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EDITORIAL

Africa beyond Political Sovereignty: a 60@ Anniversary Imperative

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Editors

This year marks 60 years since the establishment of the first inter-state institution for Africa, the Organisation of African Unity. It was established principally to support the achievement of independence and political freedom by African colonies during a decade that is associated with the idea of winds of change. Political sovereignty through the control of the nation-state was seen as critical to the achievement of the ideals of Pan-Africanism, including African unity, African pride, cohesion, and common African prosperity.

Looking back now, we can see the matter of political sovereignty first as a matter for debate, but at the time there was not much debate about the wisdom of this determination, but more on the process and its management. Ali Mazrui has given us many concepts to help us understand the African story, one of them is the concept of the Curse of Berlin that manifests in the creation of unviable colonies through arbitrary borders and artificial nationhood. He contended that this curse outlived independence and continued to haunt the independent Africa. It has only achieved the nominal unity of states at the elite level but remains fragmented and divided on many other grounds.

As we look back at the 60 years, there are many achievements to be counted and some progress was made in several fronts, but the fundamental purpose remains elusive. The continent's political sovereignty, which largely is associated with regime security, has yet to lead to social sovereignty and progress.

For hundreds of millions of young and old Africans, it is not yet Uhuru with such levels of poverty and economic underdevelopment, and with such evident levels of dependency on the West and others manifest in the conduct of the political elite.

The anniversary is not one to use to celebrate vain glory, but to frankly account for our past failures and to reconnect with the lofty ideals of the old. We must work further and better to bring about the change that has long eluded us. This includes being careful about what leaders we choose, and how we as citizens participate in our governance between elections. It is about citizens seizing the moment and taking the destiny of their countries into their hands. It is about partnerships and solidarity in this pursuit of peace, justice, and prosperity.

This journal is committed to hosting ideas and thoughts that contribute to this resurgence of African citizens in one way or another.

This edition would not have been possible without the hard work of anonymous peer reviewers and the positive response of the authors. The editors, Dr Tinuade Ojo and Joseph Keutcheu, and volunteer assistants have taken their responsibility seriously. We wish Africa visible and measurable progress in 2024.

Editor in Chief

Siphamandla Zondi

The Complexity of the Intersectionality of Domestic and International Non-Governmental Peacebuilding Organisations in South Sudan

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Abstract

As peace operations and peacebuilding develop, recent discussions have centred on the growth of peacebuilding literature on inclusivity, bottom-up and local approaches. Given that a substantial number of peacebuilding is conducted by Non-governmental organisations, which occupy a middle level to governments and community levels, the paper unpacks the complexity of the interaction of the international and domestic middle-level organisations. The paper presents a case study of South Sudan's experience, which proves difficult to operationalize the critical inclusivity debates in their operations. The article argues that although there is more participation of local organizations in peacebuilding, the internal and external organizations are still riddled with complex intersections that still maintain the liberal (international) order of peace constituted by a specific form of external governance.

Thus the paper concludes that inclusivity is a non-linear process and in constant [need of] reconstruction.

Keywords: peacebuilding, South Sudan, NGOs, local peace building, intersection.

Introduction

Peacebuilding research, policy and practice have seen a substantial paradigmatic shift. This has entailed the current focus increasingly turning towards a critical reflection of the post-liberal order that seeks to focus beyond the states (level). Shifting from a majorly internationally conceptualized and driven agenda to an understanding of the importance of local-led peacebuilding and the potential role to be played by contextualizing strategies and domestic actors (Paffenholz, 2013). Giving rise to debates on the emerging consensus that local conflict resolution is crucial to building lasting peace on one hand while acknowledging that international support tends to increase the chances of successful peacebuilding (Autesserre, 2017).

As this paper attempts to show, International actors are now, due to the emergence of the local agency, working with domestic actors to achieve their objectives; this interaction is also termed hybrid peacebuilding (Hellmüller, 2014) and has led to further concepts such as concepts such as local ownership. In this space, two levels exist (although not exclusively), one is the strictly Weberian notions of the state and liberal institutionalism (Pearce (1997: 451), Barnett et al., 2007: 36; Donais, 2012: 31) and the second is a bottom-up lenses (, usually concentrate on local civil society in general) that seeks to be institutionalized in the existing state-building and greater architecture of peacebuilding. As argued by scholars (Hoksbergen, 2005; van Leeuwen,

2009; Donais, 2012: 139–53), contention lies in the critical debates that hybridity has led to many local efforts being co-opted and instrumentalized to it the universalization of peace intervention strategies and actors (MacGinty, 2011), subject to a diverse international presence of peacekeepers, peacebuilders and peacemakers. So to say, how can the local peace-level actors best fit into the international agenda of peacebuilding,

The paper departs from the critical debates which have argued that liberal peace approaches with a state-building approach have been diminishing and the presence of domestic actors is gaining traction as presented by various scholars (Donais, 2009). This has caused the need for the focus of peacebuilding to shift from mere inclusivity of the actors to the formation of strategies that goes beyond increasing numbers of actors by interrogating the nature of the relationships and collaborations.

While various authors have provided an analysis of interaction, this has been mostly an interaction between international peacebuilding actors on the one hand and local actors in general on the other hand (Hellmüller, 2014: 7). By setting this paper as a project of inquiry, I set to describe the relationship dynamics between the international and local communities and discuss the implication of the type of inclusivity practised. The paper discusses this based on analysis of South Sudan, with a record of conflict spanning from the 1950s; there is a longstanding engagement of international actors, and lately, South Sudan's domestic actors have shown much prominence in peacebuilding activities.

According to the pyramid by Lederach (1997) which describes three levels of actors in peacebuilding, the middle-level organizations represent non-governmental organisations, and consist of middle-range leadership, generally known as civil society, from various sectors such as Ethnic and religious leaders, community leaders, academics/intellectuals and philanthropic organizations to name a few. To have a structure of comparison, the paper focuses on middle-level external actors (and organisations) who are working with domestic actors, that is [I]NGOs and IGOs (whom are international organizations founded outside of South Sudan) operating at a middle level and South Sudanese National Non-Profit Organizations – henceforth referred to as domestic organizations (founded and predominantly organized by South Sudanese).

Given their inevitable interaction, the article aims to explore the area of intersection that exists between midlevel peace actors in South Sudan. With the assumption that this process and relationship is not natural nor neutral, how then do the international and domestic actors employ their strategies in this (intersection) space? To what extent have international organizations incorporated local perspectives in their peace-building strategies? Is there an interaction of strategies at the two levels? What impact does this relationship have on the strategies employed and the general goal of moving South Sudan from a conflict to a post-conflict and even further to a democratic state?

With the aim of presenting a view of the complex space that exist and occupied these actors, presenting the reality and impact of their interaction, the paper provides importance to both academic and practice in developing theories and understanding the implications of moving beyond creating a binary of 'the local', with its representation of both 'good'(Donais, 2009) and 'unstable'(Hirblinger & Simons, 2015) and the international who are framed in whispers of colonial undertones in critical peacebuilding scholarship (Jabri, 2013).

Inclusion of Local Spaces in peacebuilding approaches

Upon reflecting on the African perspectives on peace and development in the late 1980s, Hansen (1987) in his book argued that the dominant and more western liberal perspectives of peace were not helping Africa find peace. This is because they were only addressing limited perceptions and practices. Abdullah (2017) concluded on two important issues of peacebuilding in the African Continent as a result. The first, peacebuilding in Africa has sometimes been characterized by interventions by international actors who lack the local knowledge and lived experience needed to fully address complex conflict-related issues on the continent and second researchers living and working in Africa need additional resources and platforms to shape global debates on peacebuilding as well as influence regional and international policy and practitioner audiences.

'Local' turn scholars, have highlighted the limitations of a peace concept that addresses only the technical question of the instruments of violence and who view minimalist conflict management as a sufficient condition, or the only sufficient condition, for peace (Lederach, 1997; Graf, Kramer & Nicolescou, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2008); local peace Richmond, 2013; and local ownership Donais, 2009). Calling for fundamental re-conceptualization of the methods employed to study the conflicts we try to resolve.

The significance of Such (localized) approaches revolved around the non-linearity of approaches needed to match the complexity of todays conflict and donor dependency and system theories, (Randazzo, 2017:3). John Paul Lederach explains it through his acknowledgement of web-like relationships at the basis of the social context within which conflicts take place (1997:78). He advocated for non-liner reasoning in drafting of peacebuilding initiatives. Scholars who refer to this perspective condemn previous paradigms that follow a linear casual positivist methodology, labeling them as reductionist approaches that are bound by westphalian statecentric notions regarding identities and knowledge (Korppen, 2013: 86-93) and generalize actors, agendas and action and bring limited solutions (Burns, 2011:104).

Boege (2013:39) suggests that culture-specific forms of knowledge may be instrumental in providing non-liner understanding and are as important as liner western ones. Such an approaches have tended to rely on actor-based understanding of conflict which have often perpetrated binary and misrepresent understandings of agents and their roles. It is crucial to realize that, reflecting this contingent reality requires looking beyond the 'dualistic categories that many peacebuilding strategies are based on such as inside/out or global/local' (Korppen, 2013: 90). This espouses the localization is imperative.

Placing local actors and local epistemologies at the center of understanding peace discredits tautological assumption and normative claims of universal solutions. More importantly, it is especially to discredit the tendency to privilege the local agency only when it is in service of liberal peace' (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013, 136). It also uncovers skeptical identity of the local turn theory (Simons & Zanker, 2014; (Kappler, 2015) and the perceptions on the formation of this identity (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015).

Effect on interaction on hybridization and localization

This paper tries to avoid the trap of dichotomous and limited pro/contra debates around liberal peacebuilding (randazzo 2017: 2). Despite the criticism that the liberal peace-building project excludes the everyday, most scholars keep envisaging a form of liberal peace, though hybridization. Paffenholz (2015: 30) explains the dynamics of a hybrid peace, describing it as the peace-building discourse that considers the entangled relationship of international and local, formal and informal,

and liberal and illiberal forms of peace governance. This aligns with Kraushaar and Lambach (2009) who propagate for the formation of so-called 'hybrid peace governance structures' that provide actors with a joint – hybrid –framework of norms, values and institutions. As such, the notion of hybridity suggests the need to move beyond the ontological and methodological dominance of Western actors and approaches, and to engage with bottom up, local views of politics and society (Belloni, 2011).

Cautions against hybrid forms of peace governance need to be exercised. Although there is evidence on the critical reflection and concerns on identity of the local (who defines them) within these hybrid structures (Heathershaw, 2013), there is lack critical analysis hybridity has led to concerns of diffusion of peacebuilding norms. The questions on the latter are not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also which and whose ideas matter (Acharya, 2004). The worry here, is that local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents' cognitive and identities. This produces an additional category that shows the constant feedback between domestic and international actors' ideals over time.

This question sparks a notable contribution on the influence and the type of interaction and the impact in terms of peace objectives. In his demonstration, Acharya (2004), has attempted to argue that these transnational norms shape regional institutions and produce institutional changes through a contestation between emerging transnational norms and preexisting regional normative and social orders. Thus, he describes the this interaction may lead to localization, which in itself is as a complex process and outcome. Through this process then norm–takers (the local in this instance), build congruence between transitional norms (including norms that were previously existing in the region.

The concern here is that inclusion and the local turn can result in having more local actors in peacebuilding who are not only the receivers of these international norms, but also transfers to their constituencies. Thus, as an addition to norms being resisted, displaced or localized as explained by Archarya (2004: 254), there is also a possibility of absorption of some norms from the local to the interveners.

Thus, there is a constant [need] for exchange of information which leads to the constant feedback of the different actors although at the same level. This then impacts on strategies, behaviors and the general outcome of the peace. Examination the type of this interaction and the impact it has on achieving peacebuilding objectives remains important for the analysis of the development of peace practices and its longevity.

Non–Governmental capacities as middle–level actors

NGOs are part of the peacebuilding consensus that include donors, major states, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and international financial institutions, in which there is a broad concurrence on liberal peace, though there might be disagreement of how this is to be achieved in a technical sense (Richmond and Carey, 2005:3).

Although NGO involvement can hardly be described as a panacea for the establishment of sustainable peace and development, NGOs have made enormous differences to complex peace processes through both their independent access at grass roots level, and via their cooperation with the local population, or attempts to modify state and unilateral interventions at the socio–political and developmental levels. NGOs have, to a great extent, inherited the role of building civil peace as a key component of the liberal peace, along with the parallel construction of the constitutional peace (through democratization) and institutional peace (associated with the UN system), which

are also components of the liberal peace. As a middle level organization, effectively, NGOs are thus crucial in building the institutions of the liberal peace from the bottom up, including free market economies and development strategies, social reform, political democratization to human rights and humanitarian assistance (Duffield, 2001:11). This consensus effectively indicated that NGOs have become part of the external governance of post-conflict zones. (Olivier). The construction of liberal peace now focuses on peace-as-governance, and the NGOs are vital actors in this project within the broader context of the globalization of the norms of the liberal peace and of global civil society. Non-state actors and the NGOs have been instrumental in broadening the understanding of peace and security (UN, 2004b:5).

NGOs have become essential in building stable communities and effective institutions, where it has become apparent that, NGOs not only have a role to play in peacebuilding, but that they are vital to the process entailed in the construction of the liberal peace (Richmond and Carey, 2005:19).

Case of South Sudan

South Sudan presents a case that requires scrutiny. Some of the key contributions provide insight to the predominantly liberal peace building trajectory adopted by South Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was that of liberal peace-building and state-building (Gerenge 2015: 87). However, in just about 3 years' time after its secession, the young nation relapsed in to conflict. The previous peace-building efforts that prioritized elections had failed to bring about true peace and transformation (Young 2012: 9-10; 134-176). Several documents highlight various issues including, the lack of an inclusive peace process (Ajak 2015: 8; Akol 2014) in seeking to understand why the country relapsed into another war so shortly after independence.

There is strong evidence that peace negotiations characterized by high civil society involvement have enjoyed sustained peace in the peace building phase (Wanis-St. John & Kew 2006). This has led to an inclusion of bottom-up processes the top-level peace talks, for instance at the peace talks held in Addis Ababa, where Civil society participated directly in the talks alongside representatives from the Church, political parties and political detainees to name a few.

While arguing for the support of local and subnational peace-building efforts, and multi-level approaches to peace-building strategies, the report 'in the long Haul'by Christian Aid says that South Sudan's multi-level and interdependent conflicts require peace-building strategies that reject the distinction between local and national processes. Local does not mean unimportant, and sub-national actors can impact national dynamics of peace and war, just as national leaders depend on local constituencies to supply fighting forces and for legitimacy, according to the study (Christian Aid: 2018.) Although there is increased civil society participation, engagement and collaboration between both the international and internal (local) organisations, to which the quality of such a relationship is the inquisition of the paper.

Strategies used by Mid-level Peace actor in South Sudan: Community centered Vs Community engaging approaches

As explained above, the previous protocols involving the international actors were mainly employed at a high level, monitored by the international actors and were characterized by lack of a connection to the ground and the local, thus disconnecting the South Sudanese local to peace processes (Salman, 2011). One of the largest drivers of peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan was largely maintained in state building. Prior to 2016 the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), approach employed by the UNMISS focuses on bilateral high-level intervention

between government signatories and international monitors. According to the United Nations Peacebuilding fund their peacebuilding plan focused on building the state's capacity to manage conflict and strengthen the rule of law in line with the overall principle of national ownership.

The strategies employed by international organizations have considerably changed. Consider the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Within the office of transition and conflict mitigation (TCM), they have one of their project is known as Viable Support to Transition and Stability VISTAS. The VISTAS project started in October 2013. The way the project was designed with a close and strong focus with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). However, due to the outbreak of the conflict in 2013, that changed.

> "As the project was just starting, the conflict broke out and we decided to not work at the government level anymore… of course the government is allowed to attend meetings, but due to the political development, USAID is not in a position move funds or do our operations through the government. The focus has shifted, and we work exclusively in the community level. It is very important because it's a very positive tool to have and offers flexibility needed" (Interview with an officer of USAID, Juba).

The shift drew attention of the international actors from formal systems of the government and more to the community and domestic thus, defacto inclusivity. The strategy therefore has focused more on community centered approaches.

There are also external actors who have a mandate to not only make the living conditions of conflicting communities better but transform the communities while doing so. Search For Common Grounds (SFCG), a United States based INGO, in South Sudan has from the get-go focused on working with communities,

> "We stepped in to respond to these challenges and promote peaceful coexistence between Madi and Acholi, creating a six-month pilot project called "**Together We Can**", with support from UNDP. Leveraging the potential of existing grassroots networks, we trained leaders from Magwi and Pageri, helping them identify the root causes and the consequences of the conflict affecting their communities. We created safe spaces where both sides could meet to discuss their shared problems and begin rebuilding trust between them. For many people from Pageri, our initiatives represented the first time they were able to spend a night in Acholi land without fearing for their lives. The dialog sessions were widely praised by local authorities, including the Magwi County Acting Commissioner." (Interview with program officer at SFCG, Juba).

Domestic actors in South Sudan have always fought for more visibility and inclusivity. One of the advantages of domestic organizations as argued by Donais, (2009) is their ability to effectively reach the communities who suffer through the everyday conflict and peace (Richmond, 2009). The domestic organizations experience conflict both as victims and responders.

> "If something happens to you as an aid worker or to your family, you are compelled. You are much better equipped to respond compared to others who did not have that foundation in the community. Most times the first responders are national organizations it's just that it is not documented into this grand mechanism. I will say that a lot of the work that national NGOs don't get appraised into the bigger picture. If you interview organizations, they will tell you that they started as a group of young men or women to respond to a particular need in this area and then gradually evolved into what they are now. So, they were formed to represents a particular problem identified in the community." (Interview with a representative from NGO forum, Juba).

Organizations such as South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (SSuNDE) is a national non-governmental organization that promotes active participation of citizens in peace-building and democratic political process and provides impartial and professional reports and recommendation about those processes to South Sudanese public. The strategy used in peacebuilding is divided into three aspects that is, some of the strategies used include: civil society strengthening through highlighting interdependence (this is especially in the lake regions). Here, SSuNDE meets with local communities and discusses what it is that unites them, for instance roads and water points, and also discusses ways of strengthening these dependencies by improving the areas which bring the different communities together. They also perform constituency dialogue in tackling governance programs. This dialogue is done in partnership with governmental bodies at the local level. This is to provide a platform where the legislators can dialogue with the communities on the different needs and issues that they face. They are also engaged in evidence-based advocacy and collection of data through opinion polls and surveys, and the shares this information with different organizations, such as different local government bodies and security sector institutions.

The above strategies are also compared to the strategies of Community Empowerment for Progress (CEPO). Their strategies were almost similar, that is working from the bottom-up. This includes Community peace dialogue – which involves the community to promote ownership; community consultation for peace; conducting of both national and subnational campaigns and consultations on behalf of the government and other international organizations. Thus, SSuNDE and CEPO present a more community centered and engaged approach, however, it should be noted that SSuNDE are privileged to use state resources and institutions to also conduct their work unlike other domestic grassroots organizations.

It is also important to acknowledge that currently many INGOs are engaging directly with communities, beyond the humanitarian dimention. Although a practice that is new to many of these INGOs, it remains prescriptive.

Building relationships; Domestic organization cooptation

As peacebuilding needs to work in the restoration of legitimacy within the political processes and institutions, it also needs to enhance trust between individuals and between groups in a society. Thus peace-building results in the bringing together of different actors and key players who are engaged in the re-building of a country. Thus, this process will require the level of the actors working together as the process takes its form from a deep and long-term transformations that requires an integrated approach engaging a diverse range of actors (InterPeace). The emphasis here is on cooperation.

Empirical evidence supports the theoretical claim that there is barely any meaningful partnership that fosters productive interaction, observed by the international as well as the internal actors/ organizations of peace in South Sudan. Here, partnership is taken to mean a form of engagement where two or more actors of peace share ownership, as well as the responsibility for managing the peace objectives of the country as equal partners.

South Sudan is currently undergoing a massive proliferation of non-governmental organizations. Some are seen as sincere, while others are seen as opportunistic, a sentiment expressed by international donors. This fear is maintained for both international and internal organizations operating within South Sudan. This has been an advantage as well as a disadvantage in that the management and the running of such organizations, especially in such an unstable country as South Sudan, can be difficult. The influx of these organizations does not seem to help in fostering

any relationships, partnerships and collaboration within the internal organization and between the internal and international organizations. It leads to some opportunistic organizations as well as groups, which are inclined politically assuming the role of peace actors and in turn making this partnership seem difficult, impossible and apparently futile.

This is not to say that there is a complete lack of collaboration. For instance, women organizations within Juba seem to have mastered the art of working together at least in some aspects to bring about change. Organizations such as Eve organization for Women Development, women for women international and South Sudan's Women Empowerment network have partnered specifically in political policy advocacy both to the international members such as IGAD and TROIKA, as well as their government counterparts i.e. SPLM–IG and even opposition groups, largely represented by SPLM–IO. Few other attempts have been made on the partnership and incorporation of strategies especially efforts directed from the domestic and peace from below. Peace Pax has also been known to engage in collaborative work, thus organizing a workshop that lasted from 2012 to 2015 to strengthen women's leadership skills and to raise their participation in political decision–making and in handling security issues.

This lack of cooperation is mainly seen when it comes to specific projects that are implemented in communities. Here, it is observed that the strategies used by some international organizations have a sense of '*humanitarian angle.* International organizations are believed to be offering what is known as 'bandage solutions' such as building schools, as opposed to teaching the community how to build, manage and maintain schools, these however remain importnant.

However, domestic organizations, for the most part engaged with the communities on a discussion level, whether on behalf of other international community of by themselves. Their lack of financial flexibility and capacity limited their impact in physical development and special impact. Despite these, they remained well apt to the challenges facing the communities at a deeper level.

As an illustration of the command on local dynamics, I will demonstrate using the Integrated Development Organization (IDO). IDO is involved in community engagement mostly in internally displaced people (IDP) camps around Juba. They also focus on the youth and representation of women as a way of impacting the community in a positive way. The strategies involve using community man power to manage their resources. This is seen for instance in a water pump project which was built in a Malakal in 2016. IDO finds it necessary to have a water management committee which will be engaged with tackling the day to day issues and that is tied up and concerns the water source. In this strategy, they train community leaders on how to manage disputes and build their knowledge on mitigation. IDO therefore mostly facilitates a development action plan where they involve the communities in developing and implementing solutions on a day to day basis. Thus, the community takes the lead in identifying the needs and solutions for their specific contexts. IDO then steps in with the facilitation of and providing different resources and capacity building. They therefore call for international – domestic coordination, but more importantly a call for to local–local coordination and partnership as well. Some of this leasons learnt have now, and recently, being applied to communities by INGOs. An avenue where bothe internal and external rganisations can seek partnership.

Another illustration was an event arranged by the Screen of Rights, which a domestic organization is run by lawyers who aim to give free legal advice. This conference aimed to tackle hate speech which is rampantly spreading in Juba, and the rest of South Sudan. Issues raised include the need for laws to address hate speech which do not currently exist in South Sudan. The problem of the hate speech, which is more prevalent on the streets, is that it is harder to control than when it is encountered online. Another aspect is fact that the hate speech has become accepted as common

language. This has therefore led to the perpetuation of different forms of discrimination in South Sudan. The participants of this conference included teachers and students from local universities, shop owners and business men from surrounding areas, as well as other local community groups and NGOs. The main strategy used by Screen of Rights focuses on working on peace-building by providing training and workshops to citizens, communities and youth groups in several areas in Juba. Interestingly, the participation at this conference catered for a bottom-up process, where the organization was interested in influencing the people who interact with day to day hate speech in their communities and neighborhoods.

Engagement of international organisations on such occasions has proved subtatively important in providing capacity training and materials to such domestic organisations to conduct such exercises. Often, the need will be identified by the local organisations and motivated for intervention by the domestic organisations on one had, or the INGOs will make a call for a bit of a local partner to implement suggested activities, or for these local organisations to submit proposals which will go through approvals and acceptance by theid donors. Although this model is familiar to many donor-NGO relationship, it does provide the challenge of the projects/ solutions going through the process of constant [need] for exchange that then impacts on the diffusion of behaviors and the general outcome of the peace, contributing to the initial localization of norms and a hierarchical guardianship in peacebuilding.

Looking at some cases of engagement with international organizations such as UNMISS, the focus balances between community-level peace education and more towards engaging political semi-elites i.e. the local government leaders from the different counties. The paper is not claimimg the engagement of the local in such levels. For instance UNESCO hosted a similar conference in August of 2017 with a slightly more open participant pool of about 200 delegates who were drawn from academia, online activists, youth organizations, representatives of traditional media, media development organizations representatives, government representatives, UN agencies, diplomatic missions and various other actors and stakeholders. The paper is however arguing that despite this, it remains that such an engagement is occasionally open, and its inclusion is largely at a participatory level.

Subservient role of the domestic organizations

There is a subservient role of the local turn that can be seen in the power that both the international actors and peace-builders hold over and against the domestic (internal actors). There is increasingly a growing trend in peace-building in the appreciation for power asymmetry and inequality between international actors, who often are the users of the liberal framework, and the in-domestic actors whose efforts and capacity often fall shorts of intended objectives. This has led to the current tendency in South Sudan to prioritizing the state as the key focus of peace interventions and aligning peace-building with state building. This leads to the prominence of the view that domestic actors are used as subcontractors and entities which have to be trained and conformed in order to make a contribution. This is a prominent position held by a number of the peace actors in Juba. Thus, international strategies (mainstream) strategies in peace-building are presented as the dominant one. The reality still stands, that of the local turn being viewed as subservient to the liberal peace-building approach in the contemporary peace-building mechanism (Thelen 2000). This presented a disconnection with the citizens to the peace processes. The extent to which this high level interaction has influenced contemporary peace is not in doubt, however, the outbreak of war in 2013 reiterates the need for a multi-level and integrated approach to tackle complex issues, especially in an era where domestic actors have considerable agency and influence.

The lack of partnership does not happen by coincidence. Richmond & Franks (2009); Chandler (2010) have argued that the lack of a 'radical nature in the local turn and hybrid formations of international/ liberal and local/non-liberal institutions, practices, and values will continue to subvert the local turn'. With careful examination of the case of the international community and the elites of South Sudan response to the ongoing conflict, there remains a power play in the peace process.

In their own lifetimes, most South Sudanese have lived through a multiplicity of episodes of war. These peace processes, as with the wars, have reshuffled political alliances and positions, creating winners and losers in the architectures of power. Since the 1980s, these agreements have reshuffled power between circles of notorious elites. The agreements have often been made behind closed doors, in foreign lands, based on decades' worth of old relationships that have hugely excluded the people and communities, as they are seen to be actors of low influence. Political processes still reign. This is illustrated in the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, where there was minimal inclusivity of internal organization/ groups and civil societies. As expressed by members of Screen of Rights, most peace agreements have not addressed the psychological issues adequately. The international community also only focusses on the political conflict, forgetting the more deeply rooted cultural conflict that happens on the ground. Although this was later on reversed in the high Level Revitalization forums that have since taken place in Addis Ababa, which call for inclusivity and participation, albeit with great difficulty most of these domestic organizations have, at least, earned an observer role in the peace talks.

The subservient role of domestic organizations can also be observed in the funding of peace organizations. International organizations remain well funded, well trained and the elites remain well connected. However, the domestic are often side lined and their ideas barely recognized, while they lack capacity in term of management, financial and innovative peace-building methodology.

> "If funding is for education or maybe agriculture. In order to survive they will basically modify the scope to fit the funders so that they become agriculture based organizations. In order to do that they move to the national level because the infrastructure of the donors does not really trickle down to the community level. When they come to the national level they will lose their identity to some extent because you have to fit into this design that is compatible to the donors otherwise you cannot get any money. Of course the intention is when they get the money, they will be able to stand on their own two feet, and they will go back to their mandate. Not many go back. The thing is that the relationship between I NGOs and national organizations, is sort of more competitive and also sub contractual in nature." (Interview from Government representative).

Grassroots Relief & Development Agency (GREDA) is a domestic organization that has spent 7 years focusing on the youth and community leaders. Domestic organizations such as GREDA remain poorly funded and this affects their performance. Some of the activities that are entrenched in their strategy involve facilitating dialogue, where they seek to speak to the communities about existing issues that bring about conflict and arranging sport activities which brings the communities together and builds rapport and relationship. GREDA believes that funding both domestic and international organizations will in turn influence the communities in different ways to cultivate a culture of peace, as forces will be acting from the political top and from the communal bottom in efforts to achieve peace. Until 2017, GREDA had not received funds from the Multi-donor trust fund that was set in 2006. They hold the belief that it is due to the small nature of their organization, as compared to other well established organizations that may trace their influence to political elites.

The IDO expressed their sentiments that majority of people in South Sudan are voiceless and that they (the citizens) should be one of the targets of the international community. However, this does not only apply to international organizations but also to domestic and national governmental departments. This demonstrates a disconnection between the international and the grassroots organizations and the domestic organization with the grassroots organization. IDO has also expressed that in their experience, access to international organizations mostly happens as far as funding is concerned. Moreover, allocations of these resources are determined by the access to the authority that an organization has. National non-governmental organizations, with links and ties to national and provincial governments, enjoy more resources like funding and available training more than their local and community counterparts. Thus the impact of national domestic NGOs is far stronger than the communal ones. This means that communities that do not have access to these national domestic NGOs do not get to be beneficiaries of their work.

It also remains true that the funding of domestic organizations affects their level of influence by promoting (or the lack of promotion) of the organizations capacity. In the organizations that were covered, some were found to hold more capacity in terms of resources and influence, as they were well known and better funded. Thus, the top-down processes, were more accessible to them.

There has been issues of funding when it comes to the operationalization of such collaborative efforts. Domestic organisations also maintained that in their experience, when donors do provide funding, it comes with a strict procedure on how they should utilize the funding and on what projects. This most often hard to coordinate, especially when they, as a domestic organization, disagree with some of the projects proposed. However, some donors are flexible and are often open to changes. In this organization, the international actors are important as they are a source of funding for all their activities. However, while they receive funding from the international donors, most of their activities come already structured.

Conclusions

The discussion above give three observable facts. That is there are different approaches and strategies used by international and domestic organizations; there is lack of general partnership and cooperation; the passive role occupied by the domestic organizations in main stream peace-building and the difficult operationalization of the partnership between the domestic and international organizations/ actors of peace. This is therefore a disconnection of the top-down and bottom-up approaches employed by both the domestic and international actors. Some major noticeable effects are;

From the above, there is a realization of the failures of the liberal peace framework to attain and secure peace in South Sudan. The intention of the local turn to bridge this gap has met with different forms of obstacles that has led back the liberal peace framework. Despite the potential for meaningful local efforts in contributing to peacebuilding, the gap between the top-down and bottom-up approaches remains large and worrisome. The persisting gap is exacerbated by the challenges facing domestic organizations and the difficulty of operating during the current war. Issues of funding, coordination, lack of skills, and security render domestic organizations largely dependent on international actors. The challenge moving forward for both domestic, national, and international peacebuilders in South Sudan is to narrow the gap between their efforts in order to more effectively and sustainably solve the crisis. To do so, international organizations must understand the position that the domestic occupies and include them in their mainstream strategies and programs.

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Efforts of Different Regimes in Kenya toward National Cohesion and Integration, 1963–2022

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Abstract

Kenya like many states in the African continent is a multi-ethnic nation (Mulubale, 2017). This paper, therefore, revisits challenges facing Kenya as a multi-ethnic society. The subject of ethnicity has featured prominently in most studies on Kenya, and many of them have used ethnicity to discuss political trends and conflicts in the country. However, very few studies have focused on the efforts of different regimes in Kenya toward national cohesion and integration. Since her independence in 1963, Kenya has had challenges in putting together her ethnic communities. Conflict always arises as a result of the unequal distribution of resources (Simiyu, 2008). The author argues that challenges of ethnicity are exacerbated by failure in nation building and the creation of a national identity. To vividly explain the challenges facing Kenya's national cohesion and integration, the author will examine the efforts by successive regimes toward national cohesion and integration. Given the importance of national cohesion and integration, this study argues for a rethinking of socio-economic policies through political goodwill and instilling national ethos, otherwise, the initiatives for national cohesion and integration will be in vain, stillborn, and frustrated across the nation. The author will examine academic publications, media reports, government strategy documents, and the reports of The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) reports. The study will contribute in informing the ongoing processes of national cohesion and integration in Kenya and also, the historical accounts of national cohesion and integration added on the existing knowledge of world historiography. The paper will conclude that, despite the efforts by the four successive regimes to enhance national cohesion and integration in Kenya, deep rooted ethnic cleavages continue to thwart these efforts and have created new avenues of ethnic animosities. The paper will therefore, provide some policy recommendations for national cohesion which include; the need for equitable distribution of resources, ability to tackle corruption and impunity, proper land reforms, and proper and innovative political reforms.

This article examines the efforts of different regimes (Jomo Kenyatta, 1963–1978, Danie Moi, 1978–2002, Mwai Kibaki, 2002–2013, and Uhuru Kenyatta, 2013–2022) in Kenya toward achieving national cohesion and integration. It argues for a rethinking of socio-economic policies through political goodwill and enhancing national values and ethos for national cohesion and integration. Otherwise, the efforts towards national cohesion and integration will be in vain, stillborn, and frustrated across the nation. It will also try to question the legacies of Kenya's successive presidents who are largely responsible for lack of social cohesion by examining the regime's reinforcing narratives which is illustrative of success of propaganda and disinformation machinery meant to obfuscate subjugation of the masses and justify crushing of dissent.

The president, constitutionally, is a symbol of national unity in Kenya. Kenya's successive presidents, however, were purveyors of ethnic politics, corruption, disregard for the rule of law and state sponsored violence. Consequently, Kenya is a broken body politic haunted by consistently inconclusive elections marred by fraud, protests and violence. It is deeply steeped in ethnic stereotypes, corruption, and unresponsive politics. Basically, the state is predatory not developmental and that is why the state straddles stability and collapse.

The challenge of national unity can be traced from the 1884/85 Berlin conference which provided a proper ground for the official demarcation of the African continent into distinct territories that would be put under the influence of various European powers (Rosenberg, 2004). For the first time, several pre-existing ethnic nations with diverse social, economic, political, and cultural spheres were put under the same territory. Europeans showed a high level of unity in occupying the African continent under the guidance of German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck. They had agreed upon terms and references for the occupation of the continent among them the declaration of the sphere of influence, the policy of effective occupation, and free navigation of the River Niger and River Congo basin among others (McClintock, 2020).

The consequences of amalgamating different ethnic groups to form different countries did not pose an immediate negative impact, at least for the continent since ironically; it is these same ethnic groups that worked together to form a liberation front that ejected Europeans from the continent of Africa (Glaister, et al., 2020). Since independence in 1963, ethnic groups have emerged some were formed by colonialists while others were created by Kenya's postcolonial regimes. Ethnic groups or tribes as Kenyans call them are not homogenous either. The number of ethnic groups in Kenya is unknown. But for political reasons, Kenyans are made to believe in a number that keeps changing anyway. Daniel Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta created "tribes" and the number keeps rising. Moi created Abasuba, and Tharaka, Mbeere tribes, for instance, through distinct administrative units (districts). Kenyatta created Shona, and Makonde tribes through award of citizenship and Indian, William Ruto granted citizenship to the Pemba community through fiat yet these groups have lived in Kenya since before independence.

Since independence in 1963, Kenya has faced challenges of ethnicity. "Ethnicity" is about belonging. It is about identity. It is an edifying concept. However, once ethnicity is instrumentalized, that is, becomes an axis of political mobilization, and disorganization, a factor in access to or denial of state resources, as is has happened throughout Kenya's postcolonial period, it turns into political tribalism – dangerously volatile. Kenya's enduring challenge is lack of a philosophy, a void that enables societal rupture, personality cults, tribal warlords, and institutional impunity. Thus politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens struggle to transcend personal ends, and insular politics which upend the national good.

One of the most insistently repetitive aspects of colonial legacy in Post-Colonial Africa was the ethnic division that emerged both as a group identity and as a mobilizing agent in the quest for social, economic, and political aggrandizement. The complex process of group and class configuration coupled with a colonialist attempt to handle traditional societies and their attempt to develop an intricate capitalist economy in various colonies cannot be gainsaid (Karari, 2018). Therefore, it cannot be possible to understand ethnic complexities in Kenya's political development without going down memory lane to examine the impacts of colonization on the organization of ethnic groups (Leys, 1975)

Competitive ethnic rivalry and ethnic consciousness in Kenya's political arena derives somewhat from how the colonialist established local administrations like local governments and administrative borders based on cultural and linguistic orientation. This was guided by

an erroneous colonialist understanding of Africans which was based on the idea that Africans organized themselves along tribal lines (Sandbrook, 1985)

Literature Review

There is no dearth of studies around ethnicity. Scholars have sought to investigate the nexus between, colonization and ethnic consciousness, ethnicity and politics, ethnicity and development, ethnicity and religion, ethnicity and identity etc. However, little efforts have been made to try and examine efforts towards national cohesion and integration especially in African countries. Yet, a deeper examination of the protracted conflicts and state fragility in the continent reveal the complex relationship between the absence of strong integration and cohesion ethnic.

Across the world, the desire to achieve national cohesion and integration has formed a common debate in political discourses. Most of the conflicts in many countries are politically instigated (Shahabuddin, 2019). The crisis in Syria is historical and politically instigated, the crisis in Afghanistan is notorious, Somalia is experiencing a political crisis, Violence in Myanmar which has left millions dead is politically instigated, the Democratic Republic of Congo is going through volatile conflict, Regional tension is emanating from conflict in South Sudan, there is growing insecurity in Nigeria, Yemen is going through protracted conflict, Ethiopia is facing challenges of conflict, Sudan is experiencing political tension currently and conflict and many more not mentioned but is currently happening across the world (Alam, 2019). National Cohesion and Integration in those countries are at bay and frustrated across the region.

Ethnicity and Politics

Ajulu (2002) worked on politicized ethnicity, competitive conflict, and conflict in Kenya from a historical perspective and he gave a clear nexus between ethnicity and politics. He unravels the nexus between competitive politics, ethnicity, and ethnic conflict in a multi-party system in Kenya. He argues that, the penetration of capitalist ideology and its effects in endangering ethnic inequalities and political contestations are usually aligned to manifest such inequalities (Ajulu, 2002). Ethnicity, therefore, provides a platform for political negotiation and mobilization. The period of the multi-party system in Kenya is characterized by ethnic clashes, and these conflicts cannot be described from a primordial perspective rather, they are politically modified violence aimed at achieving both short and long-term political motives and eventually social and economic benefits.

In their study of the election of then-president Jomo Kenyatta, Brown and Sriram (2012) made a clear observation on key political players who emerged immediately British government declared its intention for Kenya about KANU and Jomo Kenyatta playing a dominant role (Brown & Sriram, 2012) According to them, the merger of KANU and KADU after the general election of 1961 and KANU's relegation of leaders to the other side of the opposition ignited doubt among Kenyan communities about their future (Brown & Sriram, 2012). As they explained, Kenyatta to Africans was not only a paramount leader but also an embodiment of Kenya's nationalism. Therefore, Kenyatta was a perfect person to offer desired national cohesion and integration for the underlying actions towards the future of Kenya.

In his study on Kenyan political actors, 'Tom Mboya, The man Kenya Wanted to forget' David Goldsworthy emphasized Tom Mboya's role in orienting ideologies of key political players, Mboya being recognized as the leader of KANU moderates who raised questions on Kenya's economic policies. That which is important was his role as a jack of all trades to Kenyatta's regime (Lonsdale, 1983). Tom Mboya was the architect of Kenyatta's KANU regime. This is because, he participated

in the formulation of the ruling party's KANU manifestos and also, he was not only in charge of Kenya's constitution but also the architect of Kenya's development strategy.

Tom Mboya himself could not stay for long after proving to be vibrant and articulate in the political scenes. At the age of 39, he was assassinated through a gunshot and died in the ambulance while on the way to the hospital. The killing of Tom Mboya gave the Kenyatta-Odinga cold war intrigues the ethnical dimensions (Otenyo, 2023). As the fate could tell, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was a communist sympathizer, who becomes Jomo Kenyatta's great friend and later great political rival to Jomo Kenyatta who was a capitalist sympathizer.

Branch and Cheeseman (2006) in their attempt to distinguish between hope and despair highlights the frustrations which embedded Kenyans immediately after independence. They argued that then-President Kenyatta and opposition leader Oginga Odinga represented two antagonizing views each of which exhibited a different version of what development means (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006). This, therefore, exhibited different aspirations of Africans. They explain that, President Kenyatta held the view that development was an individual hard work and personal endeavors while Oginga Odinga on the other side perceived development through the lens of re-allocation of available resources for the interest of paupers in the society (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006). To Odinga, this meant the redistribution of European-owned land to peasants and landless.

According to Kisaka & Nyadera (2019), there was a clear division between majority and minority ethnic communities on the eve of independence. The Nation-State by then was characterized by race, multi-ethnic and religious identity. To respond to this, the government embarked on various activities of national cohesion and integration. President Jomo Kenyatta and later Daniel Moi for example, introduced measures to unite the country through 'Harambee and Nyayo' philosophies respectively (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019). These measures were to chart the discourse of development as a step towards ethnic unification. Development and national unity were aspects which complimented each other.

The nexus between competitive politics, ethnicity, and ethnic conflict in a multi-party system in Kenya cannot be gainsaid (Ajulu, 2002). The penetration of capitalist ideology and its effects in endangering ethnic inequalities and political contestations are usually aligned to manifest such inequalities. Ethnicity, therefore, provides a platform for political negotiation and mobilization. The period of the multi-party system in Kenya was characterized by ethnic clashes, and these conflicts cannot be described from a primordial perspective rather, they are politically modified violence aimed at achieving both short and long-term political motives and eventually social and economic benefits.

A Systematic Review of the Research Methodology Approach

This study majored in systematic research methods which chronologically divided the study into three phases. Phase I and II focused on sources, reliability, and their validity plus arguments and claims which appeared in the existing number of literatures reviewed. Phase III was used to give further details on the conceptual and theoretical approaches of the existing studies and to point out some of the challenges and gaps with the current application of National Cohesion and Integration doctrine.

Phase I was important in giving ground to this study within the general view of existing studies. From this phase, it was possible for the author to explore various trends in conflict more so those that are occurring in Kenya. This involved having a keen interest in research questions and

objectives that characterized previous studies. From this perspective, my study could identify issues that have dominated conflict research as well as those that have been downplayed.

An in-depth analysis of available literature revealed existing debate around causes of conflict in Kenya from both policy and academic dimensions. From the findings of existing trends in conflict research, this paper was able to ground its objectives and goals on areas that have been ignored generally. In addition to the theoretical and conceptual aspects of conflict studies, Phase I also offered a deep understanding of the conflicts in Kenya and how academia from various disciplines and backgrounds has researched the country and its challenges.

From the findings, there is a clear indication of the inadequacy of using the National Cohesion and Integration approach in understanding the state of affairs and dynamics of Kenya, yet the country has the potential strength and weaknesses of National Cohesion and Integration as both strategy and doctrine of conflict prevention and resolutions. To adequately meet the research objectives in Phase I, the research was guided by the following questions; first, what is the historical dimension of the conflict in Kenya? Second, what have scholars looked at and concluded as the major issues in conflicts? What have been the efforts of various governments to address the challenges of conflict in Kenya since independence? What are some of the implications of overlooking National Cohesion and Integration in our broad understanding of intractable conflicts currently dotting many parts of the world?

Phase II focused keenly on finding relevant policy platforms and databases where relevant information to this research could be extracted. By use of these databases, the research was able to generate books, articles, reports, formal publications, and other valuable publications relevant to our study. Some of the major databases found and used in the study included University libraries, Web of Science, Scopus, JSTOR, Ebsco, and institutional and government digital libraries.

Keywords such as National Cohesion and Integration, Kenya, nation building, ethnic conflict, intractable conflicts/warfare, peace studies, international law of armed conflict, and Africa (see table 1) were used to search in the sources. A total of 53 sources were extracted from the search above before sources that were duplicates, ineligible, and published in languages that were not familiar to authors were expunged and did not surface in the analysis of the study. Ultimately, a total of 30 sources were adopted and used in the study (see figure)

Table 1: Some of the key search words used in the various databases to scrutinize through the literature.

Database	Search titles/keywords/terms
Web of Science, Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Scopus, University Libraries, JSTOR, EBSCO, Academic Databases, Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Digital institutional libraries such as those that belong to governments and international agencies.	"Peace and conflict resolution" "NCI" "civil wars" "Kenya conflicts" "national unity" "asymmetric conflicts/ warfare" "international law of armed conflict" "peace studies" "Africa" "post -colonial" "non-state violent actors" "protracted conflicts" "ethnic identity" "political settlement" "elections in Kenya" "armed conflict" "state building" "human security"

Discussion

Regimes and National Cohesion in Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta 1963-1978

Jomo Kenyatta came to power not as a fresher in politics but as an individual who went through various experiences with the colonial government; he was in touch with the political realities of

his time. The process of colonization and the brutal experience of the Mau Mau left the country wounded and in a sorry state. When the country attained independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta inherited a scarred nation (Kenyatta, 1964). Many Africans were in detention. According to the demographic study done by John Blackers, about 50,000 people died (Maloba & Maloba, 2018). David Anderson's work indicates that 10,000 Mau Mau soldiers died due to conflict (Klaus, 2020).

About 7.5 million acres of land were alienated during colonization and were held in the trust of white highlands. Most of these were in the Rift Valley and Central provinces. This was followed by the declaration of about 20 percent of the valuable land as crown land with no reciprocal compensation to Africans who had been dispossessed (Kenyatta, 1964). As a result, many Africans became landless in their territory. Africans had been forced to provide free labor and denied the right to grow cash crops.

Jomo Kenyatta took over a country already torn apart because of land issues. The country was divided politically, economically, and socially following the colonial experience (Kenyatta, 1966). During the decades of colonization, European powers had granted some favors to African collaborators. Some of these were considered landed African bourgeoisie, who received support for political interests (Kenyatta, 1966). This according to Europeans was a perfect deal to conclude the process of independence in favor of Europeans.

The terms of independence established during the negotiation stated that redistribution of land will not be for free. That meant squatters and landless Africans, those who had no right or means to acquire or recover land, those who had no land rights, or those who had no right to acquire plots of land through traditional inheritance, were detached from Kenya's agricultural economy (Kenyatta, 1965). This led to a surge in the number of squatters. By the year 1948, it was estimated that this number surged to about 220,000 and this number continued to surge during the emergency. On the eve of independence, 92 percent of the population of Kenya then was domiciled in rural areas. The land ownership system was still collective, communal, and familial.

President Jomo Kenyatta was quick to address African issues among them national cohesion and integration. President Kenyatta adopted Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 termed African Socialism. This paper was Key in addressing issues of social, economic, and political inclusion across the country (Shem, 2016). Kenyatta adopted African Socialism and Conservative Nationalism. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 entitled "African socialism" was beneficial in planning for the economic development of Kenya. This was a paper aimed at creating new societies different from colonial societies. It took into consideration political equity, social justice, freedom from poverty, exploitation, and diseases, upholding human dignity, provision of equal opportunities for all, and equal distribution of resources and services devoid of race, social injustice, and oppression.

From the political front, African Socialism according to Kenyatta was important as it was grounded on the development of state-run-mechanized farms and market control. Through African Socialism, Kenyatta borrowed from Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana's belief in a single-party state. The idea was, a multi-party system and class division were alien to Africans. Social differences among communities could be reconciled through a one-party system. Democratic and socialist values were part of the pre-colonial history of Africans (Emmanuel, 2012). This is because the production and distribution of wealth were contributed by all people in the society. Kenyatta was clear in thought that multiple political parties would yield ethnic alignments further exacerbating ethnic violence and disintegration.

Kenyatta adopted African Socialism for several reasons; he wanted to create a society that was distinct from the colonial societies, a society that was free from economic and social inequalities,

racism, and oppression, a united and free country where the rights and freedoms of individuals are upheld, he wanted to create a free, humane and just society characterized by equality before the law and the rule of law, and finally a society exhibiting growth of income per capita.

Kenyatta further adopted a national philosophy entitled "Harambee" a Kiswahili word meaning pulling together. This was a cordial call to all ethnic tribes and people to join hands together toward nation–building. It is an indigenous philosophy aimed at uplifting poor Kenya (Nge'the, 1983). The system encouraged all communities to work together and to an extent raise funds for start–ups, initiatives, and projects with the government promising financial support to such initiatives.

Harambee philosophy according to Kenyatta was a development strategy that aimed at mobilizing people at the local level to participate in economic and social development at their locale. The aim was to achieve a collective good instead of personal aggrandizement. Through collective good, local resources like labor and other materials could be successfully maximized. The majority need in society is guided by the choice of project or initiative to be undertaken. Harambee indeed was an idea whose time had come.

President Kenyatta ensured that the culture of hard work was inculcated in all citizens devoid of race, culture, and origin. The funds mobilized from across the divides were used for both physical and infrastructural developments like roads, air, and waterways both of which enhanced national cohesion and integration (Nge'the, 1983). Agricultural and educational sectors also gained from Harambee's philosophy since they formed the basis of development. The projects initiated through Harambee at the time attracted both local and international attention. Donors such as Non–Governmental Organizations stepped in to offer reinforcements.

Did Jomo Kenyatta mean well for the country at the time? Scholars have argued that Kenyatta epitomized avarice and that still haunts Kenya to date (Buijtenhuijs, 2016). Privatization of the state for personal aggrandizement is a colonial legacy that Kenyatta entrenched. It was meant to wrong foot and stigmatizes Mau Mau (freedom fighters) and ethnic groups whom Kenyatta and fellow avaricious elite dispossessed of their ancestral land that the British settlers had appropriated. Mau Mau continued to call for land restitution but was dismissed as lazy and more into "politics" than work. The disturbing inference was that they were architects of their poverty and landlessness.

Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi 1978–2022

Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi served as the third vice president before ascending to become the second president of Kenya in 1978. Moi managed to take up a top position despite several attempts from political factions to deter his ambitions. At some point, this deterrence turned to harassment from government officials and other politicians. At some point, he contemplated resignation but before he handed in the letter, he received conviction by close allies (Klaus, 2020). Otherwise, if he did, Kenyan history could have taken a different trajectory from the one in the records.

President Moi took over and promised continuity of Kenyatta's presidency through a philosophy called "Nyayo" a Kiswahili word meaning footsteps. This, therefore, meant that President Moi followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Kenyatta and his government. This according to him meant three major things, properly defined traditional ties both in government and shared political and religious values, undoubted loyalty to the president and ruling party KANU and sound ethnic grounding and clout (Santiago, 2023). President Moi's style of leadership was unprecedented and therefore was referred to as the professor of politics.

President Moi, like his predecessor, envisioned a nation that is prosperous with people from distinct ethnic communities peacefully co-existing. This is a vision he penned down in his book "Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principle." In this book published in 1986, President Moi defined what a prosperous nation looked like. In the book, he also indicated the passion for good leadership of his predecessor Kenyatta. Notable things include how he described in his book major setbacks to nation-building including corruption and self-aggrandizement, negative ethnicity, threats of war in the continent pose threats to growth and development in African states. To some scholars (Nzau & Guyo, 2018) Nyayo was not a philosophy rather an ideology of subjugation like *Harambee.* This ideology was couched under love, peace, and unity yet he behaved oppositely. He was tribal, corrupt, tyrannical, and divisive.

President Moi clearly articulated the roles and responsibilities of every individual in nation-building. For the youth, he developed a clear plan with a clear sense that they are the leaders of tomorrow. He, therefore, passed a mandatory admission into the National Youth Service (NYS) before they transited to higher cadres of learning like colleges and universities. According to Moi, National Youth Service training was to impart a sense of national belonging and practical education for national development. The knowledge, skills, and attitude gained in training will be impactful to the country. Training laid the foundation for committed, responsive and responsible leaders for tomorrow. He gave intellectuals a responsibility to guide and show direction to the youths. To his dismay, the intellectuals used young people in colleges and universities to instigate conflict and strikes (Santiago, 2018). This according to him was a bad example that leadership can only be obtained through violence.

The year 1982 was indeed a sad moment in Kenyan history and President Moi's regime. There was a coup d'état which was an attempt to overthrow the KANU regime under Daniel Moi. On Sunday 1st August 1982, at 3.00 AM a faction from Kenya Airforce took charge of the Eastleigh Airbase outskirts of Nairobi and by 4.00 AM Embakasi Airbase which is in proximity had also been captured (Diang'a, 2002). By 6.00 AM Hezekiah Ochuka who led the faction of Kenya Airforce and aired on Voice of Kenya Radio station based at Nairobi C.B.D both in English and Kiswahili language that the military had taken over the government. This followed attempts to bomb Kenya's statehouse.

President Moi was able to quell the attempted coup and restored calm across the country. Historians will argue that this sad moment changed Moi's attitude. To some, the episode transformed President Moi into a dictator. To others, Moi became a firm leader. The nexus between the two is, both agree that both attitudes were aimed at reinforcing and strengthening his leadership and government. Political assassinations were experienced in the aftermath of an attempted coup which some argued was a process of elimination of rebels. President Moi managed to rule Kenya for a record 24 years. He retired in 2002 after completing constitutional two-term limits.

Mwai Emilio Kibaki 2002-2012

Mwai Emilio Kibaki was the fourth Vice President of Kenya before he became the third president. Before 2002, Mwai Kibaki had tried two times both in 1992 and 1997 to be the president. During the 27 December 2002 polls, the opposition alliance named National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won the election. Mwai Kibaki became the president and has been the party's flag bearer. The 2002 polls marked a great turn-around in the politics of Kenya ever. Formation of political alliances behind it and after the election led to the ousting of the ruling party KANU which had enjoyed an atmosphere of authority and dominance since independence. The Kenya African National Union conceded defeat in a historical proclamation. It marked the first-time political alliances were

formed unanimously to challenge the dominant political party devoid of tribe or clan. Both Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, who were on the opposition front united to defeat KANU.

The historic post-election violence of 2007/08 tested Kenyan political stability. The experience almost plunged the country into civil strife, which reached its full-blown. It exposed the country's rotten system (Klaus, 2020) It ruptured wounds of irregularities and inequalities on various issues, including land allocation, a pervasive culture of impunity, the overbearing presidency and ethnic-based power, dishonesty of the largest scale among the political elites, malfeasance, and rabble, which pushed the country over the precipice (Securing justice, 2013)

The election pitted the incumbent Mwai Kibaki and the opposition Raila Amolo Odinga. The elections were marred with irregularities and illegalities. It was not clear even to the electoral commission then who won the election. The results were protested by then-opposition leader Raila Odinga leading to mass violence. Scholars have argued that the election only provided a platform to express historical injustices of land and inclusivity which had piled up. The experience called the attention of international communities and the United Nations. Kofi Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations was sent to find a truce between worrying parties. This led to the signing of an agreement leading to the formation of a coalition government. The coalition government had both incumbent Mwai Kibaki as the president and Raila Odinga as the Prime Minister. This was one of the first processes of achieving national cohesion and integration.

To ensure continuous national cohesion and integration, the Coalition government came up with reform agenda also known as the implementation of reform agenda 4. The reform agenda was agreed upon between President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in the presence of arbiter Kofi Annan. The reform agenda was read all together in form of a press release. Key issues discussed in the reform agenda are as follows.

The first one was a constitution review process. The parliament of Kenya was given the mandate to constitute a constitutional review commission to look at gaps in the present constitution to ensure national cohesion and integration. The committee was constituted and in April-May 2009, the committee invited the public to submit their memoranda. The committee analyzed issues submitted and come up with three key issues; transitional provisions, a system of government, and a level of devolution of power. The committee ended up publishing a draft for discussion by the public. This led to the amendment of the constitution leading to the promulgation of the new constitution of Kenya in 2010. The constitution provided a shift in the paradigm of leadership and government to enhance inclusivity.

Other issues discussed within the reform agenda include instituting Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to do inquiries into the nature and causes of continuous conflict in the country. Others included reforms in the judiciary, electoral commission, police reforms, issues of youths and unemployment, and land reforms (Norris et al. 2018). Putting in place all the circumstances surrounding the events at the time, the coalition government made efforts to ensure all the reform agendas were achieved.

Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta 2013-2022

Uhuru Muigai Kenya became the president in 2013 via Jubilee Alliance Ticket. This was a conglomeration of the majority tribes of Kalenjin and the Kikuyu. Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto under the jubilee ticket faced it off with Raila Odinga and his running mate Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka.

Kenyan democracy was tested for the first time after the promulgation of the 2010 constitution during the lead-up to the 2013 election and after (Kenia, 2013). This was a tense but relatively peaceful general election that occurred on 9th March of the same year. The Independence Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC) announced Uhuru Kenyatta as the president-elect under the Jubilee coalition after having garnered 50.07 percent of the total votes cast. He was elected on a joint ticket with William Samoei Ruto as his running mate who became a de-jure deputy president. His greatest competitor, then Prime Minister Raila Amolo Odinga went to court in a bid to challenge his win court. Irrespective of all the allegations of technical failures, electoral malpractice, and irregularities, the Supreme Court of Kenya validated the election of Uhuru Kenyatta.

Although Mr. Odinga accepted the court's decision on the electoral petition, civil society and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) continued to raise questions concerning shortcomings in electoral processes and their impacts on Kenyan democracy. It was upon the elected president Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto to restore people's confidence in the electoral process and show total commitment to the implementation of the 2010 constitution more so on matters of devolution, land reforms, national reconciliation, and total fight against corruption. Failure to do so the country was going to be polarized and alienated from the international community

In as much as there were clashes preceding the elections of 2013, and following the verdict of the Supreme Court, the country tried as much as possible to abstain from a repeat of the 2007/08 post-election violence. Several factors contributed to this peaceful election. Some of them include, a consensus reached by political elites and entire citizens not to turn the entire country back to the brink of war. Pressure from the international community more so the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases, restriction of freedom to assemble, media self-censorship as well as the imposition of security personnel on hot spots helped in averting unrest

However, there are vital issues that are yet to be addressed (Wato, 2011). A plethora of reforms focusing on systematic and structural conflict drivers, unemployment rate, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), land reforms, regional and socio-economic inequalities, weak institutional framework, ethnic tensions, and culture of impunity are factors that are yet to be implemented. Up to now, accountability for 2007/08 post-election violence is yet to be solved. Cases are still resting with the International Criminal Court. Cases of witness tempering still going on to date

March 2018 Historic Uhuru-Raila Handshake

In August 2017, Kenya went to polls and the incumbent Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta was passionate to retain his seat for the second term. The opposition led by Raila Odinga was also passionate about breathing fresh air into government by outdoing the incumbent government. The independent electoral and boundaries commission announced Uhuru Kenyatta as the president after garnering 54.17% of the total votes cast against Raila Odinga who finished second with 44.94% of the vote (Carter report, 2018). The results were disputed by the opposition. The opposition took to the Supreme Court to petition the electoral results. The Supreme Court upon hearing the petition made a historic ruling ever in Kenya by nullifying the presidential election. The Supreme Court ordered a fresh presidential election within 60 days.

Kenya went on a repeat election in October 2017. The opposition boycotted the repeat election with the claim of an un-revamped electoral system. The opposition claimed that they could not participate in an election with the electoral body which bungled the election. According to the

opposition, it was until the electoral body is reformed that they will participate in the election. All the same, elections went on with only one presidential candidate participating. The electoral body went ahead and again declared Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner.

Kenya entered into a session of confusion (Onguny, 2020). The opposition refused to recognize the presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta and his government. They pronounced a resistance movement that boycotted paying taxes and the purchase of goods from government-owned companies. The country was at standstill for months. On 30th January 2018, the opposition leader Raila Odinga was sworn in as the people's president. The situation ushered in a country with two presidents i.e. the president of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga the people's president.

The situation was dire and this called the attention of both the continent and the world. The international community called for a truce between the two rivals. The succession movements had been planned and discussions around it were ongoing. Kenya was about to be divided into two (Oxford Analytica, 2018). The idea was to solve electoral injustices which have provided a breeding ground for political betrayals and persecutions. Issues of political exclusion also formed part of the discussion since the presidency had been emanating from only two tribes the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin.

Just like then vice president George Saitoti once said, 'there comes a time when a nation is more important than an individual" the two opposing leaders decided to end their prolonged political differences because the end was unpredictable and the country needed to move on. This led to the famous "Handshake" where the two leaders shook hands after a long period of deliberation in Harambee house offices. The handshake took place outside the Harambee offices in the presence of the media. The two leaders agreed to work together to enhance unity between Kenyan communities. Through a handshake, a sigh of relief was breathed into the Kenyan political environment. The situation which had scared investors was restored. Peace reigned.

Conclusion

Whereas the spirit and changes in the country's development agenda aim at achieving national cohesion and integration, the attempts remain sound and committed mainly because it displays tendencies and strategies toward national unity in Kenya (Klaus, 2020). Various commissions of inquiries into national unity have laid down major steps which need to be implemented. Some of them include the Kriegler report on 2007 election malpractices and Waki report of 2007 on Post-Election Violence (PEV) and Ndungu's report on land questions.

Kenyan leaders need to take these reports and initiatives by revisiting and converting these recommendations into actionable plans. In as much as most of these recommendations focused on land, there are some which involved constitutional reforms such as the Building Bridges Initiatives which came about after the historic handshake in March 2018 (Boone, et al., 2019) other constitutional reforms led to the promulgation of the 2010 constitution which has served the country very well.

However, there are vital issues that are yet to be addressed (Wato, 2011). A plethora of reforms focusing on systematic and structural conflict drivers, unemployment rate, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), land reforms, regional and socio-economic inequalities, weak institutional framework, ethnic tensions, and culture of impunity are factors that are yet to be implemented. Up to now, accountability for 2007/08 post-election violence is yet to be solved. Cases are still resting with the International Criminal Court.

Policy Recommendations

Shift from the colonial administrative system

Post-colonial scholars often refer to the role and impact of colonialism on African countries including Kenya, yet they seem muted on the failure by post-colonial African societies to immediately shift away from the colonial style of administration. Now this issue has impacted Kenya much deeper than many can imagine. For one, Kenya only transformed its colonial provincial administration system in 2013 after the amalgamation of the 2010 constitution. The provincial administration system was not only exploitative but was never structured in a manner that it could enhance service delivery to the people. The lost decades between 1963 and 2010 when Kenya was governed using the same system as the one left by the British colonial administrators needs to be reexamined more so on the reason why successive governments maintained this inefficient system. But an even more crucial component about retaining the colonial administration system is the people who worked in this system may not have changed their work ethic, culture and mentality. With some of them still in the public service and high political offices, their approach to governance may remain not only exploitative but also divisive thus affecting national cohesion and unity.

Equitable distribution of public goods

After every five years, Kenyans have been heading to the polls since the return of multiparty in 1992 to elect their leaders. Central to their campaigns has been the issue of economic development and transforming the lives of Kenyans. Recent decades have seen the country benefit from increased number of highly trained economists; planners and policy experts who can help design sustainable development plans that can propel the country into the next level as it was with the case of Kenya's vision 2030 blueprint. But the elephant in the room has been the question of equity and fairness in the distribution of resources. Basic economics and development programs explain that national development needs to cover the broader nation and not specific regions of the country. Just as the colonial government did by favoring white settlements over the rest of the country, successive governments have focused more on developing their so called 'strong holds' investing money in projects that have very little returns. What is even ironical is that money meant to finance these projects are often borrowed as loans which today seem to burden the Kenyan taxpayers with repayment. Unequal distribution of resources will not put Kenya among the competitive nations because underdevelopment in one part of the country will be reflected in the aggregate GDP. But the trend of unjust distribution of public goods seems to persist. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed with urgency if Kenyan is to go far.

Inadequate land reforms

The question of land is integral not just because land is a factor of production but also because land is at the core of historical injustices and grievances in Kenya. The problem of land has been an issue from the colonial period when land was forcefully annexed or heavily taxed to the post-colonial period where successful governments either maintained status quo or introduced reforms that did not adequately address the issue. Land remains an emotional topic in Kenya with evidence from the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation report as well as the 1998 Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry revealing the depth of land problems in Kenya especially how it impacts on tribal clashes. If the issue of land is not well addressed in Kenya, then national cohesion and unity is likely to fail.

Tackling corruption and impunity

Perhaps the impact of corruption and impunity is not always given enough attention, especially on the extent to which these two continue to divide the country. Most studies focus on the impact of corruption and impunity on the economic spheres of the country, but at the same time they highly impact on the nation's sense of unity. In Kenya, corruption is entrenched into institutions and organizations that are supposed to ensure fairness and justice. Lack of justice, be it legal, economic and political makes various segments of society feel isolated and marginalized. Many can attest to lack of justice within the legal systems, mistreatment from security agencies, denial of opportunities despite merit, misinformation and spreading of fake news by people in authority as well as extrajudicial killings are other examples of how much corruption and impunity affects the country. Successive governments have not been able to address the issue of corruption and impunity which has seen some of the least competent individuals continue to serve in high positions within the public service. Dealing with corruption and impunity will certainly be a game changer for Kenya and its citizens. The idea that the country and policies being made should only focus on development and not address corruption and impunity only worsen economic and social divisions within the country

Introduction of innovative political reforms in Kenya

There are many discussions over the need for political reforms in Kenya and how such changes are likely to impact on the country. In fact, since 1964, Kenyans have been preoccupied with the discussions about political reforms with numerous efforts starting with the abolition of the Westminster model of government just a year after independence to the introduction of the devolved system of government in 2013. Yet, despite the many political reforms in the country, they seem to be inadequate when it comes to national cohesion and unity. Perhaps we can lay the blame on lack of innovative political reforms that will take into account not only the unique structural and demographic features of Kenya, but also the aspect of human nature which is often ignored. The complexities of Kenya's ethnic composition and decades old stereotypes need to be dismantled in the new political dispensation and a new understanding of who is a Kenyan, what obligations do they have towards the republic as well as the roles they have to play in ensuring the caliber of leaders governing the country constitutes the best the Kenya can offer will contribute immensely towards the rebirth of a new nation, one where its citizens are united and there is cohesion.

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Santiago, A. P. (2018). From "new breed" to entrenched African leaders; examining modernization rhetoric and policies of Paul Kagame, Yoweri Museveni, and Isaias

An Analysis of ANC Power at the 55th National Conference

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Abstract

In the lead-up to the centenary of the ANC in 2012, Booysen proposed an analytical framework through which to assess the ANC's power and ability to retain that power in future. This was because the ability of the ANC to maintain dominance over the South African political system was diminishing for various reasons, but the future remained uncertain. The analytical framework examines ANC to power in four dimensions: the ANC concerning the people, the state of the ANC organisationally, the ANC electorally and the application of said power. The analytical framework indicates milestones to measure whether the party is strengthening or weakening. This paper adopts Booysen's analytical framework to examine ANC power at the time of the 55th National Congress held in 2022. Using the milestones indicated by the framework this paper argues that the ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators namely the ANC in the state, concerning the people and electorally while it has remained stable as an organisation.

Introduction

The year 2022 marks 110 years since the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) and 32 years since its unbanning when it had to make the transition from a liberation movement to a political party. For 28 out of the 32 years as a political party, the ANC has enjoyed unparalleled dominance of the South African political landscape where it has enjoyed most of the electoral support and general trust from society. In the lead-up to the ANC centenary in 2012, Booysen (2011, p. 303) provided an analysis of the ANC's political power in four dimensions. The ANC in the state and government, the ANC electorally and in competition with other political parties, the ANC in relation t people and the ANC organisationally. She argued that the four faces of ANC power offered an inclusive analytical framework for tracking its consolidation of power and its ability to continuously reinvent and retain that power. In her assessment of the ANC in the state and government, she suggests that a weak ANC would be characterised by policies that fail to meet targets, the inability to decide on alternative policies, combined with a reluctance to change deficient policy and the pretence that policy is changed when instead it is just merely recast. As for the ANC in relation to other people, (Booysen, 2011) further argued that the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength as long as social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another.

The ANC electorally and in competition with other parties, she argued that the party remains strong for as long as the ANC enjoyed 60% of all electoral support and a sizeable majority of the provinces (*ibid*). Most notably and in relation to the focus of this paper, she contends that at the organisational level, the strength of the party is signalled by relative unity and cooperation. Therefore, when factional politics dominate the flow of ideas and challenges to the mother

body prevail, weaknesses materialise. Consequently, while the internal party contestation for leadership positions may indicate a vibrant ANC when this contestation is rooted in access to state resources, it points to an increasingly fragile organisation.

This paper aims to analyse the state of the ANC power using the above metric at the 55th elective conference in 2022 and ten years after the development of this model. The paper argues that the ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators namely the ANC in the state, in relation to the people and electorally while it remains relatively stable organisationally. The paper adopts document analysis as a means of data collection. Document analysis is a qualitative research method in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning to a particular topic. Document analysis was most appropriate for this analysis paper because it is a contemporary analysis of ongoing events. Furthermore, document analysis is an efficient and effective way of gathering data because documents are manageable and practical resources. Documents are common, easily accessible, and reliable sources of data. Also, documents are stable, "non-reactive" data sources, meaning that they can be read and reviewed multiple times and remain unchanged by the researcher's influence or research process (Bowen, 2009).

This paper is divided into four sections which discuss each metric individually, firstly it examines the state in government, followed by the ANC in relation to the people, the ANC electorally and finally the ANC organisationally.

The ANC in state and government

The assessment of the ANC in the state and government (Booysen, 2011) suggests that a weak ANC would be characterised by policies that fail to meet targets, the inability to decide on alternative policies, combined with a reluctance to change deficient policy and the pretence that policy is change when instead it is just merely recast. Perhaps the most glaring policy failure is the economic policy of the ANC.

The ANC's policy direction is determined at the elective conferences that take place every five years. The ANC has maintained a culture of National Conferences. When it was banned in 1960, national conferences were held annually. During its years 'underground', the ANC held major conferences sporadically, usually to consider policy shifts required by changing circumstances. After the ANC's unbanning in 1990, national conferences were held every three years until December 1997. At the 50th National Conference held at Mafikeng, North West in December 1997, it was decided future national conferences would be held every five years (Dhawraj, 2017).

According to the ANC constitution, Rule 11, among other responsibilities, the National Conference:

· Decides on and determines the ANC's policy, programme, and constitution.

That means that economic and social policy is adopted first at the conference and then brought to parliament to be adopted as national policy. During the peak of ANC electoral dominance between 1999–2009 where the party at its peak enjoyed 66% of the electoral support, it was inevitable that ANC conference policy resolutions would be South African policy. Nonetheless, the ANC enjoys a majority within parliament and still has room to direct national economic policy.

The 2012 ANC conference resolutions begin with the declaration that the ANC's economic vision rests on the Freedom Charter's call that the people shall share in South Africa's wealth. This is reiterated across multiple ANC conference documents in the years that follow. It acknowledges the persistent and stubborn challenges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment.

The resolutions further declare the intention to transfer the structure of the economy through industrialisation and broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) to address the basic needs of the people of South Africa (ANC, 2012, p. 20). In sum, the ANC recognises the structural economic challenges facing the country and their response in 2012 was to address these challenges through the implementation of BBBEE and industrialisation. However, both these goals are not clearly defined and there are no measurable milestones that can be used to reflect on the progress made.

The 2017 ANC conference was convened under the theme "*Remember Tambo: Towards Unity, Renewal and Radical Socio-Economic Transformation".* The theme itself underscores the failure of ANC's economic policy after 23 years in office. During this conference, the ANC's approach to economic revival was through the expropriation of land without compensation. In the resolution documents, the party stated:

> "The ANC is committed to addressing the historical injustice of land dispossession and we shall pursue land expropriation without compensation as a matter of policy. We shall give effect to this resolution in a manner that strengthens the agricultural sector, improves economic growth, and meaningfully addresses inequality and unemployment".

In the lead-up to the 2022 conference, a discussion document was released which would guide the discussions during the 55th National Conference. In the discussion document, the ANC declared that the ANC's economic policy is to build a new more equal society. The document further suggests that there must be a return to the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) must enter a second phase of the ongoing transition from colonialism and apartheid to a national democratic society. According to the discussion document, during this phase, the ANC will forge ahead with interventions that seek to change the structure, systems, institutions, and patterns of ownership, management, and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans. This is a very ambiguous statement that has no clear meaning or tangible indicators.

Reflecting on the conference resolutions and discussion documents, it becomes clear that there is also a discontinuity in ANC policy and the ANC going with whatever political rhetoric is popular in that period. In 2012, at the height of ANC power and dominance, the keyword was black economic empowerment, targeted at the emerging black middle class. In 2017 it was a radical economic transformation, a response to the rising number of the poor and dislocation in the space of the middle class as the torch bearer of their aspirations. Finally, in 2022 the ANC evokes liberation euphoria and declares a return to the National Democratic Revolution. Arguably this is an indication that the ANC is losing its identity and hopes to be clinging to its historical legacy as a means to stimulate support.

There is also a clear disconnect between policy resolutions and implementation. While the party has grand visions and ideas about what needs to be done the implementation is severely lacking. In addition, due to the fact, there aren't specific measurable outputs instead there are vague timelines at best, it becomes difficult to determine whether the party has failed to meet targets or not. It becomes additionally challenging to develop new policies in response to either failure or success of a policy. This ambiguity further limits the political imagination to develop newer policies to respond to the context of the day. As per the analytical framework, this indicates the weakness of the ANC in the state and government.

The ANC in relation to the people

As for the ANC in relation to other people, (Booysen, 2011) further argued that the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength if social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another. Reflecting on social indicators, particularly inequality, poverty, and unemployment which determine the quality of life of South Africans, the ANC has weakened significantly.

In March 2019, the South African quarterly poverty statistics were released. The statistics aim to characterize the nature of poverty in South Africa. From those statistics, 64.2% of black South Africans lived in poverty, followed by the Coloured population at 41, 3%, then the Indian/Asian population falling to 5.9% and then the white poverty levels at 1%. What these figures indicate is that poverty in South Africa disproportionately affects black people who also make up the majority population. According to these statistics out of the 56 million people living in South Africa, 30.4 million of those people live in poverty. Additionally, 49.2% of this poor population is black African women. Furthermore, poverty in the country is concentrated in previously disadvantaged areas or former homelands. Finally, and most importantly, poverty is on the rise in South Africa.

Poverty is a complex societal issue presenting itself along racial, social, and political lines. Essentially poverty is characterized by a person's inability to meet the basic needs necessary for survival. The definition and measurement of poverty is complex. Poverty presents itself in social, economic and political ways and thus it is challenging to capture all its forms in a single definition. In addition to the problems with the conceptualization of poverty, South Africa does not have an official poverty baseline, however, households whose accumulated income is less than R2000.00 p/m are considered very poor (Naidoo, 2011). Numerous studies have emphasized the role socioeconomic status plays in shaping political attitudes and political participation. These studies essentially argue that income and education are determining factors of an individual's political preference and behaviour.

South Africa is known as one of the most unequal countries in the world if not the most unequal country. StatsSA lists four key indicators of inequality; South Africa's labour market which is heavily racialized, gender biased and the largest contributor to income inequality. Secondly, the reliance on social grants as opposed to wages from employment in the bottom 60% of households in the country. Thirdly, identifies the Eastern Cape as the most unequal province with individuals living in the Eastern Cape having had the lowest annual mean and median expenditures for all four data points and finally the increase in the asset distribution among black people, in which there has been consistent in average asset scores for black Africans led to a decline in asset inequality between groups, in sum intra-race inequality is on the rise in particular among black South Africans (StatsSA, 2020). For the focus of this paper, the focus is on income inequality and distribution of wealth which have a historical underpinning and enjoy much political attention. South Africa has one of the highest income inequalities in the world. Therefore making income disparity is a potentially strong factor driving voter identity and ultimately voter behaviour. According to the 2011 Census, 95% of households earn below R12800 per month with 45% of households earning zero annual income. Income status likely maps into the nature of the association with the formal labour market, union membership, or unemployment status, which can further define the nature of voter interests (Fedderke & Giannaros, 2017).

According to (Francis & Webster, 2019) South Africa, like many developing countries is grappling with a continued decline in its primary economic sector, the mining industry which results in a simultaneous decline in employment. In addition, South Africa has also failed to grow its industrial base and has further seen a decline in manufacturing employment. In the first quarter

of 2023 unemployment in South Africa was 32.9%, the first rise in over a year, from 32.7% in the prior period. The number of unemployed persons is estimated to be 7.9 million people (TradingEconomics, 2023)

Furthermore, South Africa also has a very youthful population. According to the StatsSA midyear population estimates of 2018, 35.66 % of the population is between the ages of 15 to 35. This segment of the population contributes the highest level of unemployed persons into the economy with 54.70% of people within this age group being unemployed. In 2022 South Africa was subsequently declared the capital of unemployment in the world.

Undoubtedly, this high level of poverty, unemployment and inequality in the country is an indictment of the failure of ANC policies and the ANC in government. The Rational Choice Theory of Voter behaviour suggests that voters care about and respond to the economic and political performance of the incumbent party. Voters consider the past performance of the government and their future expectations and then punish or reward parties accordingly.

Arguably, trends in ANC support closely match fluctuations in the evaluation of national economic conditions and satisfaction thereof. It seems reasonable to expect that as time passes voters will increasingly link their plight to government policy and hold government policy and government responsible. With time and as the ANC's track record develops retrospective evaluations should become more relevant as South Africans become better to evaluate the ANC's time in office.

Overall the quality of life of South Africans has deteriorated and as (Booysen, 2011) the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength if social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another, which from the evidence cited above is on the contrary. Inequality, poverty and unemployment are worsening or have stagnated. Within this context, it is reasonable to argue that the ANC in relation to the people is weakening.

The ANC electorally and in competition with other parties

In the first ten years of South Africa's elections many observers, analysts and academics argued that race and racial rhetoric was the driving factor for South Africa's electoral outcomes (García-Rivero, 2006; Naidu et al., 2006; Schlemmer, 1994). In this school of thought, scholars argued that the legacies of apartheid encouraged enduring and inflexible racial and ethnic cleavages that inform electoral behaviour. As a result, the 1994 elections and subsequent elections thereafter were widely described as the racial or ethnic census. The core assumption of this period was that partisan support was racially aligned; black people will vote for black parties and white people will vote for white parties.

However, Schulz-Herzenberg (2008) presented a study of aggregate behaviour voter activity and voter behaviour between 1994 and 2004 revealing that the South African electorate is less predictable than initially thought.The study made the following assertions: It confirmed that South African voters do not make up their minds anew with every election as partisanship guides electoral outcomes. Furthermore, it indicated that multiple factors drive party identification and that the relationship between race and party images is a key driver of voter behaviour. Finally, the study argues that the sociological context in which they find themselves in ethnicity and race also determines voter behaviour.

The year 2004 election year represented the peak of ANC dominance with the party receiving 69.69% of the national votes, achieving the coveted two-thirds majority (IEC, 2019). However, since 2009 the margin of dominance has slowly been declining. Despite the dominance of the

ANC, South Africa is a vibrant democracy that houses multiple opposition parties. The reduced margins of victory of the ANC are in contrast with the electoral outcomes of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the leading opposition party, and the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF, the third-largest political party in South Africa and as from the 2019 election a resurgence in the support of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Freedom Front Plus (VF+).The following table highlights the ANC's electoral performance in contrast to three leading political parties in South Africa since its centenary when the model was first developed and, in the lead, up to the 55th National Conference.

Table 1: Electoral Performance of ANC 2014-2021

Year	2014 NPE	2016 LGE	2019 NPE	2021 LGE
Party				
ANC	62.15	53.91	57.50	45.59
DA	22.23	26.9	20.77	21.66
EFF	6.35	8.19	10.80	10.31
IFP	2.40	4.25	3.38	5.64
VF+	0.90	0.77	2.38	2.34

Source: IEC

This paper considers both the Local Government Elections and General and Provincial Elections. this paints a more accurate picture of the electoral performance of the ANC in competition with other parties. The current electoral trends indicate the decline of ANC support and an increase in the support of opposition parties, the IFP and the EFF. The electoral trends also indicate a decline in the support of the DA which over the past few years has lost its image as a multi-cultural alternative and is facing accusations and perceptions of being a "white "party. The electoral performance of the ANC is also contrasted against a significant decline in voter turnout. When contrasting registered voters with the voting-age population the findings indicate the ANC returned to power in 2019 with the active consent of 35% of the voting-age population.

When citizens are unhappy with the performance of the ANC they choose to abstain from voting as opposed to voting for opposition parties. Whereas voter theories suggest that when the electorate is unhappy, they seek out other potential representatives, Kotze (2006) underscores that South African voter use their votes as an ANC accountability mechanism and use non-voting to punish the ANC.

With the marginal gains of the EFF, IFP and VF+, the above table further suggests a shift in this mentality and South African voters are beginning to vote for alternative parties. This could also be a result of the generational change that is taking place as most voters are people born after 1994 and those born during the transitional phase in the mid-1980s who the first beneficiaries of the post-democratic South Africa are. The ANC can no longer liberation euphoria as a basis for support. Therefore, as per the model, the ANC has weakened significantly.

The ANC organisationally

At the organisational level, the strength of the party is signalled by relative unity and cooperation. In this regard, this paper argues that the ANC towards the 55th National Policy Conference is relatively stable i.e., not strengthening nor registering significant weakness. In so doing I expand the analytical framework to focus beyond the factional contestations within the organisation

and to reflect on the actions of the party in parliament about the positions taken at the elective conference and directives of the National Executive Committee (NEC). This paper argues that the stability of the ANC lies in its ability to consolidate its position during times of crisis. In this way, the party ensures its survival by not being seen to be fragmented.

This paper reflects specifically on the actions of ANC MPs during the motions of no confidence that were initiated by opposition parties in the years 2010–2022. The first motion against a sitting ANC president was initiated in 2010 against former president Jacob Zuma for being considered unfit to hold office, 2017 former President Jacob Zuma had survived five motions of no confidence against him, three had been voted on, one has been withdrawn and one was amended (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017) Within the South African Constitution, a Section 102: Motion of No Confidence needs a 51% vote, or at least 201 MPs to vote in favour. The initial motions of confidence were related to issues of an underperforming economy, unemployment, and social cohesion, in the final motion of no confidence in November 2016 the failure to implement the public protector's remedial actions was included in the reasons for the motion (Wilkinson, 2017).

To provide context, in the 2009 general elections, the ANC had won a 65.9% of the overall votes which translated to 264 out of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. In 2014 the party secured a comfortable 62.1% of the votes amounting to 249 seats. In 2019 the party won 57.5% which translated to 230 seats in the National Assembly. Therefore, the ANC enjoys the majority in the NA and no motion in parliament can pass without their support. For a motion of no confidence to succeed, the number of votes needed would be 201 out of 400. In the ten years of Zuma's presidency, the ANC enjoyed a majority which ensured the failure of any motion of no confidence brought against the president.

As a result of the reluctance of the ANC MPs to vote in support of the no-confidence motions and therefore act against the former president, the EFF, UDM, and COPE took the Speaker of the National Assembly to the constitutional court for failure to fulfil their constitutional obligation to hold the president accountable. Therefore, the National Assembly was constitutionally mandated to create rules for the impeachment of a president. This ruling was in response to the reluctance of the majority ANC National Assembly, to hold former president Jacob Zuma accountable for not implementing the remedial action determined by the Public Protector for the security updates to his Nkandla Homestead.

Among the critiques of South Africa's electoral system is the lack of accountability by the representatives elected to office (Matlosa, 2008). In a closed party list system, the electorate votes for the party and the party determines who will be in office. In this way, the party representatives serve at the behest of the party and not the electorate and it is to the party that they must account. It is in this context that the ANC MPs receive directives from the ANC NEC on what action to be taken in parliament. When motions of no confidence against the former president were initiated the ANC MPs "*closed rank*" maintained the "*party line*" and voted against the motions.

Similarly, in 2022, when a preliminary report found that the incumbent president Cyril Ramaphosa may have a case to answer about the theft of money at his Phala Phala farm that occurred in 2020. ANC MPs were given strict instructions by the NEC to vote against the adoption of the report. When the report was tabled in parliament on the 8th of November 2022, 214 MPs voted 'no'. There were 148 votes for 'yes', with two abstentions (Cotterrel, 2022). In context, the ANC currently has 230 seats in the national assembly.

Through these actions, I argue that the ANC organisationally is stable. The current MP's tow the party line and take instructions very well. While the organisation faces questions about its

electoral survival due to poor performance in government, a failing economy and dismal social indicators, its ability to take resolutions and follow through suggests that this is a party working towards a common goal. It indicates party discipline which is necessary if it is to continue to enjoy electoral success. Particularly in the wake of an increase in opposition parties who are fragmented, and who have failed to carve an independent image outside of the ANC failures, despite their growing electoral support.

In addition, while the analytical framework focuses on the factions and flow of ideas within the organisation, at the 2022 National Conference the factions were not as pronounced as they had been in previous conferences. Factionalism is not unique to the ANC and is an inherent feature of all political parties. Sarakinsky (2015) cites Sartori's factors that create factionalism. A faction may be created as a response to the organization and may either be motivational or ideological. However, these factors tend to overlap, and it is often unclear what the actual causes of the factions are.

At the 54ᵗʰ National Conference held in 2017, there was the *Radical Economic Transformation* faction and its key figure head former president Jacob Zuma. This faction which rallied around the disgraced former president claimed to be "fighting for the economic emancipation" of South Africans although in very vague terms. According to Southall (2022), four broad themes emerge as the core principles guiding the existence of the RET faction. Firstly, it is black empowerment in the form of state machinery as apparatus for said empowerment. Secondly, land reform in the form of expropriation without compensation. Thirdly a revision of the constitutional settlement and the Mandela Compromise and finally a strong support for the existence of state enterprises and an anti-privatisation stance. The RET faction also bodes a strong anti-Ramaphosa sentiment.

By the time of the 2022 conference, the RET faction had weakened considerably as key leaders of the faction, the former secretary general of the ANC Ace Magashule and Carl Niehaus were unable to officially participate in the conference as delegates. The RET faction also had close ties to what was known as the *Premier League* which was a group of Premiers from The North-West Province, Free State, and Mpumalanga who wielded significant influence within their provinces and often determined the provincial and regional conference outcomes. At the 55ᵗʰ National Conference the members of the Premier League Ace Magashule were barred from attending, David Mabuza declined nomination from the floor, which left only Supra Mahumapelo to agitate for some change.

In the lead-up to the 55ᵗʰ National Conference, the Taliban faction emerged from Kwa Zulu Natal. The Taliban is the name of a fundamentalist Islamist group which is notorious for its disregard for human rights and links to terrorism and it is unclear why a bloc within the governing party would find it suitable to name itself that. Nonetheless, this faction was assumed to be supporters of Jacob Zuma Makhaye (2022), and as arguably shares similar ideological values as the preceding RET faction.

There was also the "Chris Hani" Cabal that is named after the SACP former general secretary of the SACP but represents a cohort of ANC leaders namely Gwede Mantashe, Oscar Mabuyane and Enoch Godongwane who originate from the Eastern Cape and are known supporters of the incumbent president. While the RET values continue to reverberate within the organisation the supporters of the current president are at odds with those values. Therefore, the current factions within the ANC are ideological, which is easier to overcome. This allows the party consolidates its position and present a united form and cooperate during these times of crisis.

Conclusion

The ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators (the ANC in the state and government, the ANC in relation to the people and the ANC electorally) in the analytical framework and remains stable in the fourth indicator which is the ANC as an organization.

Reflecting on the ANC in the state and government, the paper argues that the ambiguity of ANC policies limits the political imagination to develop newer policies to respond to the context of the day. When contrasting the policy framework to the second indicator the ANC in relation to the people, it becomes evident that the quality of life for most South Africans is on the decline. Inequality has remained stubborn and widened, and so has poverty and unemployment and combined with the decline in the key economic sectors are likely to worsen.

The failure of ANC policy which results in the worsening of the quality of life of most ANC supporters is finally translating into a decline in the electoral performance of the ANC. The ANC electorally and in relation to other parties shows a steady decline in ANC electoral outcomes while opposition parties in particular "black" parties such as the EFF and IFP are gaining momentum as alternatives, meaning there is a shift in the political landscape and the ANC is losing votes to opposition. This marginal shift indicates that the electorate is more willing to vote for alternatives which are different from previous electoral cycles in which voters punished the ANC by abstaining from voting. Nonetheless, despite the weakening of ANC power across three of the four indicators this paper argues that the ANC is at its stable organisationally. The paper focuses on the actions of the ANC MPs in parliament and their ability to take instruction and tow the party line. These actions indicate a more stable the ANC than what is assumed. As a result, the paper argues that the focus should be extended from the internal factions of the organisation to the response to crises that the organisation faces while in government. During these times the ANC has been able to consolidate its position and work in unison to achieve its goals. As An analysis of ANC power, overall the paper concludes that by the 55th National Congress, the ANC was at its least powerful.

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The Bricoleur Economy

Indigenous Gold Mining in Zimbabwe

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Abstract

This article uses the concept 'Bricoleurs' to analyse the different categories of indigenous small-scale miners in Zimbabwe. Indigenous citizens constitute the bulk of the small and medium scale gold miners who continue to use antiquated methods of extraction and processing and they market their gold through illegal networks managed by middlemen. The study highlights the challenges Bricoleurs encounter in forcing inclusion into the mainstream mining economy, and the government's failure to capture them into the formal gold market. The indigenous gold miners' experiences reveal the trials posed by fragmented and incoherent legal and institutional policy frameworks that militate against the Bricoleur miners' productivity. With gold deposits found all over the country, and in the absence of supporting organisational structures, the Bricoleurs' self-empowerment through devious means has become accepted by mining authorities. Data for this article was collected mostly through interviews with different stakeholders in the gold mining industry in Harare, Shurugwi and Chakari in Zimbabwe.

Introduction

For over a century, peasant farmers in Zimbabwe traditionally practiced small-scale gold mining to supplement their income. Since 2001, the significance of small-scale gold mining was emphasized by the shift to gold being the main source of cash income for many of the citizens. The persistent droughts in the country and the continuously shrinking job market over the last 15 years forced many people to turn to illegal gold mining. The intractable harsh political and economic challenges in the country since 2002 stifle the different stakeholders in gold mining, stalling development. Extensive institutional decay, endemic and systematic corruption, mining policy inconsistencies, and political vulnerability, all militate against the resilient miners.

This paper aims to give an introspective account of these legal and illegal indigenous gold miners, the Bricoleurs', methods of forcing inclusion in the gold mining economy in Zimbabwe. The reflective approach partly contributes an explanation to the contradictory policy tendencies seen in the country's mining environment and reveals the complex dynamics that have shaped indigenous actors' activities in gold mining in the country. Bricoleur is used as a metaphor to explain the sum of Zimbabwe's indigenous gold miners who are constantly in motion and shifty in improvisation during the informal gold production process. It is an all-embracing allegory that encapsulates the various categories of indigenous gold miners.

The data in this article was collected mainly through interviews with different groups of stakeholders in the gold mining industry in Zimbabwe and focuses on the period 2013 to 2017. The groups included artisanal miners, civil society organisations (CSO), interest groups,

and some of the government departments that work on mining. The fieldwork was conducted during the ongoing political and economic turbulence in the country in 2017, which made it difficult to conduct interviews openly and snowballing was used to identify interviewees. The polarised views of Zimbabweans on all socioeconomic and political issues made it essential to separate the emotions of the interviewees from the facts on the gold mining environment in the country. Anecdotal evidence from media reports too was just as polarized. These limitations necessitated verifying the information against anecdotal evidence and consulting natural resource governance researchers in Zimbabwe.

The next section discusses the concept 'Bricoleur' and its applicably to the mining landscape in Zimbabwe. The different categories making up this Bricoleur group: *Makorokoza*, small scale gold miners (SSGM), women and the new players, the Chinese artisanal miners, are analysed with emphasis on their organisation, extractive and marketing methods, and the hurdles they face in this informal sector. The gender dimensions are essential for explaining inclusion and the hazards of being female in this male dominated environment. The legal and administrative mining framework and how the different categories relate to this system follow next, and the paper winds up with a brief discussion of the conflicts encountered in the Bricoleur mining arena.

Bricoleurs

Bricolage usually refers to things put together in a rather unsystematic and rudimentary fashion, and the indigenous gold mining landscape in Zimbabwe resembles such a colourful ensemble of gold miners. The sector is composed of a collection of largely destitute rural peasants. Many of these rural dwellers have been scrounging around for gold for generations. Add to these is a nouveau middle class of entrepreneurs who operate registered mining companies, politicians, bureaucrats, and by the end of 2010, Chinese artisanal miners had also entered the fray. These miners use unusual archaic and dangerous techniques and tools to extract gold. The majority of the SSGM in the country are all Bricoleurs who do not always have a specific strategy and program, but always make use of what works in practice, using whatever they cobble together and what is available (Panagiotis 1999). Their mining knowledge and skills are passed on orally down to younger generations. According to Lévi-Strauss(1994) a Bricoleur is:

> …someone who works with his hands, using devious means… his universe of instruments is treacherous, and the rules of his game are always to make do with whatever is at hand, that is to say, with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous (Rodgers 2012).

Bricoleurs accumulate their skills, arsenal of tools and other essential resources over time. A logic of consequences (March and Olsen 2004) is used to determine the usefulness of tools for the different processes in their gold production processes. Following a logic of consequentiality implies treating possible rules and interpretating them as alternatives in a rational choice problem, confirming that "man's natural proclivity is to pursue his own interests" (Brennan and Buchanan1985, ix). To advance their own socio-economic transformation, Bricoleurs evade and avoid officialdom and work on the margins. In the case of gold mining, this is often done violently and in fierce competition. Constantly challenging the modern dominant commercial methods of gold extraction and processing gives scope to Bricoleurs to define themselves and their overall relationship to society. Cheater (1989 cited in Maphosa 1998) concurs with this view as she observed that every kind of change, social, political, and economic, results from the manipulative tactics of cultural dissidents. Cultural dissidents are people with courage to challenge and redefine society's norms and values in pursuit of their own interests (ibid) and survival. Through their small successes, these Bricoleur gold miners have challenged formal

gold extraction methods and demonstrated their value to human development and to the great continuum of human culture. They have thus triggered many narratives, both positive and negative, about their work.

In Zimbabwe, Bricoleurs becomes a metaphor that explains how indigenous gold miners have embraced flexibility through continuous movement and diversity through weaving complex collaborations and using different extractive and processing styles. They straddle both the primitive and modern gold mining methods, signaling the need for the development of appropriate technologies that can be applied by relatively unsophisticated self-made mining engineers (Rodgers 2012). Bricoleurs allow for dynamics and contexts to dictate and determine which methods they employ, giving them an aptitude for creativity as they can combine different techniques and methodologies in different situations to mine and market gold. With flexible and appropriate support measures for uplifting Bricoleurs in the country's mining regime, their productivity can increase tremendously.

By defining indigenous gold miners as Bricoleurs, knowledge on the subtle divide between the formal and informal gold mining practices and processes are easily exposed and these portray the narrative constructed by these enterprising individuals.

Who are the *Bricoleur* gold miners in Zimbabwe?

The Bricolage of gold miners in Zimbabwe is composed of many sub-groups formed within two distinct categories of indigenous gold miners in the country: artisanal miners, the *Makorokoza* (those on the lowest rung who scrounge around), and the SSGMs. The line between the SSGMs, who are often formally registered, and the illegal *Makorokoza,* who roam the country in search of gold deposits, is very thin as they both use similar extractive processes and often collaborate in their mining ventures (Saunders 2008). Many categories all face different challenges that raise questions on the knowledge and technologies required to transform their mining practices in their ever-shifting communities. Each category of miners interacts differently with the mining administration system and regulatory institutions and interprets the mining legislation differently. The legally registered SSGMs have been targeted for assistance by different institutions such as the Ministry for Women's Affairs and private banks, yet most of the miners in this category continue to face viability constraints as they operate informally.

The key determinant for who is a *Bricoleur* in this paper is set by the country's Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2010), which defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as "any person who, before the 18th of April 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such person" (Matsika 2010). The act remains shifty and contested, though the intention behind the noble idea was to indigenise the Zimbabwean economy by promoting and increasing the participation of indigenous miners in business and in the exploitation of all the country's economic resources (Magaisa 2012). This article refers to all categories as Bricoleurs but makes a distinction between the various classifications when necessary.

The largest category of indigenous miners, the SSGMs and *Makorokozas,* has largely eluded state economic capture in both the extractive and marketing processes. These Bricoleurs have thus remained on the periphery though their gold finds its way into the formal market. Many small-scale miners are hesitant to join the main association of SSGMs, because they do not feel that it represents their interests [Interview in Harare]. The national miners' association has attempted to formalise all small-scale mining operations to enhance the accountability of gold ore and prevent revenue leakages through theft.

From 2011, the Bricoleurs increased their produce to overtake the more resource endowed large-scale commercial miners (LSCM) in the country. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development estimated that the small-scale miners contributed 30% of the total tons of gold produced in 2012, and it noted that they were responsible for 65% of total production in the first six months of 2012 (Government of Zimbabwe 2012). This prompted the SSGMs to set a production target for themselves of 17 000 tons for 2013 (ibid). This prompted the (Minerals Marketing Commission of Zimbabwe) ZMMC to express optimism about mineral receipts that were envisaged to increase by 500% for the then next five years to $6 billion from the 2012 reserves of $1,2 billion (ibid). In 2016, the artisanal miners contributed 45% of the country's gold production (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2018) and by 2018, the artisanal miners had contributed over half the 24,8 tons of gold Zimbabwe produced that year and by 2028, both artisanal and small-scale miners accounted for 53% of total gold deliveries (Chenjerai 2016). These achievement came at a great cost to the environment. For instance, Manicaland province reported illegal mining damage of around 600 hectares of prime timber owned by the Allied Timber company in Chimanimani, and the Mazowe River has had part of its course diverted and is now characterized by deep pits, with large sections of the river heavily silted (ibid). Damage of prime agricultural land and river pollution due to cyanide poisoning is widespread in the country.

For many years, LSCMs dominated the mining landscape with very little local participation. The government, through the ZMDC, tried unsuccessfully to implement broad though disjointed gold mining empowerment projects. A few smaller scale initiatives by independent indigenous miners were more successful though this was done using artisanal mining practices. The line between the SSGMs and artisanal miners remains blurry and is defined by the legal status of the former. The majority of the SSGMs are a result of a bottom-up self-empowerment process by the miners (Saunders 2008). Other than lack of capital, the expansion of indigenous gold mining was hindered by reports of constant harassment by government officials and security agents' accusations of smuggling gold. Both the shareholders and the Zimbabwean government lose revenue through smuggling, as the proceeds from many of the big commercial gold mines are not accounted for. The irony is that even in the big commercial companies, the Zimbabweans who own shares are not aware of the actual production capacity and volumes of these big companies (Maguwu 2011).

Sub-categories of SSGMs-Small-scale miners

Within the category of SSGMs, there are different layers of categories that are defined by the amount of money a mine owner can afford to invest. In these categories, three important subcategories stand out regarding the way the miners relate to the mining institutional framework. These are the women who were organised by the government's gender development department, middle class business savvy small company owners and low-end businessmen who were initially farmers. Irrespective of each groups' financial status, they all use the same extractive processes though they go through slightly different mine acquisition processes. The largest categories, *Makorokoza*, are clearly illegal gold miners.

Most, if not all, small-scale miners operate seasonally. Their claims are usually in areas with the potential for alluvial gold. Alluvial gold mining is often considered to be the most environmentally friendly form of gold mining since it only requires dredging land surfaces and rivers (Hilson 2003). The controversial method of open pit mining, in which there is no vertically descending mineshaft, is also used. This is an environmentally unfriendly method in which layers of earth are scrapped away to form a deep wide-open pit where gold ore is extracted as the digging goes downward in layers. Such mining practices take place in the open making

operations possible only in favourable weather. Without water draining equipment during the rainy season, Makorokoza miners must wait for the dry seasons. This means no steady income is guaranteed therefore it is not possible to secure loans to buy equipment.

Bricoleurs do not qualify for most private loan funds and with government schemes, it is more complicated as the main criterion is reportedly politicised: that of being a ruling party member. Due to political uncertainty and instability in the last decade, mines ceased to work as collateral with all financial institutions in the country. For the Bricoleurs, lobbying is impossible as registration fees demanded by the Chamber of Mines keep them out, hence they do not get any assistance in improving their extractive capacity. For SSGMs, this is complicated by the difficult partnerships that the more formal SSGMs have with their Rural District Councils (RDCs).

'*Makorokoza*'

The Artisanal miners – *Makorokoza,* are largely unregistered miners who are divided into different categories too. Most of them are poor rural people trying to eke out a living, but there are groups that over time morphed into a dangerous security threat in the gold mining industry, *MaShurugwi* and *Magweja* [the destroyers]. In this paper, Makorokoza refers to groups made up of gold diggers and panners (men, women and children) who are scattered along Zimbabwe's major rivers. The latter sub group, MaShurugwi, named after Shurugwi, a small mining town, and *Magweja,* are very violent and they invade the big commercial mines at night (Interviews). They move about rapidly in very large groups, sometimes as many as over 500 and these marauding groups of miners have bases in the forests that are very well organised mimicking military regiments (ibid). They all use two distinct mining methods: panning for gold along rivers and sometimes digging alongside the riverbanks, and unsophisticated underground methods that lack proper support structures. *Makorokoza* divide into smaller teams and when they work in bands of fours, they very often manage to sell about 50 to 70 grams of gold for about USD\$2 000 which is reportedly mostly spent recklessly in a typical 'lilies of the field–marginals who live for the moment' (Day et al, 1998) attitude they depict. In many of the gold mining areas where they move around, women reportedly come out at night in massive numbers to make money from the artisanal miners (Interviews in Chakari and Shurugwi).

A well–known excuse for criminalising artisanal mining in Zimbabwe is the damage to the environment and the poisoning of water in the rivers. Since *Makorokoza* move around quickly, it is difficult to make them take responsibility for the damage. *Makorokoza*, just like the millers, use mercury and other dangerous chemicals, such as cyanide in processing gold. The health costs of gold mining are immense to the *Makorokoza* as many of them die from mercury poisoning (Mtetwa and Shava 2003). Illegal gold buyers and millers supply the mercury that is used by *Makorokoza* miners in the amalgamation process, a cheap way to collect small gold particles from sediment (ibid). The amalgam is formed by the combination of mercury and gold and is burned over an open wood fire or with a blowtorch to separate the mercury from the gold. Nitric acid is also used to remove impurities in conjunction with mercury amalgamation in gold extraction (van Straaten 2003).

Many researchers reported that many *Makorokoza* have burns on their hands due to the use of nitric acid without protection. Since, most artisanal mining takes place alongside rivers, the chemicals end up in the waterways. On contact with soil or water, mercury becomes methyl mercury that easily enters the food chain. The Global Mercury Project (GMP) developed interest in Zimbabwe due to the high number of artisanal miners who were poisoning the regional water body, the Zambezi River (Global Mercury Project 2007). Since then, it has been encouraging the banning of whole ore amalgamation and regulation of the mercury trade.

Zimbabwe is a signatory to the GMP, which aims to promote knowledge and capacity building on the links between SSGMS practices, health, ecosystems, and social factors to prevent mercury pollution and exposure. Unfortunately, the government has not taken action to implement the recommendations on the responsible use of mercury. Still, the GMP has been building capacity in the Zimbabwe Panners Association that has countrywide membership. In 2006, the GMP trained over thirty SSGMs trainers in all the country's gold mining districts. The significance of this training was the miners' needs identification that presented the following problems: environmental impact assessments, financing mining operations, dewatering mines, milling costs and transport, disruption of family life as miners roamed the country sides, water shortages, diseases, and alcoholism (ibid).

Women in gold mining

In 2006, the Ministry of Women and Gender launched a country-wide programme to lure women into mining and to assist them. The ministry sponsored women to register mining claims and paid for the prospecting costs. A significant number of rural women were able to register gold mine claims through this process. In Banket, the ministry also paid for access to the geological maps that were produced by the German settlers who were the first farm owners in the area around 1930. The Banket area is rich in alluvial gold, which is easy to mine for people without advanced technology. These attempts to uplift women in gold mining were done under the March 2004 National Gender Policy, which addresses policy discrimination against women in line with the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Zimbabwe is a signatory to the CEDAW protocol, has a national Women in Mining Association, and is a member of the SADC Women in Mining Trust.

According to the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Council's data, there are an estimated 500 000 artisanal miners' country-wide and 30% are women and children. This was an increase from 1996, when only 10% of the then 20 000 legal mining claims were female owned (ibid). By 2001, approximately 70% of these women were full or part my owners. The rest of the women were engaged in ore grinding using mortars and pestles (ibid). From then on, more women registered mining claims. Unless they own the mines, women are usually labourers in the SSGM group (panners, ore carriers and processors), providers of goods and services (cooks, shopkeepers) and are often solely responsible for domestic chores. In the Makorokoza category, women get more involved in mineral processing activities ranging from crushing, grinding, sieving, washing, and panning, including amalgamation and amalgam decomposition. Generally, in gold mining, women tend to get confined to processing aspects and are thus at risk of more exposure to dust and mercury (Hinton et al 2003). There have been reports that in some cases, men are aware of the dangers associated with mercury use hence they consign women to undertake processing responsibilities (Mtetwa and Shava 2003).

There are many impingements against the advancement of women in mining in the country. A disturbing trend is that most of the women who pursue mining are single parents (Interviews Shurugwi). Due to the physical demands of managing a mine, most women who own mines have secured the help of male relatives to manage the production and marketing of their gold (ibid). Women miners reported needing a man all the time since the miners are rough and difficult to handle and tend to challenge the women's instructions. The security threats in the gold mining sector deter many women from being actively involved in all the mining activities hence the costs of hiring a male middleman affects their economic empowerment.

Secondly, developing the mines remains an impossible feat because the women lack collateral needed by the financial institutions to lend them money. Neither their land or farms, nor the

mines are accepted as collateral by the banks and other financial institutions. Thirdly, the women lack many essential skills needed in running a business. Most women do not treat mining as a business, they do not have business accounts and they live from hand to mouth (Interviews Shurugwi and Chakari). Even though the ministry tried to have the women form cooperatives, the women failed to reinvest in the mining industry, as all stakeholders wanted the profits shared immediately. For many women, despite being registered mine owners, mining is a subsistence economic activity just as it is for the *Makorokoza*. This means that small-scale gold mining will remain a labor-intensive exercise unless extensive remedial measures are designed to target the miners. For now, there is no hope of forward development into a business consortium model by the miners. Lastly, the delays in the issuance of mining licenses cause more problems for women. Officials were accused of giving licenses to multiple applicants and women very often must fight off several other claimants. This dissuades many women from participating in gold mining because the men always win the physical fights hence the women's security is always threatened. Other than those women who own mines, most of those hanging around the different categories of miners tend to provide more of the other services such as sex, food vending, alcohol, and drugs at times. Sometimes the women are forced to join syndicates where they sell sex to access panning sites. The police are aware of this as they have been known to do the facilitation for panners when they sell their gold (Interviews in Chakari).

Middle class business savvy Small Scale Gold Minerss

Business savvy small-scale individual miners seem to go through different experiences with the mining administration. Registration for them is quick as they simply buy existing mining shelf companies. With the assistance of former black government employees who know where mining concessions are located, shell companies are then used to peg the area (Interviews Chakari). This is done through the mining commissioners' offices that are in the major mining districts.

Ideally, the commissioners issue the prospecting license, and the prospectors are supposed to do their own pegging. It is an anomaly that the mining commissioners' office reportedly do the pegging. The peggers wait patiently like vultures outside the commissioners' offices for the estimated one thousand people who register gold mining claims weekly leading to the slogan 'Mining takes precedence over farming' (Interviews Harare). This group uses the reported trend of 'air pegging' that is done by the commissioners' offices. In air pegging, potential miners identify vacant areas on maps and just peg on paper without visiting the site (ibid). This leads to major conflicts since the air pegged land might be occupied by someone else. After pegging, registration then takes place with the ministry's mining office. Though a miner is supposed to serve public notices before registering a claim, this does not happen due to the air pegging practice. Mining under such circumstances becomes an illegal activity because the Environmental Management Authority's (EMA) compliance certificate is supposed to be acquired before registration can be completed.

Some of the middle-class business savvy SSGMs have instituted what is called a 'mining tribute' (Interview Harare). Under this system, the small-scale mine owners allow other poor miners to use their claims and after selling their produce, they then pay a fee to the mine owner. Farm owners too are known to encourage this practice as they permit all categories of small-scale miners to work on their land, 'You can mine in the middle of my farm once you have a mining license' (ibid). With each claim covering 5 hectares, the law on the size of these small claims is unlikely to be changed as it benefits the farm owners and many of these farm owners are politicians.

Despite being more resource endowed, the business savvy group also suffers from a general lack of expertise in sinking my shafts. There are no drill rigs for going down the shafts in most of

their mines (Interviews Shurugwi and Chakari). Very few miners in this category have the technical capacity to get a lot of ore out of the ground. Even with the few who have the shafts, there is no headgear to provide safe access to the shaft. In some of the gold mining regions, there are rifts that pass through the mines making it dangerous to dig haphazardly.

The tools of production used during the extraction process, wheelbarrows, and pickaxes; in typical Bricoleur fashion, cause severe damage to the environment as digging takes place randomly. The miners just take out the ore without supporting the walls and this can be hazardous to their lives (Saunders 2008). Mining techniques that do not damage the soil, pollute, or waste water, while allowing miners to maximise gold extraction with the lowest possible impact on the environment can ensure the sustainability of production in terms of soil conservation and water usage (Rodgers 2012).

Extracting the gold is too labour intensive such that the registered small–scale miners invite the *Makorokoza* miners to do all the digging and they then share the proceeds equally. Profit margins dwindle when *Makorokoza* miners are invited by the SSGMs because *Makorokoza* miners are accused of stealing gold from the mine owners. Many mine owners interviewed reported that the hired *Makorokoza* workers go down at night when the employer is asleep and digs for gold. The basic security services provided by the middle-class business savvy SSGMs are inadequate to fight off the *Makorokoza* workers hence the mine owners often work around the clock to deter theft.

An interesting group that is significant notches above this group is that of the Indigenous Commercial Miners. These are composed of local mine owners who manage to attract foreign investors, but they only remain at the helm of the mining ownership and get involved in some management capacity. Unfortunately, under the current Mines and Minerals Act, commercial miners follow the registration process and once they complete the acquisition process, 'they do what they want' regarding the extraction and environmental care. This is partly due to the lack of technical capacity to supervise mining activities by the government (Interview). A major concern for all the big commercial companies, including the indigenous ones, is the need for constant political support due to the high uncertainty in the environment. Though the small companies need political support too, they do not stand to lose as much as the big companies. A notable difference between the LSCMs and the SSGMs is the understanding of corporate social responsibility. The relatively competitive SSGMs think that corporate social responsibility is for the big mining companies only. And yet, as local companies, they too ought to contribute in whatever way they can.

The Chinese factor at the small–scale level

The Chinese miners have been trying hard to penetrate the small–scale mining category that is usually reserved for poorly resourced local miners. Though they work as local artisanal miners, they are not indigenous miners in Zimbabwe. Local miners interviewed reported encountering the Chinese miners walking around in known gold rich areas in search of mines. Many of the Chinese miners approach the local miners directly with offers of partnerships and purchasing at times, but the unfavourable conditions they offer have been rejected as undesirable by most local mine owners. The partnerships they offer are alleged to reduce the owners to employees. The few mine owners who took them on as partners faced financial difficulties as the Chinese reportedly took advantage of their illiteracy in running such ventures (Interviews Harare). The fact that the Chinese come in organised groups has raised suspicions that corrupt public officials are supporting their endeavours. Mining officials in the ministry are believed to assist the Chinese in identifying the mining hot spots on maps through air pegging, from their offices in the city.

One former mining commissioner was even accused of delaying the issuing of licenses to local applicants and he would then later then sell off the claims to the Chinese (ibid). In the last decade, the Chinese have brought in mining equipment such as compressors, bulldozers, ball mills for processing and earthmovers, but they still use manual labour too to drill shafts and pay pithy wages that are between $2 and $5 per metre dug (Interviews). With no monitoring of the mining processes, the Chinese use the *Makorokoza* too, as they argue that 'the human eye sees much better and can spot the gold better than any machines' (ibid). Their machines have wreaked havoc on the environment. Another problem is that they come into the country pretending to want to do professional mining but instead they resort to cheap extractive methods and labour.

The Chinese miners are also accused of invading mines at night, digging up quickly, and vacating immediately. In the few instances when they got caught, there was no prosecution or legal action taken against them (ibid). Taking punitive action against them is complicated by the fact that the government relies on Chinese diplomatic support in the international arena and that many Chinese officials collude with senior level bureaucrats and politicians. The Chinese miners have thus become more daring as they have the government on their side. For as long as they offer an alternative to the closed western investments, the government of Zimbabwe will tolerate the Chinese miners.

The legal and administrative mining framework

Mining operations of SSGMs are complicated by the fact that institutional responsibilities are scattered across different entities, which complicates the task of both registration and compliance. The many impromptu policies have caused grievances as they are not applied consistently by the fragmented mining fraternity. The Mine and Minerals Act Chapter 21:05, in force since 1965, is the principal law governing mining in Zimbabwe. This law specifies the conditions for security of tenure and outlines clear provisions for the acquisition, maintenance, and relinquishing of a mining title. The government amended the Mines and Minerals Act in 2008. These amendments outlined the indigenization requirements for the mining sector. For gold, which falls into the precious metals and precious stones category, 25% of the shares must be transferred to the state without compensation and another 26% must be owned either by the state, or by indigenous Zimbabweans.

Miners in the country deal with a fragmented legal and administrative system that covers 45 legal Acts, 60 different statutory instruments, 15 ministries and 20 local boards that are directly involved in mining. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development has the overall responsibility for the formulation and enforcement of the mining policy. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce simultaneously oversees the management of extracted minerals. The state's central regulatory and market role is also located within institutions like the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and the ZMMC commissioners in the six mining regions who issue licenses in their jurisdiction and adjudicate in disputes. The commissioners' report to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. The President's Office overrides all other procedures as it gives 'Special mining grants' which supersede any other grants given by any of the other offices. The Mining Affairs Board (MAB) was tasked with granting authority for prospecting on reserved ground, but it is not clear if the body has ever functioned in line with its mandate. The MAB also exercises oversight on the issuance of mining titles and the effective administration of the Mines and Minerals Act. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development chairs the board which brings together the different administrative and experts in the mining sector.

The myriad actors and policies cause both confusion and loopholes for mining companies as they can be selective on who to deal with, and which policies to comply with, causing confusion and instability. Both the managers and the miners deal with constant shifts in the administrative procedures. Stakeholders in mining are not part of the policy making process that is dominated by the government. Social responsibilities of miners are thus relegated to the background in such a scenario. This has resulted in the widespread failure to integrate mineral rights, land use planning and development as evidenced by the many conflicts on mining claims. The chaotic situation works in favour of the unscrupulous politicians and bureaucrats by creating room for political interference and corruption since the reporting lines become blurred undermining the legislation.

Unlike the commercial miners, the small-scale miners bypass many of these administrative and legal hurdles the big companies must go through. The SSGMs have special prospecting and mining arrangements that are acquired through a claim system (ibid). But contrary to this, all respondents had similar information on the particularistic criteria used to acquire mining concessions. After registering their claims with the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, the SSGMs go to their local boards in their respective RDCs for the land use authority where they pay $20 to register and another $30 annual fee for land use. The next step is the acquisition of a health clearance certificate from the EMA that needs signatures from at least eight other government depts. In addition, other prominent people are required to sign on what the SSGMs call 'the big book', which is part of the miner's application in support of the miner. Usually, the District Chief must sign, plus any other person of standing in the community. All the SSGMs must be registered and fall under the jurisdiction of RDCs (Singo 2012).

According to interviewees, the process of mine acquisition is relatively easier if known gold deposits are on one's land because all they must do is buy a prospecting license. However, if one intends to secure a claim that is below 100 hectares that is located on someone else's land, the landowner must be consulted first. If the claim is over 100 hectares, a prospector can only take 10 hectares around the claim area and each block must be 10 hectares only. The license for the 10 hectares costs $500 hence small-scale miners can afford very small claims. The claims may be small, but more people can then afford to own some means of income generation. These small-scale claims are estimated to yield about 60 milligrams from a ton of ore in the open cast mines (Interviews in Harare).

Conflicts amongst mining groups

The government is aware of the tensions that exist between large-scale mining companies and the SSGMs. It is equally aware of the opportunities that the LSCM operations can offer in supporting the development of SSGMs yet there are no efforts to initiate a dialogue between the two sides. Hence conflicts continue between the two groups for many reasons amongst them: allegations of encroachment on mining territory by the SSGMs; accusations of mineral theft by *Makorokoza* and allegations that both the legal SSGMs and *Makorokoza* cause health, safety and environmental hazards. Similar conflicts occur in other countries too, for example, in Siguiri mine in Guinea, some estimated 10,000 artisanal miners were estimated to be operating illegally within the AngloGold Ashanti's operation mine lease area. At times during the rainy season, an estimated 10,000 artisanal miners reportedly invade the mining pits in Siguiri when working areas are flooded or inaccessible (Mining Technology undated).

In Zimbabwe such mining boundary disputes top the conflict list, though many other misunderstandings and suspicions affect the development of harmonious relationships between the Bricoleurs and LSCMs which view all SSGMs as security threats and lump them in the same

category as the Makorokoza. Respondents in Chikari gave an example of a big gold mining company that fixed the road that branches off from the main road to its mine. Many registered small-scale miners surround this big mine, but this company skipped all the sections of the road that branched off to the small miners' claims and continued onto its mine location. This signaled resentment and intolerance of the presence of the SSGMs. On the other hand, the SSGMs are resentful of the fact that large-scale operators are granted land rights, yet they are the owners of that land traditionally (Interviews Shurugwi and Chakari).

There is a general failure by different stakeholders to articulate how the LSCMs can assist SSGMs with improved access to processing and mining technologies, better health, safety and environmental practices, product marketing and equipment supply without affecting their own profit margins. In fact, the LSCMs can benefit tremendously from Bricoleurs' indigenous knowledge in environmental conservation and gold deposit tell-tale signs, which can be used to identify future prospecting areas. More importantly, the SSGMs category can be that crucial link between the large companies and the local communities that complain of neglect by the mining companies. Such a liaison would ensure stability and some common understanding of the expectations of each actor.

New gold sites continue to pop up in the country and they trigger a rush by both the *Makorokoza*, the relatively more stable and legal category of the SSGMs, and the more resourced indigenous LSCMs. When gold deposits were discovered in several new locations between 2012 and 2013 in Mlonga Village 17, Jambezi area under Chief Shana in Hwange District in Matabeleland North Province and in Amaveni in Kwekwe, thousands of *Makorokoza* flocked to these areas after word spread of the new gold deposits (David 2012). The flood of *Makorokoza* turn chaotic very quickly hence a security response is always used to keep the entire SSGMs miners out of new finds. According to anecdotal evidence, new gold finds have social consequences too; "The gold find triggered a spending spree in nightclubs around Kwekwe, where panners from Amaveni who had been lucky were buying expensive drinks for patrons" (ibid). The government reacts brutally whenever there are new mineral wealth finds. The police cordoned off the Amaveni area to prevent illegal gold panning under the usual pretext of curbing the social ills that accompany such gold rushes. But by the time geologists from the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development arrived to collect soil samples for analysis, some politicians had already lodged claims for the recent finds. This effectively leaves out the SSGMs who can then only lodge claims for peripheral areas to the central claims area. The government's securitised mining approach effectively keeps SSGMs on the lower rungs of the mining wealth ladder and opens opportunities for the political elites and the well-connected aspiring miners.

Conclusion

Problems besetting the gold mining sector reflect the general economic environment in Zimbabwe since about 14 years ago. The chaotic mining environment has kept miners in the Bricoleur mode, and they have become a recognised entity due to their large production volumes, and this is partly a function of the archaic and confusing legislation and policy frameworks that govern access, exploitation, and management of gold mining in the country. Compliance and enforcement remain a major problem for the Bricoleurs. Safeguarding the mining environment from degradation and creating marketing opportunities that connect the small producers to the bigger and more lucrative legal markets is paramount. The big commercial gold miners that use more sophisticated extractive methods have never attempted to build capacity to uplift the indigenous gold miners. There is a history and evidence of resentment between these two categories: the large-scale mechanised miners and the Bricoleurs.

The unmet aspirations of the indigenous gold miners and the failure to capture them into the formal markets reveals their unacknowledged and unrealized potential in contributing to the nation's economy. Zimbabwe's economic decline has been driven partly by policy uncertainty over the issue of local ownership (indigenisation) of mining concessions. Due to the muddled administrative environment, Bricoleurs will continue to have the upper hand if the process of acquiring mineral rights remains politicised and complicated.

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African Indigenous Research to Decolonisation of African Universities' Curricula

A (South) African Perspective

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Abstract

The phrase *African indigenous research* (AIR) depicts a novel research thrust that seeks a global entrance into the mainstream research assortment as a competitive area of study. A discourse on decolonisation attempts to reverse the gains of colonialism. Existing studies show that most (South) African universities' curricula can be traced to the colonial era. A rereading of available scholarly conversations depicts some reluctance on the part of education authorities towards decolonising the (South) African universities' curricula. It is in the context of the above that the present study engages conversations on decolonisation in order to establish a common ground that affords AIR a notable articulation on decolonisation of (South) African Universities' curricula. The present research is anchored on a critical race theory (CRT) in which narrative inquiry as a methodological approach is utilised. Although the phrase African universities' curricula is employed, the study will focus on the (South) African universities' curricula as representative examples. The (South) African scenario is preferred as a case study due to the author's familiarisation with (South) African universities as well as African decolonisation discourses. The study attempts to answer the following three questions (1) what motivated research conversations on decolonisation? (2) why is the study on decolonisation of the curricula in (South) African universities necessary? and (3) what is the global impact of decolonisation processes in (South) Africa?

Keywords: African indigenous research; global impact; (South) African universities' curricula; decolonisation; community of inquiry

Introduction

The present study seeks to engage scholarly contributions on decolonisation in order to establish the contribution of African indigenous research (AIR) to the decolonisation of (South) African universities curricula. Scholars who corralled on decolonisation include the following representative examples: Ajani and Gamede (2021), Du Plessis (2021), Simelane (2019), Mahabeer (2018), Saunders (2017), Chaka, Laphalala and Ngesi (2017), Higgs (2012), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), Ritskes (2012), Mignolo (2005), and wa Thiong'o (1986/1981), among others. The struggle for decolonising university curricula has been rife in (South) Africa. Thus, Emmanuel (2023:1) writes that, "for a significant majority of scholars writing in and about Africa today, the case for counter-hegemonic discourse is aptly expressed through the concept of decolonisation, which literally means to negate colonisation." In my view, Masoga and Shokane's (2019) "Afro sensed" conversation also fits into this debate on decolonisation. Afro sensing refers to "knowledge

which is located within an Africanism knowledge space (paradigm)" (Masoga & Shokane, 2019). According to Masoga and Kaya (2011:153), "Afro-sensing is an approach which contends that communities cannot significantly advance the development of Africa without taking African cultures seriously." In an effort to decolonise the imposition of western knowledge in Africa, Mignolo (2005) argues that coloniality is deep seated in modernity, progress and dependency on the western knowledge as the only benchmarks of improvements, currency and latest developments. Nevertheless, there are also critics (e.g., Táíwò, 2019) who argue that most conversations on decolonising the curricula neither identify nor sufficiently explain which parts of the curricula they regard as requiring some revisions. Elsewhere, it is alleged that such conversations neither take into account nor implement legality issues (see Himonga & Diallo, 2017). According to Himonga and Diallo (2017), efforts toward decolonisation of the African universities' curricula should start with decolonisation of the law and the legal education. Another observation is that it has become a common practice among African reformists to by-pass legal itineraries and proceed to accelerate what is traditionally perceived as correcting colonial imbalances and injustices. One would then evaluate as illegitimate the claim that (South) African universities' curricula require some amendments. In addition, other writings have revealed that it is usual for politicians to induce the attention of the commoners by citing alleged colonialist continuum as a paradigm for revolutionary activism in order to ignite the perceived majority consensus clamouring for curricula reforms in (South) African universities. For example, Wax (2013:226) was opposed to the stance of politicians by writing that, "we continue to be hoodwinked by politicians who promise the eradication of poverty as a grand ideal." Chilisa (2012), Le Grange (2016), and Simelane (2019, no pagination) also argue that "colonised people invoke their histories, worldviews, and IKSs to theorise and imagine alternative possibilities such as an alternative and decolonised curriculum." When van der Merwe and van Reenen (2016:2) write that, "...parodied racial integration and transformation efforts at the university," the argument of a university curriculum that sustains a political pedagogy comes to the fore. Mashau (2018) and Grosfogueol (2011) prefer to use the following terms, "de-Europeanisation," "de-westernisation," and "de-hegemonisation," which in their individual meaning, still carry the concept of decolonisation. However, *The Soudien Report* (2008:9) had previously enunciated that "...discrimination in public higher education institutions, with a particular focus on racism and to make appropriate recommendations to combat discrimination and to promote social cohesion." Mashau's (2018) and Grosfogueol's (2011) position had been foregrounded in *The Education White Paper* 3 (1997:1) which identified the racial and discriminatory practices which required that "...all existing practices, institutions and values are viewed anew and rethought in terms of their fitness for the new era." In my view, for Luckett (2016:416) to write that, "getting a degree here [referring to UCT] is a form of mental slavery and colonisation...We must exorcise the colonial ghost from the curriculum..." is not a bold but an emotional statement. Understandably, Luckett's statement, among others, emerge from a (South) African context in which universities' curricula are a reflection and reminder of colonial practices which many people are still nurturing and experiencing in a supposedly democratic (South) Africa. However, I still maintain that Luckett, among other activists and Decolonialists, may need to retain their composure so that as one reads a scientific piece of writing on such a critical debate, it neither depicts hate-speech nor a hindsight of vengeance towards the beneficiaries of apartheid/colonialism. However, the above argument exposes the limitations of a post-colonial African state emerging from white settler colonialism (e.g. Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc.). This type of post-colonial state is built on multi-racial politics, and the question of decolonising curriculum and universities cannot be treated in isolation from reformulating the law and the constitution (see Himonga & Diallo, 2017). In my view, a research scientist needs to desist from the popularised phrase of parents eating "sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on the edge" (see Waldman, 1989:1–5). In my reading of conversations on decolonisation, the readership should be informed that (South) Africa has an agenda that of

decolonising the universities' curricula. The above assertion may further be extended by making reference to "Rhodes Must Fall" and "Fees Must Fall" initiatives (see Himonga & Diallo, 2017). Himonga and Diallo (2017:2) noted that, "In 2015 South African universities witnessed a spate of protests under the banners of 'Rhodes Must Fall' and 'Fees Must Fall' and the broad issues of social justice and the transformation of universities from their colonial and Eurocentric heritages." It is generally held elsewhere that when one considers the genesis of decolonising the curriculum, the so-called "Rhodes Must Fall" (see Rhodes Must Fall Oxford 2018) movement tended to divert from pressing national questions. The present research examines the function of AIR by exploring conversations on decolonisation in order to establish whether such initiatives are (1) succeeding in implementing curricula reforms in universities, (2) what are the legal implications of such initiatives, and (3) the global impact of decolonisation processes in (South) Africa. In view of the last point (no. 3), a dialogue is facilitated with contributions that are critical of decolonisation processes in Africa. These include: Táíwò's (2019) critique of decolonisation processes in (South) Africa and Lee and Paine's (2019) discussion on "What were the consequences of decolonisation," among others. In this study, critical race theory (CRT) is employed in conjunction with narrative inquiry as a methodological approach.

Critical race theory

The present study utilises CRT in arguing that higher education institutions contribute to the maintenance and perpetuity, not only of apartheid and racism, but also of the curricula that sustain colonial tendencies in both theory and practice. CRT or simply critical theory (Lombard 2010) is known to have originated in US law schools. The proponents of CRT are numerous to enumerate. Some examples include: De la Garza and Ono (2016), McCoy & Rodricks (2015), Martinez (2014), Delgado and Stefancic (2012), McLaughlin & Whatman (2011), Hilrado (2010), DeCuir & Dixon (2004), Bernal (2002), and Ladson–Billings & Tate (1995), among others. Ladson–Billings (1998:7) furnished the present argument by elucidating the criticality of CRT when it "first emerged as a counter–legal scholarship to the positivist and liberal legal discourse of civil rights." Although CRT emerged primarily from and is taught at many law schools, as prefigured by various schools of thought, it has, however, spread to "other disciplines and even to other countries…" (Delgado and Stefancic, 2012:113–142). Awareness of Ladson–Billings' and Delgado and Stefancic' views have led De la Garza and Ono (2016:1) to concur that, "CRT originated as an extension and critique of critical legal studies (CLS)." Meanwhile, Martinez (2014:9) says CRT brought "together issues of power, race, and racism to address the liberal notion of colour blindness and argues that ignoring racial difference maintains and perpetuates the status quo with its deeply institutionalised injustices to racial minorities." Both Delgado and Stefancic' (2012) and Martinez' (2014) explanations were developed by De la Garza and Ono (2016:1) who also maintained that "CRT is an intellectual movement that seeks to understand how white supremacy as a legal, cultural, and political condition is reproduced and maintained, primarily in the US context." A detailed account of the function of CRT is conveyed by Delgado and Stefancic (2012:1–18) in the following writing:

> CRT movement is a collection of activists and scholars interested in studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power. The movement considers many of the same issues that conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses take up, but places them in a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the unconscious. Unlike traditional civil rights, which stresses incrementalism and step–by–step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.

Thus, Delgado and Stefancic (2012:41) examine race as a "social construction, not a biological reality." Hence, "we may unmake it and deprive it of much of its sting by changing the system of images, words, attitudes, unconscious feelings, scripts, and social teachings by which we convey to one another that certain people are less intelligent, reliable, hardworking, virtuous, and American…" (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:42). Following up on the ideas propounded by De la Garza and Ono, the dual contribution of Orbe and Allen (2008:209) also affirmed that, "unlike most of the earlier genres of race scholarship, critical race scholarship does not treat race as an independent variable; rather, it regards race as a site of struggle." Hence, Hiraldo (2010:57) echoes that, "CRT scholars work to address the inter-sectionality of race and other social identities within their analysis…essentially CRT places race at the center of the paradigm; however, this does not necessarily mean that other identities are ignored." In the context of the representative examples given above, it can firmly be stated that CRT is a "useful theoretical construct for decoloniality and transformation because it seeks to explain how education systems and institutions not only perpetuate, but also maintain racism, Eurocentric epistemologies and racist pedagogical practices" (DeCuir & Dixson, 2004; Bernal, 2002). Having discussed CRT as an emergence of a legal framework, it is not a misrepresentation of facts to suggest that any meaningful effort towards decolonising the curricula in (South) Africa needs a recourse which is legalistic in both form and character. From a (South) African perspective, I observed that decolonisation initiatives (or better still *reforms* towards revolutionising key sectors such as education, land, etc.) have not followed legal reform processes. In my opinion, it is in the best interest of both scholarship and the higher education system in (South) Africa to utilise the existing legal institutions and expertise in order to expedite credible curricula reforms in the country. It can also be said that any meaningful curricula reforms should begin with some legal and judicial reforms (see for example, The World Bank, 2004). Commencement on the decolonisation exercise should take account of and be guided by a legal framework. In my view, failure to acknowledge legality issues tends to define the decolonisation exercise as politically motivated; hence, extrajudicial. The same view could have motivated Ball (2012, cited in Mahabeer, 2018:8–9) to write that, "there are grave implications for curriculum changes brought about by government initiatives to suit political, economic and social goals." Sayed, Motala and Hoffman (2017:1) add that, "decolonising the curricula has recently been re-energised by the students through political action across (South) Africa." It is in the context of the above opinions that AIR should engage contributions on decolonising the curricula by employing feasible approaches that seek to strike a balance between visible legacies of institutionalised colonial appendages and the efforts of Decolonialists.

A Narrative Inquiry

This paper utilizes a qualitative research method known as narrative inquiry. Narratives are how "we story the world" (Mishler 1995:117). A study of psychology shows that human beings think, perceive and imagine using narrative modes to enhance understandings and meanings to their political discourses and therefore rely on narratives as a way of formulating political knowledge and "reality" about the world (Mudau & Mangani 2018:179–202). Therefore, the main argument is that narratives tend to provide meaning either in moments of crisis or when the centre is not holding. On the one hand, qualitative research method involves "the systematic collection, organisation and interpretation of textual material derived from talk or observation. It is used in the exploration of meanings of social phenomena as experienced by individuals themselves, in their natural context" (Malterud, 2001:483). On the other hand, Clandinin and Connelly (2000) maintain that "narrative inquiry is an umbrella term that captures personal and human dimensions of experience over time and takes account of the relationship between individual experience and cultural context." As Clandinin and Connelly observed, narrative inquiry is suggestive of an investigation into the discourses that explored on the theme/subject under scrutiny. Clandinin and

Connelly's views are supported by Etherington (2000). Social scientists and anthropologists have published extensively on Decolonialism and their Decolonialist conversations are widely read. The development of the present study will benefit from the interaction with such conversations. In addition, previous contributions on both IKSs and AIR are in abundance. These will also add value to the scholarly engagement in order to arrive at the analytic conclusions from an informed position. Other contributions have focused on relatively contemporary discourses such as Afrocentricity (see Asante 1998; 2014) and Africology (e.g. Okafor, 2017). An interface with the conversations by the above scholars will broaden the scope of the present research. Allied to the above dialogue, are dissertations and periodicals that have mesmerised on themes discussed in the present discourse.

Research on decolonising the curricula in (South) Africa

The research was motivated by a wider reading of conversations that explored on decolonisation debates. Some examples will suffice. Jonathan L. Earle contribution on *African Intellectual History and Historiography* (2018), has informed the present study in a unique way. The present research carries the title *African Indigenous Research* (AIR) which complements Earle's ideas in *African Intellectual History and Historiography* (AIHH) in a various way. Earle (2018) wrote that Europeans regarded Africans as racially inferior people who neither possessed written chronologies nor political pasts of which to speak. In other words, as Earle maintains, Africans are not qualified to speak against colonialism which they could not dismantle when the system commenced and perpetuated. Earle (2018) maintains, "intellectual historians of Africa are principally concerned with how Africans have understood and contested the contexts that they inhabited in the past, and how ideas and vernacular discourses change over time." Other contributors who are renowned for their research on the Social Sciences and Humanities with a special focus on Africa include: Steven Feierman (1990) and John Edward Philips (2006). In addition to Earle's opinion, it has also emerged that present African indigenous researchers are concerned primarily with decolonisation. Falola (2001:5) argues that "Modern intellectuals owe their origins to the spread of Western formal education, which began in some parts of Africa in the sixteenth century and were soon joined by the British, Danes, French, Dutch, and Germans." It seems there is a belief among some (South) African people that Africans themselves sustained colonialism. With that sense in mind, it is not feasible for African professionals, who benefitted from Europeanism, to speak against the system that shaped their intellectualism. The alleged view is that (South) African scholarship makes it impossible to think of African history as an inert entity awaiting the attention of professional historians. Professionals take their place in a broader field of interpretation, where Africans are already reifying, editing, and representing the past. Earle (2018) has cited cultural anthropologists such as Chika Okeke-Agulu, David T. Doris and Lorand Matory who "comparatively studied a wide array of cultural practices, such as Black Atlantic religious productions, art and decolonisation" (see Okeke-Agulu, 2015; Doris, 2011; Matory, 2005). Also, affirmative as well motivational for this research is Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò's book entitled *Against decolonisation: Taking African agency seriously* (2022). In his other contribution entitled "Rethinking the Decolonisation Trope in Philosophy," Táíwò (2019:135–159) argued that contemporary African decolonisation discourse has lost its way. Simelane's (2019) study also influenced the gathering of the momentum towards the development of the present discourse.

The necessity of a study on decolonising the curricula in (South) Africa

The study on decolonising the curricula in (South) Africa is necessary for various reasons. For instance, information gleaned from the majority of conversations from among (South) African researchers who focus on AIR in general and decolonisation in particular, shows that

(South) Africa is literally serving "two-masters" – apartheid beneficiaries and post-apartheid manipulators emerging from black people who claim to represent the majority poor. The idea of serving two masters (see Bell, 1976: 470–516) needs to be critically evaluated in view of the denial by (or rather reluctance on the part of) the perceived democratic society in the new dispensation to reverse the oppressive/apartheid system that is still trapped and sandwiched within various strata including the higher education sector. I am persuaded to agree with Bell's (1991:378) opinion that, "…a manifestation of our humanity which survives and grows stronger through resistance to oppression, even if that oppression is never overcome." Bell's (1991:378) "…even if that oppression is never overcome," is challenged by Nelson Mandela's acumen that, "…education is the most powerful weapon we can use to change the world" (see Du Plessis, 2021:54). Mandela's statement should not be taken for granted in the context of African indigenous researchers who should appropriately employ their education as a powerful tool to engage contributions on decolonising the curricula in (South) Africa. One may speculate that Nelson Mandela's reference to decolonial education as the most powerful weapon to "change the world" was not primarily rooted in the educated African nationalist thinking which he regarded as the viceroy of decolonisation and perceived to be best positioned to drive the decolonial agenda. In my view, Mandela's position attempted to rekindle a decolonisation agenda by blending the nationalist thinking with the modern Decolonialist philosophy (e.g., Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2022) towards a reformulation of the education system in (South) Africa. Admittedly, Mandela belonged to the first generation of decolonial leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Kwame Nkrumah, and Robert Mugabe whose entrance to politics were influenced as beneficiaries of either Western or missionary education. However, the first democratic President of South Africa was keen towards reconstructing the rainbow nation's higher education system to also benefit the previously underprivileged which until now remains "unfinished business of epistemological and racial decolonization" (Falola 2022:3). According to other views, decolonising the curriculum is not the task of a novice. For example, Jansen (2017) contends that decolonising the curriculum is driven by specialists and not students and others who are regarded as intruders. Zeleza (2009, cited in Mahabeer 2018:1) maintains that "within the (South) African higher education context, decolonisation of the curriculum calls for the dismantling of Eurocentric epistemologies that continue to dominate" (see also Heleta 2016:1–8). Thus, Santos (2014, cited in Mahabeer, 2018:1) also gravitates that, "in (South) Africa, the call for the Africanisation of universities and the need for them to detach themselves from their colonial and apartheid histories has come to the forefront." The study could go on and on to elucidate conversations that made it necessary to proffer research on decolonisation of the (South) African universities' curricula.

The global impact of decolonisation processes in (South) Africa

When Mahabeer (2018:10–11) writes that, "decolonising the curriculum is about acknowledging diversity, ethics and language, universalising the curriculum, and creating a synergy between the 'old' and the 'new' curriculum with the focus on 're-humanising' the curriculum," the sense of the global impact of the decolonisation processes in (South) Africa comes to the fore. For instance, both Frantz Fanon (1963) and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986) are widely celebrated and globally recognised for their contributions on "decolonisation of the curriculum." Sanford, Williams, Hopper and McGregor (2012, cited in Mahabeer, 2018:1) reveal that, "despite teacher education curricula recurrently undergoing change globally, foundational fundamental philosophies have not changed." Thus, it is argued that "curriculum decision-makers must become catalytic agents of change and not be obsessed with Western knowledge and ideologies, nor should they totally discard Western Eurocentric ideologies" (Mahabeer, 2018:10). According to Mahabeer (2018:10), "curriculum decision-makers should make deep intellectual decisions on curriculum matters by exploring local and international imperatives that would generate knowledge that is globally

competitive and yet locally mindful." Still on the global impact of decolonisation of the (South) African universities' curricula, language is the focus of attention. For example, Hunter's (2015, no pagination) research reveals communities in late colonial Tanzania which "translated international discourses about freedom and citizenship into the Swahili press." Meanwhile, Táíwò's (2019:135–159) position contradicts Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2013, cited in Simelane, 2019:13) study that says coloniality refers to "long standing patterns of epistemic power and domination emanating from colonialism, and transcends colonial borders." One would therefore not support Masoga and Shokane's (2019) argument which locates indigeneity within the Afro sensed epistemology and ontological grounding in the light of "globalising" AIR on decolonisation processes. Masoga and Shokane's (2019) proposition of Afro sensing refers to "knowledge which is located within an Africanism knowledge space (paradigm)." Elsewhere, Masoga's (2017) emphasis on IKSs of the African peoples, though recognised as a profound "local" knowledge, has not proved itself as vibrant and practical beyond the ingenious formulation. The above argument is raised at the backdrop of Masoga's (2017, cited in Masoga & Shokane, 2019, no pagination) assertion that indigenous knowledge is "knowledge owned by local people in their specific communities and passed on from generation to generation." Masoga's view of IKSs sought to support Prah's (2004:105) contention that, "African culture should occupy a central position in the overall social activity of Africans." Masoga's (2017) contribution, though requiring a critical reflection, are not in the list of ground-breaking efforts toward IKSs. Some contributions on decolonisation do not really present themselves as befitting attention on the global platform. For example, Grosfoguel (2013:74) argues that "the canon of thought in all the disciplines of Social Sciences and Humanities in the westernised university is based on the knowledge produced by a few men from five countries in Western Europe namely Italy, France, Germany, England and the United States of America." In my view, Grosfoguel's assessment does not have a positive impact at the global level. The same view is held by Dladla (2011, no pagination) who observed that contributions "appear as though there were not world-renowned African scholars with bodies of work which as a result of being grounded in the specificity of the African experience expressed views which differed considerably from the Eurocentric." Nevertheless, a balanced critical reader may disagree with Dladla (2011, no pagination) for making the following comments:

> Much of the curriculum in (South) African universities is still unashamedly culturally chauvinistic and not even as might arguably be the case with other parts of the world, a locally-driven cultural chauvinism, but the most classical and unapologetic Eurocentrism with a bias against and condescension towards non-European thought and even more especially against the African perspective and experience.

While Dladla makes an insightful statement on the decolonisation of African universities curricula, he does not significantly present the impact of decolonisation initiatives at both (South) African and global levels. Meanwhile, decolonisation of the curricula at African universities is not a simple excise; it involves a lot of hard work and wider consultations. Proponents of decolonisation of the African universities' curricula have cited the choice and use of language as one of the factors that need to be attended to. Mbembe (2015:17) argued that "a decolonised university in Africa should put African languages (cultural heritage) at the core of its teaching and learning programme." Meanwhile, information gathered for this study has shown that Mbembe appears to be unaware that at (South) African universities various local languages are taught. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996:4) declared the 11 languages (namely: Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, SiSwati, Tshivenda and Xitsonga) as official languages. According to Olivier (2009), as far as education is concerned, decolonisation of the languages in (South) African universities may not apply. So, decolonising the language at African universities may be deemed as practically inappropriate. However, what I

am gathering from the author's contribution is that African societies are endowed with alternative and indigenous ways to curing illnesses. In *Colonial Power and African Illness*, Vaughans (1991) deliberates on IKSs and the potency of African medicine to cure illnesses. Nonetheless, one would not lose sight of the fact that (South) African universities have a global focus because they attract professionals and students from all the world. For African indigenous medicine to be recognised globally, AIR should deepen its initiatives at research institutions in (South) Africa. Another outstanding scholar to comment on decolonisation is Táíwò (2019:135–159). Táíwò classifies decolonisation into two categories: deconolisation$_1$ and decolonisation$_2$. While decolonisation$_1$ aims at achieving political and economic self-determination, remarked Táíwò, deconolisation$_2$ is regarded as a contemporary academic hostility to ideas and practices due to experiences of the colonial past. According to Táíwò, the latter has no end, and is "analytically unhelpful" (see Emmanuel 2022:2). Táíwò (2019:135–159) regards decolonisation conversations (e.g., Fanon, 1963) as "counter-hegemonic discourses" and refutes that such contributions cannot "move the erstwhile colonies toward actualisation of their freedom in any meaningful way" (see also Emmanuel, 2022:2). The claim by the United Nations (n.d.) that, "the wave of decolonisation which changed the face of the planet . . . represents the world body's first great success," also depicts a contrast to Táíwò's position as explained above. In addition, Crawford's (2002, no pagination) analysis that, "many link decolonisation with developing global human rights norms" does not represent a majority view. Admittedly, "western European empires covered the globe for considerable portions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Lee & Paine, 2019:406). Lee and Paine (2019:406) opined that, "Extensive research suggests that European rule negatively affected political and economic development in their colonies." Nonetheless, interaction with critical scholarship has revealed that the gains of conversations on decolonisation have not been achieved globally in spite of the voluminous literature recorded so far. Having examined Táíwò's (2019) and Lee and Paine's (2019) contributions, among others, the readership would not be unconscious of the delineation that AIR is divided over the issue of decolonisation from both (South) African and global perspectives. Almost all conversations on decolonising the curricula focused on language change. Another contestation that tends to be a hindrance to the positive impact of decolonisation efforts at the international level is the question of adherence (or lack of it) to the law. Earlier on in this discourse, legal reforms were discussed briefly as the starting point prior to decolonising the African universities' curriculum so that the exercise does not appear as one of the "invasions" or "operations" which is a common feature in (South) Africa. It was alluded to that when a legitimate programme is politicised it loses its credibility as a genuine exercise towards reform. Thus, Himonga and Diallo (2017:2) pointed out that, "decolonisation of law, which in turn raises questions about the legal history of African countries; the concept of law; the role of law in African societies; the status of indigenous systems of law in post–independence or post–apartheid legal systems; and how law is taught in African law schools." "The first premise is," further argued Himonga and Diallo (2017:3), "that decolonisation cannot be achieved without the development of indigenous systems of law through legal education. In essence, the development and survival of living customary law cannot be divorced from the decolonisation of law in Africa." Hence, Hotz (2015:23) concurred that, "as a law student, I believe decolonising the law faculty goes beyond the faculty and the institution. It speaks to what the law is and how it is used within society."

Conclusion

The present study lived up to its commitment of exploring conversations on decolonisation of the (South) African universities' curricula. Various discourses on decolonisation were discussed. Outstanding concepts which emerged from the conversations comprised the impact of western thought and knowledge as well as imposition of western culture through language on the (South)

African education system. In its entirety, AIR established that conversations on decolonisation attributed some distortions on African societies (including African universities' curricula) as consequences of western imperialist regime. However, some scholarly views were opposed to decolonisation processes on (South) African universities' curricula. These critics argued that conversations on decolonising the universities' curricula were overzealous and the contributions were just "counter-hegemonic discourses" which were "analytically unhelpful." The global impact of decolonising the (South) African universities' curricula was also discussed. Scholarship cited for this study has demonstrated that decolonisation conversations have not achieved much globally. The question of adherence to the law regarding both the constitutionality of decolonisation as well as implementing strategies earmarked for curricula reforms in local universities was explored.

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Petites mains féminines, vulnérabilité professionnelle et pratiques conjointes de compensation financières dans l'administration publique universitaire au Cameroun

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Résumé

Cet article se propose de mener une étude ethnographique sur des petites mains féminines de l'administration de l'université de Yaoundé II afin de voir dans quelle mesure l'utilisation du concept de résilience financière fait sens. De ce fait, situées à des positions d'infériorité administratives, les petites mains féminines, contractuelles temporaires d'administration ou à statut par défaut, semblent plus exposées aux pressions résultant des différents aléas sociopolitique, sanitaire, économique et de gestion auxquels peut être confrontée l'institution universitaire. En prenant en compte la crise de la Covid–19 comme point de référence temporel, cette étude permet de mettre en lumière les différentes stratégies et pratiques financières mobilisées par ces agents pour contourner et affronter les difficultés auxquelles les prédisposent leur condition socioprofessionnelle. A ce titre, il faut considérer que ces pratiques de compensation de revenu rendent compte de la capacité de cette catégorie à s'adapter aux évolutions dégradantes qui déterminent leur condition précaire de travail. Elles renseignent bien sur leurs réalités d'entrepreneuse de résiliences. On peut dès lors lier la résilience financière des petites mains à un conditionnement socioprofessionnel légitime. Celle qui favorise en tant que positionnement d'action, la compensation de leur revenu par la diversification des activités génératrices de revenus et la mise en place des systèmes d'entraide et de solidarité au sein de l'institution.

Mots clés : vulnérabilité, compensation financière, conditionnement, positionnement

Catherine[1] est une jeune femme de 30 ans, inscrite en thèse depuis 2020, elle intervient par ailleurs dans le cadre des activités académiques à l'Université de Yaoundé II depuis 2018. En période d'examens, elle assure des fonctions de membre dans certaines commissions pour lesquelles elle bénéficie de quelques revenus sporadiques issus des états financiers desdites commissions. Exerçant dans des conditions précaires, des Catherines au sein de l'Université sont nombreuses. En effet, dans son fonctionnement quotidien, l'institution universitaire s'appuie sur trois grandes catégories d'acteurs souvent visibles : le personnel enseignant, le personnel administratif et les étudiants qui en sont les usagers. Elle mobilise une forte main d'œuvre qui dans sa diversité, assurent en fonction de ses prérogatives la continuité et la permanence du service public. Le choix d'analyse du personnel « subalterne » qui s'inscrit à la frontière du dedans et du dehors de l'affiliation institutionnelle universitaire constitue ici une catégorie d'analyse intéressante. Il permet de saisir à partir du bas, les registres d'actions qui rendent compte de la gestion à géométrie variable de la ressource humaine mise au service de l'institution. De ce fait, situé à la plus petite échelle de positionnement et de conditionnement socioprofessionnelle du personnel

administratif, cette catégorie permet de rompre avec le caractère homogène et universel auquel invite de prime à bord à penser l'institution. Les petites mains, considérées ici comme la main d'œuvre non permanente de l'institution s'en tiendra aux « agents temporaires » et « aux sans statuts » qui y travaillent. Majoritairement logés à des tâches de guichet, ces agents constituent une opportunité analytique permettant de comprendre les rapports qu'entretiennent les agents en position subalterne avec l'administration universitaire en situation de récession ou de rétrécissement financier.

C'est d'ailleurs dans l'optique d'améliorer les conditions des travailleurs que le statut des personnels d'appui a été signé par le Chef de l'Etat en date du 18 mai 2011, et renforcé par le décret du 13 janvier 2012 fixant les modalités de paiement des indemnités et primes allouées aux personnels d'appui des universités publiques. Si cette décision vient renforcer le statut du personnel d'appui et d'administration, une part importante du personnel temporaire à contrat à durée déterminée et des travailleurs sans contrat de travail considérés comme des « sans statuts » à l'université ne s'y retrouvent. Ce qui participe de fait à une catégorisation par la marge. Il faut préciser que le recrutement du personnel temporaire est tributaire de l'administration universitaire et la cécité institutionnelle de leur condition de travail précaire participe à construire leur identité professionnelle de subalterne. Considérés comme des salariées d'en bas, le petit personnel dans sa diversité ne constitue pas des catégories privilégiées mise en discussion dans les travaux traitant du champ universitaire comme objet d'analyse en science politique camerounaise. C'est davantage les éléments structurants la machinerie du pouvoir universitaire, à travers l'investissement des universitaires dans l'arène politique (Luc Ngwé et al, 2006), le rapport des étudiants et des femmes au politique universitaire, au pouvoir, et à l'ordre politique dominant (Morillas, 2010 ; Nkolo Asse, 2015 ; Bella, 2015 : 291; 20 ; Ngo Nlend, 2020), ou encore leur démobilisation collective (Pommerolle, 2008) et les genres de violence en milieu universitaire (Mimche, 2021) en contexte post autoritaire qui ont constitué les centres d'intérêt majeurs. Pourtant, dans le sillage de la « main invisible » d'Adam Smith (Dellemotte, 2009 : 28), les petits personnels considérés comme des agents invisibles bien qu'omniprésents des administrations universitaires, participent tout aussi à la performance de l'institution (Makosso, 2006 : 69).

Des lors, analyser les pratiques professionnelles et les modes de gestion administrative qui renforcent leur déclassement socioprofessionnel et financier à l'université demeure d'actualité. D'ailleurs, c'est la classe féminine au demeurant fortement vulnérable qui sera mis en analyse. Diverses raisons justifient ce choix dont sa position déclassée dans les rapports sociaux de sexe (Patton Salinas et Fusulier, 2011) et dans son rapport au pouvoir au sein d'une structure largement dominée par les hommes. Le paradoxe qui accompagne ces rapports sociaux de sexe et de pouvoir est lié au plafond de verre (Laufer, 2004) qui détermine dans les hauteurs institutionnelles, le sommet de carrière auquel peuvent prétendre les femmes à l'université et à la précarisation des femmes au bas de l'échelle institutionnelle parce que plus nombreuses. En étudiant de concert les agents temporaires, les agents sans statut comme des catégories socio–professionnelles subalternes, s'intéresser aux femmes en bas, permet de rappeler que ce sont leur condition précaire de travail qui renforcent leur inégalité dans le champ universitaire. Cette inégalité de traitement des sous–groupes construits institutionnellement permet ici de relever les ressorts explicatifs d'une possible féminisation du salariat subalterne (Avril et Al, 2019) à l'université.

En effet, questionner la condition des travailleurs soumis à cette précarisation permet d'analyser les résurgences ou les transformations contemporaines du travail salarié en Afrique subsaharienne (Bourel et Vadot, 2022) en général et dans l'université en particulier. Elles documentent combien la diversité des configurations animées par l'action des agents et leur rapport au revenu constituent une modalité souvent usitée de la pluralité de traitement des travailleurs au sein d'une même

institution. En tant qu'agents temporaires, elles inscrivent dans une zone intermédiaire entre l'intégration et la désaffiliation (Lhuilier, 2017). Par conséquent, en situation de crise financière à l'Université, ces agents temporaires constituent donc les catégories les plus explosés du fait de l'insécurité professionnelle déterminée par leur statut de temporaire. Conscientes de ces conditions précaires, les femmes sont souvent portées à faire preuve de résistance et de résilience pour pouvoir survivre dans ces conditions dégradées auxquelles elles sont confrontées. Des lors, cette recherche se propose de mener une étude ethnographique des petites mains féminines de l'administration de l'Université de Yaoundé II, afin de voir dans quelle mesure l'utilisation du concept de résilience financière fait sens. De ce fait, la matérialisation des relations directes qu'elles entretiennent avec l'administration en tant qu'agents subalternes les positionne en catégorie d'exécution. Situées à des positions d'infériorité administratives, leur déclassement face au pouvoir décisionnel en tant que petites mains féminines d'administration, semblent plus exposées et soumises aux pressions résultantes des différentes crises auxquelles peut être confrontée l'institution universitaire. Considéré comme le fruit d'une observation directe des agents d'en bas ou de base en action dans leur environnement professionnel quotidien, ce travail s'appuie sur une enquête de terrain menée au campus de Soa de l'Université de Yaoundé II auprès de 15 profils différents[2].

En prenant en compte la crise de la Covid-19 comme un choc institutionnel et point de référence temporel de la dernière crise qu'a connu l'environnement universitaire, cette étude permet de mettre en lumière les différentes stratégiques et pratiques financières, formelles et informelles mobilisées par ces agents situés en parenthèse de l'administration. Ces stratégies qui sont à l'œuvre des pratiques de résistance permettent de contourner et d'affronter les difficultés auxquelles les prédisposent leur condition socioprofessionnelle. Ces pratiques de résistance par la résilience nous apprennent sur les formes de pouvoir qui structurent leur environnement et l'envers d'une domination centrée sur une catégorie de genre situés du « mauvais côté » du rapport de pouvoir. On peut dès lors lire la résilience financière dont elles font montre à partir de deux mécanismes observables dans le champ universitaire. La diversification des activités génératrices de revenu envisagée comme complément de salaire (Bapes Ba Bapes, 2022) et la mise en place des systèmes d'entraide et de solidarité, au sein de l'institution qui constituent ici des variables déterminantes de cette résilience. A ce titre, interroger les dynamiques constitutives du positionnement socioprofessionnel des catégories subalternes féminines et les pratiques mobilisées en vue de leur adaptation aux conditions précaires de leur cadre de travail sont donc révélateurs d'une forme de privatisation par le bas des mécanismes de compensation des revenus. Cette privatisation par le bas permet de mettre à jour leur conditionnement résilient en tant que catégorie socioprofessionnelle déclassée.

Le positionnement socioprofessionnel déclassé des petites mains de l'administration universitaire

Bien que considérées comme invisibles (Amabiamina, 2014), on envisage la vulnérabilité des petites mains féminines d'administration comme une construction socioprofessionnelle légitime. Cette construction tient de plusieurs ordres dynamiques considérant que le conditionnement précaire des travailleurs qui participe de la vulnérabilité professionnelle est institutionnellement construite. C'est l'incorporation de cette vulnérabilité envisager comme de l'ordre du naturel et légitime qui est source de résilience pour la catégorie.

Le conditionnement précaire des petites mains de l'administration universitaire

La souffrance au travail (Loriol, 2012) constitue une piste intéressante pour rendre compte de l'impensé du conditionnement précaire des catégories subalternes d'administration dans le champ universitaire. Les « petites mains invisibles de l'administration » qui nous intéressent dans cette analyse sont considérées comme les plus petits agents de base de l'administration. Ce sont les agents les plus subordonnés et travaillant pour la plupart au contact des publics universitaires[3]. Omniprésent au sein de l'université en tant agents, ils sont soumis à une hiérarchie qui impose des tâches et contrôle leurs activités au quotidien. S'ils ne bénéficient pas d'une sécurité sociale, d'une prime de soins en cas d'accident, des indemnités en cas de congé maladie ou d'invalidité, leurs conditions de travail reflète ce déclassement lié à leur condition professionnelle. Constitué des agents de sécurité, des agents de ménage, les agents courtiers de bureau et de gestions des examens non régis par les textes administratifs, les conditions de travail de ces sous catégories de l'université sont précaires. Parce que ne constituant pas une priorité dans l'agenda institutionnel universitaire, la méconnaissance de ces conditions a pourtant longtemps menée vers des situations de dénonciation, de contestation, et de revendication pour un meilleur traitement de leurs droits auprès des autorités compétentes.

Par ailleurs, l'interpellation du Ministre par 100 agents de sécurité dénonçant un licenciement abusif par leur institution en est une parfaite illustration. En date du O7 janvier 2021, c'est le ministre de l'Enseignement supérieur (Minesup), le professeur Jacques Fame Ndongo[4], qui invitait le recteur de l'Université de Yaoundé II-Soa[5], à apporter des solutions à la crise socio professionnelle qui se vit au sein de son institution par des agents de sécurité dite « Police campus »[6]. Leur revendication portait sur « les conditions d'exercice de leur métier, de l'absence de contrat de travail, de leur non-immatriculation à la Caisse nationale de prevoyance sociale (CNPS) et du prélèvement de 12,95 % dans leurs salaires mensuels non reversés à la CNPS par les services financiers et comptables de l'Université de Yaoundé II »[7]. C'est à partir de ce traitement public révélateur des conditions défavorables de travail observé en milieu universitaire, que se voit renforcer l'étiquette de « vulnérables ». Cet étiquetage est caractéristique de l'inadaptation des normes contemporaines (Lhuilier, 2017) aux transformations socioprofessionnelles du travail en période de récession financière. Le fonctionnement universitaire comme dans toute organisation tient compte d'un ensemble de dispositions et de dispositifs de gouvernance multi scalaire qui affecte par son mode d'action, le traitement différencié du personnel administratif. Cette différenciation catégorielle, qui tient lieu de note structurelle du corps universitaire, se positionne en un motif de classification des agents. Autrement dit, la classification des agents dans la structure d'une organisation constitue un poids déterminant des structures objectives de l'institution. Les conditions précaires qui accompagnent ce positionnement déclassé des agents à bas revenus dans le champ universitaire tiennent de l'ordre de la vulnérabilité comme variable explicative de construction de leur identité professionnelle.

La vulnérabilité professionnelle de petites mains féminines institutionnellement construite

La vulnérabilité devient un critère institutionnel distinctif dès lors que les conditions de travail bien que régies institutionnellement ne sont pas toujours respectées. En effet, si l'initiative étatique relève de la création des grands corps de l'Etat en s'appuyant sur ces quatre dimensions instituant, fondatrice, économique et symbolique (Aballea, 2013 :17), il en est de même à l'inverse de la constitution des catégories professionnelles plus modestes. L'institution universitaire inscrit dans le sentier de l'action de l'Etat crée, valide et participe à la formation des espaces de qualification (Aballea, 2013) des catégories professionnelles subalternes et vulnérables. C'est elle qui crée, octroie ou non les statuts avec ses droits et ses devoirs, ses privilèges et ses contraintes spécifiques. En considérant qu'une politique publique renvoie à ce que le gouvernement décide de

faire ou de ne pas faire ; l'institution universitaire dans l'institution en tant qu'Etat est pourvue d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui leur permettent de décider des actions à mener à l'endroit des catégories cibles. A cet effet, décider c'est choisir ; c'est faire le choix de prendre en compte ou non les préoccupations et les conditions vulnérables des agents dans l'agenda institutionnel universitaire comme un problème. Cependant, l'institutionnalisation par l'attribution d'un statut administratif par défaut renforce sa reconnaissance en tant que catégorie précaire et vulnérable dans le champ universitaire. Elle participe de la qualification du personnel temporaire et à petits revenus de l'administration comme une catégorie « du dedans et du dehors » fonctionnant en marge des corps légitimement constitué à l'université. Construire l'identité professionnelle et hiérarchique des « salariées d'en bas » de l'administration sied aussi de la singularité de leurs conditions de travail qui constitue un préalable à leur classification. Cette classification s'opère à partir de deux corps à savoir : le corps enseignant et le corps administratif. Le recrutement des petites mains en comparaison de ces deux grands corps est limité dans le temps parce que soumis à des contrats à durée déterminée d'un an. Ce sont les conditions de recrutement de ces agents qui définissent en partie, suivant les privilèges et les contraintes préalablement définis, le traitement public auquel ils sont soumis. Dans ces configurations, la vulnérabilité professionnelle perçue ici en termes de nouvelle catégorie d'action publique (Soulet M.-H., 2005, 2014), renseigne bien sur l'usage du recrutement dans la construction des catégories. En procédant à la reconnaissance par qualifications (Naville, 1956) hiérarchiques de salariées du bas ou de catégorie subalterne d'administration, l'on désigne ici une identité professionnelle (Dubar, 1991; Demazière et al, 2012) qui positionne le petit personnel en catégorie institutionnellement vulnérable.

Dans le champ universitaire, les vulnérables désignent des catégories précaires disposant d'un statut par défaut (Castel, 2003) dans l'administration. La vulnérabilité apparaît comme une caractéristique englobante (Lhuilier, 2017) pouvant désigner des conditions professionnelles précaires des femmes d'en bas dans le champ universitaire. En effet, penser la vulnérabilité des catégories subalternes revient à tenir compte des évolutions autour d'un seuil de pauvreté tributaire de la détention du capital d'actifs (Lallau, 2008) financier qui définit la capabilité. La capabilité en tant que ressource immatérielle traduit *« l'ensemble des modes de fonctionnement humain qui sont potentiellement accessibles à une personne, qu'elle les exerce ou non »* (Sen, 1992, 12), c'est-à-dire leurs libertés réelles d'action. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui rend intéressant cette catégorisation des lors qu'on vient à considérer comme dans le champ microéconomique la vulnérabilité comme une menace, une extension dynamique de l'analyse de la pauvreté (Alwang & al, 2001). A ce titre, elle renforce bien l'incertitude statutaire qui encadre le rapport au travail des catégories subalternes souvent déterminées le cas échéant par des contrats de travail[8] ne garantissant pas le maintien au poste[9] et favorisant ainsi l'informalité ou le défaut statutaire de certains acteurs[10]. Pour les catégories « sans statut » existantes, la volonté d'intégrer institutionnellement le corps administratif ou enseignant repose davantage sur des ressorts cognitifs et subjectifs axés sur la confiance, « la promesse de recrutement »[11]. De ces « promesses de recrutement » souvent tacites, entre responsables administratifs et postulants ou encore entre ainés et cadets académiques, qui laissent transparaitre un usage varié des postures de domination et de pouvoir, renforçant ainsi ce statut par défaut. L'usage permanent de ces catégories d'agent à « statuts par défaut » au sein de l'institution universitaire s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une institutionnalisation de l'informalité des emplois.

De l'incorporation de la vulnérabilité professionnelle à la résilience financière

La reconnaissance de ce défaut statutaire et l'usage qui en est fait au sein de l'institution universitaire renforce l'idée d'une violence symbolique qui correspond au pouvoir d'imposer un système de pensée comme légitime à une catégorie dominée. Il se traduit de ce fait par une double

dynamique d'acceptation publique des conditions précaires de travail au sein de l'institution. Celle-ci passe par une formalisation de la précarité des salariées d'en bas d'une part et d'autre part, par l'acceptation par les agents de base des conditions précaires de travail. L'acceptation des conditions précaires renforce l'explication par les processus d'incorporation et d'appropriation (Faure, 1999) des postures de dominées, de l'ordre socioprofessionnel à partir des classifications et hiérarchisations au sein de l'institution. Elle participe de ce fait à intérioriser les inégalités de condition comme étant légitimes.

C'est donc la vulnérabilité professionnelle légitimée qui donne sens aux actions de résilience au sein de l'institution. C'est elle qui conditionne à travers le « on va faire comment, on fait avec le peu qu'on peut avoir. On a pas d'autres choix »[12], le niveau de capabilité des agents à agir dans le sens de l'améliorer de leurs conditions. La résilience financière constitue donc ici une piste de réponse que l'on peut lire à travers les actions individuelles ou collectives menées par les femmes à bas revenu dans l'institution. Elle est révélatrice des dynamiques conjoncturelles qui permettent de lire sous des angles multiples, une réalité d'apparence homogène du personnel travaillant au sein de l'administration universitaire bien qu'étant chacune des catégories logées et traitées à des enseignes différentes. La condition des personnes à bas revenu de l'administration soumise à des réalités plurielles exigent de ce fait de mener des investigations empiriques pour lire à travers la distinction (Bourdieu, 1979) des agents, l'anthropologie des intérêts qui détermine l'économie des actions et des transactions à l'œuvre de leur catégorisation. On sait que c'est la structure du capital et sa distribution dans le champ universitaire qui renforce la classification des agents. Elle est au fondement de la catégorisation et du positionnement des agents ; ce qui conduit inéluctablement à une hiérarchisation des risques et des enjeux de pouvoir que la sécurité professionnelle garantit dans le champ universitaire.

Par conséquent, c'est à partir de cette échelle de positionnement des agents en fonction de leur rapport au pouvoir institutionnel, soit de décision ou d'exécution, soit de subordination et de subalternité que s'identifient les formes de résistance face aux risques qu'ils encourent dans l'exercice de leurs activités. On distingue alors les agents à faible résilience et les catégories à forte propension de résilience qui s'identifient à travers une adaptation des pratiques productives, des modes d'accumulation du capital, et souvent des réorientations majeures de stratégie. En effet, en prenant en considération les conditions qui favorisent l'émergence conjointes des pratiques de forte résilience chez les agents les plus vulnérables, il est important de préciser que celles-ci tiennent principalement aux capacités locales d'actions et de réaction. Ces capacités à réagir s'inscrit aussi dans le cadre d'un apprentissage qu'offre les tontines et des espaces d'échange entre femmes. Elles découlent de la conversion des potentialités des agents[13], via les opportunités (marchandes et non marchandes) qu'elles parviennent à saisir à partir des habitus sociaux, des dispositions et des manières d'être qu'elles mettent au service de leur environnement professionnel afin d'assurer leur survie. La résilience est révélatrice de l'usage et du partage des expériences de vulnérabilités et d'opportunités entre les femmes autour d'une cause commune. Entre potentialités et opportunités, elle détermine l'ampleur des possibilités d'être et d'agir accessibles aux agents en se centrant sur la capacité d'action de ces dernieres face aux risques plutôt que sur sa vulnérabilité.

Les Pratiques conjointes de compensation financières des femmes au sein de l'université : entre registres d'action collective et individuelle

Parce qu'elles épousent les transformations socioprofessionnelles que subissent les administrations publiques du fait des crises sociopolitiques et financières, les pratiques de compensation financières s'inscrivent dans la matérialité des stratégies d'action collectives et individuelles menées par les

agents dans le champ universitaire. C'est l'usage dans l'espace socioprofessionnel des expériences privées d'organisation financière que s'inscrivent les pratiques incorporées d'adaptation et de résilience menées par les femmes en situation de crise face à leur vulnérabilité professionnelle. Ces pratiques s'illustrent par l'émergence d'initiative caractérielle d'actions collectives solidaires, de micro-activités entrepreneuriales parallèles de nécessité (Couteret, 2010 ; Tessier Dargent, 2015) d'échange et de transaction dont l'externalisation (Dufournet et *al.*, 2019) dans le champ universitaire renforce vis-à vis des autres catégories cette position de dominée. C'est l'usage de leur position saisie comme des fenêtres d'opportunité qui rend bien compte de leurs capacités résilientes dans le champ universitaire.

Le positionnement des tontines comme une action collective et solidaire de résilience financière

Les femmes agents de ménage, de bureau ou de sécurité au sein de l'université ont adhéré aux logiques propres d'épargne et de solidarité pratiques en mettant sur pied des tontines de fortune en fonction de leur champ d'activité respectives. Calqué sur le modèle de l'association des femmes « Ladies »[14] de l'Université de Yaoundé II, les femmes se mobilisent en épargnantes pour investir en commun ou individuellement dans des actifs financiers parallèles. Pour les membres de ces petites associations, la tontine constitue une forme d'épargne à caractère socioculturel (Kemayou et al, 2011 : 163) qui s'adapte mieux à leur habitus (Dubois, 2003a) genrée axée sur les valeurs d'entraide, de solidarité, de sociabilité et de conformation aux normes de l'institution (Dubois, 2010 :10). Déjà socialisées à ces formes d'épargne dans le cadre social, participer à la tontine constitue un choix inéluctable pour survivre et faire bon usage du revenu. En fonction de leur habitus de classe (Jourdin et Naulin, 2011, 2019 :54), les tontines constituent pour les femmes du social incorporé (Bourdieu et Passeron, 1970 ; Francois, 2007 :45). Comme elles le soulignent, « on n'a pas d'autres choix que de faire la tontine pour jongler ; quarante mille va t'aider à faire quoi ? Alors que les tontines justement te permettent de faire quelque chose avec le salaire parce que si tu ne fais pas comme ça tu ne feras rien comme investissement, tu vas seulement manger avec »[15].

De cette acception, la tontine aide à relever par l'investissement, le déficit financier du revenu mensuel qui en soi ne représente quasiment rien pour des femmes avec des charges familiales lourdes[16]. Les tontines longtemps logées au rang des survivances (Essombe Edimo, 1998), sont considérées de ce fait comme des activités économiques informelles (Aryeetey, 1995 : 205) mobilisées par les catégories les plus à risque. Penser le rôle des tontines au sein de l'université pour les agents de base permet de l'envisager comme une action collective financière innovante et stratégique mise en place en vue de répondre à un problème. En effet, en situation de récession financière, l'émergence des tontines féminines en milieu professionnel modifie leurs comportements économiques et agissent en retour comme des contraintes sur leur action. Dans la mesure où pour les femmes agent de ménage et agents de sécurité en l'occurrence, « *les cotisations mensuelles sont de 30000 milles francs* cfa pour celles qui peuvent le faire. A défaut d'avoir un nom inscrit pour la cotisation, les femmes peuvent se mettre en groupe de deux pour une cotisation de 15 000 milles francs cfa chacune pour souscrire à une place. Les cotisations courent sur 10 mois à partir du début du contrat de travail »[17]. Tout en leur offrant des points d'appui souvent informels pour assurer leurs besoins financiers, les tontines se positionnent en circuits financiers internes. Circuits auxquels ont recours les femmes regroupées en sous-catégorie professionnelle qui leur permet de subvenir aux difficultés financières prédéterminées par leurs conditions de travail. Servant à la fois de crédit à la consommation, de caisse d'épargne, les tontines jouent un rôle fondamental dans l'économie des salariées d'en bas. Elles traduisent les capacités de résilience des personnels à petits revenus à faire face à l'adversité (Nzemen, 1988 :130, Salina et Fusulier, 2011 : 15) du champ professionnel universitaire dans lesquelles elles évoluent.

L'université comme un espace marchand et transactionnel pour les petites mains de l'administration

On considère dans le cadre de cette partie que les pratiques informelles de marché menées par les petits personnels de l'administration constituent un ressort de transformation socioprofessionnel de l'espace de travail en espace marchand et de transaction. Cette transformation à l'œuvre dans le champ universitaire tient de l'investissement menées par les femmes à travers la mise en place des circuits de micro-activités génératrices de revenu (AGR)**.** Qu'elles soient fixes ou ambulantes, les activités génératrices de revenu constituent des activités de production et de commercialisation de biens et services qui procurent des revenus réguliers, afin d'améliorer les conditions de vie des principales initiatrices. En effet, envisager les AGR menées par les femmes au sein du campus comme un mécanisme de compensation financière constitue une réponse pour faire face à leurs conditions financières précaires. Ces activités mettent en exergue la capacité des femmes à se faire une place dans les circuits économiques (Salina et Fusulier, 2011 : 16) informel en faisant usage de leur position pour offrir en parallèle des services soit de ménage ou encore de restauration aux agents fonctionnaires et responsables dans le service. Traditionnellement, il existait une organisation sociale hiérarchisée, reposant sur une division sexuelle des tâches avec des domaines de compétence féminine. Toute l'éducation reçue par les jeunes filles les préparait ainsi à accomplir efficacement leurs rôles d'épouse, de mère dévouée, de gardienne de foyer et des traditions (Bile et al, 2022). De nos jours, la reconversion de ces compétences de la sphère privée vers la sphère publique se donne à voir dans les universités par ces actions. Elles se positionnent ainsi en capital culturel dont la mobilisation en situation de crise ou de vulnérabilité participe à construire des réponses résilientes pour subvenir à leur besoin tout en accomplissant leur activité. Si la tontine en constitue un des marqueurs dans le champ social, l'université se transforme de ce fait en espace de reconversion marchand et de transaction. Un espace d'extériorisation des savoirs être et des savoir-faire fortement dépendants de leurs socialisations primaires dont les déterminants sociaux (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) de catégorisation de genre contribuent à travers la féminisation des réponses proposées. A ce titre, on observe que les femmes s'investissent davantage aussi au sein de l'institution à la vente ambulante des articles comestibles, vestimentaires, de produits de santé et de beauté, de bijoux, etc. Elles parcourent les bureaux avec des produits de consommation qu'elles proposent. Vendeuses de beignets de manioc[18], ou de jus naturels, la clientèle souvent fidèle et ciblée demeure les responsables et personnels administratifs ainsi que le personnel enseignant.

L'université comme un espace de domination par la gratification

A l'Université, « les états financiers » constituent un moment d'euphorie réel pour les agents ayant fait partie des commissions de travail montées par les facultés et l'administration centrale. Normal, *« les états sont un argent gardé qui permet d'avoir quelque chose en plus sur le revenu qui existe déjà et qui ne représente pas grand-chose »*[19]. La gratification va de soi, elle n'est pas commune. Elle constitue une libéralité, une faveur en principe bénévole qui est donnée à quelqu'un en plus de ce qui lui est dû. C'est un supplément au revenu qui peut être versé de manière régulière ou pas en vertu de son usage par son employeur ou par une hiérarchie au sein de l'institution. Par ce biais, les relations de domination entretenues par ces mecanismes de compensation deviennent plus formelles et rationalisées parce qu'elles tiennent compte de l'existence du niveau hiérarchique, ou encore de la détention du capital symbolique qui ultérieurement accumulé, est reconverti en capital économique (Bourdieu, 2003 ; 2017). De ce fait, parce qu'elle n'est pas obligatoire, la gratification permet de mettre en perspective les rapports de domination qui structurent non seulement sur le plan institutionnel et collectif ou individuel, l'ordre établi qui accompagne la distribution et la redistribution des gratifications dans l'espace universitaire.

Sur le plan institutionnel, la distribution des gratifications tient compte d'un ensemble de préalable qui épouse les codes de classification compatible à l'environnement dans lequel il est situé. A l'université, *c'*est la position administrative et le grade académique qui constituent des variables déterminantes de distribution des primes. Par conséquent, par cette codification l'institution participe à renforcer les inégalités et les rapports de domination entre les salariés d'en haut et ceux d'en bas au sein de l'université. Dans ce sens, la gratification est fonction des dispositions du capital culturel et symbolique dont ne disposent pas toujours les petites mains. De ce fait, on voit que la distribution des gratifications dans le champ universitaire facilite l'entretien du rapport de domination par les détenteurs des capitaux. Si l'ordre symbolique semble primer sur l'ordre matériel dans les structures des échanges entre agents ; les actions menées par ceux-ci participent certes de la logique de l'échange mais aussi de la logique du pouvoir (Jourdain et Naulin, 2019 : 148). Sur le plan personnel et privé, elle renforce la structure des ordres établis entre le chef et le subalterne, le détenteur de l'autorité, de la décision et l'exécutant. Lorsqu'on étudie le champ de production qui accompagne cette gratification et ces récompenses, on voit bien se faire la rencontre entre les habitus de l'autorité et de habitus de soumission et de subalternité. Cette rencontre qui rend bien compte du rapport de domination, vise la stabilisation des relations dissymétriques (Corcuff, 2019 : 50) entre catégories reposant sur une transaction ou une tractation. Descendante est donc l'action qui accompagne la main hiérarchique dans la redistribution et la gratification dans le champ universitaire car, l'autorité est déterminée au sommet du champ du pouvoir (Bourdieu, 1989). Parce que (in) formelle, pécuniaire ou en nature, organisée ou spontanée, la figure de la gratification et de la récompense est plurielle. Elle relève du cadre des avantages de service que peuvent bénéficier les petites mains dans l'exercice de leur activité. En fonction du champ d'affectation dans lequel elles sont assignées, elles compensent les revenus en se référant aux biens accessibles dans le cadre de leurs services. Au demeurant, les femmes travaillant au restaurant de l'université peuvent cas échéant disposer quotidiennement d'un repas familial, des vivres et des tickets pour un usage privé. De même, pour les personnels de bureau, temporaires ou sans statuts qui continuent de servir la faculté sous la tolérance des chefs[20], ils peuvent bénéficier des gratifications au gré à gré matérialisée par les bons de carburant, de l'argent en guise de reconnaissance du travail accompli et de compensation régulière de survie.

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Endnotes

1 Catherine est un nom d'emprunt pour préserver l'identité de l'enquêté ayant émis des réserves à être citée dans le cadre de ce travail.

2 Constitués de cinq agents de ménage, cinq agents de sécurité, deux doctorantes (membres de commissions affectées à la gestion des examens sans véritables contrats de travail), et trois agents de bureau dans les diverses permanences qui en dépendent

3 Ce sont des agents en contact permanent avec les étudiants et les enseignants et les responsables administratifs dans le cadre de leurs activités que ce soit en matière de guichet sécurité, de guichets d'administration, gestion d'examens, ou des services d'entretien et d'hygiène de l'université ; ce sont les omniprésents de l'espace universitaire.

4 Propos du ministre recueillis de la correspondance du 07 janvier 2021 en guise de réponse « *Vous avez pris la décision de vous séparer de 116 agents, dont certains cumuleraient 10 années continues de service et qui travaillaient dans le cadre de police campus dans l'institution dont vous avez la charge*». Source, https://www.stopblablacam.com, du 12 janvier 2021 ;

5 le Professeur Adolphe Minkoa She, recteur en cours d'exercice de l'Université de yaoundé 2.

6 « lors de sa création en 2011, le corps des agents de campus police avait vocation à recruter des temporaires pour une période d'un an. Chaque début d'année en novembre, un appel à candidatures est lancé pour un nouveau recrutement avec un contrat qui court du 1er janvier au 31 décembre ».

7 Tireé du site https://actucameroun.com, du 12 janvier 2021

8 On fait référence ici au non-respect des normes de protection pendant le travail et l'absence d'une sécurité sociale qui suggère une prise en charge en cas d'accident au travail. Cette précarité tient de plusieurs ordres dont la durée d'un an renouvelable sous condition d'un nouveau dépôt de dossier de recrutement. Elle encourage la médiation entre registres formels et informels de gouvernance des petites mains chez le personnel temporaire qui soumis à un contrat à durée déterminée est sujette à des conditions précaires d'exercice de leur métier avec l'absence de contrat de travail, la non soumission à une assurance sociale, la non-immatriculation à la CNPS ne justifiant pas ainsi le prélèvement de 12,95 % dans leurs salaires mensuels non reversés à la CNPS par les services financiers et comptables de l'Université de Yaoundé II, et l'absence de carrière professionnelle.

9 Propos collectés en entretien menée dans un focus group avec 25 femmes agent de ménage à l'université de Yaoundé II en date du 27 août 2021. L'irrégularité de la rémunération, l'absence de contrat écrit ; l'absence de sécurité sociale liée à leur fonction les conforte dans cette condition de précarité ; des conditions d'exercice de l'activité, et plus généralement par une exposition plus importante du travailleur à des risques concernant son emploi ;

10 Entretien menée avec une jeune femme travaillant dans les services de gestion des examens de l'Université II et dont l'affiliation avec l'institution de ce point de vue reste sans fondement normatif et institutionnel clair au vu des services rendu à l'institution. Entretien mené le 12 aout 2022, à 10 h.

11 Tiré de l'entretien mené le 12 Aout 2022 avec une jeune sans statut d'emploi mais travaillant pour le compte de l'université de Yaoundé II durant la période des examens.

12 Propos recueillis auprès d'une femme agente de sécurité de Police Campus, en date du 10 Octobre 2022 au campus de Soa.

13 Ce potentiel est lié pour l'essentiel à leurs différentes dotations en capital : monétaire, physique, humain, social

14 la plus importante des associations des femmes au sein de l'institution regroupant toutes les catégories d'agents administratifs.

15 Propos tenus par les femmes de ménages lors de l'entretien en date du 16 août 2022 au sein du campus de l'université de Yaoundé II à Soa ;

16 Propos recueillis de l'entretien avec une femme de la sécurité de police Campus en date du 14 octobre 2022 au sein de l'université de Yaoundé II Soa. Elle a un salaire de 50 250 fcfa net à la fin du mois et cinq enfants en charge.

17 Propos Tirés de l'entretien avec les femmes de ménage dans le cadre d'une collecte de donnée par focus group sur « Les inégalités de genre à l'université » en date du 27 aout 2021 à l'Université de Yaoundé II.

18 Entretien mené avec une vendeuse de Beignet de manioc, femme de ménage affectée au secteur sud vers la direction des affaires académique et de la coopération de l'université de Yaoundé II. En plus de ces activités, propose comme beaucoup de femme de service du ménage des services pour une offre privée de ménage dans les bureaux et les maisons des responsables administratifs

19 Propos tiré de l'entretien avec une doctorante, membre d'une des commissions examens à l'université le 12 aout 2022, au sein de l'Université.

20 Entretien mené avec un agent de bureau, ex temporaire, le 10 aout 2022 .

The Digital Party

Political Organization and Online Democracy

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Over two centuries political parties have stood as one of influential organizations in humankind. Besides playing several functions such as capturing and exercising state power, political socialization and interest aggregation, these organizations have not been free from controversies. At the centre of these controversies is the mass-elite divide which Robert Michels referred to as Iron Law of Oligarchy. Michel's revelation was a revelation that elite interests were not necessarily compatible with those of the mass. This observation notwithstanding, political parties have remained the very influential actors in politics irrespective of some speculations that globalization is likely to lead to the withering away of political parties and the nation-state.

Despite the fact that this predicted crumbling of the two is yet to be witnessed, digital technologies seem to be significantly changing the way political parties and their functioning have been construed for centuries. Owing to the effects of digital technologies on political parties, Gerbaudo dedicates his book to exploring the digital parties. While drawing experiences from popular digital platforms such as the Five Star Movement in Italy and Podemos in Spain, he shows how the formation of digital parties has transformed party politics. Unlike the traditional parties which rely on vertical communication with much of the information flowing from the party headquarters, the digital party is presented in the book as anti-hierarchy as it puts participation, expressed through the participationism ideology at the fore front.

Gerbaudo shows that digital parties mainly draw their support from the digitally savvy youth who have long felt excluded from the political mainstream. From chapter 2 to chapter 9 the author provides a very rich and detailed account pertaining to the manifestations of the digital parties. Underscored in these chapters is the emphasis that digital parties bring in an empowerment dimension to politics as party leadership is not based on Weber's hierarchical authority but on charismatic leadership in which the hyperleader magnetically appeals and enjoys immeasurable support from the "*connected outsiders*". The digital party is thus seen as a revamping strategy to resuscitate party politics at the time when the traditional political parties are presumed to be in a decline. Gerbaudo shows that the advent of digital parties presents a message that unlike traditional parties that have tended to operate from the party headquarters, the digital party is electronically everywhere whenever there is internet connection, but physically nowhere. Online networking and politicking thus make the presence of a party cadre superfluous as whoever is connected to the digital political network or platform automatically becomes a cadre.

The book is very insightful as it offers an informative overview of the evolution and controversies related to both the traditional parties and the digital parties. The author tries as much as possible to present a balanced opinion regarding the plausibility of the claims made by the proponents of

digital parties; particularly on issues such as the role of the hyperleader, the horizontal nature of interactions and the inevitability of party headquarters.

Despite showing some concerns regarding the practicability and functioning of digital parties, the author seems to be convinced that the digital parties are on their way to taking over traditional parties. The basis upon which this position is taken is nonetheless doubtful as despite being cherished, there are several aspects related to digital parties that are not adequately addressed by Gerbaudo.

To start with, the presentation on the ascendancy of the digital parties does not clearly show whether this new form of political parties is a means to an end or an end in itself. As the digital party is presumed to have overtaken the traditional party, what happens after the digital party takes reign is not clear. Given that the digital party claims to dismantle the hierarchical tendencies of traditional parties, it is not clear how the invisible party would run the traditionally hierarchical government. It is also not clear whether taking over the traditional parties implies the transition to digital or invisible government. Lack of this clarity reduces the status of digital parties to mere pressure groups.

In addition, at the heart of the digital party lies a belief that the connected outsiders should take charge of the political processes. The insider-outsider relationship seems to be vicious given that the outsider becomes an insider and the insider becomes an outsider. The fate of the toppled traditional insiders remains uncertain. It is not clear whether the traditional insiders are assimilated or marginalized due to their digital illiteracy. In addition, the euphoria of digital party does not consider the digital divide that has tended to marginalize the poor. While the idea of the digital party takes care of the excluded educated youths, nothing is said regarding the welfare of the poor whose participation in politics through traditional political parties has always been minimal. The digital party does not seem to have an agenda for the poor.

Likewise, the idea of an existence of a digitally talented hyperleader seems to be confusing. Despite the concerns raised by Gerbaudo regarding the operationalization of the hyperleader, his/her presence presents him/her like a top figure in an invisible hierarchy, that is not substantially different from the top leader of a traditional political party. Based on the way the hyperleader is described is not clear whether that leader is charismatic or just popular due to his/her online political activism.

The book also does not adequately consider the question of accountability. Leaders of digital parties seem to be taken for granted as the mechanisms through which they should be held accountable are not addressed in the book. If capturing and exercising state power is one of the goals of digital parties, as it has always been the case for traditional parties, digital parties ought to be accountable to the electorate. Even through electronic democracy, the citizenry need to have power to hold the behaviour of their leaders in check. As it has been the case for traditional parties, the existence of physical party headquarters provides opportunities for the citizenry and party members to at least express their grudges towards the party and the government serving them. In cases of a soured relationship, aggrieved persons have physically confronted the party headquarters or the state. The digital party seems to be a ghost in times of crisis as it is difficult to hold an invisible leader accountable. The digital party also does not clearly show how intra party conflicts and controversies can be addresses beyond the wisdom of the charismatic hyperleader.

The digital party as discussed by Gerbaudo seems to overgeneralize the traditional parties by treating them as aversive to digital technology. Experience shows that even traditional parties have been opting for digital platforms in order to attract some sections of members such as the youth (Mustapha et al., 2016). To a great extent, much of what is being done by digital parties is somehow being done by traditional parties. The difference mainly rests on the degree of the use of the digital

Edwin Babeiya

platforms. As the normalization perspective shows, the adoption of digital technology does not necessarily change the status quo (How et al, 2016). The digital euphoria might thus not be realistic.

The digital party as discussed by the author seems to be ideologically fragile. It lacks a clear ideology that puts its sustainability in jeopardy. A sense of deprivation and exclusion that is held among what Gerbaudo calls the connected outsiders cannot hold these parties forever. As Gainous et al. (2018) argue, some users of digital technologies are partisan and thus their use of the social media platforms does not affect their entrenched partisanship It is worth noting the traditional political party has tended to have a clear ideology. On the contrary, the digital party seems to be anchored on participationism as an ideology. Beyond embracing the participatory culture, the digital party ought to have a clear ideology through which the cherished participation is anchored. Short of a clear ideology their political agenda becomes blurred.

These observations notwithstanding, this book is very useful for political scientists as it opens the windows for more discussion on the fate of both the digital and traditional political parties.

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Developmental Integration and Industrialisation in Southern Africa

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
A corpus of literature emphasises the need for industrialisation and integration if states belonging to regional blocs aspire to prosper economically, politically, socially, technologically and culturally. In Southern Africa, gains have been made mainly in political cooperation and solidarity but remain desperately underdeveloped regarding regional integration. Yet, current realities made evident through the advent of Covid 19 pandemic, the ongoing climate change-induced crisis, the energy crisis and the vexing challenges of migration call for the urgent need for regions that ought to foster and prioritise developmental integration and industrialisation.

The text, *Developmental Integration and Industrialisation in Southern Africa* by Siphumelele Duma exposes this glaring gap in the literature by taking stock of the developmental integration and industrialisation matrix of the region whilst at the same time proffering solutions on what needs to be done for the realisation of the critical goals of these notions.

In the synopsis, Duma explicitly makes the thrust of his text clear – to examine the impacts and contribution of developmental integration on the regional industrialisation process in SADC. In the process, the text would determine whether this initiative has contributed to an increase in the significance of the SADC region's manufacturing sector (as a measure of industrialisation), as well as what accounts for the failure of developmental integration to accelerate the industrialisation process in the SADC region. Whilst Duma's book analyses the performance of all member states using industrialisation economic indicators for the period 1992 to 2020, it specifically nuances its analyses to a sample of three countries considered as the fastest growing economies in the Southern African region, that is Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa. In dissecting this thrust, the text is organised into nine thematic chapters.

Chapter one is titled Introduction, Understanding SADC's Quest for Industrialisation. It lays the background by contextualising the global south's quest for development integration and industrialisation by locating such to the legacies of colonialism. In the case of Africa, Duma rightly points out the genesis of the continent's pursuit of development integration and industrialisation through the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos (LPA-FAL), 1980-2000. This sought to ensure the self-sufficiency of the African continent by creating an industrial base in each member state, which was to be designed to meet the interests of the particular country and which would be strengthened by complementary activities at the sub-regional and regional levels.

In chapter two, Duma juxtaposes the notions of developmental integration and industrialisation in Southern Africa through the deployment of neo-structuralism and neo-liberalism as theoretical lenses. He is aware of the limitations of these theories, especially concerning the exaggerated calls to limit governments in the affairs of industrialisation and development. The historical attainment of

statehood in Southern Africa, where liberation movements had to take arms makes them vanguards and architects of any developmental trajectory or industrialisation exploits within the region.

The debate is further pursued in the next chapter, where the colonial motives of industrialising and developing metropoles at the expense of the colonies resulted in a deliberate deindustrialisation of African states. There was thus a need to put in place development and industrialisation initiatives to recover the losses of colonial exploits which were never for the development and industrialisation agenda of the Southern African region. It is for this reason that Chapter Four chronicles the historical evolution of SADC from cooperation to integration. SADC as a regional organisation evolved out of SADCC, an offspring of the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 and the Front-Line States (FLS) consisting of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The FLS was an informal and loosely coordinated political alliance that had attempted to aggregate its member states' power to pursue a specific foreign policy objective in Southern Africa. The FLS had a twin objective of waging liberation to decolonise the region and, simultaneously, forging African unity buttressed through political and cultural symbiosis. The expression and mechanisms of the struggle were coordinated and executed under the FLS' security arm of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee – ISDC. These security dynamics, to some degree, continue to shape the political and security cooperation of the region and help entrench collective thinking among regional members. This historical background as Duma avers, makes one understand the regional developmental agenda of industrialization and integration better.

In Chapter Five, the text outlines several challenges to the African continent in general, and the SADC region in particular noting the main challenges as the lack of finance and a proper supporting infrastructure. The chapter further explores mechanisms SADC has put in place for financial resources to support the region's industrialisation process, especially in terms of investment in infrastructure. The author explores these mechanisms by way of nuancing the efficacy and importance of financing mechanisms for industrialisation, the government-private sector collaboration in pursuit of the SADC industrialisation objectives as well as the SADC Regional Development Fund (RDF). Having looked at the funding sources and possible alternatives, the following chapter focuses on SADC's Industrialisation through Developmental Integration.

This chapter reflects on SADC's industrialisation through developmental integration by exposing the dire straits of a region that had undergone a veritable incipient decline in terms of industrialisation and integration between 1990 and 2020. The author identifies some countries' poor economic performance and trading unprocessed as chief reasons. This is further buttressed by the country case study scan which the text delves into in Chapter Seven. The chapter singles out Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa as typical case studies given that they are the most industrialised at a regional level. The analysis of these three countries is premised on such ingredients as economic indicators that measure industrialisation, including the MVA share of the GDP, the industrial sector's share of GDP and the annual growth rates of these economies.

With regards to Botswana, the author rightly opines that the country successfully recovered from being identified as one of the poorest countries in the world and the region by effectively harnessing resources in the form of diamonds. Mauritius like Botswana is amongst the smallest countries in the SADC region but now stands as one of the fastest-growing economies primarily because of a boom in its manufacturing sector. The industrialisation process of this island country was geared and engineered by the Mauritian government's establishment of a national development bank in the 1960s, to support the island's industrialisation and economic diversification objectives. This has resulted in various small-scale industries involved in food processing, beverages, cosmetics, fertilizer and footwear being established and meeting local needs. South Africa on the other hand is identified as pursuing continuities as opposed to discontinuities in terms of the mineral energy

complex set up by successive colonial and apartheid governments. This has made South Africa the most industrialised country not only at the regional level but at a continental level.

In chapter eight entitled 30 Years of the Developmental Integration Quest for Industrialisation in SADC, Duma locates 2022 as the 13th anniversary since developmental regional integration within SADC was institutionalised. This was largely due to regional leaders' recognition of the significance of industrialisation as a precursor for socio-economic development. However, the chapter exposes the inert pace at which developmental integration and industrialisation have taken place at the regional level. This has resulted in the SADC region's failure to transform its economies due to a lack of deliberate effort in operationalisation. The author notes that there is still a long way to go towards the improvisation of the regional manufacturing sector for synchronising regional and national industrialisation plans and strategies.

The ninth chapter concludes the text, offering practical recommendations required for the Re-engineering of the state to take action in SADC. At the centre of integration between the SADC economies is the goal of industrialisation and development. The SADC economies have a limited production capacity, thus, developmental integration was the approach adopted to help build state capacity through a policy of indigenisation of investments. The author avers that although selected SADC member states consisting of Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa have adopted several ambitious initiatives to industrialise and diversify their economies, the manufacturing sector does not have the required dominance in their economies to ensure sustainable industrialisation.

Regional integration and industrialisation remain the panacea for any country and region serious about an economic takeoff, yet current realities in the SADC region exposed by this text do not demonstrate such agency. The text perhaps remains the most current in addressing the regional developmental integration and industrialisation framework, which if harnessed will largely contribute to the fruition of the much-talked-about Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the Africa Union's Agenda 2063.

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About the African Association of Political Science

The African Association of Political Science was launched in Dar es Salam in 1974 as the continental parent body of political scientists in Africa, and as a platform to interrogate the state of the politics, governance, economy and development of African states. Before its collapse, AAPS promoted the systematic study and application of African Political Science scholarships. The Association also interrogated the viability of knowledge conjectured about/for Africa. AAPS became a formidable composition of established and emerging African Political Science scholars, Political Science students, scholars from related disciplines and the corporate membership of foreign scholars and institutions.

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Notice

AAPS together with South African Association of Political Studies and the Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation at University of Johannesburg at holding a colloquium on Southern African Development Community @ 30: Pasts, Present and Future. Papers are welcome that look at regional and national issues in SADC or comparable experiences, which must be no more than 6 000 words long and using APA referencing and citation style by 31 July. Send to Africanpolitics2019@gmail.com with Colloquium as title.