyo 2021). Muslim-Christian marriages take place occasionally, but are exceptional. Since the end of the civil war, neighbourhoods in the capital, N'Djamena, tend to be either Muslim or Christian. Nonetheless, Muslim and Christian leaders seek dialogue with the political leadership and — during President Déby's rule, with his blessing — publicly preach cohabitation, by saying “Everybody is free to choose his religion. You cannot restrict the liberty of other religions. You must also have

5 Arrêté Nr. 014/PR/PM/MATSP/SG/DGAT/DAPEC/SAC/2015, portant dissolution de l'Association Ansar Assounna Al-Mouhamadiya, 31 March 2015.

6 Catholic Bishop, 3 November 2015.

the liberty to belong to a religion, as well as not to practice.”⁷

On the other hand, for Chadians it is evident that political power is in the grip of ethnic groups from the North who are predominantly Muslim. The power circle is dominated by Muslims; and corruption within the power circle enables the ruling elite to profit from state resources. Therefore, Christians commonly express a feeling of marginalization and claim that they do not have access to political power or to the riches of the country.⁸ In short, Chad could be described as a society in which religion plays a decisive role in defining the social order and individuals’ status within it.

Islam and Politics in Chad

Even before the emergence of jihadist Salafism, the countries of the Sahel experienced multiple waves of Islamic renewal in the late 20th and early 21st century. Adherents to these movements set out to purify Islam of its syncretistic elements and to emulate the first three generations of early Islam (Elischer 2021:25), and have positioned themselves against the established power of Sufi Islam (Soares 1999: 238; Gauvain 2021; Thurston 2016). This resulted in a fierce intra-Islamic dispute over the “real” Islam and the legitimacy of theological interpretations. The emerging movements included jihadist groups with limited religious knowledge, such as Boko Haram and various groups in Northern Mali (Pellerin 2017). From the perspective of Western hegemony, rather than acknowledging the subtleties of this dispute, these new developments were painted in broad strokes as a “strong opposition to European hegemony” (Kane 2008: 181)⁹ and “labelled as violent extremism” (Ismail 2013: 221). A different concern was found among traditional Muslims and members of Sufi brotherhoods, who feared the expansion of Arabian Wahhabi/Salafi Islam would subjugate and sideline syncretistic Sahelian Islam, with its long history of integration into local traditions and languages.

Admittedly, the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, invested substantial capital in the Sahel for social work, student grants and missionary work, such as the construction of mosques and the provision of religious teachers and Qur’an books (Kaag 2007). However, it is also clear that Islamic reforms were promoted by local Muslims – mainly young men who had studied in the Gulf States, who had been on the pilgrimage journey to Mecca, or who had simply lived and worked in the region for a while.¹⁰

7 Religious leader, Muslim, 11 March 2017.

8 Different Christians in leading positions in church and society in 2016 and 2017.

9 Kane (2008) acknowledges a similar anti-European tendency in both the rise of Salafism in the Sahel and the anti-colonial reformist movements.

10 Different Muslim academics in 2016.

In Chad, events were not different from elsewhere in the Sahel, even if these developments were somewhat delayed by the long years of civil war and the relative isolation of the country due to its poverty. The country also experienced the penetration of Arabian-influenced Islam via Sudan and various waves of returning migrants (workers, students) or pilgrims. Saudi Arabian assistance for social work and the construction of mosques further helped to spread the “new” Salafi Islam (Ladiba 2011; Kaag 2014).

Leaders of traditional Sufi Islam in Chad, the Islam of the marabouts and the brotherhoods (Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya, Senussi and others) consider this reformed version incompatible with the Islam that they practice: “Yes, the Tijaniyya adapted itself to the local context. The Wahhabis¹¹ want to practice Islam word for word.”¹² Hence, in Chad, as in other countries of the Sahel, we can see disputes within the Muslim community, as regards to the question who has the right to represent Islam and whose Islam is too Africanised. The political power, be it the French colonial administration or the post-colonial regimes, long favoured the Tijaniyya brotherhood (Yacoub 1992; Lanne 1992). Today, reformist movements are closely controlled by the authorities through a department in the Ministry of the Interior, but have nevertheless penetrated Chadian Islam.¹³

Ordinary Chadian Muslims perceive the renewal movement as a generational conflict between tradition on one hand, and foreign influences supported by the younger generation on the other hand.¹⁴ In general, the opinion of my interlocutors was that the Sunna¹⁵ — as Islamic reformers prefer to call themselves — want nothing to do with the Islam of their own forefathers: they regard it as obsolete and in contradiction to real Islam. The terse comment of one observer was that “The younger ones coming back from Saudi Arabia are now telling the old ones how to live Islam.”¹⁶ The adherents

11 In Chad the categorisation of “Salafists” and “Wahhabis” is often used as a synonym by the population.

12 Tijaniyya Cheik, 12 February 2016.

13 Leading figure of Ansar al Sunna, 11 February 2016. He explicitly pointed out that Ansar al Sunna does not pose a danger for the state, and that radical Islamist movements, like Al-Qa-īda au Maghreb Islamique or Boko Haram, have nothing in common with Islam.

14 Muslim researcher, 23 October 2017.

15 “We are no Wahhabis, we prefer to be called Sunna, and we follow the way of the Prophet and his companions. The West prefers to call us Wahhabis or Salafists and to work only with Sufi Islam. But this is the Islam of the heathens, of the traditionalist Africa. We ask to look for the fundamental Islam, the Islam which was brought to us by the Prophet.” Imam, 6 November 2016.

16 Catholic clergy, 6 February 2016.

of the more Salafi-influenced Islam reproach the adherents of Sufi Islam for needing the intermediation of marabouts to understand the Qur'an, as they do not speak Arabic. Their practices are a little different, and sometimes, they even deny that Sufis are Muslims.¹⁷ Scholars (Hiribarren 2018; Racine and Mahamat 2018) read this divergence more as a dispute for political influence; whereas a member an NGO in N'Djamena told me that the only crisis is the issue of leadership among Muslims.¹⁸

This section sought to illustrate how Chad possesses all the ingredients that have led to the development of Islamist movements in other Sahel countries, legacies that left a highly fragmented society (Khayar 1976), high poverty rates, bad governance, and corruption, coupled with intra-Islamic disputes. As Estes and Sirgy argue, these conditions may seem like a breeding ground for jihadist activities:

The overall level of social development and 'social mal-development' of the terrorist's own country of origin is one of the most powerful predictors of the willingness of radicalized militants to engage in acts of terrorism against their own governments and peoples and those of other nations" (2013:645).

However, so far, the threat of Islamist terrorism or jihadi Salafism reaches Chad from the neighbouring countries and not from the inside. So then, what holds Chadian society together?

Survey and Results

Design of the survey

This section reports the results of my empirical research in Chad on religion and politics. It is based on the quantitative dataset of a survey conducted in five major towns in 2015 and 2016.

To get an inside view of Chadian religious history and religious cohabitation, and to overcome the limitations of statistical data, I also conducted in-depth interviews (N=189) between 2015 and 2017. The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guideline. My longstanding research in Chad and the years spent in the country enabled me to establish mutual trust with various Chadian opinion leaders, including religious leaders, politicians, social scientists and journalists, as well as with Chad-based international representatives. The interviews focused on a cross-section of

17 Different Muslim leaders in 2017.

18 NGO leader, 10 November 2016.

aspects of coexistence, religion, fundamentalism as well as the tense political situation. Therefore, interlocutors requested to remain anonymous. Some excerpts from these interviews were already included in the previous sections, while others will be used later in this text to illustrate the survey results and to move beyond a purely statistical analysis.

The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Centre Al Mouna¹⁹ in N'Djamena. I trained the interviewers on methodology and techniques of conducting interviews, as well as supervised the fieldwork at all sites to ensure the validity of the study.

The core questionnaire used in this study is based on earlier research I conducted on attitudes towards society and religion (Dickow 2005). Additionally, I consulted questionnaires of internationally renowned research institutions such as the Pew Forum (Pew Forum 2013) and Afrobarometer²⁰ to aid in the construction of relevant questions. The questionnaire is approximately 130 questions, of which twenty (20) touch on the socio-demographic background and characteristics of the respondents. The thematic blocks are made up of both individual questions and series of questions (including control questions) which enquire about psychosocial attitudes, social and economic perceptions, religion, ethnicity and identity, political orientations, perceptions of differences and coexistence, and outlook of the future.

The size and socio-linguistic differences inhibit the collection of country-wide representative survey data in Chad. The survey had to be restricted to towns, where the entire ethnic and linguistic strata of the country's estimated population of 14 million could be reached. The selection of the towns was based on the following categories, to allow statistically relevant comparison:

- the capital, where Muslims and Christians are more or less equally represented (N'Djamena),
- one town in the predominantly Islamic-dominated North-East (Abéché),
- one town in the predominantly Christian-dominated South (Sarh),
- two "mixed" towns (Mongo in the centre and Moundou, the country's economic hub, which is located more to the South).

19 I would like to thank the director of Centre Al Mouna and her colleagues for their excellent cooperation and welcoming me as a colleague and friend.

20 Afrobarometer. Questionnaires. Accessed February 24, 2017. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/questionnaires>.

The data set and statistical analyses

Between October 2015 and February 2016, the interviewers conducted 1,857 face-to-face interviews. They (speaking French, Chadian Arabic and one dominant language of the respective region) used geographic cluster sampling to identify interviewees. The interviews mainly took place in respondents' homes, and sometimes at work. The questions were read out by the interviewer and the respondent had to choose one (sometimes two) option(s). With few exceptions, most questions were closed.

For the purposes of the analysis, the data of the item pool were grouped into five indexes covering the following themes: democracy, cohabitation, religiosity, fundamentalist religious attitudes, and Islamist fundamentalism. For each item belonging to the respective domain, the respondent was given one point for an affirmative and no point for a negative answer. Each index was checked for internal consistency by a reliability analysis.²¹ Depending on the number of items, regrouped indexes contained zero to nine points, which were then grouped into three to five categories, ranging from none/low to high/very high.

The index “democracy” consisted of seven items/statements related to democratic attitudes and opinions on different forms of government.²²

21 Cronbach's alpha for the index “democracy” is 0.62; for the index “cohabitation” 0.56; for the index “religiosity” 0.66; for the index “fundamentalist religious attitudes” 0.56; and for the index “Islamist fundamentalism” 0.52.

22 Respondents had to make a choice (either/or) for each of the following three statements: “Judges who follow the directives of the government.” vs. “Truly independent judges who apply the law no matter what the government says.”; “Only one political party with a single plan for the country's future.” vs. “Several political parties, each with its own plan for the country's future.”; “A government that controls the press, radio and television in order to prevent discord.” vs. “A government that allows the press, radio and television to criticise it and accepts the freedom of the press.” Furthermore, items rejected get also a point: “The largest group governs, and the others accept its decisions.”; “One group dominates the others, and those that don't like it must either keep quiet or get out of the country.”; “A single party open to everyone governs without opposition.”; “Whether we like it or not: when different language or religious groups live together in the same country, they must either dominate or be dominated.”

The index “cohabitation” was based on nine items concerning the attitude towards peaceful coexistence and mutual respect of other groups.²³ The next three indexes — “religiosity”, “fundamentalism”, and “Islamic fundamentalism” — relate to religion, with the first two covering all respondents while the third includes only Muslim respondents. Thus, the index “religiosity” draws on its common use within the social sciences. By and large, scholars conceptualize religiosity as an aggregate measurement of affiliation, practice, and beliefs (Rule 2007; Mathur 2012; Huber and Huber 2012; Ezirim et al. 2021). Accordingly, the six items of the religiosity index include both religious beliefs (e.g., faith in Allah/God) and practices (e.g., praying and attending services).²⁴

Fundamentalism is covered in the remaining two indexes. In the literature, conceptualizing the measurement of religious fundamentalism focuses on a literal understanding of the sacred book of the respective religion, as well as on the importance of religion in societal life (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Paul Williamson et al. 2010; Appleby 2011), or sometimes only on self-identification (Emerson and Hartmann 2006: 139). Accordingly, to the approach of fundamentalism, the index “fundamentalist religious attitudes” consists of seven items that concern fundamentalist understanding of the Holy Scriptures, lack of separation between the worldly and heavenly spheres, and the exclusivity of one’s own religion.²⁵

23 “Very different groups can live together in the same country, accept one another and respect one another’s rights.”; “A country with groups with different traditions is wealthier and more interesting for it.”; “Given the strength of the different groups in our society, it is necessary to search for compromise and come to some agreement.”; “In the event of a violent conflict between the different groups, everybody would lose in the long run.”; “In spite of everything that has happened, peace and cooperation between the different groups can still be achieved.”; “I feel very close to people of my ethnic group, regardless of their education, wealth or political views.”; “I feel very close to people of my own religion, regardless of their education, wealth or political views.”; “I would agree to my daughter marrying someone from a different ethnic group if they love each other.”; “I would agree to one of my children marrying someone from a different religion if they loved each other.”

24 “I believe in a life after death, in which good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished.”; “I try to live my life according to the teachings of my religion.”; “I am convinced that my religion is the only true one.”; “How often do you pray?” (regularly = regularly and often); “Do you attend services in your place of worship (mosque, church)?” (yes, once a week); “I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.” (no).

25 “Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society.”; “I believe that my religion is the only true one.”; “I would agree to one of my children marrying someone from a different religion if they love each other.” (no); “I must spread the word of God among all the people I meet.”; “The Qur’an/Bible is the word of God and must be taken literally.”; “Whenever my neighbours who belong to a different religion than me celebrate a religious holiday I pay them a visit and congratulate them.” (no); “A political party that asks for power in the name of religion would be a good thing for Chad.”

To identify Islamist fundamentalism, the separate index “Islamist fundamentalism” has been created. It contains some items from the general fundamentalism index, supplemented by specific items concerning Islamic beliefs and the introduction of Sharia law.²⁶ Therefore, only statistically significant results will be presented.

Socio-demographic variables

The socio-demographic variables of the sample reflect recent population estimates²⁷ of Chadian society. Out of 1,857 respondents, 52% are men and 48% are women. Roughly, two-thirds of the respondents are younger than 35 years and one-third older.²⁸ 55% of the respondents are Muslims, 43% are Christians, and 2% indicate that they belong either to the traditional or no religion.²⁹ 17% of the Muslims identify themselves as Salafists or Wahhabis.³⁰

Regional origin, language, and, in most cases, religion serve as clear markers to differentiate among the different ethnic groups. To receive statistically reliable results, the respondents were assigned ten main groups³¹ based on their responses about their ethnic affiliation. With one-third of the population, Sara³² is the largest ethnic group in Chad (Azevedo and Decalo 2018). Out of the total sample, 35% are Sara, 16% are Hadjarai, 11% are Ouaddai and 9% are Chadian Arabs. Mayo-Kebbi make up 7% and Goran 6%. The other groups constitute less than 5% of the population.

26 “I would agree to one of my children marrying someone from a different religion if they love each other.” (no); “Whenever my neighbours who belong to a different religion than me celebrate a religious holiday I pay them a visit and congratulate them.” (no); “A political party that asks for power in the name of religion would be a good thing for Chad.”; “Our constitution needs to be revised in order to allow Sharia as the principle law.”; “An adulteress must be stoned.”; “The Qur’an is the word of God and must be taken literally.”

27 The last census in Chad took place in 1993; since then the population has almost tripled according to estimates and has reached about 15,000,000. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/chad-population/> (Accessed June 6, 2016).

28 In 2015 the average life span in Chad was 53 years for women and 51 for men. Population Reference Bureau (2016), <<http://www.prb.org/pdf16/prb-wpds2016-web-2016.pdf>> (Accessed July 20, 2017).

29 As the latter are statistically insignificant, they will not be mentioned in the analysis.

30 In Chad both expressions are used synonymously.

31 The classification follows SIL International, <<https://www.ethnologue.com/country/TD/languages>> (Accessed April 17, 2016).

32 According to the census of 1993, Sara, Arab and Mayo-Kebbi constituted more than half of the Chadian population. Ethnonet <<http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/tchad/genpop.htm>> (22 May 2016).

Dickow, H./Satisfaction with the status quo: Why has Religious Terrorism not yet Gained Ground In Chad?

Table 1 Distribution of ethnicity by religion³³

Ethnic Group	Religion	
	Islam	Christianity
Goran	100%	0%
Ouaddai	100%	0%
Fitri-Batha	100%	0%
Kanem-Bornou	100%	0%
Arab	98%	2%
Hadjarai	88%	12%
Barguirmi	73%	27%
Sara	9%	91%
Tandjile	10%	90%
Mayo-Kebbi	16%	84%

Ethnic and religious affiliations mainly overlap (Table 1); respondents from the Goran, Ouaddai, Fitri Batha, Arab and Kanem Bournou ethnic groups are Muslims (98 to 100%). Also, 88% of the Hadjarai are also Muslims while 12% are Christians. The Christian-dominated groups are the Sara, Mayo-Kebbi and Tandjile (84 to 91%). Respondents mostly live in the region of their ethnic origin, with exception of N’Djamena where all ethnic groups are present. The study revealed that 5% of the respondents received no schooling at all, while 12% had an Islamic-influenced education (Qur’anic school or an Arabic primary school). About half of the respondents attended primary (16%) and secondary education or vocational training (28%). More than a third passed the baccalauréat or has an academic degree. Christians are among the respondents with a higher educational level,³⁴ whereas Muslims tend to have a lower level of education. Muslims are overrepresented among merchants and pastoralists while Christians are overrepresented among small traders. Also, the Christian-dominated group of the Sara is overrepresented among civil servants and private employees. Regarding household income, it is evident that some completely Islamized groups (Goran, Arab, Fitri Batha and Kanem Bournou) belong to the two highest income groups. In contrast, predominately Christian groups and the

33 N=1,749; excluding NA, no and traditional religion.

All numbers are rounded percentages in this and all the following figures.

34 70% of the Christians and 51% of the Muslims attended a secondary school or higher educational institution.

Hadjarai are among the group with low or average household income.

The above presented overview of the sample shows the high fragmentation of Chadian society along ethnic, religious, as well as economic lines. During the French colonial period, Southerners were drawn to missionary education, through which some were rewarded with positions in the colonial administration. Muslims, however, tended to refuse western education (Khayar 1976). This dichotomy is still statistically visible, although more and more young Muslims pursue their studies in either Chad or preferably an Arabic-speaking country. The state is the largest employer, and anyone with a degree in higher education can apply for a civil service position with a regular but low income. A degree from Saudi Arabia may offer greater opportunities for social mobility, as a civil servant indicated: “Young people who have studied in Saudi Arabia immediately get higher civil servant positions here.”³⁵ Groups that have traditionally been more commercial-orientated are overrepresented within the highest income brackets.

Indexes and associations

Chad is recognized as one of the least democratic countries in the world (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Opinion leaders observe that Chadians live in an authoritarian state and not a democratic one. Déby had promised them peace and democracy when he took power, but has not kept his word.³⁶ This does not prevent respondents from supporting democratic ideas as the index “democracy” discloses; a majority of 55% expressed a demand for democracy.³⁷

Figure 1 illustrates that Christians (59%) show the highest demand for democracy compared to 39% who classify themselves as Wahhabis/Salafists. The share of non-democratic Wahhabis/Salafists is almost three times higher than the average. Several interlocutors explained that Wahhabis/Salafists aim at a political Islam³⁸ and that they are trying to gain political influence by creating political parties without believing in democracy.³⁹ One could say, using Wagemakers’ (2020) distinction of quietist, political and jihadist Salafist tendencies presented above, that political Salafism has not yet gained a foothold in Chad. It is important to note that the constitution prohibits political parties that invoke ethnic or religious principles.

35 High-ranking civil servant, Christian, 26 October 2016.

36 Journalist, Muslim, 23 November 2016.

37 We asked about pro-democratic preferences which Afrobarometer calls demand for democracy but not about the perceived supply of democracy, namely do people think they are getting democracy. (Mattes 2019).

38 Leader of an NGO for Religious Dialogue, Muslim, 5 October 2016.

39 Imam, university professor, 31 October 2016, and Christian university professor, 6 March 2017.




Figure 1: Index “democracy” by religious group

According to the democracy index, the Goran (12%) and Ouaddai (11%) showed the highest undemocratic attitudes among the Muslim-dominated ethnic groups. The level of education influences democratic attitudes. Respondents with an Islamic-influenced education are overrepresented among “undemocratic” respondents. However, democratic views among respondents with no education or higher education rank above-average. This is a remarkable result, considering that Hanf (2009) and Lee and Lee (2016) claim that only higher education correlates with higher democratic attitudes.




Figure 2: Index “cohabitation” by religious group

In a religious and ethnically divided Chad, a substantial majority demonstrates its willingness to live with other groups. Eighty per cent of respondents express a very high/high degree of acceptance of cohabitation. However, regarding the highest level of approval of cohabitation (i.e. 8–9 pts.), only 46% of the Muslims were in favour compared to 58% of their Christian compatriots. As anticipated, Wahhabis/Salafists are the least predisposed towards social coexistence. The willingness to live together increases linearly with age. With regard to economic conditions, only the (Muslim-dominated) higher income groups show a certain reluctance to cohabitation.

Similarly, during individual interviews, religious leaders and intellectuals of both the Muslims and the Christians emphasized Chadians’ willingness to live together peacefully. They stressed that both religions are frequently represented in many families. According to the interviewees, the civil war of 1978/79 jeopardised this coexistence. A Muslim stated: “The problem with

cohabitation is a heritage of the past. Muslims say, it is our turn now and Christians feel excluded.”⁴⁰ There was a broad consensus that the real threat to peaceful coexistence today might come from Wahhabis/Salafists: “However, in Chad we do not have Salafists who are prepared to resort to violence.”⁴¹ Salafists or Sunna (see footnote 15) interviewees also emphasized their acceptance of cohabitation, as the Imam of a local CHIA branch explained, “Everybody has got his religious book, but we are all Chadians and need to live together without fighting.”⁴² But other interlocutors contradicted his statement, claiming that “Wahhabis want to change the religion in Chad”⁴³ and that “they want all of us to turn to their Islam”.⁴⁴

Religion plays an important role in the daily life of the Chadians, as shown in Figure 3. Religion is also a constant factor in public life: “There is no laicism here like in France. Here, religion has its place in public life – at state events there is always a religious word at the beginning; moreover, the state supports, for example, the renovation of the cathedral or pilgrimages to Mecca.”⁴⁵ According to the religiosity index, eight out of ten respondents are “very religious” or “rather religious”. Clear differentiations between Muslims and Christians can be found. All Islam-dominated ethnic groups are, as to expect, overrepresented among “very religious” respondents (Ouaddai 71%, Arabs 57%, Goran 47%, Hadjarai 45%) as this index also includes questions on the regular observance of religious practices. Interestingly, Wahhabis/Salafists (with 56% in the “very religious” category) do not differ significantly from other Muslims. Christians/Southerners are overrepresented in the “religious” (49%) and “hardly religious” (30%) categories. Again, education plays a significant role since the higher the educational level, the lower the religiosity. This applies to both Muslims and Christians. Hoinathy’s and Eizenga’s (2019) observation about Salafi proselytising in Chadian universities has not yet led to quantifiable results in the survey and is therefore not visible in the dataset. Respondents with a high income belong to the very religious group, that is merchants (57%) are highly overrepresented amongst them.

40 Researcher, Muslim, 21 January 2016.

41 High-ranking member of the CHIA, 31 October 2016.

42 Imam, member of the CHIA of Moyen Chari, 5 February 2016.

43 Imam, university lecturer, 11 November 2016.

44 High-ranking civil servant, Muslim, 4 March 2017.

45 Catholic clergy, 2 December 2015.




Figure 3: Index “religiosity” by religious group

Religiosity based on religious practice and everyday life concerns the contemplative and individual outlook on religion. Are “religious” respondents also “fundamentalist” according to the indexes constructed from the item pool? Could religion be a dividing force as indicated by the following statements? Many Sunna-orientated interlocutors affirmed during individual interviews that, “Islam is only a logical development. In the long run we expect all Christians to turn to Islam, the only true religion”⁴⁶ and “I would prefer if everybody becomes Sunna – the pure teaching”.⁴⁷

47 Businessperson, 11 February 2016.




Figure 4: Index “fundamentalist religious attitudes”

A fifth of the respondents show low fundamentalist religious attitudes, and notably, almost one-third show a high attitude (Figure 4). The least religious fundamentalist (0–2 pts.) are Southerners/Christians, employees (28%) and civil servants (26%). It is striking that “highly religious” groups are also “highly religious fundamentalists”⁴⁸, that is the Northerners and Muslims with an Islamic-based education, the two highest income groups, as well as merchants (51%). Wahhabis/Salafists are more than twice as likely to be religious fundamentalists than the average (67% vs. 31%).

The following associations between the indexes, “democracy”, “cohabitation”, “religiosity” and “religious fundamentalism” disclose further relations, indicating that, “Very religious” respondents also reveal strong religious fundamentalist attitudes. Correlations show that “very religious”

48 For the sake of brevity I use terms such as “low” and “high” fundamentalists or “high Islamist fundamentalists” to correspond to the indexes into which the data was grouped.

respondents tend to be undemocratic, while at the same time showing a high acceptance of cohabitation. Indeed, religious fundamentalism and cohabitation are not contradictory. All three categories of “religious fundamentalists” are prepared to coexist socially. One could conclude that in highly fragmented Chad, religion attenuates social friction and facilitates cohabitation. From a survey result, Dowd (2014:635) came to similar conclusions on religious tolerance in Nigeria, and deduced a “positive relationship between religious observance and religious tolerance” (Gez et al. 2021).

When it comes to democracy, the differences between low and high “religious fundamentalists” are striking. About 71% of the respondents with low religious fundamentalism score high on the democracy index. At the same time, only 41% of the “high religious fundamentalists” are democratic. A high level of fundamentalist religiosity seems to be an obstacle to democracy.

Cross-tabulations with some socio-political attitudes and demographic variables confirm this observation on the relationship between high fundamentalist and low democratic attitudes. About 37% of the “high religious fundamentalists” show unconditional support for their political leader, but only 17% of the “low religious fundamentalists” show this support. Equally, 54% of the first group approve the government for doing the right thing, compared to 22% of the “low religious fundamentalists”. The preference for a government of national unity is highly accepted by “non-fundamentalists” (81%), while less accepted by “high fundamentalists” (65%).

Eight out of ten “highly religious fundamentalists” believe that democratic liberties lead to a debauched life, while only five out of ten of the “low fundamentalists” maintain the same view. Consequently, for 94% of the “high religious fundamentalist” respondents, religion is more important than politics (53% for the “low religious fundamentalists”). Furthermore, 58% of the “high religious fundamentalist” Muslims and Christians agree that a political party in the name of religion is a good thing for Chad (only 3% of the “low fundamentalists”) and 95% maintained that faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society compared to 43% of the “low fundamentalists”. As one observer points out, formation of Salafist/Wahhabist parties has already taken place, “they know that times have changed and that they cannot impose Sharia by force, no matter what they try to do now. They are now pretending to opt for democracy and form political parties. They chose a President who has nothing to do with religion. But we know the members and we know that they are Wahhabis.”⁴⁹

49 High-ranking member of the CHIA, 31 October 2016.

The cross-tabulations further reveal that religious fundamentalism also determines support of the authoritarian regime. “Highly religious fundamentalists” are overrepresented among the supporters of late President Déby, whereas “low religious fundamentalists” prefer to support an opposition leader. In short, higher religious fundamentalist attitudes are not an obstacle to cohabitation but rather to democracy.

Finally, Figure 5 illustrates high Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among more than a third of respondents, and low attitudes among a quarter of them. As expected, Wahhabis/Salafist (53%) are overrepresented among “high Islamists” (4–6 pts.), that is, respondents who score highest on the Islamist fundamentalism index.




Figure 5: Index “Islamist fundamentalism”

“Islamist fundamentalists” notably show firm views about the political order, that is 88% of them opt for Sharia as the principle legal system. Christian interlocutors expressed the fear that “Muslims want to Islamize the public sphere”⁵⁰ or even “turn Chad into an Islamic state”.⁵¹ A Muslim intellectual expressed concrete plans precisely for this aim by commenting that “We try to get more young people into the civil service. They will enforce the Islamization of the state.”⁵²

Again, 75% of the “high Islamists” are in favour of a political party in the name of religion, whereas 45% support their political leader unconditionally, and 62% think the government is doing the right thing. A government of national unity is favoured by only 65% of the “high Islamists”. Moreover, “high Islamists” are more likely to support Déby over opposition leaders. It was revealed that 37% cite Déby as their favourite politician (compared to 27% of the total respondents) and only 16% name members of the opposition. Merchants (59%), farmers (52%), and small traders (49%) belong above-average to Déby’s supporters.

According to several interviewees, Chad’s economic crisis, the high level of corruption among the Chadian elite, and the lack of confidence in state institutions intensify the danger of radicalisation. “We also fear that in a society weakened by bad governance and corruption, jihadists will find it easier to gain a foothold.”⁵³

Briefly, “high religious (Muslim and Christian) fundamentalists” and “high Islamist fundamentalists” show a strong tendency towards undemocratic attitudes and authoritarian structures. This supports Altemeyer’s and Hunsberger’s (1992) findings on the link between fundamentalism and authoritarianism. Moreover, the data reveals that the higher the religious or Islamist fundamentalism, the lower the support for democracy.⁵⁴

50 Catholic Bishop, 6 February 2016.

51 Leader of an NGO, Christian, 19 January 2016.

52 University teacher, Salafist, 11 March 2017.

53 Leader of an NGO, Muslim, 21 January 2016.

54 The age of the respondent does not show significant differences in these categories.

Dickow, H./Satisfaction with the status quo: Why has Religious Terrorism not yet Gained Ground In Chad?




Figure 6: Islamism Fundamentalism by Education Level

The level of education (Figure 6) plays a significant role in shaping Islamist attitudes. Respondents with an Islamic-based education (Arabic primary school: 61%, Qur'an school: 47%) and those with a university education of two years (41%) are overrepresented among the “high Islamists”, which is not the case among respondents with no education (26%). The high level of Islamist fundamentalism among university graduates confirms Hoinathy’s and Eizenga’s (2019) observation about the infiltration of Islamic extremism into higher education. Apparently, it could happen despite the restriction of religious liberties in Chadian universities observed by other scholars (Ladiba and Abakar 2020: 203). Pellerin (2018) argues that a lack of either basic education or profound religious education facilitates the recruitment of Islamist fighters. In the case of Chad, only a quarter of the respondents who are without any education show Islamist fundamentalist attitudes.

The high level of Islamic-educated respondents is less surprising, and the respondents’ professional profiles provide further information, as merchants are overrepresented among the “highest Islamists”. As described above, merchants tend to have high income, predominantly Muslim, and are

overrepresented among those with an Islamic-based education. The data reveals that the two highest income groups show the highest Islamist attitudes. This corresponds with Marchal's (2012) insight that Wahhabi influence has grown stronger among the economic elites since the mid-1990s, especially merchants (Arditi 2003). Some of my Muslim and Christian interlocutors also pointed out that individual members of some completely Islamized groups, such as the Goran or Kreda, had achieved social advancement through trade with the Gulf States.⁵⁵ On the other hand, civil servants and private employees, who are — due to less lucrative income — overrepresented among low or average household income groups, tend to show low religious and low Islamist fundamentalism.

The self-assessment of respondents with the highest Islamist attitudes confirms the assumption that they belong to the economic elite, that is, “high Islamists” are financially better off now than two years ago, and regard themselves rather as upper or middle class.⁵⁶ According to them, the gap between rich and poor has decreased. Consequently, they express above-average satisfaction with their income and less envy of rich people. They are wealthy, therefore, poverty is neither an important issue for them nor do they judge Chad as a society with striking economic differences. Contrary to the majority of their compatriots, they are happy today,⁵⁷ and more importantly, expect that they will be happy in ten years' time. Their outlook on the future is optimistic compared to their “low Islamist” compatriots. Respondents who classify themselves as Wahhabis/Salafists show the same tendencies, only by a slightly lower degree.

Discussion and Conclusion

To summarize the results of the survey, the data shows that Chadians have high willingness to coexist with compatriots of different religious orientation. This tendency is especially high among two groups. First, Christians show a slightly higher willingness for cohabitation than their Muslim compatriots. This, as interviewees suggested, is partly a lesson from the country's violent past.

55 Different Muslim and Christian academics in 2016 and 2017.

56 “In 2011, the richest 20 percent of Chadians accounted for about 48 percent of total consumption expenditures, while the poorest 20 percent of Chadians accounted for only 5 percent. The increase in these wealth disparities can be attributed to the growth in the oil industry, as the increase mainly benefited oil-related investment in urban capital.” <<https://borgenproject.org/tag/income-inequality-in-chad/>> (19 July 2019).

57 The Gallup Global Emotions Report states named Chad as the most negative country in the world in 2018. <<https://www.gallup.com/analytics/248906/gallup-global-emotions-report-2019.aspx>> (22 May 2019).

Second, the data reveals that, on the whole and irrespective of religious orientation, respondents who score high on the religiosity index tend to have a stronger willingness for cohabitation. This result may appear counter-intuitive to those who instinctively associate religiosity with low tolerance for religious difference.

An examination of the qualitative interviews with Chadian opinion leaders confirms the results of the quantitative data set. In line with the survey data, most interviewees emphasized Chadians' high level of religious tolerance. Only representatives of a more Wahhabi/Salafi-influenced Islam showed some reservations. Religious leaders, with whom I spoke, emphasized the joint appearance of the highest representatives of Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism at official state occasions. Within Islam, however, they acknowledged the existence of conflict between traditional Sufi Islam and Salafism/Wahhabism, which can cause divisions in families. This division, they attributed to Saudi influences, which leads young people in particular from Sufi Islam.

The survey further showed that the dividing lines between "high" and "low" scores on the Islamist fundamentalism index point towards education and income. Those who score "low" on the Islamist fundamentalism index are poorer and have no schooling. Interestingly, those who score "high" on the same index represent two different strata of schooling, which are: firstly, those I labelled "Islamic-educated respondents", only attended Qur'an schools or Arabic primary schools, and secondly those that attended two years of tertiary education. This finding is worthy to note because it goes against scholarly perception whereby absence of access to formal education could foster Islamist radicalisation (Jones 2017; Le Roux 2019:6), a risk of extremism that supposedly decreases with higher education (UNDP 2017: 41). Still, further studies are necessary in order to explain this result. For example, it would be useful to know in which countries respondents completed higher education. Since the 1970s, Chadian students have received grants to study in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia (Loimeier 2016: 227). As Ladiba and Abakar (2020) point out, such experiences abroad tend to steer graduates towards greater proximity to Salafism.

Further insights emerge as I inquire into the profile of these Chadian Islamist fundamentalists. As I have shown, they largely belong to the merchant class and economic elite. Having profited most from the Déby regime, they

embrace undemocratic attitudes and support authoritarian structures in general, and the late President in particular. These results are remarkable, given that Déby, as mentioned above, has banned some Salafist organisations. With their own position secured, the Islamist fundamentalists seem to see no need to turn against the corrupt structures that benefitted them. Despite the economic crisis, they are particularly optimistic about their future.

Some of the interviewees feared that Muslims who are less optimistic than the Islamist fundamentalists, identified in the quantitative survey, and who no longer have confidence in the state and its structures could follow the examples of coreligionists in other countries in the Sahel region and turn to radical Islamism.

I thus propose that studies of political or jihadi Salafism should take into account such tight ties with the regime as a major factor. As discussed earlier, scholars trying to explain the absence of jihadi violence have emphasized factors such as strong state regulation of religious institutions (Elischer 2021), and even argued that, as the state's primary objective is political stability, it sees it necessary to suppress Salafi presence (Ladiba 2011). Conversely, state abuses, be it violence or corruption (Raineri 2020) – both of which are endemic in Chad – could provoke a lack of trust in state institutions or indirectly stoke jihadi violence (Buchanan–Clarke and Nkomo 2021). My data complement these findings by highlighting another factor that could mitigate Salafi opposition, namely proximity to the regime and access to economic prosperity.

Where do we go from here? In my research in Chad, I noted a growing refusal by respondents to accept religious identification other than “I am Muslim, that's all!”⁵⁸ In this study, I sought to minimize my imposition on the studied population by deliberately refraining from dividing people into pre-identified Islamic movements, and instead relied on respondents' opinions, attitudes, behaviours, and self-identifications. This breakdown of categories allowed me to go beyond the widespread identification of such regimes' support base, ever since French colonial times, first and foremost with the Sufi movements (Villalon 1994; Solomon 2015). Therefore, I would suggest future research should go beyond the traditional or even scholarly classificatory norms. Taking inspiration from Wagemaker's (2020) identification of Salafist orientations, additional categories should be developed to allow specific religious tendencies to be recognized and measured. This would also take into account the increasing fragmentation of Salafist and other movements

58 Muslim clergy, university teacher, 8 November 2016.

Dickow, H./Satisfaction with the status quo: Why has Religious Terrorism not
yet Gained Ground In Chad?

within this conflict-ridden region. Larger sample sizes can help in identifying nuanced associations between profiles (e.g. education, profession, wealth), attitudes (political, religious), and propensity for radicalization.

References

- Adebayo, R. I. (2015). “The historical development and challenges of Islam in Ila–Orangun, Nigeria.” *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 5(1): 1–28.
- Adesoji, A. O. (2011). “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic fundamentalism and the response of the Nigerian state.” *Africa today* 57 (4): 99–119.
- Afrobarometer. Questionnaires. Accessed February 24, 2017. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/questionnaires>.
- Afzal Upal, M. and C. M. Cusack. (2021). *Handbook of Islamic sects and movements*, Leiden: Brill.
- Agbiboa D. E. (2013). “The Nigerian burden: religious identity, conflict and the current terrorism of Boko Haram.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (1): 1–29. DOI: [10.1080/14678802.2013.770257](https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.770257).
- Aghedo I. and O. Oarhe. (2012). “The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria respond?” *Third World Quarterly* 33(5): 853–869. DOI: [10.1080/01436597.2012.674701](https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.674701).
- Altemeyer, B. (1996). “*The Authoritarian Spectre*”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Altemeyer, B. and B. Hunsberger. (1992). “Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice.” *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 2(2):113–133. doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr0202_5
- Altemeyer, B. and B. Hunsberger. (2004). A Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale: The short and sweet of it. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* (14): 47–54. doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4
- Appiah, K. A. (2005). “African Studies and the concept of knowledge.” Hamminga B. (ed.). 2005. “*Knowledge Cultures. Comparative Western and African epistemology.*” 23–56. Amsterdam, New York: Brill.
- Appleby, R. S. (2011). “Rethinking Fundamentalism in a Secular Age.” In: C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer and J. VanAntwerpen (eds.). “*Rethinking Secularism.*” 225–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Arditi, C. (2003). “Le Tchad et le monde arabe: essai d’analyse des relations commerciales de la période précoloniale à aujourd’hui.” *Afrique contemporaine* 207: 185–198.
- Arrêté Nr. 014/PR/PM/MATSP/SG/DGAT/DAPEC/SAC/2015, portant dissolution de l’Association Ansar Assounna Al-Mouhamadiya, 31 March 2015.

- Ayegba, U. S. (2015). Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9(3): 90–99.
- Azevedo, M. J. and Decalo, S. (2018). *Historical Dictionary of Chad*, London: Rowman & Littlefield, Fourth Edition.
- Benjaminsen, T. A. and Ba, B. (2019). Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political ecological explanation. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 46(1): 1–20.
- Bøås, M. 2014. “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali.” *CTC Sentinel* (7) 4: 1–6. Accessed July 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04CTCSentinelVol7Iss4.pdf>.
- Borgen Project. (2018). “New Opportunities: 10 Key Facts about Poverty in Chad. Accessed July 19, 2019. <https://borgenproject.org/tag/income-inequality-in-chad/>.
- Borrel, Th., Boukari-Yaraba, A., Collombat B., and Deltombe Th. (2021). (eds.) *L’empire qui ne veut pas mourir. Une histoire de la Françeafrique*. Paris: Seuil.
- Briscoe, I. (2014). *Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali*. Clingendael Institute.
- Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Nkomo, S. (2021). “Violent Extremism in Africa: Citizen Perspectives from the Sahel Epicenter and Periphery.” *Afrobarometer Policy Paper* 74.
- Buijtenhuijs, R. (1978). *Le Frolinat et les révoltes populaires du Tchad, 1965–1976*. Den Haag: Mouton.
- Buijtenhuijs, R. (1987). *Le Frolinat et les guerres civiles du Tchad (1977–1984)*. Paris: Karthala.
- Centre Al-Mouna. (1996). *Conflit Sud-Nord. Mythe ou réalité?* Saint Maur: Sépia.
- Centre Al-Mouna. (2000). *Quelle laïcité pour un Tchad pluriel?* N’ Djamena: CAM.
- Clausen, F. and Attaran, A. (2011). “The Chad–Cameroon pipeline project—assessing the World Bank’s failed experiment to direct oil revenues towards the poor.” *The Law and Development Review* 4(1): 32–65.

- Coudray, H. (1992). “Chrétien et Musulmans au Tchad.” *Islamochristiana* 18: 175–234.
- Coudray, H. (1994). Les islams au sud du Sahara. L’exemple du Tchad. *Etudes* (1945). 380(5): 657–667.
- Coudray, H. (2001). “Les chrétiens dans un pays à prédominance musulmane. Expériences, problèmes et solutions. L’islam et les relations islamochrétiennes en Afrique noire.” (conference paper).
- Debos, M. (2013). *Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement de l’entre guerres*. Karthala: Paris.
- Dickow, H. (2005). *Democrats without Democracy? Attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad*. Byblos: Centre Internationale des Sciences de l’Homme.
- (2020). “Der Marschall und die Menschenrechte.” *Geschichte der Gegenwart*. <https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/der-marschall-und-die-menschenrechte/>
- (2021). “Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy.” *The Conversation*. 21 April 2021. <https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443>
- Doutoum, M. A. (1983). *La Colonisation française et la question musulmane au Tchad: exemple du sultanat du Ouaddai (1895–1946)*. Paris: Université de Paris.
- Dowd, R. A. (2016). “Religious diversity and religious tolerance: lessons from Nigeria”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(4): 617–644.
- Dowd, C. and Raleigh, C. (2013). “The myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel.” *African Affairs* 112 (448): 498–509.
- Ehiane, S. and Moyo, P. (2021). “Climate Change, Human Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics in the Lake Chad Region.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. First Published December 28, 2021. doi.org/10.1177/2F00219096211063817.
- Eizenga, D. (2018). “The Unstable Foundations of Political Stability in Chad”, *West African Papers*, No. 12. (OECD Publishing, Paris) <https://doi.org/10.1787/508844d3-en>
- Ekhomu, O. (2019). *Boko Haram: Security Considerations and the Rise of an Insurgency*. CRC Press.
- Elischer, S. (2021). *Salafism and political order in Africa* (Vol. 154). Cambridge: University Press.

- Emerson, M. O. and Hartman, D. (2006). "The rise of religious fundamentalism". *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 32: 127–144. doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123141
- Estes, R. J. and Sirgy, J. (2013). "Radical Islamic Militancy and Acts of Terrorism: A Quality-of-Life Analysis." *Social Indicators Research* 112 (2): 615–652. doi.org/10.1007/s11205-013-0363-2
- Ethnonet Africa. Tchad. Accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/tchad/genpop.htm>
- Ewi, M. and Yenwong-Fai, U. (2017). "Money talks: a key reason youths join Boko Haram." <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/money-talks-a-key-reason-youths-join-boko-haram>
- Ezirim, G. E, Mbah, P. O, Nwagwu, E. J, et al. (2021). "Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sub-Saharan African Sample: Contributions of Personality and Religiosity." *Soc Indic Res* 153: 1087–1107. doi.org/10.1007/s11205-020-02536-z
- Gallup. (2018). Gallup Global Emotions Report. Accessed May 22, 2019. <https://www.gallup.com/analytics/248906/gallup-global-emotions-report-2019.aspx>
- Gauvain, R. (2012). *Salafi ritual purity: in the presence of God*. Routledge: London.
- Gatta, G. N. (1985). *Tchad. Guerre civile et désagrégation de l'Etat*. Paris: Présence Africaine.
- Gez, Y. N, Y. Droz, J. Rey and E. Soares. (2021). *Butinage: The Art of Religious Mobility*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Gez Y., Beider, N. and Dickow, H. (2021). "African and Not Religious: The State of Research on Sub-Saharan Religious Nones and New Scholarly Horizons." *Africa Spectrum* (2021), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00020397211052567>
- Ghanem, D. (2017). "Jihadism in the Sahel: Aqim's Strategic Maneuvers for Long-Term Regional Dominance." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* June 23. Accessed June 18, 2020. <https://carnegie-mec.org/2017/06/23/jihadism-in-sahel-aqim-s-strategic-maneuvers-for-long-term-regional-dominance-pub-71413>.
- Hanf, T. (2009). "Factors Determining Democratic Attitudes in Deeply Divided Societies." *Al-Abhath* 57: 91–144.

- Hansen, K. F. (2017). “Regime security in Chad. How the Western war on terror saved the dictatorial Chadian regime.” *Ante Portas – Security Studies* 9 (2): 55–70.
- (2021). “Serial Coups and Déby’s Rise to Power”. In: *The Oxford Handbook of the African Sahel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 185–202.
- Hiribarren, V. (2018). “Pratiques de l’islam au Tchad.” 28 November 2018, *Libération*. Accessed July 13, 2019. <http://libeafrica4blogs.liberation.fr/2018/11/28/pratiques-de-lislam-au-Tchad/>
- Hoinathy, R. and Eizenga, D. (2019). “The state of secularism in Chadian higher educations. Testing perceived ties to violent extremism.” *Resolve Network Research Brief 2*. Accessed July 23, 2019. https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/2019-03/RSVE_02LCBBrief_Chad2019.pdf
- Hood Jr, R.W., Hill, P. C., and Williamson, W. P. (2005). *The psychology of religious fundamentalism*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Huber, S. and Huber, O. W. (2012). “The centrality of religiosity scale (CRS).” *Religions* 3(3): 710–724.
- Idrissa, R. (2017). *The Politics of Islam in the Sahel: between persuasion and violence*. London and New York: Routledge.
- International Crisis Group (2017). Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246/fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military-measures>
- International Crisis Group. (2019). “Speaking with the ‘Bad Guys’: Toward Dialogue with Central Mali’s Jihadists.” *Africa Report* 276, 28 May, Brussels. Accessed May 28, 2019. <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/276-speaking-with-the-bad-guys%20.pdf>
- Ismail, O. (2013). “Radicalisation and violent extremism in West Africa: implications for African and international security.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 12 (2): 209–230. doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.796209
- Jones, E. (2017). “The reception of broadcast terrorism: recruitment and radicalisation.” *International Review of Psychiatry*, 29(4): 320–326, [DOI: 10.1080/09540261.2017.1343529](https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2017.1343529)
- Jourde, C. (2017). “How Islam intersects ethnicity and social status in the Sahel.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35 (4): 432–450. doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2017.1361016
- Kaag, M. (2007). Aid, umma, and politics: transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad. *Islam and Muslim politics in Africa*: 85–102.

- (2014). “Gulf charities in Africa.” In: Lacey, R. and J. Bethall (ed.). *“Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the “Age of Terror” and Beyond.”* Gerlach.
- Kassim, A. (2015). “Defining and understanding the religious philosophy of jihādī–Salafism and the ideology of Boko Haram.” *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 16(2–3): 173–200.
- Kane, O. (2008). “Islamism: What is new, what is not? Lessons from West Africa.” *African Journal of International Affairs* 11(2): 157–187.
- Khayar, I. H. (1976). *Le refus de l’ école. Contribution à l’ étude des problèmes de l’ éducation chez les Musulmans du Ouaddai (Tchad)*. Paris: Jean Maisonneuve.
- Kimitene, E. V. (2013). *Ethnicisation du commerce à N’ Djamena* (Doctoral dissertation, Université Michel de Montaigne–Bordeaux III).
- Kroesbergen–Kamps, J. (2020). “Witchcraft after modernity. Old and new directions in the study of witchcraft in Africa.” *Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 10(3): 860–873.
- Ladiba, G. (2011). *L’ émergence des organisations islamiques aux Tchad. Enjeux, acteurs et territoires*, Paris: L’ Harmattan.
- (2020). *Valeurs républicaines et vivre-ensemble au Tchad*, Paris: L’ Harmattan.
- Ladiba, G. and Abakar, W. M. (2020). “Arabisants, françisants; musulmans et chrétiens; Pluralisme social et mouvements religieux dans les universités du Tchad.” In: Villalón, L. A and M. Bodian (eds.). 2020. *Entre le Savoir et le Culte : Activisme et mouvements religieux dans les universités du Sahel*. 179–207. Dakar: Amalion.
- Lanne, B. (1992). “La politique française à l’ égard de l’ islam au Tchad.” In: Magnant, J.–P. (ed.). (1992). *L’ islam au Tchad*, 99–126. Bordeaux: Centre d’ Etudes de l’ Afrique Noire.
- Lee, J.–W. and Lee, H. (2016). “Human capital in the long run.” *Journal of Development Economics* 122: 147–169. doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.05.006.
- Le Roux, P. (2019). “Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the Sahel.” *Africa Security Brief* (36). Center for Strategic Studies, Washington.
- Levtzion, N. and Pouwels, R. (eds.). (2000). *The History of Islam in Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

- Loimeier, R. (2001). *Säkularer Staat und islamische Gesellschaft. Die Beziehungen zwischen Staat, Sufi-Bruderschaften und islamischer Reformbewegung in Senegal im 20. Jahrhundert*. Hamburg/Münster: LIT Verlag.
- (2013). *Muslim societies in Africa: a historical anthropology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- (2016). *Islamic reform in twentieth-century Africa*. Edinburgh: University Press.
- Magnant, J. P. (ed.). (1992). *L'islam au Tchad*. Bordeaux: Centre d'Etudes de l'Afrique Noire.
- Maiangwa, B., Uzodike, U. O., Whetho, A. and Onapajo, H. (2012). "Baptism by Fire": Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 59(2): 41–57. <https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.59.2.41>
- Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject. *Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Oxford: James Curry.
- Marchal, R. (2012). "The reshaping of West Africa after Muammar Qaddafi's fall." *NOREF Report: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 10*.
- Marty, M. E. and Appleby, R. S. (ed.). 1991–1995. *"The Fundamentalism Project"* (Vols 1–5). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mathur, A. (2012). "Measurement and meaning of religiosity: A cross-cultural comparison of religiosity and charitable giving." *J Target Meas Anal Mark* 20: 84–95. <https://doi.org/10.1057/jt.2012.6>
- Mattes, R. (2019). "Democracy in Africa. Demand, supply and the 'dissatisfied democrat'." *Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 54*. Accessed September 27, 2019. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp54-democracy-africa-demand-supply-and-dissatisfied-democrat>
- Nolutshungu, S. C. (1996). *Limits of Anarchy. Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville/London.
- Onuoha, F. C. (2014). *Why do youth join Boko Haram?* Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
- Patey, L. A. (2010). "Crude days ahead? Oil and the resource curse in Sudan." *African Affairs* 109: 617–636. doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq043
- Pellerin, M. (2017). "Les trajectoires de radicalisation religieuse au Sahel." *Notes de l'Ifri*, February 2017.
- Pew Forum. (2010). Religious Affiliation in Sub-Saharan Africa. <https://www.pewforum.org/2010/04/15/religious-affiliation-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/>

- (2013). “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Accessed March 14, 2020. <https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/>
- PNUD. (2017). “Journey to Extremism in Africa.” Accessed September 20, 2017. <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/journey-to-extremism.html>.
- Racine, C. and Mahamat, M. A. (2018). “La cité culturelle tchadienne au miroir de la lutte anti-terroriste ou les enjeux de pouvoir d’une labellisation religieuse subversive.” *La politique africaine*, 149: 21–42. doi.org/10.3917/polaf.149.0021.
- Raineri L. (2020). “Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*: 1–15. DOI: [10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078).
- Rosander, E. E. (1997). “Introduction: The Islamization of “Tradition” and “Modernity””. In: Westerlund D. and E. E. Rosander (eds.). 1997. “*African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists.*” 1–27. London: Hurst.
- Rule, S. (2007). “Religiosity and quality of life in South Africa.” *Social Indicators Research*, 81(2): 417–434.
- Seli, D. (2018). “Trajectoires et processus de radicalisation à l’ouest du Tchad.” In: de Bruijn, M. (ed.). 2018. *Biographies de la Radicalisation. Des messages cachés du changement social.* 115–129. Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing CIG.
- SIL International. Accessed April 17, 2016. <https://www.ethnologue.com/country/TD/languages>
- Soares, B. F. (1999). “Muslim proselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflict in contemporary Mali.” *Proselytization and communal self determination in Africa.* 228–245.
- Soares, B. and R. Otayek. (2007). *Islam and Muslim politics in Africa.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Solomon, H. (2015). “Islam in Africa: from Sufi moderation to Islamist radicalization.” *Journal for Contemporary History* 40(2): 176–196.
- Sounaye A. (2009). “Ambiguous Secularism. Islam, Laïcité and the State in Niger.” *Revue internationale d’anthropologie et sciences humaines* 58 (2): 86–115. doi.org/10.4000/civilisations.2025

- (2017). “Salafi revolution in West Africa.” (Working papers ZMO). Accessed May 25, 2019. https://www.zmo.de/publikationen/WorkingPapers/sounaye_2017.pdf
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2020). “*Democracy Index 2019*”. Accessed May 22, 2020. <https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>
- Thomson, V. (2012). “Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria.” *Global security studies* 3(3): 45–60.
- Thurston, A. (2016). *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, preaching, and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Triaud, J. L. (2000). “Islam in Africa under French Colonial Rule.” In: Levtzion, N. and R. Pouwels (eds.). 2000. *The History of Islam in Africa*. 169–187. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- UN Human Development Index (2017). Accessed June 17, 2019. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/138806>
- UNDP, Le Centre pour le dialogue humanitaire. (2017). “Radicalisation, violence et (in)sécurité. Ce que disent 800 sahéliens.” Accessed December 14, 2017. https://f-origin.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2725/files/2017/06/I_Etude_PNUD-HD_perceptions_Sahel_Resume_ex%C3%A9cutif.pdf
- United Nations Development Programme (2020): Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking>
- Verschave, F. X. (1998). *La Françeafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République* Paris: Stock.
- Villalón, L. A. (1995). *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: disciples and citizens in Fatick*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wagemakers, J. (2021). “*The Citadel of Salafism*.” Afzal Upal, M. and C. M. Cusack. 2021. *Handbook of Islamic sects and movements*. 333–347. Leiden: Brill.
- (2020). “Salafism: Generalisation, Conceptualisation and Categorisation.” In: Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), *Contextualising Salafism and Salafi Jihadism*. 21–37. Report, Danish Center for Prevention of Extremism.
- Westerlund D. and Rosander, E. E. (eds.). (1997). *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists*. London: Hurst.
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). “*The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state power in Jordan*.” New York: SUNY Press.

- (2006). "Anatomy of the Salafi movement." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(3): 207-239.
- Williamson, P. W., Hood Jr, R. W., Ahmad, A., Sadiq, M. and Hill, P. C. (2010). "The Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale: Cross-cultural application, validity evidence, and relationship with religious orientation and the Big 5 factor markers." *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 13(7-8): 721-747 DOI: [10.1080/13674670802643047](https://doi.org/10.1080/13674670802643047)
- Yacoub, M. S. (1992). "L'islam et l'Etat en République du Tchad." In: Magnant, J. P. (ed.). 1992. *L'islam au Tchad*. 93-98. Bordeaux: Centre d'Etudes de l'Afrique Noire.
- Yacoub, M. S. and Gatta, G. N. (2005). *Tchad. FROLINAT. Chronique d'une déchirure*. N° Djaména: CAM.
- Zeltner, J. C. (1979). *Les Arabes dans la région du Lac Tchad*. Sarh: Collège Charles Lwanga.