

Luli Callinicos

Oliver Tambo and the Politics of Class, Race and Ethnicity in the African National Congress of South Africa

Erik Olin Wright draws a distinction between class alliances and multi-class movements.¹ In a class alliance, class differences are openly acknowledged and negotiated. In a multi-class movement, a range of classes come together – the middle, the working and the peasant classes – against a common enemy. Since its inception, the African National Congress (ANC) has been a multi-class movement, in the sense in which Wright defines it. Oliver Tambo's achievement was to have kept this movement together during the struggle against the common enemy of apartheid by down-playing class cleavages.

But the ANC is not only a multi-class movement; it is also a multi-racial – or 'non-racial' – movement. The race question, however, has always been more demanding: downplaying race (as well as ethnicity) in a sharply divided society such as South Africa is an even more exacting task. This paper – a chapter from a forthcoming biography of Oliver Tambo – examines the race, ethnicity and class divisions that surfaced in the exiled ANC during the 1970s. It serves as a case study to illustrate Tambo's difficult assignment of deferring class, ethnicity and race issues as a necessary condition for the success of the broad national liberation movement of the ANC. This inclusive strategy also served to allow creative expression to both class and race struggles, which prepared the way for a liberal, reconciliatory democratic state: but in a post-apartheid South Africa, the shelved subtexts of class, race and ethnicity remain.

It is now more than 15 years since Oliver Reginald Tambo left South Africa and established the 'A.N.C. Mission Abroad' for purposes of preparing for guerrilla warfare inside South Africa. Yet Tambo has nothing to show for all the material support that the outside world has given him. Not a shot has been fired in defence of the defenceless Black people of South Africa. These are the direct results of surrendering the leadership of the ANC to the Slovos of the South African Communist Party. The judgement of history will be that Tambo sold his soul to the SACP white leadership and in the process betrayed the struggle of the African people of S.A.²

The Morogoro conference of 1969 was the first major gathering of the ANC outside of South Africa. It had come about as a result of frustration at the lack of progress of the ANC in exile and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Tambo had prepared for the conference by fundraising to cover the considerable costs of such an exercise, and the canvassing of all its far-flung branches, for items to be put on the agenda. The consequent resolutions, which aimed at restructuring the External Mission of the ANC, though passed unanimously,

resulted in considerable disquiet: the answers they provided generated new problems, exposing the fault lines of the movement. While some of the structural problems within the organisation seemed to have been settled, unresolved contradictions surfaced. These were problems that seemed to crop up every generation – questions of class, nationalism and ethnicity. It fell upon Tambo, as Acting President of the ANC, to deal with these perennial issues at this lowest point in his exile years.

An immediate cause of dissatisfaction arose out of the reshuffling of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC. Some of the senior members who were dropped from the NEC also failed to be re-elected onto the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party (SACP).³ This occurred just as non-African Party members were receiving official recognition by the ANC for their contribution to the struggle over many years. SACP members had been responsible for the Strategy and Tactics document, which was passed without dissent at the conference. Before Morogoro, the Party hierarchy, led by Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks, supported by Joe Matthews, Flag Boshielo, Ben Turok and others, had advocated the opening up of ANC membership to all races (although some black and white SACP members, including Brian Bunting, Joe Slovo and Ray Simons opposed this view). They had also urged a radical restructuring of the ANC-SACP alliance, recommending a clean sweep of the old Executive. These decisions were passed as resolutions at the conference. It was easy to see why those ousted from the old National Executive Committee should view themselves as victims of a conspiracy. In fact, not only was the bulk of the former NEC dropped after Morogoro, but also those holding senior positions in some of the military camps were suspended.

As the months went by, a pressure group began to emerge objecting to both the opening up of the ANC membership to non-Africans, and the acceptance of the Strategy and Tactics document, which had been prepared by three SACP members, only one of whom, V.J. Matthews, as an African, had been a member of the ANC before Morogoro. The leading dissenters to the Morogoro resolutions identified themselves as 'African nationalists'.

The issue of African nationalism and African identity continued to be a major concern. Throughout the black diaspora, ideas inspired by icons such as Franz Fanon, Malcolm X and Aimé Césaire were fueling the rise of a Black Power movement. It was clear that many newly independent African states were more sympathetic to the Pan Africanist Congress than to the ANC's multi-racial stance. In 1970, Tambo penned a 10-page letter to an unnamed nationalist within the ANC, detailing precisely his own thinking on the relationship between class and nationalism. 'Let me refer to this afternoon's very interesting debate on the question of nationalities,' he wrote. 'It seemed to me you misunderstood something, for I have seldom known you, in such weighty discussions, to cling so tenaciously on ground that seemed to me so untenable'.

In the same way as the working class was more than simply a group of people, he argued, but represented an economic philosophy and a powerful potential for mobilisation, so the ANC wanted to cultivate the concept of race in order to generate in all the oppressed a 'race consciousness'. 'In so far as they are in opposition to white rule, they must recognise themselves as a Black opposition. They are all, in varying degrees the victims of white racism.' All Africans regardless of differences – whether they were co-opted into the apartheid system, or were living comfortable middle-class lives, or were resigned to discrimination – were 'victims of white rule whether they are resisting or not'. As for whites in the struggle, 'as a group they are no force. They are individuals who have chosen their places on the side of the Blacks in the black vs White conflict. While they were not 'black' in colour,

in so far as we represent the struggle as assuming a black vs White character, then they are part of the blacks. The distinction I would make is that a white man must identify completely, to a degree which makes his skin colour irrelevant.⁴

Tambo's notion of nationalism revealed that his attention to race was as keen as it had ever been. As a leader of the Youth League in the mid-1940s, Tambo had himself stood for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. Much later, he was to recognise and accept the processes which were to lead to the Congress Alliance.

Before 1950 there was the feeling that there are two camps; some belong to one, some to the other. But after 1950 we were all together and when we discussed politics we never thought of the differences in our philosophies. We were all equals deciding what to do.⁵

His post-Morogoro concept of African nationalism demonstrated a further change. It now embraced a wider, more inclusive and non-racial definition, while at the same time acknowledging the legitimacy and necessity of black affirmation. Although 'non-Africans' were not permitted to serve on the ANC's National Executive, by admitting members of all races into the ANC itself, Morogoro had otherwise shaken off the multi-racial nature of the alliance structure so frequently criticised by the PAC and other Africanists.

At first, Tambo, as a respected founder of the ANC Youth League known to be sharply conscious of racism, was seen by the 'African nationalists' as a potential. Based mainly in London, they requested that Tambo call a meeting at the home of ANC member Tami Mhlambiso to listen to their grievances.⁶ At least ten people attended.⁷ They were particularly unhappy, they confessed, about the opening of the ANC membership to all races. The London office was a case in point, where they maintained the 'African image' had been supplanted. The chief representative there had been Raymond Mazizi Kunene, but after the conference there was a reshuffling, and Reg September was now appointed the new representative. 'People were complaining that look, when people from home come, and visit the office, they don't see the Africans... And

most of the people at the meeting felt they were being pushed into the background', explained Tami Mhlambiso.⁸

Strong egos abounded in London. The exile community there was described by one Africa-based ANC member as a 'snake's nest... gossipy and backbiting'.⁹ Exiles included non-African members of the SACP, who as non-ANC members were not welcome in many African countries, and whose absolutist and confident 'scientific socialist' judgements often discomfited followers and non-followers alike. The meeting also raised other complaints: twenty three cadres in Lusaka had been suspended; questions were raised over corruption – 'pickpockets' – in Lusaka. Notwithstanding the hopeful note on which the Morogoro conference had ended, the crisis in the movement, they insisted, had not been resolved but exarcebated.¹⁰

The meeting lasted for two days. Ultimately, Tambo acknowledged some of the points that were raised and promised to discuss these concerns with the National Executive. It was then agreed that a conference should be arranged and held to discuss the matter further with an enlarged executive, with as many of the members of the NEC as possible. A consultative conference was held in Lusaka later in the year. 'And I must say,' commented Tami Mhlambiso on Tambo, 'all the problems were faced squarely. I mean there was no dodging or ducking of issues, and whenever there was disagreement we tried to iron out those differences'.¹¹ A national secretariat was then appointed by Tambo to explore these issues.

In 1972, the ANC's external mission was expanded. New offices were opened up in Sweden, the United States, Canada and other centres. A number of the men who had expressed their concerns at the London meeting were appointed to these new posts. Tennyson Makiwane already held a new post in London as Deputy Director of External Affairs. Tami Mhlambiso was assigned to the United Nations in New York. Amongst the military men, Ambrose Makiwane was relocated from Kongwa camp to the office in Cairo; and Tambo appointed Robert Resha to chair the national secretariat.

The other objection at the London meeting had been the perceived 'hijacking' of the ANC by the SACP. The Strategy and Tactics document, they charged, though circulated and discussed for some time before the conference, had been adopted without formally putting the document to the vote at the actual conference. The setting up of the Revolutionary Council (RC), which originally had been appointed as a 'home-go' committee, was also viewed with suspicion. The RC, which included Yusuf Dadoo, Reg September and Joe Slovo, seemed to them to be the product of a well-orchestrated SACP caucusing before the conference. There was an uneasy perception that 'non-Africans' dominated the leadership of the Party; this was all the more disturbing now that the new structure gave non-African communists more influence in the ANC. Spokespersons at the meeting distinguished between African SACP members who were sensitive to the national question, such as Moses Kotane and J.B.

Marks (who had gone so far in the early 1960s as to suggest 'liquidating' the SACP), and those who were under the influence of whites – they cited the Slovos and Fred Carneson as 'middle-class whites' who had no mass base.

Because of his own political history, Tambo was able to appreciate the fears of the nationalists of an ideological takeover by the Communists. To demonstrate his understanding of their anxieties, Tambo looked favourably upon a project proposed by Johnny Makatini, aimed to deflect the interventionist role of left-wing whites in black politics. The ill-fated SACP-driven operation to land cadres on the shores of the Transkei, for example (fully and enthusiastically supported by Tambo), had deployed two non-South African Communists, Alex Moumbaris and Sean Hosey, to lead the crusade. Against this background, Tambo agreed to the formation of an alternative organisation within the ANC alliance, distinct from the SACP, aimed at focusing white members' support work on their own community in South Africa.

It was the right moment for a left challenge to Soviet-oriented communist parties the world over. The students' revolt, which had begun in Paris in 1968, spread to Germany and other European states, crossed the Channel to the United Kingdom and then traversed the Atlantic, making a deep impact on an American youth already radicalised by the anti-Vietnam war. This New Left movement embraced a marxist, class analysis of society while rejecting the Stalinist legacy of the USSR and its satellite countries. Naturally, the SACP, which had looked to the USSR since its inception for inspiration, guidance and support, was uncomfortable with the New Left.

Makatini, based in north Africa, had developed contacts with French radicals. Like Tambo, he gave priority to an open, pragmatic strategy which would harness all those opposed to apartheid. In Africa, Makatini had initiated relationships with 'unfashionable' states such as the Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal and Zaire, despite the reactionary nature of some of these regimes. 'Johnny ended up with all sorts of diplomatic bedmates, which worked to the advantage of the ANC,' commented Neo Moikangoa, Tambo's personal assistant, who had known Makatini well.¹²

And so it was that one wintry night in 1972, Oliver Tambo walked briskly under the shelter of an umbrella through the streets of Paris to a certain Left Bank cafe to meet the key figure in this project, Breyten Breytenbach.¹³ Eloquent, romantic and brilliant, the well-known Afrikaner poet lived in exile; his Vietnamese wife, Yolande, had years before been refused an entry permit into apartheid South Africa. Breytenbach was offering to recruit and mobilise the intelligentsia, particularly radical Afrikaner thinkers, artists and writers, to resist the apartheid system from within. His key argument was that as oppressors, whites were deeply alienated. To illustrate the message, Breytenbach gave the analogy of the lion-tamer and the stool. The lion saw no distinction between the stool, or the whip, and the lion-tamer. Whites were by definition

part of the oppressive machinery, and only by recognising the leadership of the liberation struggle could they come to terms with their alienation.¹⁴

Briefed by Johnny Makatini, Tambo was given a run-down of the activist poet's achievements. Together with artists and intellectuals in the cafe society of Paris, Breytenbach was one of the founders of Atlas, the anti-apartheid organisation operating in France and the Netherlands. Atlas saw its mission as a direct action group involving European and South African radicals. In Holland they persuaded the dockers in Rotterdam to refuse to unload South African cargo. They exposed tobacco smuggling as well as sanctions-busting schemes in the Netherlands. Atlas was also involved in exposing sanctions-busting oil deals to Rhodesia. In Paris, when the South African embassy moved location, at Breytenbach's behest a number of French Trotskyists hijacked the transit van and stole all the documents to do with the French-South African deal on Mirage aircraft.

On the night of the Paris rendezvous, Breytenbach proposed to deliver to Tambo an amalgamation of Atlas with a specifically South African-based Okhela. It was to be a white, New Left alternative to the South African Communist Party, operating within the ambit of the ANC. It was important, argued Breytenbach, that whites should be seen to be supporting the ANC from a nationalist perspective. Breytenbach's record of achievements was in a very sensitive realm, but his proposal was in keeping with the ANC's inclusive approach and its new membership policy. Tambo indicated that he thought the proposal was a good idea and accepted it, on condition that the project would be kept under close wraps.

Soon afterwards, Okhela made its first move. Makatini was later to remind them that they had undertaken Okhela's first assignment against his wishes. (Makatini had apparently hesitated, realising that Tambo, having encountered determined opposition by the SACP members on the executive, was not going to support Okhela.)¹⁵ Nevertheless, Breytenbach travelled to South Africa of his own accord in disguise as one Christian Galaska, accompanied by an Okhela colleague Barend Schuyttema from the Netherlands. Their aim was to make contact with the local left intelligentsia through Gerardt Maré, a young Afrikaner activist in Natal, in order to offer educational and military support. Maré, though, rejected what he regarded to be an adventurist proposal. Breytenbach then travelled around the country, trying to identify recruits amongst student leaders. 'As I understand it, a lot of them were very keen, in a romantic sense. And also with Black Consciousness at the time, there was this sort of searching for a path. It was totally disorganised, unstructured', commented a one-time Okhela member.¹⁶

Somehow – some said through an informer within Okhela; possibly, it was darkly rumoured, through the SACP intelligence network; or through a murky figure in Solidarite, the originator of the false passport and documents – Breytenbach was apprehended. The detentions of a number of student activists

followed, and in the ensuing trial the whole plot was blown apart. Breytenbach himself, embittered by the absence of the ANC's political backup, recanted – disparagingly ‘grovelled’, by his own admission – in a painful show trial. He received a nine-year sentence.¹⁷ When Breytenbach emerged from prison he rejected the ANC and forsook politics. He indicted ‘the smokescreen of ideology ... akin to bad breath, which one does not smell if it is one's own’.¹⁸

Okhela lasted only a year or two longer. There were confrontations by the few remaining Okhela members, leading almost to fisticuffs with Makatini (who by this time was in New York), accusing the ANC of failing to protect Breytenbach. Makatini protested that they had failed to understand the political sensitivities of the matter.¹⁹ Okhela members, disenchanted, turned to the Black Consciousness Movement. They shook off some of Okhela's more doubtful members, including Schuytema. Later Okhela reinvented itself as a new organisation, trying to raise funds by approaching potential donors who would be sympathetic to any anti-communist approach. Ultimately, the remaining activists of this organisation realised that ‘in the real world to do anything you have to recognise the ANC... to fight against them you might set up some small outfit, but you are not going to get anywhere’.²⁹

Clearly though, the dissatisfaction of activists from all directions pointed to the fact that the ground was fertile for political entrepreneurship. Tambo was not moving quickly enough for the group of eight leading dissenters in advancing their demand to reverse the Morogoro resolutions. In fact, the steps Tambo had already taken to meet their grievances and anxieties had backfired. The national secretariat had been dissolved by the Executive Committee, who saw no particular reason for the existence of an additional structure. And then there was the embarrassment of the Okhela debacle, which was revealed to ANC members only after Breytenbach's highly publicised detention and trial.

More disturbingly, Tambo had to deal with a wave of complaints about the new positions granted abroad. Following the Morogoro conference Tambo had appointed Alfred Nzo to head a commission to examine grievances. What emerged was a disturbing degree of ‘tribalism’ or, as Tambo preferred to call it, ‘provincialism’. The testimony of incensed comrades gave clear evidence of this trend. With greater or lesser diplomacy, witness after witness outlined the grievances of the victims in the camps, who perceived the reshuffling of the offenders to other positions as reward rather than chastisement, and this because they were, like Tambo himself, ‘Cape men’.²¹ The relocation, rather than punishment, of vocal critics such as Chris Hani and Ambrose Makiwane, who were Xhosa-speaking, seemed to them to be clear evidence of Tambo's bias.

‘Some comrades think you are acting for your tribe. Others think not’, attested one witness. Others were less tactful. ‘Comrade OR has over the years indulged in this sort of practice.’

In a later meeting with a group of Transvalers, Tambo met with even darker accusations of blackmail. 'What have you done which prevents you expelling [a Xhosa-speaking culprit]?'²²

Tensions had also built up between the followers of Chris Hani and Joe Modise. By 1972, despite the resolutions at Morogoro, these did not seem to be relieved. Urban Transvalers were said to be described as 'thugs organised by Modise to destroy his enemies' – possibly a reference to Modise's youthful career as a gang leader in a Johannesburg township.²³ 'Cape men' seemed to be unwilling to accept Modise's authority – 'Joe is the commander of Sothos'.

In the notes jotted down by Tambo himself, he squarely faced the complaints of most concern to him:

Previously we hear a comrade has done this or that; he must be reprimanded. Later he is again in another diff. position. This has meant offence is rewarded with positions... [T]here is bias in the organisation in favour of a group who seems always to be given positions... Many times Pres. promised mistakes would be rectified. I can find nothing which has been rectified.

Pres. promised to deal with case of 7, [i.e. to reprimand Hani and others who issued a memorandum of complaint prior to Morogoro] but no sign that anything had been done. I can't blame anyone who says Pres. is favouring one side. I appeal to Pres. to rectify mistakes.

The ethnic factor seemed to have been further compounded by class differences.²⁴ For historical reasons, the Cape men were better educated and had acquired professional qualifications. As a result they had gained ascendancy in the ANC. Some had revealed themselves to be arrogant and unwilling to accept the leadership of lesser educated comrades. 'Some of us are just there for the spade work,' objected one complainant. The leaders seemed to be out of touch with the experiences of their grass-roots members.

Tambo's notes also revealed criticism of leaders. The leadership was perceived to have become so comfortable in their positions that their revolutionary ardour had been dampened, notwithstanding their rhetoric.

'I find differences from top to us,' declared one of the witnesses. 'Why are we staying in one place & never moving forward home? This is because leaders are living with families, receiving salaries; their wives are employed. It seems leaders are dedicated only as long as they continue to receive these salaries... Only those who have their wives here are paid. Those whose wives are at home are not paid'.

The attestant went on to explain the reasons for the leaders' delay in returning home:

'I think mistakes are clear only to rank & file & not to leadership'.

The Wankie debacle continued to be perceived by some to be a cynical exercise to promote the image of the leadership while the foot-soldiers were sacrificed in the process. 'They lead a popular & famous organisation here ... If we

leave they will not have their salaries; therefore they deliberately create conditions likely to invite govt-action against us. The blame is at the top'.

'Only one province is responsible', he added darkly.

Deep suspicion of the ('Cape') leaders who had organised the ill-fated Wankie incursion was expressed. Chris Hani was accused of having deserted the battle by crossing the border to Botswana. 'If I had done it, this would have been an issue! I will never forgive them'. And:

'The Rhodesian affair was suicide, playing with the lives of the people. Why were we brought back in haste? We are kept here for publicity for the organisation and for the leaders individually.'

There was also moving testimony of feelings of neglect and rejection.

'The leaders say they remember us when we have fallen'.

'My ailment was badly handled whereas Gatyeni was sent overseas'.

And prophetically, 'We shall be here for 30 years'.

Evidence also revealed low morale and acute despondency. 'Why are we staying in one place & never moving forward home?' At Morogoro Tambo had assured the conference that they were 'marching indisputably towards victory'. But, said one witness, 'The Leader has been dishonest all along. We have lost the struggle; we must admit defeat. We cannot say fighting in Rhodesia is of any benefit for our struggle'. Many cadres consequently felt trapped. 'Those with passports will travel to London & other places. Ask leaders to find us travel documents too.'

This was a daunting message of the perceived divisions between leaders and grass-roots members, and it fell to Tambo not only to respond to personal accusations, but also, though belonging to the ethnic group which dominated the leadership, to be the conciliator. But to the end of his days, Tambo steadfastly refused to acknowledge, at least publicly, that ethnicity had any influence on decisions in the ANC.²⁵ After all, the movement's entire *raison d'être* at its formation had been to unite all black groups throughout the country. 'What is called tribalism is one of the reasons that kept us apart. If you wanted to do anything, you had to show you were all suffering the same thing', he asserted.²⁶ Tambo admitted that ethnicity existed in the minds of people because territorial and cultural differences had existed since precolonial times. He illustrated the way in which, in apartheid South Africa, these differences were perpetuated, both by the ruling class and the media, as well as in popular culture.

It's an ongoing thing... Take in Johannesburg. We all get employed by the same body and are paid in the same manner. The wages are the same. We knock off the same time. There's no tribalism in that. And yet two people will quarrel, then the issue becomes 'you're a Xhosa, I'm a Sotho, and that's why we're quarreling.' The reason for quarreling has nothing to do with tribe... It's an excuse which people look for to explain disagreements.

Regional differences, or 'provincialism', Tambo conceded, did however influence material conditions and therefore perceptions. Whether tangible differences were based on ethnicity or material conditions, the ANC was dedicated to

minimizing them. Under the heading, 'Disparity', Tambo recorded in his 1970/1 notebook:

This meeting considers it essential, and accordingly instructs the NEC, to investigate and take steps to eliminate the disparity and inequalities between cadres in the leadership and those in the rank and file, as reflected in the practice and basis of payment of allowances to the one category of cadres and the provision of general maintenance for the other.²⁷

Tambo held a joint meeting with the Revolutionary Council, the President-in-Council and the Coloured People's Congress²⁸ to discuss the restructuring of personnel. Tambo called it the 'Operation de Move-On' (reminiscent of the 'cafes de move-on' at home – those coffee carts in the streets of Johannesburg that had to be easily transported in an emergency, for the police might descend on them at any time and close down the whole operation). Tambo reshuffled personnel. However unfortunate, and in whatever form, Tambo had to implicitly acknowledge ethnic susceptibilities. He restructured command lines in order to increase accountability to the main structures and the top leadership. In his notebook, Tambo wrote:

'N.B. ALL ARMY personnel, all MK members all ANC members move except...' except for the 'Transvaler' Joe Modise, who was to remain as the Commander in Chief. To those who commented on Modise's regional and cultural origins, Tambo was firmly dismissive: 'No! People say all kinds of things about us. Modise is a very capable man. There's no one to put in his place. Someone who says he should be removed is talking rubbish!'²⁹

Nevertheless, despite his rejection of ethnicity in the ANC, Tambo 'virtually handpicked a new leadership... in a pluralistic way', commented Albie Sachs. 'Balancing out older/ younger; to some extent rural/urban, although it always had a very strong urban bias; Johnny Makatini representing certainly non-communist, at times anti-communist positions, linking up with people in America and representing a certain style on the one hand; and people like Yusuf Dadoo at a later stage on the other, in the Revolutionary Council representing a totally different tradition. Joe Slovo representing the SACP, and important in relation to MK, balancing out the MK people with the political work, the international work'.³⁰ And in addition, it might have been added, Tambo chose tacitly with an eye to ethnic and provincial backgrounds. He hoped that these measures would reassure the MK as well as those who were not 'Cape men'.

But many of the 'Cape men' were not happy. In 1975, frustrated and disappointed in Tambo, eight of the dissenters took the decision to break away - their complaints had been heard and addressed, but sufficient steps had not been taken to give them a stronghold in the organisation. Their sense of belonging and leadership in the organisation had not been forthcoming.³¹ They chose the occasion of the unveiling of the tombstone of Robert Resha, veteran of the Sophiatown and Bantu Education struggles, ANC representative in Nigeria, communist and nationalist, and frequent companion of Oliver Tambo in vari-

ous diplomatic missions and fund-raising efforts. Ambrose Makiwane launched a blistering attack on the ANC leadership.

'The ANC has been hijacked by non-Africans,' he declared. 'Our strategy and tactics are in the hands [of] and dominated by a small clique of non-Africans. This is the result of the disastrous Morogoro Consultative Conference of 1969 which opened membership of the ANC to non-Africans. At this conference, Robbie opposed this on the grounds that, that was a violation of the policy of the ANC.'³² Makiwane called for 'fundamental changes in the manner in which the ANC operates abroad'. He did not mention the leadership itself, but spelt out the nationalists' perspective: 'South Africa is an African country. The African is the most oppressed. He suffers the worst deprivation and exploitation. This is not being racialist, it is a fact, it is an objective reality'.

Tambo was indignant at what he considered to be the appropriation of Resha's name.

'What they claimed had happened at the Morogoro Conference of 1969 was a palpable untruth', he wrote in a smuggled report to Robben Island, 'and they knew it'.

To their shame, they used the honoured Robert Resha in his grave, to do what he has never done and never would do, namely, to try and destroy the ANC. In all the chicanery, I have known throughout my involvement in the ANC, there is nothing to compare with the way Themba Mqota and Ambrose Makiwane used Robert Resha – against his silenced will, when he could no longer say 'No!' And in the result, at the very moment when people all over the world and in SA were paying homage to his great service, he was suddenly projected by this group as the leading crusader in the service of counter-revolution, anti-ANC, anti-coloured, anti-Indian, anti-white anti-communist. The crusade by the Mqotha group never had any chance of destroying the ANC, but the great image of Robbie was severely marred in the process.³³

Resha, like Duma Nokwe, had been involved in discussions amongst Africans on nationalism. He had opposed the opening up of the ANC membership but would never have consented, Tambo was adamant, to expose internal discussions, in this manner.³⁴ 'Robert Resha's name was desecrated as if he were supporting something to which he was opposed to throughout his whole life and service to his people, his country and his organisation', he wrote. 'This they did deliberately because they thought that Robert Resha was silent, but he is not'.³⁵ Members of the SACP were equally outraged. Duma Nokwe, in his anger, swore then and there to have the eight leading dissenters ousted.³⁶ 'He went back to Lusaka, recalled Albie Sachs. 'And he said, "These people are not ANC. They are against ANC".³⁷

And indeed, at the following ANC executive meeting, the eight were summarily expelled. At the meeting, Tambo was openly critical of the conduct of the UK faction but he voted against their summary expulsion.³⁸ The decision was one of the few which did not go through a process of decision by consensus. Uncharacteristically, though, Tambo allowed their expulsion to go ahead unprocedurally. The eight were not given a hearing, nor the opportunity to

defend themselves.³⁹ The first that Tennyson Makiwane heard of the move, he claimed, was through Radio South Africa.⁴⁰ Retrospectively, Tambo blamed himself for not being more scrupulously correct during the process. 'It could have been dealt with differently', he admitted years later. 'These people were never asked to explain why they'd said those things. They were never charged... But the matter having been decided, I assumed the position of the executive.'⁴¹ To his critics, Tambo's rare blunder seemed to confirm the suspicion that he was under the thumb of the SACP.

For Tambo, this unhappy experience also proved to be a lesson. In later years he was to become more assertive: on occasions of unresolved consensus, he was to communicate more effectively his own will by virtue of his status as the leader acting in the interests of the movement as a whole.⁴² In the event, some of the group, including Ambrose Makiwane and Pascal Ngakane, rejoined the ANC a few years later, at the movement's invitation.

But now, Tambo was at a low point. The disappointment of middle-level and rank-and-file cadres in the military were still ringing in his ears, while in their statement following the expulsion, the eight attacked the 'corrupted and co-opted section of the ANC leadership', 'the abandonment of elective procedures, the accountability and renewal of leadership'. They made a point of singling out Tambo, censuring him for his 'duplicity'.

Tambo has failed to make public pronouncements as Head of the ANC, instead, in private gatherings he says different things to different people, depending on who and where they are.⁴³

In the context of the heady guerrilla victories in Angola and Mozambique, they revisited the military failures of MK.

Tambo, his hand always clutching a passport, always on the point of flying off somewhere, makes a remarkable contrast to a leader like Machel, who during the struggle was seen always having a gun slung over his shoulder, leading his men into the fight.

'It is our considered view,' they concluded, 'that Oliver Tambo as clearly betrayed the sacred trust and mandate given him by the ANC to had the external mission... His conduct has been a betrayal of colleagues languishing in jail like Nelson Mandela, whose hopes of leaving Robben Island lie in the successful prosecution of the struggle. No, the truth must be said as it is, that this man – that Oliver Tambo, is unfit to lead a revolutionary struggle.'⁴⁴

These charges were swiftly and hotly denied by individual members of the executive, and more formally by the SACP, which was accused of being white-led and hijacking the ANC. In due course, the leadership on Robben Island also distanced itself from the eight. 'There is only one ANC,' was Nelson Mandela's message through Mac Maharaj and others as they were discharged in 1975, 'and that is the ANC which has its head office in Lusaka, and whose president is O.T.'⁴⁵

But in the meantime, in some western countries in particular, the incriminations contributed to the ANC's negative image. To at least some black South Africans studying in the US, the ANC of the early seventies 'seemed to be in the wilderness'.⁴⁶ In the eyes of even sympathisers, the ANC was 'stolid, deadily dull'.⁴⁷ A sense of unease infused the branches – nothing seemed to be happening. The image of Tambo was conflated with the ills of the movement. 'There was generally an atmosphere that we are not going to get anywhere; a lot of people felt that', recalled Joe Slovo. 'And of course when you are in that kind of mood then it's easy to find targets; and one of the obvious targets is the leader of the organisation'. Tambo's visit to the annual meeting of the African Studies Association held at Wisconsin University, Madison, in 1972, where he was thought to have made a 'poor impression' with a somewhat lacklustre speech, provoked Ali Mazrui's question, privately, to some South African students: 'What has the ANC done to Tambo – or, what has Tambo done to the ANC?'⁴⁸

Tambo was not made in the mould of the uncontested, charismatic individual leaders such as existed at the time in Cuba, in Frelimo or in Vietnam. He was still merely the Acting President in an organisation which emphasised collective responsibility. Certainly the ANC's left-wing 'had a bit of an anti-leadership approach'; in the revolutionary tradition – and one which Tambo consciously promoted – the masses counted.⁴⁹ Tambo's unassertive style also exacted a personal price. A couple of years after the expulsion, Tami Mhlambiso, who had been posted to the USA, was replaced by the talented Johnny Makatini. Mhlambiso felt that his association with the eight was the cause of his demotion. He recalled a pointed and hostile comment by one member of the executive. He decided to discuss his situation with Tambo, whose 'blue-eyed boy' (together with Thabo Mbeki) he had thought himself to be.⁵⁰ Tambo promised to set aside some time to consider Mhlambiso's case. Instead, shortly afterwards Mhlambiso received a cable via E.S. Reddy (a valued friend in the United Nations but no member of the ANC) from Alfred Nzo the secretary-general advising Mhlambiso that his representation in North America was terminated forthwith. He was to report to Dar es Salaam for further instructions. Mhlambiso, feeling rejected and apprehensive, instead took a post in the United Nations' Department of Public Information.

Mhlambiso was deeply wounded at Tambo's silence during the whole affair, but tried to analyse and understand Tambo's delicate situation. Ultimately, 'when it came to making a decision, O.R. sided with the old guard', he said.⁵¹ But then again, he conceded, the dissenters themselves had failed on their side, 'to take the initiative... you either apply yourself fully or you can't be effective'. Nor had they given sufficient support to Tambo. 'They knew what the situation was... When you heard people talk about certain things... you felt some [had] just an axe to grind and some of them were just power hungry'.⁵² A close friend of Mhlambiso, never a member of the ANC and angry with Tambo for

his 'failure to give moral personal support' over the matter, conceded the constraints at the time. As he saw it, 'O.R. was fighting for his political life in the ANC'.⁵³ Mhlambiso recalled Tambo's perspective of leadership, and the pragmatism that inevitably accompanied it. Tambo saw his role as not taking sides, but to chart a course that would be beneficial to all. 'People must understand you to be many things to many people', Tambo had once told Mhlambiso. This approach made it extremely difficult to pinpoint Tambo's position. 'Would you say Oliver was Marxist, was a member of the Communist Party or wasn't he? You wouldn't be sure. You would have to dig a lot. A lot of people believed he wasn't, he was a devout Christian... others said he is a loyal nationalist... At the time when you are thinking of what was going on in all the political formations in London you had to be quite a leader to be able to survive and continue'.⁵⁴

Caught between the strident demands of the nationalists to reverse major decisions at Morogoro, the low morale in the MK camps, the most recent spectacular failures to penetrate the home base, and the angry accusations of tribalism and favouritism in the granting of positions to 'home boys', and in the context of the self-destructive divisions of the PAC, Tambo faced a potentially fatal fragmentation. Attacks were also launched from outside. Gleeful press bulletins reported Tambo's imminent resignation to take up job offers ranging from Attorney-General in Tanzania to a United Nations post with the Organisation of African Unity.⁵⁵

In fact, NEC members contended, Tambo had considered the full implications to the movement of the demands of the eight; they had not presented a well-argued intellectual position.⁵⁶ 'The group had their own axes to grind because they were also among those who were dropped from leadership levels. Some of them had been in the Party', reasoned Joe Slovo. In this context, despite (and because of) his personal friendship with all of the eight, Tambo had had to weigh up particularly carefully their requirements against what their target, the SACP, had to offer.

The Party was indeed a formidable ally, and the ANC had to be extremely skilful riding this tiger. Certainly, the ANC had lost potentially valuable support through its strategic alliance with the SACP – the Cold War was visited on its doorstep. Tambo had, for example, supported Duma Nokwe's ostentatious statement of support for the Soviet Union during its incursion into Czechoslovakia in 1968; but it did not sit well with him. Tambo admired the genuine commitment and sacrifices made by many comrades, and above all, their dedication to what he termed 'humanity', or *ubuntu*.⁵⁷ And although the materialist philosophy of communists was at odds with Tambo's own Christianity, it was their vision of an egalitarian society which valued people above property which he found inspiring and powerful, conferring an added meaning to the ANC's rather more general version of African nationalism.⁵⁸ Tambo shared with Mandela, Sisulu and others, a respect and warm appreciation for the almost unique commitment displayed by the SACP. 'For many decades,' Mandela had

pointed out in the Rivonia trial, non-black African communists 'were the only political group who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us; live with us and work with us'.⁵⁹ On the occasion of the ANC's sixtieth birthday in 1972, Tambo made a point of honouring the SACP's general secretary, Moses Mabhida for his 'absolute loyalty' to the ANC. 'Our alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle', he testified.⁶⁰ Tambo also admired known communists of other countries. In 1968, in honour of the seventieth birthday of the renowned African American singer, Paul Robeson, Tambo wrote a tribute to 'a universal idol and a friend dear to all who know him or have only heard his priceless voice' – he was not referring only to his songs.⁶¹

To be sure, there were differences of political culture which impinged on the liberation movement. The democratic centralism of the SACP contrasted markedly with the ANC's African culture of consensus and courtesy. Party meetings were often marked by vigorous intellectual debate and theoretical confrontation (strictly, of course, within Party meetings). While a Party member might introduce a point by jumping up and disagreeing vigorously with the previous speaker, traditionalist ANC members would begin, 'African style' by concurring with what the previous speaker had said before going on to qualify parts of the argument. Tambo himself had developed this form of conversational courtesy to a high degree. Agendas inevitably took longer to work through, but the effect was to fashion a conclusion to which everyone felt they had contributed. 'It makes you respectful of people,' reflected Sachs. 'The idea isn't everything. There is a person behind the idea; somebody speaking, and you respect their views and their right to speak, and there might be some truth in it... The right to be heard is very strong'.⁶²

How powerful were SACP members within ANC? The Party had grown in stature since the shift from mass movement to armed struggle in the liberation movement. This had given the SACP an edge, because of its history of underground experience, its revolutionary theory and its association with a world power. The support of the USSR and the states within its orbit agreed to – and were in a position to deliver – financial, material and educational support for revolutionary armed struggle. Backing of this magnitude was not available from other quarters.

In his speech of July 1981 on the occasion of the SACP's 60th anniversary Tambo refined the nature of the the relationship between the Party and the ANC. It was 'not an accident of history' nor was it 'a natural and inevitable development' but a conscious, developed strategy.⁶³ At the Rivonia trial Mandela had resolutely rejected allegations by the state that the aims and objectives of the ANC and the SACP were the same. As Tambo was to do many times in the future, Mandela likened the aim of both the ANC and the SACP in achieving 'the removal of the white supremacy' with 'the cooperation between Great Britain, United States of America and the Soviet Union in the fight

against Hitler.' 'It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against Communism,' added Mandela, 'to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept Communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious... It is not only in internal politics that we count Communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, Communist countries have always come to our aid'.⁶⁴ The fact that the assistance from the Soviet Union to the South African liberation struggle was facilitated by the SACP was also not 'an accident of history' – thanks to the SACP, the ANC was the first liberation movement in Southern Africa to have direct contacts with the CPSU. But there were also ambiguities. Moses Kotane accompanied Tambo on his first trip to Moscow; yet Kotane had been against the public emergence of the SACP as being premature and politically confusing. Later, when requests to the Soviet Union were forwarded by Kotane, they came from the ANC Treasurer-General, rather than from a member of the SACP.

At the same time, the SACP recruited a number of talented ANC members. Marxist analysis permeated the movement. But the SACP's culture of tight security created a problem of perception – while the publicly known, senior members had a disproportionate number of non-Africans, the bulk of the membership was African. There was a suspicion that members secretly caucused before important ANC meetings in order to influence direction and vote their own members into power, although many vigorously denied that this was a practice in the SACP. 'It didn't operate in that way,' insisted Joe Slovo. 'I am not saying they weren't individual Communists who used, and even still use, their position to try to advance sectional interests. I am sure that did happen from time to time, but certainly it wasn't the overall approach of the Party. I mean, we would have destroyed ourselves if we would have done that, and certainly O R would never have accepted it. He wouldn't have stood for it.'⁶⁵ Ben Turok, an ex-member of the SACP, confirmed this interpretation. 'We had a very mature approach to the way to work in a mass movement; that was: never force through a decision; no entryism – you never voted for a communist, you voted on merit. We were extremely careful, leaning over backwards never to offend'.⁶⁶ Other SACP members claimed that the ANC also learned to broaden its vision of the liberation movement through the SACP. As one of the the early non-racial political organisations in South Africa, 'the Party shaped our non-sectarian approach to the struggle in South Africa', observed Chris Hani.⁶⁷

On the other hand, the SACP subsumed its socialist programme to the priority of the 'national question'. MK, for example, which had initially been a 'joint venture' and in practice driven by SACP veterans of the Second World War, became in exile firmly an armed wing and preserve of the ANC. Indeed, at that stage some Central Committee members were expressing dismay at the diluted state of relationship between the Party and the ANC. Besides the publication of the *African Communist* magazine and some international activity, the SACP

seemed to be diffused in the ranks of the liberation movement.⁶⁸ The SACP was arguably as influenced by the demands of African nationalism as it was by Marxism-Leninism. This was a point which formed the basis of an on-going critique by the Unity Movement.

Within the ANC itself, it was not only the eight who deeply distrusted the role of the SACP in the movement. Sections of the senior and middle-level, who were not members of the SACP, as well as those who were not necessarily nationalists so much as neo-Marxists or Maoists, wished the ANC to distance itself from the Soviet rendering of socialism.⁶⁹ 'The ANC as a broad umbrella was its strength,' avowed Phyllis Ntantala Jordan, long-time friend of Tambo, 'but intolerance was its weakness'. The movement owed this flaw to Stalinism, she asserted, citing her own experience of the intolerance of the ANC towards the independent campaigns in the 1950s of both the Cape African Teachers Association against Bantu Education and the Unity Movement's long-term boycott strategies. It was this Stalinist tradition, she maintained, which threatened to overtake the ANC in a later time of crisis.⁷⁰

Breytenbach, who was friendly with some of the eight, accused Tambo of being the SACP's 'useful idiot' – Lenin's phrase to describe the instrumentalism of Bolshevik revolutionaries towards liberals and nationalists. The indictment was greeted with outrage by those close to Tambo. Tambo – shrewd, sensitive, subtle and strategic – was his own man, they maintained. While Tambo 'didn't have that robust conviction and ability to take swift decisions that would impact heavily on the lives of others', conceded Albie Sachs, '[h]e would be willing to try new ideas; but his way of doing it was very much just to let it seep in. Let people imbibe it, take it on, and get used to it; enrich it and develop it. And if he felt the membership was firmly against it, he would leave it. He would wait. He would wait until its time came'. The disadvantage of this approach was the length of time it took to reach a decision, and Tambo's reluctance to confront members outright. 'He would be rather reluctant to take steps to reprimand and discipline people. Always understanding the problems and difficulties of person's lives and all the rest', said Sachs. 'But in the end he wouldn't duck'.⁷¹ The group of eight itself cited an example of Tambo asserting his leadership. They recalled Tambo's firm action to stop an SACP document calling on their members not to ostracise certain ANC members including Resha, Mhlambiso, Piliso and Kunene plus four of the eight.⁷²

'Essentially there was no way of manipulating O R,' asserted Joe Slovo. 'Anybody who ever attended a meeting of the Revolutionary Council or the leadership structures outside, the whole of this period at the time, would be aware that at the end of the day it was O R's assessment, taking into account – and because he was a great democrat – the thinking expressed at these meetings. And he was perhaps one of the greatest listeners that I have come across... who had the talent and the capacity at the end maybe of a three-day session of the Revolutionary Council or an extended meeting of the NEC at which some

of us were invited, to summarise the discussion and point the way in the most brilliant fashion; in a way which kept us together, which took into account the differing views. He had the talent there which I have never seen equalled by any other person in the movement. I mean they were just gems of summary; because he would sit for three days, sometimes not taking part in the discussion at all, just making notes; and come back the next day, and then spend two hours saying; 'Right these are the issues, this is what has been said, these are the tendencies', and so on. By the end of it we felt, there is the concept. He pulled it, always pulled everything together.⁷³

But for those who were anxious to push their line, or impatient to reach rapid conclusions, Tambo's style could be misinterpreted. Going for consensus rather than majority rule meant that 'you speak a little bit longer; you don't have this fierce thing of majorities and minorities, and the minority winning over some people and becoming a majority. It's a kind of core set of values and approach, and then you bring in the people. You arrive at something that gives everybody a little bit of something. And certainly a chance to be heard'.⁷⁴ For those who expected a leader to be autocratic, or at least authoritative, Tambo disappointed. They could not see that Tambo's priority was to hold the movement together. He did this, according to Mac Maharaj, 'partly... by fudging issues; because if he didn't fudge the issues, he would not have held the movement together'. Tambo 'developed a knack of... picking some aspect of what you have said and stitching it together in a different way, but leaving everybody feeling that you had made the decision'. Tambo's style was one of pragmatic crisis-management.⁷⁵

Tambo's task in preventing the fragmentation of the movement taught him to become a skilful balancer of tendencies. In the context of the anti-imperialist struggles in Vietnam and Africa, Tambo realised that the exploration of Marxist-Leninism had become extremely popular. Dialectical materialism appealed to the MK youth, particularly as it offered a coherent explanation of society. 'Congress had no theory of social change other than the struggle for power,' argued activist and professor, Jack Simons, one of the cadres' most popular teachers.⁷⁶ Tambo, trained as a scientist, displayed a natural caution towards what seemed to him extravagant claims by Marxists to be 'scientific socialists'; yet he appreciated the theoretical and analytical skills that the SACP brought to the movement. The Strategy and Tactics document, for example, commissioned by Tambo, was put together by communists and was 'very very useful' in pinpointing the weaknesses of the movement and giving direction to the road ahead - 'certain things that were not done, which were then organised to do'.⁷⁷ Its declaration that 'the main content of the present stage of the South African revolution is the national liberation of ... the African people' was reminiscent of the SACP's two-stage theory of revolution.⁷⁸ SACP member Chris Hani singled out what was for him the principal achievement of the Morogoro confer-

ence: that 'the ANC began to say the working class is the backbone of the struggle – of course, working with other classes and strata'.⁷⁹

The ANC, as a national liberation movement, was a multi-class movement in which a range of classes had come together – the middle, the working and (to a lesser extent) the peasant classes – against a common enemy. Despite the alliance with the SACP, the 'national question' demanded that class cleavages be down-played. This made eminent sense during the struggle against the common enemy of apartheid. But repeatedly, tensions between race and class analyses inevitably arose. The group of eight specifically accused 'Tambo's "ANC" of 'a thinly disguised sectarian attempt to substitute a class approach for the national approach to our struggle'.⁸⁰

But the ANC was not only a multi-class movement – it was also a multi-racial movement. The race question was a greater challenge for downplaying race in a sharply racially divided society such as South Africa was a more exacting task – to marginalise race in the struggle against apartheid seemed like evading the central issue, and the demand of the group of eight for a few years was a serious threat to the ANC.

Tambo saw the balancing of both class and race issues as a necessary condition for the success of the broad inclusive nature of a national liberation movement. At the same time, this umbrella movement also had to allow expression to both class and race struggles. Anyone who insisted on excluding either the one or the other, would themselves eventually be excluded. In one of his notebook in the mid-seventies, Tambo had written:

Widespread emphasis on importance of workers' struggle this & ensuing years. Yes. Correct. But the criticism directed at the Labour movement is that of Utopians passing simple judgements where sages would prefer balance.⁸¹

A balance that is, between struggles of class and race, employed and unemployed, urban and rural, and ethnicity. Tambo clearly accepted the SACP argument on the value of class but never for one moment overlooked the national struggle – 'for tactical purposes colour analysis remains valid & there is national opposition of the blacks despite few new black recruits to the bourgeoisie'.⁸²

The expulsion of ideologists was to occur once more, nearly a decade later, when a group of class analysts within the ANC attempted to eclipse race. To block either race or class was to court division and destruction. At all costs, Tambo worked to avoid such a consequence. Personal friendships, family comforts, private reservations – all had to be relinquished for the sake of holding the movement together. That for Tambo was the bottom line.

Notes

1. Erik Olin Wright, *Interrogating Inequality: Essays on Class Analysis; Socialism and Marxism*, (Virgo) 1994. Wright's distinction between class alliances and

- multi-class movements draws on earlier debates on the nature of popular and united fronts which go back at least to the 1930s. (See for example the discussions of George Dimitros on the Comintern, and Claudin's *History of the Comintern* during this period.)
2. From 'In Defence of the African Image and Heritage: Reply to the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party statement entitled "The Enemy Hidden Under the Same Colour"', African National Congress of South Africa (African Nationalists), Dar es Salaam, February 1976.
 3. Interviews J. Slovo, Johannesburg, 5.1.94, V.J. Matthews, Pretoria 31.8.94, Document 19 in Karis and Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge* Volume 5 (Indiana Press) 1995.
 4. Tambo Archives, A.11.1.3.
 5. Brian Bunting, *Moses Kotane*, p.231.
 6. Interview Tami Mhlambiso, New York, October 20, 1993.
 7. *Against Manipulation of the South African Revolution*, Tennyson Xola Makiwane, African National Congress of South Africa (African Nationalists), Dar es Salaam, October 1975.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. Interview, 17.11.95.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. *Ibid.*
 12. Interview Neo Moikangoa, Johannesburg June 14, 1993.
 13. Telephonic interview with Breyten Breytenbach, August 14, 1993.
 14. Interview Bill Anderson, Johannesburg, June 23, 1993.
 15. Personal communication, Glen Moss, April 12, 1996.
 16. Anderson, *op.cit.*
 17. Breyten Breytenbach, *The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist* (New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), cited by Tom Karis and Gail Gerhart, unpublished manuscript 'From Protest to Challenge', Volume 5.
 18. Quoted by Maureen Isaacson, 'We've become morally correct; we need "permanent revolution", says Breyten Breytenbach', *Sunday Independent*, 27.4.97.
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. A discussion of conditions in the MK camps in the 1960s occurs in the previous chapter of the biography.
 22. Tambo Archives, A.11.3.1a.
 23. *Ibid.* All quotations in the next few paragraphs are from Tambo's notebook, unless otherwise stated.
 24. Evidence by Duma Nokwe, Tambo Archives.
 25. Interview by author. Sandown, 14.1.93.
 26. Interview with Oliver Tambo by Tom Karis and Gail Gerhart, March 3,4, and 6, 1991.
 27. Tambo Archives, A11.3.1.
 28. The CPC was formerly the South African Coloured People's Organisation.
 29. Karis and Gerhart interview, *op.cit.*
 30. Interview Sachs, Sandown, February 3, 1993.
 31. Interview, Tami Mhlambiso, New York, October 20/21, 1993.

32. 'Speech delivered by Mzimkulu Ambrose Makiwane on the occasion of the unveiling of the tombstone of the late Robert Resha', London July 19, 1975.
33. Tambo Archives, correspondence, 1977, also Karis and Gerhart interview, *op.cit.*
34. Karis and Gerhart, *op.cit.*
35. Tambo Archives, A11. n.d.
36. Karis and Gerhart.
37. Sachs, *op.cit.*
38. 'Statement on the Expulsion from the ANC (SA) of: T.Bonga, A.M. Makiwane, J.D. Matlou, G.M. Mbele, A.K. Mqota, P. Ngakane, T.X. Makiwane, O.K. Setlhapelo', African National Congress (African Nationalists), London, 27th December, 1975.. Thanks to Fertz Ngakane for a copy of this statement.
39. Karis and Gerhart, *op.cit.* Frene Ginwala interview, Johannesburg February 18, 1993 and Joe Slovo interview, *op.cit.*
40. 'Against Manipulation of the South African Revolution', African National Congress of South Africa (African Nationalists), Dar es Salaam, October 1975.
41. Interview Tom Karis and Gail Gerhart, London, March 3&4, 1991.
42. Karis and Gerhart, Volume 5, Chapter 2.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. Maharaj, *op.cit.*
46. Verbal communication, Wandile Kuse, Stellenbosch, 20.1.95.
47. Verbal communication by several ANC members in the UK during the 1970s.
48. Kuse, *op.cit.*
49. Sachs, *op.cit.* 50. The phrase is Mhlambiso's.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Mhlambiso, *op.cit.*
53. Interview Chris Nteta, Boston, 10.4.93.
54. *Ibid.*
55. See, for example, the summary of press reports discussed in *The Post*, 21.3.1971, and *Beeld*, 31.12.1975, *Sunday Times*, 4.1.76, *Rand Daily Mail* 5.1.76, *Natal Mercury* 12.1.1976.
56. Matthews, Sachs, Slovo, *op.cit.*
57. Interview with author, 11.2.93.
58. Interview Oliver Tambo, Sandown, January 11, 1993.
59. Cited in *From Protest to Challenge*, *op.cit.* P.789.
60. Karis and Gerhart, Volume 5 manuscript, *op.cit.*
61. Martin Bauml Duberman, *Paul Robeson: a Biography* (Ballantine, New York, 1989) p.543.
62. Sachs, *op.cit.*
63. Shubin manuscript, p.139.
64. *Ibid*, I, p. 174.
65. Interview Joe Slovo, Johannesburg, January 7, 1994.
66. Interview Ben Turok, Johannesburg, August 10 , 1993.
67. Hani, *op.cit.*
68. Shubin manuscript, p.55.
69. For example, Frene Ginwala was in the first category and Vella Pillay in the second.

70. Interview Phyllis Ntantala Jordan, October 13 1993.
71. Sachs, *op.cit.*
72. 'In Defence ...' *op.cit.*
73. Slovo, *op.cit.*
74. Sachs, *op.cit.*
75. Interview Mac Maharaj, Johannesburg, August 7, 1995.
76. Jack Simons, missive to author, 9.2.93.
77. Oliver Tambo, interview with author, 14.1.93, Sandown.
78. This is pointed out by Karis and Gerhart in *Protest to Challenge*, Volume 5. (Consulted in manuscript form, thanks to the authors' kindness in showing me their unpublished material.)
79. Interview Chris Hani, 29.3.93.
80. *Statement on the Expulsion...* *op.cit.*
81. Tambo Archives, my emphasis.
82. *Ibid.*

Luli Callinicos
History Workshop
University of the Witwatersrand
Private Bag 3
P O WITS 2050
Johannesburg
South Africa