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EDITORIAL

The Africa of 2022: Crisscrossing Crises

SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI , TINUADE OJO  & JOSEF KEUTCHEU 
Editors

Salute to Africa that is changing for better!

The year 2022 marked the 20th anniversary of the African Union (AU). The AU marked a realisation that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963 had fulfilled its mandate of ridding the continent of overt colonial rule and a new platform was needed to drive Africa towards full prosperity. Conceived amid the revisiting of the discourse of African Renaissance, the AU was meant to respond to both historical and contemporary imperatives. It was born to be a more agile, efficient, and effective institution. Born long after the Cold War ended, it was meant to reposition Africa strategically in global affairs.

Out of this were born a lot of initiatives, many efforts, and many changes. But the condition of Africa, to use Ali Mazrui's 1971 phrase, remains dire in many respects. In many areas, the dream of a prosperous and peaceful Africa remains deferred.

As the year wrapped up, the memory of the devastating period of Covid -19 pandemic continued to fade away. The disease caused so much dis-ease during 2020 and 2021 and was rumoured to be on an imminent comeback sometime during 2022. The thought of it was traumatising because Africa simply cannot afford such a brutal and virulent disease. It can hardly cope with lockdowns that free economic, social, and political activities, further diminishing the already compromised quality of life for many.

Covid just did not allow Africa to cope with or overcome the more longstanding poverty, inequality, unemployment, and violence crises, and violence crises to cope with or overcome the more longstanding crises of poverty, inequality, unemployment, and violence. The long-term calamities have detained Africa in a crisis management mode. They have buried Africa's dreams and aspirations. They sap the energies of African people in tough and unnecessary struggles for mere survival daily. They rob the continent of its vitality and its creativity.

Much effort has been made to redream a bright African future. Efforts that seek to re-inspire Africa to believe in the possibilities again. Some of this is purely utopian, a sort of escapism, a trance made necessary but the all too ghastly conditions of the present. Some of these are calculated processes of anticipating what human efforts can produce for Africa in a reasonable timeline.

In this edition, the journal platforms work on varied questions of reflection at the centre of discussions about the African condition. This includes poverty, indebtedness, identity politics, reform of states, democratization and so forth. We trust that they stimulate new thinking, new energy to on African renaissance, and richer discussions.

I thank the peer reviewers for their sterling support to the journal and the editorial team for their hard work. We dedicate this edition to the youth on whose agency the task of building a better Africa now rests.

Dedication to POWA

This volume of AJPS is dedicated to POWA.

31 July 2022 marks 60 years since the founding of the Pan-African Women's Organisation (POWA) in Dar es Salaam, then Tanganyika. It became the first continental organisation to be formed in Africa, just a year ahead of the OAU.

The POWA was a brainchild of the All-African Women's Conference - *Conférence des femmes africaines*, held in Guinea-Conakry in July 1961 to consider the interests and roles of women in the pursuit of liberation and unification of Africa. This was an initiative of several liberation movements and 10 independent African countries at the time. In 1962, these organisation decided to establish POWA to "unite women of African descent through the creation of a single platform that promotes an exchange of good practices and initiates joint efforts to support human rights and elimination of all forms of discrimination."

POWA has all this time had the following objectives:

- To mobilize women in countries that were still colonized to fight for their liberation;
- To continue the struggle for recognition and application of the right of African women to participate in decision-making in the field of political, economic, cultural and social life, both at national and international levels and particularly, to be able to express their opinion in laws regarding the welfare of women and children;
- To follow-up the development and to contribute to the improvement of political and socio-cultural aspects, on women and children in member countries and disseminate the results of research undertaken in these fields by PAWO or by member countries through documents and existing media;

- To support action taken at national and international levels aimed at ending serious human rights violation and violence against women;
- To support all the actions of African governments;
- To promote the effective unity among African states through friendship and cooperation for a genuine peace;
- To establish continuous relations of friendship and cooperation between African women and women all over the world;
- To support internal cooperation and participate in all actions for disarmament and consolidation of peace in Africa and worldwide.

POWA was first headquartered in Bamako, Mali, from in 1962 until November 1968 when the government of Modiba Keita was deposed. It moved to Algiers, Algeria, followed by Luanda, Angola; Pretoria, South Africa and now Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Jeanne Martin Cisse, a renown Guinean womanist and trade unionist, was the first secretary-general serving in this position from 1962 to 1974. In this period, she also served in the United Nations Committee on the Status of Women and the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, becoming a major voice for African women in world affairs. It was under her leadership that the POWA at its 1970 congress decreed 31 July as a Pan-African Women's Day, which to this day is observed. Madame Cisse passed away in 2017, the year when POWA formally became a specialised agency of the African Union.

From the First United Nations World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975 to the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, POWA played an active role in advancing the interests of women of African descent. It continued after 1995 to ensure the groundbreaking Beijing programme of actions and platforms placed women of African descent at the centre.

Siphamandla Zondi
Editor-in-Chief

Power-sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation in Zanzibar, Tanzania

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Abstract

Zanzibar has a lengthy and turbulent political history. One of the main causes of such negative politics has been the cosmopolitan nature of the isles, which has resulted in the long-term presence of numerous races and identities. This circumstance culminated in years of tumultuous politics marked by bloodshed, murder, and enmity. In 2010, Zanzibar began negotiations to resolve a long-standing political issue that has plagued the Island. The Government of National Unity (GNU), which incorporates a power-sharing arrangement between the first and second winners, was agreed upon as the form of Zanzibar's leadership. This process was accomplished by constitutional amendment and referendum. This paper examined the extent to which power-sharing has altered Zanzibar's identity-based politics. The study was informed by both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The study reveals that power-sharing in Zanzibar has been partially successful in eliminating identity politics. Three explanations have justified this success. First is the significant existence and growth of political trust among the societies of Zanzibar. Second, all identity groups, races, and regions were treated equally by government institutions and society. The final one is that political activities were conducted independently of historical and identity-based political narratives. The conclusion of the study is that power-sharing can be the catalyst for identity change from its worst uses to social recognition. Only if the power-sharing institution is designed to consider the possibility of reciprocal self-recognition and respect for social, cultural, and ideological diversity in society can this occur.

Keywords: Identity transformation, Identity, Identity-politics, Power-sharing, Rational politics, Socio-political transformation

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Background of the study

Zanzibar has had a long unstable political history from its colonial era to the radicalized politics of post-colonialism. Rather state, identity politics has dominated Zanzibar and coincided with the political exercises on the Island (Matheson, 2012). The identity imagination has revolved around political competition and socio-economic life (Killian, 2008; Said & Hikmany, 2016). The bone of the identity-based life in Zanzibar originated from the Isles' cosmopolitan nature, which involves several races such as African, Arabs, Asian, Comorians, and Indians (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022; Ingrams, 1967; Sheriff, 2001). This nature generated the diversity of the ownership of the Island and created the nationalist contender groups during the National independence struggle and later in the 1964 Revolution. The fundamental question is which cosmopolitan group has property rights in the country and who should rule.

This identity politics tragedy was not solved by the 1963 independence, 1964 revolution, and 1992 multi-party system, and subsequently accelerated (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022). Some scholars argued that the 1992 multi-party system was the shift of previous pre-independence and post-revolution (Brown, 2010; Nassor & Jose, 2014b). For instance, the then main rival political parties of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF) have been nominated as originating from pre-independent racial and identity divides. The proponents of this argument denote that CCM and CUF are the replicas of the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and Zanzibar and Pemba People Party (ZPPP) block respectively, representing a purely racial and identity manifestation (Killian, 2008; Mukangara,

2000). Such manifestation made the election contestation in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 based on identity. As a result, Pemba Island was suffocating the social and political exclusion due to their political support of the opposition party.

In 2010, the power-sharing Government began to exercise its work after the citizen referendum and changing the constitution. Deriving from those politics of races and region, it was, the then President of Zanzibar-Amani Karume of CCM agreed with the Late Seif Sharif Hamad, The Secretary-general of CUF, and decided to make a political reconciliation through the sharing Government to end the political crises that have marred the Island for a long time (Nassor & Jose, 2010). The power-sharing Government had survived for only five years before its collapse in 2015. During this collapse period, the power-sharing as a leadership style of Zanzibar existed in the constitution even though its implementation was stuck. The power-sharing came back again in 2020 after the elections that resulted in killings and injuries.

Such a power-sharing movement has attracted academic inquiry where scholars argued on the ability of power-sharing to solve electoral problems and enhance democracy. For instance, Nassor & Jose (2010) argued on power-sharing and its ability to enhance democracy in Zanzibar. Minde, Roop, & Tronvoll (2018) and John (2020) talk about the elections under power-sharing. They denote that despite the efforts, the Island continue witnessed electoral violence and mistrust in the region of Unguja and Pemba (John, 2020; Minde et al., 2018; Said & Hikmany, 2016). Consequently, this phenomenon hinders the effort to solve the Island's political problem. The existence of power-sharing still, the electoral problem is not well accommodated. Besides all the above scholars' arguments, the adoption of power-sharing was also expected to transform the identity-politics dynamics and adjust the society's political behaviour and activities to rational politics (Gergen, 1997; Jega, 2000). However, there has been a concern from academicians that power-sharing was not set to solve identity politics. Instead, it is a positional acquisition (Hamad, 2017; Minde et al., 2018; Mmanga, 2015; Nassor & Jose, 2010). Yet, it is not clearly known the extent that power-sharing transforms identity-based politics in Zanzibar. Therefore, this paper examines the extent to which power-sharing has altered Zanzibar's identity-based politics.

The study examines the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity politics in Zanzibar as the main source of the political problem. It needs to learn about citizens' political life after the power-sharing adoption. Therefore, the descriptive design incorporating a mix of the qualitative and quantitative methods of data was useful for getting the data. The design provides a picture of the character and natural setting of the studied phenomenon, such as identity politics and power-sharing (Creswell, 2014). The survey tool was used to get the citizens' views and perceptions on how power-sharing changes identity politics in Zanzibar. The key informant interviews help to get an in-depth explanation of the identity politics situation in Zanzibar. The study covered three districts to represent Zanzibar. These districts are Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini. Micheweni, known to be strong in political competition identity politics, plays a significant role in political exercises. Micheweni represents a Pemba identity, and Kusini presents an Unguja identity. Mjini district consists of a mixed identity of all races and identity and made to have mixed political characters and affiliations. The three districts are conducive for the study that needs to examine the extent that power-sharing transforms identity politics in Zanzibar.

The study uses 287 respondents for survey data. This cast (73%) respondents out of 393 eligible for the study. The percentage is enough to undergo this study (Bullock & Rader, 2021; John, 2020; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The study also consists of five key informants from Members of the House of Representatives, Power-sharing initiators and elites, citizens and political activists. The quantitative data were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), and qualitative

data were analyzed using thematic analysis. The ethical matters that were highly considered included getting permission from the authorities and respondents.

The Politics of Identity: An overview

The concept of identity has been used for a long time by Sociologists and Psychologists, especially in Structuralists' works of literature, including the work of Henri Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel & Turner (1979). Currently, post-modernist schools and political scientists use the concept to define an individual's social and political phenomenon concerning their society. In many use, identity in a socio-political context means "the sense of personality in the group" where its existence affects their political behaviour (Béland, 2017). The tie between an individual and their group becomes higher at the level of social and psychological roles. For instance, the individual commits themselves to obligation, trust, love, and collaboration among the group members and excludes those outside the group. In common uses, identity serves as a principle that guides political action, and they add dynamism to political exercises. In plural societies, identity marks a distinction tool for exclusion and inclusion in society (Gamble, 1994).

Identity is not a new problem in the globe; it switches from one angle to another and adjusts its style and vitality in different shapes. In current societies, identity is a tool the elite uses to acquire a political position. For instance, in African societies, political leaders build their political bases and influence political decisions through their identity of race, ethnicity, religion, or region (Alumona & Azom, 2018). It involves the organization of identity attitudes to create mass support for the ruling classes, opposition, and elites in the power polarization acquisition process. Such a situation accelerates the political competition exercised based on identity. Political activities like elections, referendums, public participation, and even crises will be based on the group identity. As a result, civil, ethnic, and tribal violence occurred, making it not easily solved.

The continuation of identity problems emerged in the societies and made the scholars think and re-think the nature, character, and ways of solving the problem. The issue here is not abandoning the identity but transforming the identity into a national identity. Such transformation is not an easy task. It needs social transformation in many economic, social, and political phenomena (Huddy, 2013). This means that the exercises of politics in society should not mainly depend on the identity of individual or group but should be on rational judgment.

Socio-political transformation in societies with identity-based politics has become a central area of conflict research in recent times. Researchers have been working to find ways of changing the role of identity in politics and adjusting political crises to political harmony (Oyero, Oyeyemi, Usaini, & Omole, 2017). Different approaches and mechanisms have been identified and used, including enhancement of national identity, succession, new State formation, and power-sharing between the identity groups (Alumona & Azom, 2018; Lijphart, 1968, 1977). Identity has been the source of the political base in many societies where political elites organized and mobilized the political parties through the identity of ethnicity, religion, race, and language. Thus, the existing political activities become much of an identity base, where one identity-based party competes with another (Olayode, 2016). Such competition generates internal enmity and hostility, producing political violence and civil wars (Alumona & Azom, 2018). Deriving from that base, the socio-political transformation of that society seems to be much more difficult and needs continuous intervention. Despite many ambiguous and contradictions of socio-political theorists and practitioners concerning identity politics, the concept still defines the community's political behaviour and social relationship. Different empirical studies have been conducted, and the results show that socio-political practices like democracy, justice, freedom, instability, violence, wars, and succession are mainly affected by identity politics (Alumona & Azom, 2018; Béland, 2017; Gergen, 1997; Moss & Tronvoll, 2015;

Oyero et al., 2017; Yunespour, 2011). According to Huddy (2013), identity politics is the identification attributed to politically relevant groups. This group includes political groups, ethnic groups, and pressure groups. Identity politics is also associated with liberal perspectives, which deal with the freedom to demand greater economic, social, and political rights in the political system (Nwanegbo, Odigbo, & Ochanja, 2014).

The concept of identity politics can be studied from different angles and bases. Firstly, from the nature of identity, secondly, causes of political identity, and lastly, recognition or matter in society (Yunespour, 2011). Starting with the nature of the identity, the individual or group can associate with the group and perceive it as subjective. This implies that the group creates an image of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. It is socially constructed, and only the group member understands their group's reality. For instance, a group can distinguish itself from an outsider because of the constructed character of the group. The Maasai tribe in Tanzania can say that the Sukuma tribe is an outside identity group because of characteristics that the Maasai created to exclude others. The objectivity of identity means the group differs from another group due to the perception of an individual or a group's self-image, values, traditions, and sense of belonging to a group (Moya, 2006).

Objective identities are the perception of a group from others' perspectives and often contradict one's self-perception (Bilgrami, 2006). For instance, in Zanzibar as a case study, the Unguja natives perceive Pemba natives as opposing the Revolution of 1964 and regard that they have no right to enjoy the Revolution's fruit. Within this filling, diversity occurs and grows in political parties and community matters, including participation in development projects. This social exclusion creates the identity which describes the social and political reality and life within the society.

The second explanation is the source of identity. Yunespour (2011) stipulates two main sources: material base and nonmaterial. The assumption of material base as the source of identity politics started from the Marxist approach of dialectical materialism. According to the proponent of this base, the core of such a structural problem is the economic relations that advantage the capital class, or more accurately, those who own the means of production, and simultaneously alienate workers and other marginalized groups in a society. Based on such social relations between haves and have-nots, economic power is assumed to be more important than other forms of power which dominate social and political relations. In other words, "economic disparity is the cause of social exploitation and oppression" (Bernstein, 2005a, p. 49). On the side of nonmaterial as a source of identity politics, the culture, social values, traditions, belief systems, language, and technology as sources of identity politics in society. The humanist perspective rejects the idea that economic power is more central in social interactions and argues that social differences such as differences in belief systems can also cause or at least exacerbate identity-based political actions (Bernstein, 2005b). This perspective holds a strong base for understanding identity politics in most of Africa and the developing world because people categorize themselves in terms of social inclusion rather than material needs. In Zanzibar, like other African societies, Pemba Island faces exclusion from socio-political benefits for many years after Independence. This situation stimulates the sense of political organizations to fight for such benefits from the central Government. As a result, the growth of opposition in Pemba becomes so high that regional competition becomes a norm during the elections. This situation accelerates the growth of division between Unguja and Pemba Island within one country of Zanzibar.

The third pick point is the recognition of identity politics in society. Does identity politics matter in society? This question gives us another room to understand identity politics. The way identity politics matters in society depict community relations in society. Brunt (1989) reveals that identity politics matter because it allows members of a society to acknowledge and recognize various social groups. It is a tool for social recognition and respecting social differences (Young, 2011). All scholars'

arguments can be summed up that identity politics can play an inclusion apparatus in society or the exclusion and differences tools.

Again, theorists are divided into two groups concerning recognizing identity politics in a certain community. Some defend it as the politics of recognition (Brunt, 1989) and the politics of differences (Young, 1990) with the potential for mutual recognition of self and others and for respecting social, cultural and ideological differences (Fleming, 2014) who belongs to the third generation of critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School. The paper examines Honneth's reframing of critical theory based on his theory of recognition. This new connection between an individual pursuit of recognition and motivation of social movements for emancipation offers an opportunity to re-affirm the already existing conviction of transformation theory that learning is based on mutuality. In addition, the often remarked disconnect between individual learning and social learning is re-worked to assert that not only is the personal political but the political is personal. Empirical findings of an EU study of non-traditional learners in higher education support the rethinking of transformative learning as a pursuit of recognition. Introduction The theory of transformative learning has always viewed learning as having individual and social dimensions (Cranton & Taylor, 2012, p. 5. This perspective is mainly brought by Constructive theorists who believe that political identity is created from social identity and used by a few elites for their political interests.

In the same vein, Tambiah (1996) denotes that the group identity is largely constructed and deployed to advance the interests and claims of the collectivity banded and mobilized as a pressure group. For this purpose, identity politics is reconstructed and reinvented to serve as an instrument of mobilization. Identity politics is characterized by a backwards-looking claim of power based on ethnic labels, which can be contrasted with a 'politics of ideas' centred on a forward-looking idea of society (Bilgrami, 2006).

Indeed, identity politics play two sides; it can be the source of the direction of the movement in the direction of civic equality, equal opportunity, and democracy (Guttman, 2009). It is also played as the source of division and exclusion. In many developed nations, identity politics has become a source of justice and development competition. However, in the African continent, many crises that, in one way or another, hinder the development of the continent are due to identity politics. As it is known, in a large part of Africa, people categorize them in terms of the identity they belong to. Alumona and Azom (2017) noted that in most parts of Africa, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia, people have been caught up in and excluded by the powerful currents of identity politics.

Identity politics in Africa for so long have controlled individual and group relations, participation, and cooperation in the community. And its failure led to atrocity situations such as apartheid in South Africa, the genocide of Ruanda, civil war in Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia, and frequent ethnic violence in Kenya. In another vein, the fallout of identity politics in Africa has also been responsible for several secessionist attempts; Belgian Congo in 1960, Uganda in 1966, Nigeria in 1967, Djibouti in 1991, and Senegal in 1991 (Alumona & Azom, 2018).

Identity Formation and Political Identity in Zanzibar

Zanzibar, a part of the United Republic of Tanzania, consists of two major islands (Unguja and Pemba) located about thirty nautical miles from the coast of Tanzania's Mainland. Unguja Island resides 68.8 per cent of Zanzibar total population of 1,303,569 while Pemba resides 31.2 percent (National Bureau of Statistic & Office of Chief Government Statistics of Zanzibar, 2013). Unguja is Zanzibar's Commercial and Capital city, where administrative centers and business activities largely take place. The identity genesis of Zanzibar can be traced back to the 1830s when Zanzibar becomes a segment of the Oman Empire. During that time, the Sayyid Said bin Sultan, the Empire of Sultan, shifted his

emperor from Muscat to Zanzibar, who established kingship rule and controlled the economic and social activities, including the plantation of cloves using slave manpower (Brown, 2016)

Subsequently, the kingship rule of Sayyid bin Sultan generates a social and political divide among the residents of Zanzibar. The residents were socially categorized into Arabs, Indians, Native Africans, and Slaves who in one way or another were connected to the state-building effort of Kingship (McMahon, 2012). Such a social category accelerated the economic and political phenomena where the Arabs were created to be Landowners, Indians to be trade owners, and natives Zanzibarians and slaves were set to be workers. The social division continues during the British Protectorate era in Zanzibar from 1890 to 1963. The British rule consolidated the racial and class status in the society by enhancing the divide-and-rule means of production throughout. In all circumstances, the native Africans benefited the least from the production from their motherland despite being large in population (Bakari, 2001). At that time the Arabs were approximately 15.9 percent, Asians 5.8 percent, and Zanzibar Natives were 56 percent, according to the 1948 census.

This diversity and identity glorification did not end in social and economic life, but also accelerated political life. The identity-based affiliations were created to safeguard the groups' interests in society. In the 1930s, they formed the Africa Association to represent the African and Zanzibar natives' interests. The same applies to Indian National Association and Arab association to safeguard the merchants' and land-owned classes, respectively. These genes accelerated the formation of political parties which struggled for Independence in the 1950s'. The Afro-Shirazi Party- ASP originated from African and Shirazi natives, mainly from Unguja, while ZPPP and ZNP originated from Arab genesis, mainly from Pemba Island. This cosmopolitan nature leaves the central question of which identity has a right on the Island and who should rule.

The identity politics tragedy was not solved by the 1963 independence, 1964 revolution, and 1992 multi-party system, and subsequently accelerated (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022). Some scholars go further and argued that the 1992 multi-party system was the shift of previous pre-independence and post-revolution. For instance, the main rival political parties of Chama Cha Mapinduzi-CCM and Civic United Front- CUF has been nominated as originating from pre-independent racial and identity divides. The proponents of this argument denote that CCM and CUF are replicas of the ASP and ZPPP-ZNP block, respectively, representing a purely racial and identity manifestation (Matheson, 2012; Mukangara, 2000). They further stipulate that, such identity based politics will not distance from all political exercises in Zanzibar.

The power-sharing of Zanzibar was initiated and geared by the political elite of two contested political parties by that time (CCM and CUF). As such, in 1999, the first reconciliation accord *Muafaka*¹ took place under the leadership of Common-Wealth Nation. This reconciliation accord enabled the Isles to conduct free and fair elections in October 2000. Unfortunately, the agreement was not implemented, and consequently, there were violent incidents in January 2001. Zanzibar experienced a catastrophe of killings, injuries, and displacement (Minde, 2014). The Catastrophe of January 2001 left the social unrest in Zanzibar and fueled the adoption of a power-sharing agreement as the only solution to a political problem. The second reconciliation was signed in October 2001, but this involved local and home initiatives, unlike the first one. The reconciliation also failed due to a lack of political willingness, mistrust, and ideologies (Nassor & Jose, 2010). Nonetheless, the third reconciliation accord, which establishes the Zanzibar Government of National Unity (GNU), was signed in 2010 by homegrown initiatives.

¹ Muafaka is a Swahili term "referring to a 'gentlemen' agreement, i.e., an agreement without specific agreement terms or a formal pact signed by the parties to the dispute" (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022).

The idea of the establishment of a power-sharing government in Zanzibar was the reflection of the long-standing political crises in Zanzibar. Any solution to political problems in Zanzibar will pass one among the two perspectives of sources. The first source is radicalizing nature of politics established since the colonial era (Lofchie, 1965; Mukangara, 2000). Under this perspective, the political crises are structurally predetermined and can be solved through generation time. The short-term effort can be done only to keep society safe and stable. It can be said that all solution is temporary but time is the healer of the problem. The second source is the current socio-political dynamics which are based on social classes and exclusion (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001). The second perspective relies on the current situation of political exclusion after the 1964 revolution. The union government can be the solution to the problem hence the excluded group will be recognized. All two scholars' perspectives on the political genesis of Zanzibar justified having a power-sharing of Zanzibar. Whether playing as a temporary solution to solve the problem in order to heal the structural problem or solving the social class and exclusion in Zanzibar, the power-sharing must aim at solving the identity politics created due to the cosmopolitan nature of Zanzibar and the current social dynamics.

Since 2010, power-sharing operates in Zanzibar with the high expectation that the pro-long political problem will be solved. Such expectation was due to the nature of the power-sharing agreement which consist referendum and constitutional amendment. The 2010 general election was conducted peacefully in such some of the political elites and citizens were satisfied that the problem is solved. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was established to include two giant parties of CCM and CUF. The cooperation of elites in the cabinets and citizens in the society made Zanzibar inter in the good records of internal political mediation success. However, as the GNU continues to pass one term of the general election from 2010 to 2015, the claims start from both ruling and opposition parties. Each party claimed cheating and misconduct to implement the power-sharing. As a result, the GNU collapsed in 2015 after the CUF reject to re-inter in the general election of 2016. The GNU back again in 2020 with violence and some sort of election fraud claiming. The rejection of opposition in 2015 made the contradiction the legitimacy of the Government. Some scholars argued that it was illegitimate because the constitution reveals that the structure of the Government of Zanzibar is GNU (RGoZ, 2010). However, some of them argue that it is legitimate hence the constitution gives power for the GNU to continue when the opposition posts are blank due to the absence (RGoZ, 2010).

The ups and downs and the mismatches of the power-sharing in Zanzibar have attracted an academic inquiry with a contiguous debate. Some of them seem it is institutional weaknesses such as the Electoral process, representatives cabinets, and other political institutions of the GNU (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012; Hamad, 2017; Minde et al., 2018; Nassor & Jose, 2014a; Roop, Tronvoll, & Minde, 2018). Some scholars seem that it is elites' weakness in their leadership. Many scholars have discussed identity politics as a challenge to political reconciliation include (Abdulhalim, 2020; John, 2020; Said & Hikmany, 2016; Sheriff, 2001; Throup, 2016). So far, little is known about the extent to which identity politics is transformed in Zanzibar. This paper, therefore, examines how power-sharing transforms identity-based politics into rational politics in Zanzibar.

Power-sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation: Findings

The result shows that power-sharing, to some extent, tries to create a justice society with equal resource distribution and enhances the natural mixture of the identity groups which cross-cutting the society. The results continue show that the past political narratives, which are the strong base of identity politics, seem to be neutralized in the current situation.

Equal social and economic benefits among the identity groups

According to Killian (1998), one Island of Zanzibar (Pemba) was highly excluded from federal benefits due to its political position. The isolation was noticed in economic benefits, including employment and social services availability (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022). The result from this study shows little changes in the economic benefits to the Island. The respondents from three districts show that in Pemba, still, citizens seem not to benefit much from power-sharing compared to what Mjini and Kusini witnessed. In Micheweni, the data shows that only 33.4 per cent of the respondents seem to think that power-sharing increases economic benefits to them, while in Mjini, 55.9 per cent and in Kusini, 57.4 per cent. This data indicates that still, citizens in Pemba seem to be excluded from economic benefits in relation to Pemba Island.

Table 1: Power-sharing increases citizens' economic among the social groups

Power-sharing increases citizens' economic development among the social groups	District of Residence			Total
	Mjini	Micheweni	Kusini	
Strong Dis-Agreed	21	23	12	56
	17.9%	21.3%	19.7%	19.6%
Dis Agreed	4	20	4	28
	3.4%	18.5%	6.6%	9.8%
Un Decided	27	28	10	65
	23.1%	25.9%	16.4%	22.7%
Agreed	28	22	17	67
	23.9%	20.4%	27.9%	23.4%
Strong Agreed	37	14	18	69
	31.6%	13.0%	29.5%	24.1%
Total	117	108	61	286
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Researchers' field data (2021)

Despite the statistical observation above, economic exclusion in Pemba seems to be better than before power-sharing. The interview with Pemba Adult residents testifies to this argument.

“...Even though the level of provision of development projects in Pemba Island is not as of Unguja due to the exclusion for a long time, the GNU open the quick economic recovery to the Island. Before the 2010 reconciliation, the political leaders seemed to think Pemba did not deserve the development due to their political affiliation. Still, after power-sharing, the construction of roads, ports and many investments in social services increased....” (R 23, 29/11/2021).

The above respondent's comments indicate at least some consideration of Pemba's economic and social benefits after the power-sharing agreement in Pemba. Because economic exclusion was taken as a tool for the political elites to get political mass in Pemba, the continuation of economic benefits distribution by the power-sharing Government reduces the feeling of exclusion. As a result, the economic benefits seem to be the major political decision. The witnesses from Pemba residents testify to this argument;

“... These days, the residents of Pemba seem to be political opportunists rather than having strong political affiliations as before. People start thinking about taking opportunities from any angle without considering their parties. If our political elites are Ministers and top leaders in the GNU, why not take the opportunity? Pemba youth are now leaving aside their political affiliation and taking the opportunity in the Government and economic projects from any source. Unlike in the previous years, the Pemba residents were ready even to live in poverty but did not take the Government-related projects and post....” (R 23, 29/11/2021).

The comments from the interviewees above indicate that through power-sharing, Pemba Island seems to benefit economically and politically. The increasing economic recovery in Pemba made the natives of Pemba take the economic opportunities apart from their political affiliation stand. This made the neutralization of the source of identity politics, which is political and socio-economic exclusion. As a result, political activities are practised through economic benefits instead of identity and region. As the power-sharing Government continues in Zanzibar, there is a possibility of accommodating identity in political activities.

Trust and cooperation among the identity groups

The core problem of Zanzibar was the mistrust between the two regions' identities and political affiliations (Unguja and Pemba). This situation made cooperation and trust in society low; as a result, political activities such as elections are conducted on an identity base. This study member were asked how they trust their opponents with different identities and affiliations, the respondents' data shows that 48.4 per cent agreed that there is an increase in trust and cooperation among the partisans, while 36.6 Percent disagreed. Again, 44.3 per cent of elites agreed that there is trust and cooperation among themselves, and 35.2 per cent disagreed.

Table 2: Political trust and cooperation among the identity groups

Political trust and cooperation among the identity groups	District of Resident			Total
	Mjini	Micheweni	Kusini	
Strong Dis-Agreed	16	7	8	31
	13.7%	6.5%	12.9%	10.8%
Dis Agreed	26	38	10	74
	22.2%	35.2%	16.1%	25.8%
Undecided	20	12	9	41
	17.1%	11.1%	14.5%	14.3%
Agreed	38	33	24	95
	32.5%	30.6%	38.7%	33.1%
Strong Agreed	17	16	1.1	44
	14.5%	14.8%	17.7%	15.3%
Total	117	108	62	287
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Researchers' field data (2021)

The statistical data above indicates increased trust and cooperation among the partisans and elites after power-sharing. Such trust led to the neutralization of identity-based politics; hence the citizens can cross-cut the society to seek opportunity. The narration from the top GNU political leader justifies the statistical data as he narrates;

“...Things have changed a lot; the political and social narrations of 1995 are not the same as those of 2010. Today 2020, there is total interaction between Unguja and Pemba. In the Zanzibar community now a day, there is no single family that cannot be mixed with either Pemba or Unguja. The mixture is now more than saturated. The GNU made people believe they can cooperate and work together as their cabinet leaders in the cabinets....” R 1, 26/10/2021).

The narration above from the GNU's top leader indicates a cross-cutting of identity brought by trust among the citizens. The power-sharing and reconciliation brought trust. The study found an increase in intermarriage and political activities cross-cut the different identities and genesis. These changes happened due to the opportunity that citizens were observed by their elites. The citizens noticed that the elites from different political parties and identities worked together. The citizens focus on the opportunity without considering the party or identity affiliation. This situation challenges the existence of pure identity politics even though the bases exist. The social interaction between the two identities based on political parties and the opportunity from both parties made the cross-cutting of the party segment. This goes contrary to the many African political parties where in most cases, the identity represents the party affiliations (Cheeseman, 2011; Longman, 2013; Olayode, 2016).

Historic political narrations at present

The current socio-political life in Zanzibar has been exercised through historical narration, which divided society according to those narratives. The pre-independence racial politics and after Independence's identity-based politics decided the society's life on the Island. The results of historic politics are election violence, social unrest, social and political exclusion, and inclusion (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022; Killian, 2008; Mukangara, 2000; Nassor & Jose, 2010; Sheriff, 2001). This study found that past politics still defines the current politics in Zanzibar but at a low level. The politics after the power-sharing of 2010 seems to be much of an opportunity rather than the clear cut of past identity. Currently, elites seem to be shifted from one party to another and region to region. Such shifting reduces identity-based politics as it was justified by one of the members of the political elite.

To be true, Uunguja and Upemba races exist, and that narrative excludes people, but it is very low due to societal change. In politics, Pemba is still the genesis of opposition, but now a day, people are not bothered with party history and genesis rather than benefits. Even that opposition in Pemba, if you guarantee the benefits in the ruling party will go. Power-sharing made citizens ignore their party and look on the opportunity as their leaders have....” (R24, 30/11/2022).

Citizens of Micheweni also testified to this as they said,

“...Pemba is indeed strong in opposition, but currently, the people of Pemba can be CCM if they get a political or Government post. In previous years our elders rejected the offer of collaborating with CCM, but our youth now said that in GNU, all-party governs, so any party is ok....” (R 23, 29/11/2021).

The above narrations from respondents indicate that, to some extent, the political phenomenon has changed in Zanzibar, even though the base of the political parties remains the same. For example, the founder of the CUF, the Late Seif Sharif Hamad, was shifting from the CUF party to ACT Wazalendo in 2019, but his follower base remains at Pemba. The remaining party, CUF, also its base, remained at Pemba. This situation indicates that the base of opposition remains in Pemba

and the ruling party in Unguja despite the freeness of shifting in different parties by their follower, unlike the previous years. Again, the power-sharing reduced the politics of exclusion of citizens on the regional background. Specifically, the incumbent GNU of Hon. President Hussein Ali Mwinyi. His leadership seems to bury the past narratives of exclusion and inclusion based on identity. A member of the House of Representatives says,

“At least Dr Hussein tries to balance the power and treat the GNU members equally. He appointed some government staff from ACT Wazalendo. Even though his party claims on that issue, my advice are the whole government office should be shared according to the constituent’s cast.....” (R04, 26/10/2022)

Another member of the House of Representatives testifies to this;

“...The GNU is good with ACT and the group of CCM under President Mwinyi (The incumbent president). The President Mwinyi of harmonized peace and unity and included all the excluded groups in the government institution. He leaves aside the past narrations.....” (PR10, 26/10/2022).

The respondents’ comments above indicate that power-sharing reduces political practices based on political history. However, the continuation of those successes depends largely on the willingness of the top elites, as many scholars argue that power-sharing success largely depends on elites’ trust and willingness to make the continuation of the power-sharing (Chigora & Guzura, 2011; Mukuhani, 2014) as a united front between the major political parties enabled the forging of an agreement that laid the foundation for a government of national unity. The unity government has brought hope not only to Zimbabweans but also to the international community for many view it as a purveyor of better moves for the country and its overall standing in the region and beyond. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an overview of the politics of governments of national unity in Zimbabwe from the first post-colonial Government of National Unity (GNU. As a part, the leader can be the source of the power-sharing discontinue and operate under history as what happened in Zimbabwe GNU under the Mugabe regime.

Conclusion

The study was set to examine the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity-based politics into rational politics in Zanzibar. The study looks at how the current political activities are undertaken with or without the influence of identity politics. The study discloses that power-sharing in Zanzibar has been successful to a certain degree in eliminating identity politics. The power-sharing has successfully helped the significant growth of political trust among the societies of Zanzibar. The cooperation and inter-relation between the two sides have increased throughout time. Such a relation creates a free-identity generation which is a fertilizer for the death of the identity politics problem in Zanzibar.

Again, through power-sharing, the equal treatment of all identity groups, races, and regions increases in government institutions. As a result, political activities are conducted independently of historical and identity-based political narratives. As a result, the struggle for resource distribution through political conduct becomes less powerful on the Island. This situation automatically reduces the severity of conducting political activities on an identity base. This situation increased the recovery of the Pemba region in terms of economic and social well-being.

This study recommends restructuring the political institutions in power-sharing to allow the recognition of identities and affiliations. This could be possible if the power-sharing deepens to

a society whereby all citizens are treated and benefited equally. The current structure continues making the power-sharing a single-sided project where the benefits and decisions are centralized to the ruling party. This situation made the citizens, especially Pemba natives, seems excluded in the power-sharing as their representatives' leaders (opposition) were powerless in the GNU. Only if the power-sharing institution is designed to consider the possibility of one society's recognition and ideological diversity can this occur.

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Appendix

List of Respondents in the interview

S.N.	Respondents	Code
	GNU Leader from Opposition party	R1
	Member of House of Representatives Zanzibar	R4
	A top officer from the First Vice President	R10
	Citizen Micheweni	R23
	Citizen Micheweni	R24
	Former GNU leader Ruling party	R11

Contributions of Party System to Democratic Development in Africa

A Historical Perspective

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Abstract

The paper examined the contributions of party system to democratic development in Africa. Democratic governance and meaningful elections have long been considered unachievable in the absence of political parties and party competition. This is because party system institutionalization is important for the consolidation of democracy. Democracy instead of being the bedrock of good governance stayed on as an unfulfilled promise because the method of power acquisition remained basically authoritarian and functioned on the basis of a hierarchy of networks and alliances with local tribe, ethnic group or through top-down utter sovereignty of institutions that choke the grassroots politicization of society which had been the moral fibre of the process of democratization. To this end, it was discovered that the relationship between political parties, electoral volatility and democracy in Africa cannot be addressed unconnectedly. The paper therefore recommends that; assumptions about the trajectory and outcomes of democratic development in Africa need to be more effectively investigated on the basis of empirically informed analysis of operationalized politics in these systems. It is important to bear in mind that most of the electoral systems, laws, institutions and constitutions that govern elections in Africa were inherited from colonialism. Electoral politics came as a proposed solution to other socio-economic and political problems. This therefore calls for an amendment to these electoral processes in order to mirror the present realities in Africa as well as adhere to best practice as it is in developed democracies. It is contended that if an electoral system is to append value to democracy, it must promote the accountability of the elected representatives to their constituencies which could be furnished through strong political parties. The paper relied on secondary data using descriptive analytical method.

Keywords: Political Party, Election in Africa, Democracy and Development, Historical perspective.

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Introduction

In Africa, the foundation for competitive multiparty politics was difficult to stretch out before 1990 as only four countries in sub-saharan Africa could be truly described as competitive electoral democracies. These are Botswana, Gambia, Senegal and Mauritius. Between 1990 and 1995, thirty eight out of forty seven countries in sub-saharan Africa held legislative elections and by 1994, not a single de-jure one party state remained in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 8). Even where the democratic try-out was successfully sustained, a single party, often the former ruling party in the one-party period tends to maintain an overriding share of power within the system by controlling of the executive or legislative majorities or both.

Modestly, democracy can be defined as a form of political system in which citizens choose in competitive elections, the occupants of top political offices of the state (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:3). This choice of candidate by citizens is usually enabled by political parties. Though, the most impending challenge posed on the survival of democracy in many African countries lies in the predominant characteristics of the parties and emerging party systems. As Katz (1980: 11) noted;

modern democracy is party democracy; the political institutions and practices that are the essence of democratic government in the western view were the creation of political parties and democracy would be unthinkable without them. Since the structuring of elections from citizen participation to candidate selection, the choice and staging of competing political programmes are done first and foremost by political parties, hence, the growth of effective parties and party systems will inevitably form a major part of the foundation of the new government.

Unlike Africa, emerging democracies in the west have core democratic processes and institutions which are shaped by political parties. It is thus imperative for Africa as well to come up with strategies to manage political parties with a view to achieving good governance and progressive democracy (Huntington, 1970, Zolberg, 1966). Laconically, the argument of this section, is that party system in many African countries are built on a somewhat different foundation compared to the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories of party system that generated from their experiences. The diverse nature of most African countries in the typical sense has contributed to the challenges of state-building, thus, the condition under which electoral politics became known and the preponderance of direct interference of African leaders in the political-economy of the state has far reaching effect on the socio-political landscape.

For election to be productive and achieve its primary goal of transmitting power by means of legitimacy, certain institutions must be in place. These institutions must possess certain qualities; competence, legal prerogative and impartiality (Pastor, 1999:75). The Electoral Commission, Judiciary, Security Architecture and Civil Society are primary institutions that are relevant in the conduct of election. Most important of all these institutions is the electoral commission, which is the institution that is charged with the responsibility of preparing and conducting elections.

As observed by (Innocent et al, 2018), institutions such as the electoral commission ought to be independent, competent and fair to all the candidates and parties participating in the electoral process. In achieving this, the electoral commission will also be expected to possess legal prerogative, ability to deploy its resources to handle election-related complaints in an unbiased manner and effectively address irregularities. It is on this basis that the electoral commission can build and earn the confidence of the electorate as well as political parties which is fundamental to arriving at a credible electoral process.

However, in Africa's fragile democracies, electoral institutions are usually low-immuned to political pressure and control of political forces, especially the ruling party which often has special interest in the outcome of elections. This is evident in Zimbabwe, Niger, Cameroon and Kenya where the electoral commission was for long controlled by the leadership of the ruling political party oligarchs (Nyamwamu 2008:4). In fact, Nyamwamu observed that during the 2007 Kenyan election, the electoral commission found itself totally impotent to resolve electoral disputes and critical questions raised on the credibility of the general election.

The argument presented in this work is not to portray Africa as a continent that cannot operate effective electoral system or stage credible elections. Even though there were instances of flaws in the conduct of election administration in some African countries, there exist a number of countries on the continent that their democracies can lay claim to effective electoral system through relatively competitive two parties and multiparty election. Examples include; Benin and Zambia in 1991, Mali and Nigeria in 1992, South Africa and Malawi in 1994, Ghana and Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002 and Egypt in 2018. For democracy to be strongly rooted in Africa, therefore, there is need for careful enthronement of the most efficient electoral system that is potent in ensuring systematic conduct of free, fair and credible elections.

Brief note on party politics in Africa

The oldest political institution in sub-saharan Africa is political party, it represents the time when politics came and remained the key instrument for the subjugation of the traditional political kingdoms. It was used as opposition to colonial rule and the podium for attainment of independence. At this time, the leadership of political parties were represented by a mixture of new and old elites with different local, regional and ethnic identity as it appeared in the names and slogans of congresses and national councils.

With independence on board, the different nationalist parties from the centre to the local levels swiftly turned to single party rule. Political parties were able to detonate the inheritance of colonial rules and policies through de jure or de facto system. Single party system appeared to be the only proficient order to articulate and aggregate citizens' interests and demands towards what were the new independent nation- state developmental goals (Hodgkin, 1961). The single party system was accepted and justified as the best option by the international community and by academia, since the priority was the political order against the risk of its orderly mobilization of grievances (Garber and Bjornlund, 1992). After independence, democracy in most African countries remained an unfulfilled promise because the mode of power remained basically authoritarian that works on hierarchy of networks and alliances with local tribal, ethnic constituencies or through top-down absolute sovereignty of institutions which helped to suffocate precisely the grassroots politicization of society which was the backbone of the process of national liberation. What complicated the situation were the structural deficiencies of the African states and the hostile international environment, as the cold war made Africa one of its experimental battle field.

The military coup d'état that usurps most African countries after independence was another hindrance to effectiveness of political parties. From the first decade of independence it was obvious that the fall in government's popularity was not containable, as various forms of social and political struggles hijacked the system. By the end of that decade, most of the African countries strangled by various political, economic and environmental crisis had no other choice than to bargain from a position of weakness and structural adjustment programmes motivated by the primacy of market over state led growth (Gentili 2005:5).

In the 1980's the age of structural adjustment was opened while the 90s could be described as the decade of the return to democracy. With the end of the Cold war at the beginning of the '90s, it was manifest that economic liberalization needs to be promoted and reformed by democratization processes, this were done along with the building of institutions that enable good governance, rule of law and capacity building. In the political realm the twin solution was the promotion of democracy intended as pluralism through multiparty elections. The adoption of rule of law, promotion of civil society, democratization were resisted in most countries by single- party leaders but embraced by majority of the population in another wave of revolution of rising expectations. According to Adejumobi (2000: 61-63), between 1990 and 1994, the first multiparty elections were held in 29 countries. From 1985 to 1989 just nine countries had multiparty suffrages but between 1990 and 1998 seventy legislative and sixty presidential elections in 42 countries were held. Between 1998 and 2001 there were 55 elections and 8 referenda. Hence, electoral laws, the redrafting of constitutions and elections became a podium of confrontation (Gentili 2005 : 5).

Functions of Political Party in Africa

Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) provides what is at hand, the classic statement on the significance of parties for orderly political modernization and development and it remains one of the useful starting points for understanding the likely role of parties in constructing

democratic regimes. According to Huntington, strong political institutions, including parties are essential for controlling and coordinating the heightened political mobilization that occurs with the advent of socio-economic progress. With the clamour for incorporation into the political arena by newly mobilized social groups, an organizational vacuum is created which must be filled by intermediary organization if the system is to remain stable. As the society records progress in modernization, the need to organize political participation also increases. The longer the organizational vacuum is maintained, the more explorative it becomes. (Huntington, 1968: 406).

Parties, according to Huntington, perform vital functions in terms of ordering the political system. They are instrumental to entronement of order and stability in the society, serve to structure the political process and make sure that citizen participation in that process is orderly. They create new foundation for solidarity and identity within society, and try to reduce pre-existing cleavage lines such as clan, ethnicity or religion. Parties also seek to provide a distinctive collective identity for their followers, one that is grounded upon acceptance of the basic rules of the national political arena. Parties also provide order to the political process, this is done by moderating the procedure for leadership succession and for the integration of new groups into the political system (Basedau and Stroh, 2008: 68, Huntington, 1968: 405, Mesfin, 2008: 6).

For Huntington and most other contemporary scholars, most times general politics was impossible without political parties. Huntington perceives 18th century hostility to political parties as divisive:

The evils attributed to party are in reality, the attributes of a disorganized and fragmented politics of clique and faction which prevails when parties are non-existent or still very weak. Their cure lies in political organization; and in a modernizing state, political organization means party organization (Huntington, 1968: 405).

Parties build unity out of disparate and potentially dangerous social forces. Parties are the leading instrument of social organization and control, whether they are ruling parties in a single-party regime or opposition parties in a multi party system. Both developing and advanced industrial nations have experienced this fact.

It is important to note therefore, that modernization theory rests on the assumption that parties will develop in response to similar spurs in every country, basically in socio-economic development. In the West, parties were the bye-products of the industrial revolution as well as social and political mobilization. The energy drives from the bottom up, party organizations are used for aggregating and transmitting societal demands.

As noted above, parties that are evolving in today's late democracies in Africa countries came up out of a very different context and function very differently. Today's newly emerging parties have arisen largely in response to political, rather than socio-economic change, they have emerged suddenly and are not naturally linked to any organized social group and so have often devised mobilizing people along issues like ethnicity and opposition to structural economic reform without regard for the long-term consequences. Though, these parties engage in competition, but often in undesirable manner. In many African countries, political parties are at the mercy of opposition elites as they use the parties to mobilize, aggregate and disaggregate various kinds of social forces. Thus, while the forms of politics have changed significantly, the underlying logic of politics as an elite-driven enterprise with the right to take charge of state's assets is the only prize that matters (Manning, 2005: 718).

Party Politics and Democracy in Africa

It is important to examine the circumstances under which parties are able to carry out their functions. Diamond (1997: 23) while analysing democratic consolidation in the third-wave democracies noted that political parties remain important if not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing competitive election for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective government and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process.

In the comparative literature, parties are expected to enable political inclusion in several ways. First, they are responsible for the political socialization of social groups aspiring to participate in the new political system. Second, they provide a unique collective identity through which members can be integrated into the political system. And third, they collate and channel constituents' demands through the political system in such a way that the system can respond to them (Mesfin, 2008, Nohlen, Michael and Bernhard, 1999).

To perform these functions, Diamond believes that, parties should have strong linkage with different social strata, offer distinctive platforms which appeal to a core set of voters and distinguish them clearly from other parties and be able to attract and retain party activists and potential leaders. Huntington (1968: 408-409) asserted that; a party should be strong to the extent that it can institutionalize mass support and that a key index of party strength is organizational complexity and depth, particularly as revealed by the linkages between the party and social- economic groups such as labour unions and peasant associations. In advanced industrial democracies, it is expected that parties will use control of offices to enthrone effective public policy while emerging democracies focus on parties' ability to deliver on promises to both voters and activists, and to win or control considerable share of government power either in the legislature or control of executive positions. Redistribution of resources is also a function of political parties in African democracies, but they often lay less emphasis on policies that will affect growth and the distribution of income in the private sector (Manning, 2005: 720).

Consequently, in many African countries, parties have few or no resources to sustain themselves between elections, given the limitation of private sectors and the uncertainties of the political future. Weaknesses in political parties and gaps in knowledge and understanding of political parties in developing contexts are magnified when it comes to party systems (Diamond, 1997).

This hypothesis rests clearly on certain assumptions about the nature of the parties that constitute the party system likewise the context in which the party system operates within a particular institutional framework and the strength of institutions. It is important to note therefore, that party systems may become institutionalized, accepted by all relevant political actors and fundamental rules of political interaction without meeting any of these positive purposes for democratic governance. For instance, in Mozambique, the leading opposition party, Renamo, limited the functioning of formal institutions, including elections and parliament, in favour of informal negotiations between its own leadership and the government (Shitu and Abdulkadir-imam, 2018). Also, President Moi in Kenya and activists in his ruling KANU party were alleged to have incited violence against seeming supporters of opposition parties in the Rift Valley and in coastal areas before and after the country's first two multiparty general elections in 1992 and 1996. The ruling party sought to use this politically motivated violence as inter-ethnic warfare brought on by the tensions of electoral competition. (Manning, 2002:17, Wood and Ilaines, 1998: 107-108). African party systems seem to obscure the best guess about the number of parties and the implications for party system performance and outcome of political competition. While the aggregate number of

parties is high, the number of relevant parties is relatively low. Fragmentation is another common indicator of a party system's prospect for consolidation. Fragmented party system with high level of ideological distance between parties tends toward polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976). Most African countries have settled for presidential system with extremely weak legislatures, the real treasure in such system is executive power and there is little motivation for parties to form electoral coalitions that might prevent their own leaders from occupying top positions even if they tend to lose out in terms of legislative seats (Manning, 2005: 723). Also, the problem of fragmentation has little to do with whether or not the electoral system heartens the proliferation of parties or the existence of ideological differences. Instead, it ends up in executive dominance. It is therefore arguable that, an institutionalized party system could be seen as a helper to democratic governability and legitimacy by facilitating legislative support for government policies; coordinating demands and conflict of interests through established procedures; and rendering the democratic process more inclusive, accessible and effective (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 120).

Another basis of complicatedness is the collective action problem arising from the strength of the ruling party, which holds the major hub of economic as well as political power. Parties in Africa often lack plain identities and articulate organization, but they habitually have strong linkage with social groups and enjoy surplus autonomy from their base. Even though, their bases of electoral support are highly robust, volatility and fragmentation among party system development and stability are clearly not adequate measures of anything in the African context (Manning, 2005: 723). Most African rulers made insincere promise and concession aimed at buying time with no clear intention of implementing elections or surrendering power to the other party.

Conclusion

The paper having studied the effect of party systems in Africa democratic experiment advises that, assumptions about the route and outcomes of democratic development in Africa need to be more effectively probed on the basis of empirically informed analysis of operationalized politics within the African political sphere. It is worthy to note that, most of the electoral systems, laws, institutions and constitutions that govern elections in Africa were inherited from the colonial system, hence, electoral politics came not as the conclusion of processes of socio-economic change and social pluralism but rather as a projected solution to other problems, particularly economic mismanagement and/or violent conflict. This situation therefore canvasses for an amendment to these electoral processes in order to reflect the present realities in Africa as well as adhere to best practice as it is in developed democracies. It has been debated that if an electoral system is to add value to democracy, it must promote the accountability of the elected representatives to their constituencies which could be furnished through strong political parties whilst at the same time ensure broader representation of key political forces. In this way, a political system becomes more inclusive, accountable, and participatory as it accords the rulers legitimacy to govern.

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Political Alienation and Electoral Participation in Nigeria's Democratization Process

A Survey of Voter Behaviour in the 2019 General Elections

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Abstract

The attainment of adequate electoral participation in a democratic setting is essential to maintain legitimacy, credibility, and stability since democracy is about popular representation. However, from available data worldwide, voter participation is gradually on the decline. The study aimed to ascertain the reasons, nature and implication of voter abstention in Nigeria's democratization process. The study posits that the low turnout during elections in Nigeria could be attributable to alienation and thus, sought to test the relationship between alienation and electoral participation focusing on the general elections of 2019. The descriptive technique was employed for the analysis of the data. A sample of 1,200 subjects was chosen from six Local Government Areas of the geo-political zones with the stratified random sampling technique. The findings from the study showed that the failure of elected political officers to fulfil electoral promises, electoral fraud, and violence, are the causes of the alienation of voters in Nigeria. Consequently, the following suggestions are made: The elected political officials should ensure good governance premised upon people-oriented policies; the governments at all levels should put up modalities for the prevention and control of fraudulent electoral practices and violence during elections.

Keywords: alienation, voter participation, democratization process, popular representation, 2019 elections.

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Introduction

The factors that engender democratization and good governance in an enduring democracy are a robust electoral process and credible elections. An Election is a viable instrument for achieving adequate representation in government as well as a significant instrument of participation in a political system. There is however global evidence indicating low voter participation; signifying an emotional withdrawal, a detachment from public affairs and a reticent approach towards political activity- see statistical figures and analysis below ("International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance", 1999, 2004). With this scenario voter electoral behaviour, has become a foremost challenge in advanced and developing democracies. In the past years, concerns have been raised that the continuous low turnout witnessed globally at all levels of elections, is an indication of the disengagement of eligible voters from the political process (IDEA, 1999). In Nigeria, electoral participation has been on the decline. Since the Fourth Republic, the percentage of voter turnout has been reducing; the last general elections of 2019 recorded a dismal turnout of 34.75% (International IDEA, 2019). This scenario may endanger the legitimacy of the political process. However, the degree, form, and intensity of the citizens' involvement in electoral activities have been subjected to heated academic debates (Raciborski 2011). Scholars, however, concede to the fact that attainment

of a functioning and successful democracy would at least, require some level of involvement by the citizens to ensure the legitimacy of the political system (Dalton, 2007; Raciborski 2011). The consequent low levels of turnout by voters experienced worldwide and its implications for democratic sustenance have stimulated observations, comments, and investigations by commentators, political officials as well as scholars who try to find out the factors responsible (Franklin, 2004; Ellis, 2004).

Studies conducted in Nigeria regarding the subject had centrally focused on apathy as the reason for low turnouts. Some of these studies include ones done by the "Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)" in 2012; Fagunwa, 2019; Iyanda, 2020, etc. Without prejudice to the studies mentioned earlier, this research contends that aside from apathy which connotes the voter disinterest in political or voting activities amongst others, other variables could be responsible for the low voter turnout. The study argues that alienation which indicates the voter's feeling of incapacity to influence political and electoral outcomes is the reason for the low turnout of the voter in Nigeria.

The Concept of Political Alienation

The term political alienation connotes the relative continuing feeling of rejection or estrangement from the prevailing political environment by the individual citizen. The politically alienated individuals desire to vote, but their feeling of insignificance to the system restricts them. They feel that their interests are not respected and represented by political leaders (Glasberg & Shannon, 2010). The alienated are of the view that political leaders who hold offices are incompetent, self-seeking and corrupt; thus, they are suspicious, hostile, distrustful and sceptical of these leaders. They believe that the political process as a whole is fraudulent; a betrayal of public trust and a charade (Campbell et al, 1954).

Alienation has several connotations; but the overriding notion that best describes the term is that of 'powerlessness' that is, erosion of the individual's freedom and control (Seeman 1959; Roberts 1987). Thus, "alienation can be conceived as the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcement, he seeks" (Seeman 1959: 784). Roberts (1987) described 'powerlessness' as a result of a sense of loss of self-worth. Powerlessness and self-estrangement have been identified as the fundamental features of alienation (Seeman 1959; Korzeniowski, 1994; Dalton, 2007). Further discourse by scholars described political alienation as a blend of a feeling of inefficacy and a lack of confidence in political institutions (Bowler & Donovan 2002; Kim 2005; Catterberg & Moreno 2006).

Political alienation has thus been categorised into two broad groups by Olsen (1968) vis-à-vis; political incapability (powerlessness) and political discontentment (disapproval or disappointment). He posits that the first case is compelled by the environment upon the individual, while in the second; it is a voluntary choice by them.

Finifter (1970) outlines five variants of political alienation. These are:

1. **Political powerlessness:** A feeling of incapability to affect political/electoral outcomes and governmental actions by the alienated.
2. **Political meaninglessness:** The perception by the individual that political/governmental outcomes/decisions are unpredictably unclear.
3. **Political normlessness:** The perception that there is a clear and rampant deviation from norms and regulations intended to govern political and governmental outcomes.

4. **Political isolation:** A rejection of widely held/shared societal norms and rules of behaviour by the individual.
5. **Political disappointment:** A display of lack of interest by the individual in political/electoral decisions and activity because of the misdemeanour by the ruling political elites

Political powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and disappointment serve as alienating factors preventing or constraining people from participating in the electoral process especially, voting during an election. Participating in an election would become hampered when people feel isolated, disappointed and incapacitated to influence the political environment. Participation can only thrive where there is confidence in the electoral operating system and the outcome of votes cast.

Electoral Participation

Research on public participation in politics by scholars in the discipline of political science has focused on conservatively electoral participation in the political system (Braddy, 1999; Van Deth 2001; Fawole, 2005; Glasgow & Alvarez 2005, Alechenu, 2012). Electoral participation can be viewed as citizens' legal acts in compliance with extant rules that allow the electorate to choose their representatives and to some extent, influence their actions in governance (Fawole, 2005; Glasgow & Alvarez 2005). Electoral participation has also been construed in terms of the activities undertaken directly or indirectly by the citizens to select their representatives and to support and/or influence the governance institutions at all levels (Braddy, 1999; Van Deth 2001).

Participation in the political/electoral system is not only restricted to voting periods but also encompasses other important political activities that take place around the election time frame in which the citizens attempt to influence political actions and governmental policies to their advantage (Höglund, 2009). This view of citizens' participation in the political or electoral process is all-inclusive in that it is not only limited to voting but also other political activities such as protests, boycotts and strikes. (Norris 2002a).

Effective participation of the citizens in the electoral system is desired because it is a podium of interaction between the citizens and the political officials during electioneering and allows the citizens to take part in decision-making and governance. It is also essential for ensuring the credibility, legitimacy and stability of the political system. Universally, there is a widely acknowledged gradual but consistent decline or abstention of voters in the past several years. Although there is little consensus in terms of what can be regarded as an acceptable or reasonable level of turnout, yet, this development has raised serious concern among governments, Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), citizens as well as non-governmental bodies.

In 2006, The International IDEA conducted a study on voter turnout that made use of election statistics from 1945 to 2015 in 214 countries. The study which covers both presidential and parliamentary elections revealed that in the preceding years leading up to the late 1980s, there was an average turnout which fluctuated from the mid-to higher 70% range. There was an average turnout of 76.4% between 1945 and 1960; it increased slightly to 75%, and then to 77.1% in 1961 but declined between the periods of 1976 and 1990 to 74.8%. voter turnout on average declined significantly to 69.7% between 1990 and 2006; it reduced to below 69% in the decade to 2006 and the decline continued, reaching up to 66% between the periods of 2011- 2015. Furthermore, there was a decline in the standard deviation of these figures to around 2.5% from a previous over 3%. The study outcome indicates an overall world turnout decline rate in participation which shows

that little variations now exist between advanced and developing democracies (International IDEA, 2006; 2016). The statistics as explained above are displayed in table 1 below.

Table 1: Voter Turnout Worldwide from 1945 to 2015

YEAR	%	YEAR	%	YEAR	%	YEAR	%	YEAR	%
1945	74.4	1958	80.7	1971	78.0	1984	78.0	1997	69.0
1946	78.5	1959	75.6	1972	80.1	1985	79.2	1998	70.9
1947	71.2	1960	73.7	1973	77.5	1986	72.8	1999	72.7
1948	75.6	1961	76.8	1974	74.1	1987	79.6	2000	66.7
1949	82.8	1962	79.2	1975	75.7	1988	73.4	2001	73.2
1950	74.6	1963	86.5	1976	76.0	1989	74.8	2002	67.9
1951	79.1	1964	74.9	1977	79.8	1990	70.3	2003	67.5
1952	74.4	1965	79.0	1978	74.7	1991	68.9	2004	68.4
1953	81.2	1966	76.3	1979	71.3	1992	72.0	2005	66.3
1954	74.6	1967	74.2	1980	80.4	1993	72.2	2006	66.5
1955	74.1	1968	75.5	1981	79.7	1994	73.6	2011- 2015-	66
1956	76.3	1969	73.8	1982	74.2	1995	67.3		
1957	74.9	1970	74.3	1983	74.7	1996	71.4		

Source: International IDEA (2006, 2016).

An Analysis of Voter Turnout/Participation in Nigeria from 1999 to 2019

The voter turnout statistics in the 1999 general elections in Nigeria were not quite impressive. A total of 57,938,945 eligible voters were registered but only 30,280,052 of these figures cast their votes, which represent 52.26% of voters registered by the INEC. In 2003, a total number of 60,823,033 voters' were registered while 42,018,735 voted to represent 69.08%. These figures show a slight increase in the number that registered as well as those who voted as compared to the 1999 election figures. Thus, the voter turnout in 2003 increased by 16.8% compared to that of 1999. The number of registered voters in the general elections of 2007 was 61,567,036. This figure was a slight increase from that of 2003; disappointingly, the total vote cast was 35,397,517, which represents 57.49%, about half the number of registered voters. The voter turnout of 2007, however, reduced by 11.6% compared to that of 2003 (IDEA, 2015; Abdallah, & Krishi, 2019). In 2011, the number of registered voters increased to 73,528,040 but, only a slightly significant 39,469,484 eligible voters exercised their franchise, representing 53.68%. The voter turnout of 2011 witnessed a further drop of 3.81% in the number of voter turnout as compared to the 2007 elections. The number of registered voters for the 2015 general election was 67,422,005, a little different from that of 2011; the total votes cast dropped significantly to 29,432,083 representing 43.65%, that is, less than half of the number of voters that registered. This figure represents a further decrease of 10.3% as compared to the 2011 elections. The 2019 general elections recorded a total of 82,344,107 registered voters, with a voter turnout of 28,614,190 representing 34.75%. This figure represents a further decrease of 8.90% as compared to the 2015 elections (IDEA, 2015; Abdallah, & Krishi, 2019; Pulse. ng, 2019).

From the analysis, the voter turnout rate has been gradually reducing since the 1999 general elections. Overall, the turnout figures from 1999 to 2011 were in the 50 and 60 percentiles; that of 2015 reduced to 43.65% and 34.75% in 2019. Although the genuineness and authenticity of these

statistics can be contested, they are however unimpressive. Even though since 1999 the voting-age population has been increasing, the turnout has been reducing. For example, the voting-age population increased from 52.7 million in 1999 to 106 million in 2019 (International IDEA Data Base, 2015, 2019; Ojetunde, 2019; Pulse. ng, 2019). These scenarios are tabulated in figure 1 and table 1 below.

Table 2: Voter Data Turnout for Nigerian Elections (Presidential-1999 to 2019)

Year	Voter Turnout	Total Vote	Registration	Voting Age Population Turnout	Voting age Population	Total Population
2019	34.75%	28,614,190	82,344,107	26.87%	106,490,312	208,679,144
2015	43.65%	29,432,083	67,422,005	32.11%	91,669,312	181,562,056
2011	53.68%	39,469,484	73,528,040	48.32%	81,691,751	155,215,573
2007	57.49%	35,397,517	61,567,036	49.85%	71,004,507	131,859,731
2003	69.08%	42,018,735	60,823,033	65.33%	64,319,246	129,934,911
1999	52.26%	30,280,052	57,938,945	57.36%	52,792,781	108,258,359

Source: International IDEA Data Base, 2015; 2019.

The Argument

Several studies on voter abstention had concentrated on apathy as the major reason for low turnout. These include the ones conducted by the “Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)” in 2012- “Voter Apathy and the 2011 Elections in Nigeria: A Research Report” (Alechenu, 2012); “Fagunwa (2019)- Voter Apathy and Nigeria Electioneering Process: A Synopsis On the 2015 General Elections”; “Iyanda (2020)- Assessing the Changing Nature of Voters Apathy in Nigeria: A Comparison of Old and New media; “Agu et al (2013)- Voters Apathy and Revival of Genuine Political Participation in Nigeria”; “Ebegbulem and Adams (2022)- Electoral Apathy and its Implication for the Conduct of Credible Elections in Nigeria”; and “Ibeogu et al (2019)- Voting Apathy among the Nigerian Electorates in 2019: The Role of INEC, Issues and the Way Forward”.

This study is not on apathy, and thus, not necessary to discourse on the listed studies above in detail. However, this study contends that the majority of non-voters in Nigerian elections cannot be classified under apathy to suggest that they all lack interest and knowledge of political activities. The author thus, introduced the variable of alienation to argue that the Nigerian voters’ are not majorly apathetic to the electoral system but could be disenchanted and frustrated with the system and its environment that constrained them from participating in voting activities. Thus, alienation is projected as the cause of the abstention of voters from the electoral process and this study sought to test the relationship between the mentioned variables by employing the qualitative research methodology. The variables - bad governance, electoral fraud and electoral violence were tested through statistical and qualitative analysis to establish a nexus or otherwise with alienation.

Political alienation refers to a person’s rejection of the existing political environment (Glasberg & Shannon, 2010). Although the alienated persons are interested in the political and electoral system, they are constrained from participating in it by political and environmental variables. Thus, an individual who rejects the prevailing political and electoral system may decide not to participate. This action is not that of an apathetic citizen but an alienated one. The investigation of alienation as the main cause of voters’ abstention in the Nigerian electoral process is a novel contribution to academic literature.

Stating the Problematic of Voter Abstention

Democracy requires the psychological involvement and active participation of people in the electoral process since societal goals are determined and executed through discussions, popular opinion, and commitment to the political system. Thus, citizens' engagement in the democratic process gives it legitimacy and direction (Dalton, 2002). Voter abstention is already a global phenomenon. It has become a major problem in developed and developing democracies (International IDEA 1999; 2006). The various elections in Nigeria, especially in the Fourth Republic, have witnessed a gradual but steady decline in turnout that has negatively impacted the democratization process (Agu, Okeke & Idike, 2013). To buttress the above point, the turnout statistics of voters for the general elections of 1999 was 52.3%; that of 2003 was 69.1% while in 2007, it was 58%. In 2011, the turnout figure was 53.7%; that in 2015 was 43.6% and 34.7% in 2019. These declining turnouts may erode the credibility of elections, legitimacy, and popular representation, which are the hallmarks of democracy. Low voter turnout trends in Nigeria call for concern because it indicates a country's levels of democratic development.

What did we study and how?

The research seeks to answer the following question: what is the impact of unfulfilled campaign promises/governance on voter abstention? what is the impact of electoral corruption on voter abstention? what is the impact of electoral violence on voter abstention?

The significance of the study is premised on the adverse effect of continuous reduction in the statistics of voter turnout in the political system. Low voter turnout can negatively impact the credibility of electoral outcomes, the legitimacy of government, and political stability. Furthermore, abstention from voting can also prevent people from voting and actively participating in the governance and policy outputs of the state. Voter behaviour is identified and specifically measured in the context of voter turnout, and voter abstention describes the aspect of the behaviour of voters who did not vote in an election. This study is necessitated by the global recognition that credible elections perform a fundamental function in entrenching democratic development and good governance.

The "International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 1999; 2002)" noted that representation of popular will and the legitimacy of the political process are ensured by credible elections. They are also essential for effective political socialization and for ensuring enduring democratic stability. It is thus imperative to draw scholars and government attention to this seemingly ignored malaise by investigating in this regard.

Furthermore, findings from the study would provide the basis for understanding the continuous and declining status of voter turnout in the Nigerian political system. It will also provide tools for policymakers to arrest the declining trend in voter participation.

Moreover, this is the first primary research (to the best of my knowledge) to investigate the nexus between political alienation and electoral participation in Nigeria or the Fourth Republic. The study will provide adequate information for making the appropriate suggestions that would positively affect public policy and governance in Nigeria. In addition to providing solutions to solving the problem, the study will make a good readership piece for scholars, students, and the interested public and also serve as a basis for further research.

The study adopted the ex-post facto and the descriptive approach in the presentation and analysis of data. The population of the study is the Nigerian State covering the six Geopolitical Zones. The National Population Census of Nigeria in 2006 puts the figures of the Nigerian population at one hundred and forty million, four hundred and thirty- one thousand, seven hundred and ninety

(140,431,790), (Nigerian Data Portal, 2006). A sample size of one thousand two hundred (1,200) respondents was sampled from the selected Six (6) Local Government Areas of the Geopolitical zones in Nigeria.

The sample size of one thousand two hundred (1200) respondents was arrived at by adopting the formula of Taro Yamane, the statistician which he developed in 1967 to calculate sample sizes from a given population (Yamane, 1967). The adoption of a 5% error margin and a 95% level of confidence, in calculating the population of one million, four hundred and ninety- seven thousand, one hundred and fifty- seven (1, 497, 157) yielded a sample size of 400. To account for possible attrition, reduce the level of error, and increase sample representativeness, and the confidence level, the number of subjects was increased to 1,200 (that is 400×3). This action became imperative since the sample of 400 represents the minimum standard sample required for the study to produce a 95% confidence level in line with Yamane's formula. The questionnaire comprised of closed-ended question sets was utilised for the study. The stratified random sampling technique was employed to select three zones (North- Central, South- West, South-South) from the six geopolitical zones; two states each (Plateau, Kogi, Oyo, Ekiti, Rivers, Delta) from the three selected zones, and one local government each (Jos South, Dekina, Ibadan South West, Ekiti West, Degema) from the selected states; making a total of six Local Government Areas.

The systematic sampling technique was then employed to select households from the selected Local Government Areas. Consequently, the questionnaires were administered to the voting age population in each of the selected households. Primary data formed the nuclei of data collection for analysis. The questionnaire for data collection comprised of open-ended question sets was utilised for the study. The data were analysed using the descriptive-analytical technique in a systematic manner that yielded an adequate understanding of the subject.

One thousand, two hundred (1,200) questionnaires were administered to the respondents for the study. From this figure, one thousand and sixty (1,060) questionnaires were completed and returned by the respondents. An analysis of the data shows that the males constituted a majority of 57.1% and the females, 42.9%. The distribution of the respondents' age constituted 50% between 18-25 years; 38.2% between 26-40 years; and 11.8% over 41. Thus, the majority of the subjects constituted the virile political participation age group. The sample distribution further revealed that the married respondents constituted 26%; single, 69.3%; divorced, 3.3%, and the "others" category, 1.41%. Moreover, 0.94% of the respondents were primary school certificate holders; 21.7% were post-primary certificate holders; 34.4% were OND/NCE certificate holders while 43.0% hold post-graduate certificates. The sample data revealed that the subjects were made up of people who have sufficient education to make useful contributions to the research. Furthermore, 22.2% of the respondents belonged to the paid employment cadre; 32.5% were self-employed while 45.3% were unemployed. Finally, 60.4% of the respondents were Christians; 31.6% were Muslims; 7.07% belonged to African Traditional Religion (ATR) while 0.94% belonged to "other" religion. Thus, the distribution indicates that the respondents cut across the religious divide.

Insights from the Study Results

Question One

Are you of the opinion that elections are important in Nigeria?	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections guarantee democratic arrangement and ensure change and continuity in governance. • Elections are important in Nigeria only when they are properly conducted.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Votes do not count. • Leaders are picked in the interest of the godfathers.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Two

Are you of the opinion that credible leaders can be selected through voting in Nigeria? State the reason for your response.	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If due process is followed. • If the political officials would stop hijacking the electoral process to ensure free and fair elections.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The peoples' votes do not count because of manipulation of the electoral process. • The political process is very porous; godfathers pick their loyal subjects and elections are not free and fair. • The process is full of bribery and corruption.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Three

Did you register as a voter in the 2019 general elections? If yes, state why and if no, why not?	
The majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To vote out the non-performing government. • To select the desired candidate. • In the interest of patriotism.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insecurity. • Manipulation of elections. • Leaders are not chosen by vote cast. • Stressful registration process.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Four

Are you eager to vote during elections? If yes, why and if no, why not?	
A Majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is an opportunity to vote out bad leaders, but such an opportunity is not available because the electorates' votes do not count in the Nigerian situation. • If it is free and fair.

Are you eager to vote during elections? If yes, why and if no, why not?	
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is a necessity. • Previous votes cast amounted to nothing; votes do not count in Nigeria and there is no good governance. • It amounts to time-wasting to vote for nothing. • Elections are not free and fair. • Because of electoral violence.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Five

Are you aware of any person who was registered but fail to vote during the election of 2019? If your response is yes, please, state the reasons.	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Inability to access voter's card. *The people's votes will not count. *It is useless to stand under the sun to vote and in the end, the votes would be manipulated. *Cumbersome voting procedures. *Insecurity and violence. *To use voter's card for other purposes- such as the opening of a bank account.
Minority (No)	*Respondents had no such experience.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Six

Are you of the opinion that the electoral process in Nigeria (registration and voting) is violence-prone and marked by insecurity?	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violence and insecurity have become norms in Nigeria's elections, for many years now. • Violence and insecurity obstructs free and fair election and scares people away from casting their votes. • Insecurity and violence are amongst Nigeria's major electoral problems. • people always lose their lives during elections in Nigeria.
Minority (No)	• Respondents had no such experience.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Seven

Are you of the opinion that many Nigerians of voting age are eager to cast their votes during elections but end up not voting for fear of violence?	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No one wants to become a victim of electoral violence no matter how patriotic. • People had gone out to vote in a series of elections only to end up being shot or killed.
Minority (No)	• Respondents had no such experience.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Eight

Do you have implicit confidence in the INEC's capability to deliver a free and fair election? Give your reasons.	
Minority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The INEC is overcoming several limitations to conduct credible elections in Nigeria. • If INEC is autonomous. • If INEC is allowed a free hand to operate by the government and political officials.
Majority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INEC tends to favour the political party in power. • INEC officials are induced with money most of the time. • INEC officials are corrupt. • INEC cannot deliver free and fair elections. • INEC is not independent so, they cannot conduct credible elections.

Source: Field Survey: 2019".

Question Nine

Are you of the opinion that many people of voting age want to participate in voting but do not? Give your reasons.	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The votes would not count. • Godfathers secure elective positions unduly for their desired candidates so that the peoples' votes do not count.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No sufficient evidence to believe so.

Source: Field Survey: 2019".

Question Ten

Are you of the opinion that the registration and voting process in Nigeria is very cumbersome, and therefore, can discourage many Nigerians from voting?	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People line out under the sun and in the end, they do not get registered. • Very cumbersome process.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not cumbersome if it will reflect the peoples' votes. • Wrong assumption and belief by some people.

Source: Field Survey: 2019".

Question Eleven

How would you rate Nigerian political officials' fulfilment of electoral promises? Satisfactory or unsatisfactory? Please comment.	
A majority (Unsatisfactory)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The political officials believe that with their money they can manipulate elections and neglect the electorates to serve themselves. • Electoral promises are just propaganda meant to induce eligible voters to vote for the political officials in their bid to capture power. • Political officials have failed to fulfil electoral promises.
Minority (Satisfactory)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very few politicians are fulfilling their promises to their constituencies.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

Question Twelve

Are you of the opinion that the majority of Nigerians want to participate in the electoral process, but do not because they believe that political office has been hijacked by political elites/godfathers and therefore electoral promises would not be fulfilled?	
A majority (Yes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral manipulation takes place at every level of the Nigerian state. • Electoral manipulation is very visible in the Nigerian political process. • It is the godfathers' game.
Minority (No)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is the corrupt politicians that hijack political offices and not the elites.

Source: Field Survey: 2019”.

Question Thirteen

What is or are the reasons why people who registered for elections fail or refuse to cast their votes during elections?	
Majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violence and insecurity. • Thugs' activities and killings. • Ballot box snatching. • Hijacking of electoral materials. • Tedious registration and voting processes. • Stress in waiting endlessly for electoral materials. • Corruption and godfathers' undue influence on the electoral process. • The feeling or belief that votes will not count.
Minority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is not everybody that votes during elections; some people are just lazy while others are unpatriotic and self-serving.

Source: Field Survey: 2019”.

Question Fourteen

What should be put in place to motivate people to participate in voting during elections?	
Majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of electronic transmission to reduce fraud, manipulation and stressful voting procedures. • Provision of adequate security. • Ensure free and fair elections. • Ensure that the votes of the electorate count. • Eliminate corruption. • Discourage godfathers' undue influence.
Minority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People should be patriotic no matter the situation and go out and vote; there is no perfect system. • To educate the electorates on the need to exercise their franchise.

Source: Field Survey: 2019”.

Question Fifteen

What are the reasons why you would not vote during elections?	
Majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violence or fear of violence • Insecurity • Irregularities in the voting process. • Corruption, rigging, godfathers' influence. • Manipulation of votes. • Vote buying. • Cumbersome voting process. • Delay of electoral materials. • Failure of political officials to keep to electoral promises. • Dictatorship of godfathers.
Minority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I will vote no matter what. • It is my right to vote. • I am a patriotic Nigerian; after all, Rome was not built in a day-Nigeria is still developing.

Source: Field Survey: 2019.

The respondents' responses are categorised and analysed in line with the research question. **What is the impact of unfulfilled campaign promises/bad governance on voter abstention?**

Respondents' responses to questions eleven and twelve clearly show the impact of unfulfilled campaign promises on voter abstention. In question eleven, the majority of the respondents rate the fulfilment of electoral promises by political officials as unsatisfactory. They stated that political officials have failed to keep to electoral promises and that electoral promises are just propaganda meant to induce voters to vote for them during elections. Responses to question twelve indicate that a majority of the respondents opined that many Nigerians decide not to participate in the electoral process because they believe that political office has been hijacked by elites and godfathers, therefore, electoral promises would not be fulfilled. Thus, in response to question sixteen, the majority of the respondents listed the failure of political officials to keep to electoral promises as one of the reasons why they would not vote on Election Day. The respondent responses are corroborated by Campbell et al (1954) and Glasberg & Shannon (2010) who aver that the alienated individual is of the view that political office holders are incompetent, self-centred and corrupt. The alienated persons do not trust these sets of leaders because they believe that their interests are not well represented by them. The feeling and belief that the elite political godfathers had hijacked the political system impeding people-oriented governance have resulted in their alienation from the electoral system. Therefore, the outcome of research question one shows that unfulfilled campaign promises by political officials hurt the participation of voters in elections.

On the question, what is the impact of electoral corruption/fraud on voter abstention, the results just the following. The impact of electoral corruption/fraud on voter abstention can be understood from respondents' responses to questions nine and eight. Responses to question nine show that majority of the respondents opined that many people in Nigeria do not vote during elections because they feel that their votes will not count due to manipulation by electoral and political officials. Responses to question eight indicate that the majority of the respondents opined that they do not have confidence in the INEC to conduct credible elections in Nigeria; this is because the body is not independent in its activities and tends to favour the political party in power. Thus, in response to question four, majorities of the respondents are eager to vote during elections only if the process is free and fair. They opined that votes cast in previous elections amounted to nothing, it is thus, a waste of time to go out and vote and then the election will not be free and fair. Also, in response to questions five and thirteen, one of the reasons given why registered voters do not vote on Election Day was that

their votes would not count due to manipulation or electoral fraud. The opinion of the respondents is supported by Glasberg & Shannon (2010) who posit that although the politically alienated citizens desire to vote in elections, they restrict themselves because they feel that they are not significant to the political system. A further submission by scholars such as “Bowler & Donovan (2002); Kim 2005; Catterberg & Moreno (2006)” posit that political alienation can be viewed as a combination of a feeling of lack of efficacy and confidence in the political system. Hence, the citizens’ opinions are corroborated by Campbell et al (1954), who aver that the whole political process is a fraud, a farce, and a betrayal of public trust. This scenario has alienated eligible voters’ in the Nigerian electoral process. Thus, the outcome of research question two shows that electoral corruption/fraud harms voter participation in the electoral process of Nigeria.

What is the impact of electoral violence on voter abstention? – Respondents’ responses to questions six and seven clearly show the impact of violence during elections on voter abstention. In question six, a majority of the respondents opined that the electoral process in Nigeria is enmeshed in violence and insecurity, obstructs free and fair electoral process and scares them away from casting their votes since people always lose their lives during elections. Respondents’ responses to question seven indicate that majority of the subjects opined that many Nigerians who want to vote during elections decide not to for fear of violence. Also, the response to question three shows that some of the respondents did not register or vote in the 2019 elections because of fear of insecurity and violence. Similarly, one of the reasons given by respondents why they are not eager to vote during elections in response to question four and the reason people decide not to vote during elections listed in questions five, thirteen and fifteen, is the fear of violence and insecurity. They opined that people had gone out to vote in a series of elections only to end up being shot or killed. The opinions of the respondents are reinforced by Seeman (1959), Roberts (1987), and Finifter (1970) who aver that the notion of alienation is fundamentally based on the erosion of the individual’s liberty and power to make political decisions.

From this submission, it can be deduced that when citizens’ perceived any form of danger in participating in the electoral process, their freedom and desire to vote are short-circuited. From this perspective according to Seeman (1959: 784) “alienation can be conceived as the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcement, he seeks.” The above submission implies that even though the citizens want to participate in the electoral process, they are constrained to stay away because of the perceived danger of electoral violence. The factor of violence has led to the alienation of citizens from voting in elections. Thus, the results of research question three show that violence during elections negatively affects the participation of voters in the electoral process.

The findings of the study are summarized thus:

1. Voter abstention in Nigerian elections is mainly due to alienation.
2. Bad governance is responsible for voter alienation in Nigeria.
3. The failure of elected political officers to fulfil electoral promises and work for the interest of the citizenry concerning policy formulation and implementation is responsible for voter alienation in Nigeria.
4. Voter alienation is a factor of electoral fraud perpetrated by political officials, parties, and INEC officials, which undermines the votes cast by the Nigerian electorates during elections.

5. The violent activities carried out by political opponents and parties during an election are the cause of the alienation of voters in the Nigerian political system.
6. The electoral process (registration and voting) in the Nigerian political system is cumbersome and thus, discourages many citizens from registering for elections as well as voting.

Other observations participants generated are as follows:

1. Cumbersome electoral process (registration and voting) is responsible for the alienation of voters and low turnout during elections in Nigeria.

The results show that the majority of the respondents stated that the very stressful and rigorous registration and voting processes in Nigeria discourage eligible voters from voting during elections. For example, the majority of the respondents state that the registration and voting processes in Nigeria are very cumbersome and thus can discourage voters from voting in the elections. They opined that the unusually long hours spent in the queue either during voter registration or voting are very stressful and discouraging.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Generally, the findings of the study epitomize contribution to existing academic knowledge as the variables of political alienation- unfulfilled campaign promises, electoral violence, and electoral fraud are strong determinants of low turnout of voters in Nigerian elections. Specifically, the empirical study of political alienation using survey data for analysis is novel in Nigeria (to the best of my knowledge). The study revealed that political alienation is a determinant of voter abstention in the Nigerian electoral process. Until now, studies have focused on political apathy as the main cause of low voter turnout in Nigeria.

The credibility of elections ensures the sustenance of the democratization process and good governance. This credibility is occasioned by effective electoral participation which is an epitome of a viable and representative government in democratic societies. The voting activity serves as the linkage point between the elected political officials and the people. It serves as the basis and opportunity for discussions, deliberations, and participation of the citizens in the politics and governance of the state. Therefore, if participation decreases, the linkage point between the people and the political system may be negatively affected. This development may threaten the legitimacy and stability of the process of democratization. Participation in the governance process is essential for attaining a just and civilized society. However, if the majority of eligible voters abstain from the process of voting, participatory democracy and governance may be unachievable.

In line with the findings of the study, the following solutions are suggested.

1. The elected political officials should ensure good governance based on meeting the needs and demands of the citizenry. The qualities of good governance like transparency, accountability, rule of law, fairness and equity in resource distribution and opportunities for capacity development should be ensured. The citizens' basic needs such as food, shelter, water, adequate power supply, access roads as well as sustaining and enduring market structure should be built and maintained.
2. The electoral system of Nigeria as it is presently cannot engender confidence in the electorates. Thus, the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) should institute credibility in the electoral process.

The INEC should be independent to manage the electoral process. Political interference from political leaders and rulers should be discouraged. Also, the political parties and electoral candidates should be sensitized to allow for equity and fairness in party primaries and other election activities. The use of electronic transmission should be encouraged and mandatory to reduce electoral fraud and manipulation. Fraudulent practices during elections should be penalized with appropriate sanctions.

3. Preventive and control mechanisms should be put in place to reduce the level of violence during elections minimally. This should be done by deploying adequate security personnel to effectively provide security to polling units in both rural and urban centres. The security personnel should be supported by an intelligence network to provide intelligence reports and monitor activities in all election centres to forestall and manage any acts of violence.
4. Governments at all tiers should put in place mechanisms to lighten the often stressful registration and voting processes to encourage more participation in the electoral process. These can be done, by ensuring that the various electronic gadgets for registration and voting are in good working condition, using well-trained and experienced staff, and re-delimitation of registration and polling units to reduce the population for effective management. The registration and voting centres should open on time, and electoral officials and materials should arrive at the polling units at the stipulated time.

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An Afrocentric Revisit of Zuma-led South Africa-China Relations, 2013-2017

Mutually Beneficial or Not

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Abstract

Zuma's administration remains the subject of scholarly debate and critics with many sections of the South African society calling it a nine wasted years. South Africa-China relations deepened largely during Zuma's administration, specifically between 2013 and 2017. While the question of whether the relationship is mutually beneficial received large scholarly attention, the interrogation of this research phenomenon has not received attention from an Afrocentric lens. In view of the above, the current article revisits South Africa-China relations during Zuma's administration to identify the benefits and challenges brought by the relationship using an Afrocentric perspective. In so doing, the article looks at South Africa-China cooperation in areas as cultural and academic exchange, financial trade, wildlife conservation and tourism. Methodologically, this a desktop qualitative article that relied heavily on secondary data and the collected data is analysed through discourse, and document analysis.

Keywords: Afrocentricity; Zuma, South Africa, China, Mutually Beneficial or Not

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Introduction

Succeeding Thabo Mbeki whose administration had cordial but not strong relations with China, Zuma deepened South Africa-China relations through a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2010. Under Beijing Declaration which marked the upgrading of the relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the two parties signed 38 bilateral agreements through which they undertook to cooperate in political dialogues, trade, investment, mineral exploration, and agriculture. On matters pertaining to global affairs, they agreed to join efforts in forums such as the United Nations and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The reciprocal visit by the then Deputy President (now President) Xi Jinping to South Africa, saw the two countries signing agreements to cooperate in mining, energy, environment, and transport (Xiong 2012). The exponential economic growth of China and other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) partners coupled with the low demand of commodity products from Euro-American developed countries prompted by global economic crisis made China and other emerging countries alternative trade partners to South Africa (Kim and Tukić 2015; Maphaka 2020a; Prinsloo 2017).

The Deputy President in Zuma's first tenure, Kgalema Motlanthe, undertook a visit to China in 2011, to promote exportation of South Africa's value-added products to China and attract foreign direct investment towards sectors targeted by the South African economy (DIRCO 2012). During his state visit to China in 2014, Zuma underscores that his administration intended to deepen economic partnership with China to advance inclusive growth and create jobs. The visit mirrors the importance South Africa attached to China as her strategic partner to respond to Pretoria's (the Capital City and Administrative hub of South Africa) national development priorities (Naidu 2015).

It is within this context that the two countries signed various agreements. Among others, the two parties signed the 5-10 Year Strategic Programme on Cooperation which entails cooperation in various areas such as mutual political trust and strategic coordination, economy and trade, and people to people exchanges. The agreement covers cooperation on the African and international affairs and multilateral platforms such as BRICS. The two countries also undertook to enhance economic cooperation in trade and investment through the South African Ministry of Trade and Industry and the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Commerce. An Action Plan on Agricultural Cooperation committing the exchange between the two countries within a period of 2014-2016 was amongst the agreements signed during President Jacob Zuma's state visit. Moreover, they signed Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirements through which China commit to import maize and apple fruit from South Africa, and the latter country undertook to import Dates from China. In supporting South Africa's human resource development, China commits to surge short-term development courses and increase training programmes extended to South Africans to 2000 from 2015-2020. South Africa's industrialisation agenda received attention during the visit with China agreeing to support Pretoria in areas such as science and technology, industrial and railway parks. For its part, South Africa urged China to surge her investment in economic zones and industrial parks (Naidu 2015; Maphaka 2020b).

President Zuma and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping reviewed the Five-to-Ten Year Strategic Cooperation ahead of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2015. It is in this context that China agreed to align industries with South Africa to boost the latter country's effort at accelerating industrialisation. Beyond that, the two parties agreed to enhance cooperation in Special Economic Zones and maritime, infrastructure development, cooperate in human resource development and financial service industry (Benyi 2017).

While the question of whether the relationship is mutually beneficial received large scholarly attention, the interrogation of this research phenomenon has not received attention from an Afrocentric lens. In view of the above, the current article revisits South Africa-China relations during Zuma's administration to identify the benefits and challenges brought by the relationship using an Afrocentric perspective. In so doing, the article looks at South Africa-China cooperation in areas as cultural and academic exchange, financial trade, wildlife conservation and tourism. Methodologically, this a desktop qualitative article that relied heavily on secondary data and the collected data is analysed through discourse, and document analysis. In 2013, South Africa and China celebrated fifteen years of diplomatic relations. Additionally, South Africa hosted the BRICS Summit in the same year. The two countries signed a joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group (JIMWG) at the said Summit, aimed at identifying and addressing problems that arise in the relationship. Against this backdrop, the paper seeks to determine whether the relationship is mutually beneficial using Afrocentricity as an alternative perspective.

Aim

- The paper seeks to interrogate a question of whether South Africa-China relationship is mutually beneficial from an Afrocentric perspective

Objectives

- To identify benefits and challenges emanating from the relationship
- Make policy recommendations to address those challenges

Theoretical and Methodological Interpretation

Afrocentricity emanates from Pan Africanist movements, writers, and leaders. Prominent amongst its proponents is Molefi Kete Asante who is credited to be its founder. He adopted and sharpened the works of Pan-Africanist writers in formulating the theory in his works: *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change*; *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge*; and *The Afrocentric Idea*. Afrocentricity is rooted on the tenets of cultural centeredness, paradigmatic pluralism, liberation, and cultural agency (Schreiber 2000; Asante 2007; Ntseane 2011, Maphaka, Rapanyane & Maphoto 2020). The tenet of cultural centeredness is premised on a conviction that African phenomenon and communities cannot be understood better when studied with foreign lenses. In this regard, researchers should be grounded on African experiences to have a better view and understanding of African phenomenon. In view of the above, the center refers to a location, place, or position. Unlike Eurocentric perspective deployed to study South Africa-China relations, the research will be rooted on African culture, ideals, values, and history. The tenet of centeredness goes beyond the perpetual subjection of Africans to historical and cultural disorientation by unmasking the marginalization of African economies as well. It is in this context that Afrocentricity calls on Africans to reclaim their culture, ideals, values, history, and interests to relocate their economies from languishing at the periphery to the center of the global economy (Schreiber 2000; Mazama 2001; Maphaka 2020a).

On the other hand, paradigmatic pluralism negates the dominance of Euro-American theories in multicultural studies. Given that the world is composed of diverse cultures, non-Europeans should be studied from their perspective as opposed to the imposition of Eurocentric ethnocentricity in non-Europeans. In other words, the perspective for each nation should be given its legitimate space to improve coexistence as the world is characterized by multiple cultures (Schreiber 2000; Ntseane 2011). In the context of South Africa-China relations, Afrocentricity is drawn to reclaim the position of African perspectives in the global intellectual space that has skewed the production of knowledge in favour of Euro-American theories. The latter should be understood in the context that scholarship in the two countries relations is dominated by the mainstream Euro-American theories, making an impression that Eurocentricity is supreme while is just a perspective among others. Thus, Africans are repositioned epistemically to think based on their experiences as the bedrock of their reasoning to study and understand an African phenomenon.

Liberation and cultural agency are premised on Afrocentric quest to re-centre, revive and liberate African societies. The latter include African history, views on epistemology, ontology, axiology, and the liberation of minds. In this context, Afrocentrists negates the marginalization of Africans contribution to the world knowledge and development. This should be understood in the context that Greek civilization was predated by African civilization. But it is the only Greek civilization that is credited to be the cradle of civilization, history, knowledge, and development. To remedy this epistemic injustice, African scholars and academics should engage into epistemic rebellion to call for the acknowledgement of the continent contribution to the production of knowledge, particularly Greek civilization (Schreiber 2000; Asante 2007; Maphaka 2020b).

The adoption and use of Afrocentricity in this article is premised on the epistemic location of the author as the South African marginalized decolonial thinker who forms part of the genuine voices of Africans that are perpetually marginalised in the studies of South Africa-China relations. Thus, the author shifts the analysis and understanding of South Africa-China relations to the experience of Africans. In view of the above, the study will form part of decolonial epistemic justice that negates the Eurocentric conviction of universality, neutrality, and single truth in the production of knowledge. The negation is largely premised on the fact that individual arguments are driven by their position to a certain class, sexuality, gender, spirituality, linguistic, location and race on the globe (Grosfoguel

2010). Thus, the author is not hidden or delinked from the analysis of South Africa–China relations, as Euro–American perspective does.

The article is anchored on a desktop qualitative approach that relied on secondary data. Leaning on Afrocentric theory, the acquisition and examination of data is informed and shaped by African people, norms, values, and culture. In this regard, the findings and recommendations of the study are shaped and informed by African values, interests, and problems, needs, history and their contemporary experience (Schreiber 2000; Mazama 2001; Asante 2007; Ntseane 2011; Reviere 2001; Mkabela 2005; Shai 2016). The article gleaned data from official policy documents, briefs, books, academic thesis/dissertation, and journal articles.

South Africa–China Relations, 2013–2017

South Africa's apartheid regime did not have formal diplomatic ties with the Peoples Republic of China before the 1990s. It was apartheid South Africa that joined the West to fight against Chinese People's Liberation Army during the 1950's Korean War. After 1994, the newly elected African National Congress government established official diplomatic relations with China and focused South Africa's foreign policy less on the West. Henceforth Africa and other developing countries were prioritised with a view to reintegrating the country into the wider international community and in growing and diversifying the economy after years of isolation triggered by the apartheid legislation (Yu 2018). With the West experiencing grave economic and liquidity crisis in the early days of President Zuma's government, the natural resource–thirsty but booming economies of India and China became the potential allies of resource exporting countries of the Third World. South Africa was thus gradually inclined to "Look East" for economic salvation (Alden and Wu 2016; Kotze 2012; Leso 2017).

Zuma's government sought out trade opportunities presented by those countries. Over time trade with Asia grew to R760 billion while with the Middle East, it grew to R166 billion in 2014. Given the large populations of these countries, the potential for substantial growth was enormous. It is not surprising therefore that DIRCO opined that the region is critical for South Africa to expand trade and investment, technical cooperation as well as skills development opportunities (DIRCO 2016). Under Zuma South Africa thus gravitated towards the East with growing emphasis on trade with other BRICS countries (Neethling 2017; Qobo and Dube 2015). The move also reduced the dominance of Western companies in the South African economy (Alden and Wu 2014).

This policy shift brought about a number of subtle effects. The first was that human rights, up to now a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy, was replaced by "realpolitik". An example in this regard was when South Africa abstained on the United Nations Security Council vote intended to refer North Korea to the International Criminal Court (Carmody 2017). The second subtle shift came about in a speech during Zuma's interview with the CNBC Africa on 27 February 2014. During the interview, the President mentioned then that when doing business with China, South Africa is treated as an equal partner whereas Western countries acted as superiors and "masters". Zuma said that "China is doing business rather than telling its partners what they should do". He further emphasised that South Africa should learn from China how to extract high-level benefits from its mineral wealth to reduce unemployment and poverty (Matambo 2014).

At face value Zuma's comments carries water especially when one considers China's commitment to not interfere into the affairs of African countries. However, Chinese development aid was tied with conditions that respond to China's foreign policy objectives. For example, during the construction of the South African Agricultural Demonstration Centre in Gariiep Dam in the Free State Province of South Africa, the role of the South African workforce was limited to provision of general labour

and support services. On the other hand, China imported her engineers and artisans to work on the project. The agreement pertaining to the Demonstration Centre did not entail any provision for the employment of the South African engineers and artisans (Tshetlo and Naidoo 2015). In view of the above, South Africa responded to China's Global Going Out Strategy of 1996. Under this economic expansion policy, Chinese companies are encouraged to invest in various sectors and generate employment for Chinese at home and abroad. In this regard, South Africa served as a foundation to advance China's foreign policy objectives at expenses her interests.

Zuma further said the lessons from China should also dovetail with both national and continental development needs (Singh and Dube 2013). In this vein, he pledged to use Chinese investments to fund the development of infrastructure, notably transport and renewable energy projects. An example in this regard was when South African State-owned Enterprise, Transnet, concluded a R5 billion agreement with the Chinese Development Bank to fund the development of railways and port networks in South Africa, on 06 July 2017 (Valjilo 2018). The Chinese model of development also drew the attention of other governmental institutions, especially the South African Parliament. Out of the Chinese development model idea, a Sovereign Wealth Fund and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission were set to be created to spur economic growth (Shoba 2018).

Challenges emanating from the relationship

South Africa-China relations were not however without challenges. At the political level, South Africa reneged on a promise to grant the Dalai Lama a visa to enter the country at the invitation of his fellow Nobel Peace Laureate, Bishop Desmond Tutu, in 2015. This uncharacteristic shift was interpreted by many observers as an attempt by the country to curry favour with and appease China (Anthony, Tembe and Gull 2015). From an Afrocentric perspective, this could be described as an encroachment of the South African space for policy making and implementation. A phenomenon that resembles coloniality as China replicates the tendency of the West by handing policy direction to South Africa. In this regard, South Africa's foreign policy principle of promoting human rights at home and abroad was relegated to the periphery, while "One China Policy" occupied the apex in the asymmetrical relations between the world second largest economy and Africa's second largest economy.

Another problem was highlighted by Thulare (2015) study. In that study he indicated that there were huge job losses resulting from the importation of cheap Chinese manufactured products into South Africa. As such, steel imports from China prompted the dis-industrialisation of the South African steel industry in 2015. With China undergoing overproduction and facing a rising labour wages, Beijing steel enterprises relocated their operations to South Africa. The net effects of this relocation were that the South African steel producing companies, Evraz Highveld and Vanadium was bailed out and Tata Steel's Operation in Richards Bay went to auction. On the other hand, small steel enterprises such as Alert Steel and Duro Pressings became liquidated. As a result, the South African government-imposed tariffs in 2016 (Maphaka 2020b). Equally Soko and Qobo (2016) state that in changing its development model, China outsources and moves her labour-intensive industries as well as low skilled jobs to Africa, thus more capital-intensive and high-tech industries are developed at home. This development is prompted by increasing labour costs at home which made it necessary for manufacturing companies to move their operation to cheap areas.

Consequent to the above, South African unemployment rose from 75 000 to 85 000; a 25% job loss in the manufacturing industry alone for the period under study. The cheap Chinese imports inhibited the South African efforts at reducing unemployment and diversifying its economy (Ehizuelen and Abdi 2018). South African nationals are thus consigned to the margins of their national wealth which benefits their Chinese counterparts. In view of the above, it is safe to argue that the foregoing

Chinese practices were not in keeping with the enhancement of manufacturing and acceleration of industrialisation advanced by Zuma's administration through the National Development Plan Vision 2030 and other domestic development policies. In this context, South Africa was responding to China's contemporary development priority of reforming her economy by relocating manufacturing industries to cheaper destination. As such, the prioritisation of China's development priorities at the expenses of those of South Africa created a situation wherein the latter country remained trapped to the margins of the global economy, while benefitting Chinese nationals and their country. This should be understood in the context that de-industrialisation by Chinese companies created wealth for Beijing and jobs for her nationals. Thus, South Africa's development priorities were overshadowed by those of China advanced through the Global Going Out Strategy Policy.

South African Multinational Companies found it difficult to penetrate the African market because of Chinese competition (Alden and Wu 2014). Thulare (2015) is of the view that Chinese companies have an advantage over their South African competitors because of state subsidiaries. The Asian giant takes advantage of Africa to enter both the United States and European Union markets. It does this by relocating some of its companies to take advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Against the foregoing, it is clear that in as far as South Africa-China relations are concerned, the body of evidence cited above indicates that South Africa always comes second when doing business with China. This development corroborates Sun's (2014) argument that Africa serves as a foundation, a means rather than an end to China's engagement with its neighbouring and developed countries. In the context of Afrocentric theoretical framework adopted by the study, these asymmetrical relations do not advance the interests of South Africa and the continent in general. They inhibit the South African effort at relocating from the margins of the world economy and ceasing to be a net exporter of raw materials and net importer of manufactured goods. This means that trade ties resembling pre-independence ones, persist today.

Cultural and Academic Exchange

2013 marked fifteen years of formal diplomatic ties between South Africa and China. To celebrate that achievement, the South Africa-China Friendship Association was established. The Association is aimed at enhancing friendship, understanding and cooperation through cultural and academic exchanges. It also seeks to promote economic and cultural interaction as well as facilitate skills and technology transfer. Subsequently, anniversary celebrations were held in South Africa and China respectively during that time. Thus, 2014 was celebrated as the "South African year in China" while 2015 was "China year in South Africa" (Wu and Alden 2014; Monareng 2016).

In 2018 a Journalism Department of China-Africa Reporting Project was established at the University of Witwatersrand. That Department brings Chinese journalists to South Africa to attend workshops concerning African issues. The first South Africa-China Dialogue was consequently held under the auspices of Africa-China Reporting Project & China Daily Africa at Witwatersrand University on the 22 February 2018 (Tutu 2018).

In 2014 the South African Department of Basic Education signed an agreement with China's Ministry of Education to incorporate mandarin into South Africa's public schools' curriculum. The agreement covers the training of teachers, vocational education, research, and development (Du Toit 2015, Yu 2018). For several observers and scholars (Du Toit 2015; Moinogu 2015; Yu 2018), South Africa stands to benefit immensely from that agreement as mandarin is likely to be the language of the world's leading economy. Mastering that language could potentially open opportunities for South African business in China (Wang 2013). Through the 2014\2015 anniversary program, Ministers of Arts and Culture from both countries were attempting to merge and finding common ground between their respective cultures. Several state-sponsored cultural activities were set-up to entertain people in

schools, theatres, and town halls. These were also meant to increase trade in tourism. In this regard, direct flights from Johannesburg to Beijing were introduced in 2015 (Benyi 2017).

The South African Broadcasting Corporation also established offices in Beijing (Alden and Wu 2014). These cultural exchanges are meant to deepen people–people relations (Du Toit 2015). Beijing seeks to elevate its global role by spreading Chinese culture and language. For this purpose, it has started building Confucius Institutes on the continent as well as awarding scholarships to African students to study in China. In South Africa, those institutes were established at the Universities of Stellenbosch, Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Rhodes, and Pretoria, respectively (Liu Guijin 2014). During the 2016 South Africa–China Bi-National Commission meeting, China committed to increase short-term skills development programmes to reduce the skills gap in South Africa. It also undertook to provide training opportunities for South Africans until 2020 (DIRCO 2016).

In tertiary education, China is providing 200 scholarships for South African students while the South African Confucius Institutes are receiving funds from the Chinese government for academic purposes (Alden and Wu 2014). In 2017 alone, over 2600 South African students were studying in China (Wenjun 2018). The incorporation of mandarin in the South African basic education curriculum has raised eyebrows. Some critics, like Alden and Wu (2016), state that this move could further side-line South African indigenous languages. Others are questioning whether China is willing to facilitating studies in South African culture, norms, and languages.

From an Afrocentric viewpoint, the net effect of that would be “cultural disorientation” as South African indigenous languages are placed at the margins. In other words, China contributes to the colonial project of destroying and marginalising South African indigenous languages, while promoting her languages in the global intellectual space. Thus Euro–American linguistic and epistemic injustice is complemented by Chinese linguistic and epistemic injustice. South Africa should collaborate with China to incorporate her languages in the Chinese school curriculum. The recent introduction of Isizulu by Beijing Foreign Studies University through its Department of Zulu in 2019, has a potential to promote the South African languages. President Ramaphosa’s administration should in this regard put more effort in ensuring that the Zulu language is integrated in other Universities across China and cultural practices of indigenous South Africans are introduced in the Chinese basic and higher education curriculum.

Tourism and Wildlife Conservation

To boost job creation, in 2010 South Africa opened a tourism office in China, later followed up with a Memorandum of Understanding on tourism signed in 2013. Since then, the number of Chinese tourists to South Africa rose from 84,000 in 2015 to 117, 000 in 2016, spending about R1 billion. According to Leso (2017) for each \$1million spent, 51 jobs were created. It is however not uncommon for Chinese nationals who visited South Africa under the pretext of tourism to be caught engaging in nefarious practices such as rhino poaching. The 2015 sixth Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Summit took place at the time South Africa was facing illegal rhino poaching. It was in that same year that the country hosted a Summit of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora (CITES). South Africa is home to 80% of the 1015 rhinos lost in 2014 (Anthony, Terhuyse and Burgess 2015). The monetary value of rhinos killed between 2008 and 2014 is estimated at ZAR 421.3 billion (Wu 2015). Reportedly, rhino horns and ivory are sold to China and many other Asian countries. But a joint South Africa–China, CITES and Interpol co-operation has since 2014 led to the arrest of 400 poachers (Benjelloun 2015).

In 2015 China–South Africa Youth Volunteers Programme in Wildlife Conservation Forum convened in Pretoria. Together with the African Wildlife Foundation and the Aspen Institute, held a three–

day workshop in the Kruger National Park at which they demanded that wildlife issues (poaching and conservation) be included in the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation agenda of Johannesburg Action Plan. For China, collaborating with the continent on wildlife matters also serves as a source of knowledge and strengthens relations with Africa. In 2017 China closed its local ivory trade in solidarity with efforts to nip the poaching of African elephants in the bud (Staden, Alden and Wu 2018).

Arguably, some Chinese nationals poses a threat to tourism industry which generate much revenue to the South African economy and contribute immensely to the employment. Beyond that, rhino and elephant are sacred family totems in many African communities and define them for what they are (Ntseane 2011). The fact that those animals could become extinct threatens the wellbeing of these communities in South Africa.

BRICS and the African Agenda

Under Zuma South Africa strengthened its trade ties with BRICS countries. Doing so was necessitated by, among others, the 2011 uprisings in Libya. Though South Africa voted in favour of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 respectively, Zuma was very critical of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation actions which led to the ouster and ultimate assassination of Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan President (Landsberg 2012). Given that his foreign policy had been guided by the core founding principles outlined by Mandela, at that point in time Zuma's priorities were to align his actions with those of the African Union. The latter was calling for, among others, African solidarity in the face of Western onslaught (Alden and Wu 2016; Langa and Shai 2019).

When South Africa moved closer to BRICS it brought with it a foreign policy with an African Agenda. This is so because the country views itself as an integral part of the continent whose interests cannot be attained without stability and prosperity in Africa (Neethling 2017). South Africa has thus committed to pursue a foreign policy dedicated towards African renaissance and the removal of all remnants of colonialism (Neethling 2017; Monyae 2012; Hengari 2014). In BRICS, South Africa seeks to advance African regional integration (RI) by providing support to regional economic communities (REC) and New Partnership for African Development. It also seeks to promote peace through peace-making, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. For this purpose, it contributes troops to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) (DIRCO 2016; Landsberg 2012). The African Agenda is linked with South–South cooperation to ensure that the continent reaps benefits emanating from rapid economic growth (Monyae 2012; Hengari 2014). South Africa's BRICS membership is thus dedicated towards advancing national, regional, and continental interests (Abdenur and Folly 2017; Sidiropoulos et al 2018).

In line with this policy, when the 2013 BRICS Summit convened South Africa invited the Chairs of continental and regional institutions (Mthembu 2019). Held in South Africa, that 2013 Summit was accordingly themed “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration, and Industrialisation”. The Summit was therefore able to deliberate issues pertaining to infrastructure development, integration, and industrialisation with counterparts in Africa and on the African soil (Sidiropoulos et al 2018; Muresan 2019). These developments enabled South Africa to successfully lobby the BRICS New Development Bank to fund infrastructure on the continent. In 2017 a BRICS African regional centre was opened in Johannesburg for the purposes of, among others, providing the continent with the much-needed technical assistance and funding (Bertelsmann–scott, Friis and Prinsloo 2016; Mazenda and Ncwadi 2016).

BRICS New Development Bank

South Africa together with its other partners created a BRICS development bank in 2015. Among others, New Development Bank seeks;

- To reform the global financial institutions so that they respond timeously to the contemporary world. BRICS countries regard the current global institutions as outdated.
- To provide alternative funding mechanisms as traditional financial institutions are considered unfair to emerging economies (Abdenur 2014). Traditional international financial institutions seem unwilling or reluctant to fund infrastructure development in emerging markets (Qobo and Soko 2015), and
- To provide a more coordinated funding approach by BRICS states (Bertelsmann-scott, Prinsloo, Sidiripoulos, Wentworth and Wood 2016).

Another reason for the New Development Bank is to provide the world with new ideas. These differ from those enshrined in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Collectively BRICS countries are essentially opposed to Western hegemony and together advocate that individual countries should formulate their own policies independently instead of the one-size-fits-all model of the West (Mthembu 2019).

While BRICS New Development Bank no-strings attached policies provide an enabling environment for South Africa to use loans on its own terms or in a manner that is responsive to her development needs, implementing such policies in a colonial world order limits South Africa's growth potential. The latter should be understood in the context that South African growth and development objectives are tied to a transformed world order (Maloka 2019, and China and Russia are reluctant to support the inclusion of South Africa, Brazil, and India in the transformed United Nations Security Council (Maphaka 2020a). In this regard, South Africa, India, and Brazil acts like colonial subjects that respond more to the interests of China and Russia while their interests receive scant attention. The BRICS Outreach Dialogue which draws the African continent into BRICS Summits and the New Development Bank funding of the African infrastructure, enable China and Russia to draw the support of African countries in their multilateral engagements. Moreover, the no-strings attached policy advanced by the BRICS New Development Bank, provides an enabling environment for China and Russia to advance their alternative policies to those of the West in the Global South, including the African continent.

In agreement, Anthony *et al* (2015) indicates that the no-strings attached policy of the BRICS offers an alternative avenue to Western loans and development aid pretext as a tool of interference to advance Western neo-liberal policies in Africa and other parts of the Global South. With this, it is safe to argue that the New Development Bank is used by Russia in her endeavour to reclaim her erstwhile status and frustrate any threat from the West. Arguing on the BRICS New Development Bank, Hooijmaaijers (2021) asserts that the bank enables states such as Russia to evade sanctions imposed by the Western Europe countries and the United States of America. While other multilateral financial institutions cannot extend any loan to the sanctioned Russia, the country is receiving loans from the New Development Bank with the sanctions having no effect as the loans are extended through the local currency as opposed to the United States dollar. On the other hand, China is using the bank to advance her ambition of climbing to the peak of the globe.

The foregoing developments are corroborated by Besada and Tok (2014: 76) argument that "other countries, particularly China and Russia, are instrumentalizing the forum to get what they want out of African countries without formalizing the grouping's policies and effecting change to global

institutions at the global level, as was initially promised". Senona (2010: 10) underscores that "countries of the South, in particular African countries outside of IBSA and the BRIC, need to be circumspect when dealing with these emerging powers. Africa should ask probing questions and not take these alliances at face value, as these countries are strong, fast emerging economies already claiming a serious stake in global economic dominance". The presence of BRIC countries on the African continent is not largely driven by their wish to support development in the region. At the heart of their policy towards Africa is a strive to use the continent to advance their commercial interests, draw political and diplomatic support in the international community and multilateral institutions (Soko and Qobo 2016).

The implications of these developments are that South Africa and the African continent on its entirety remain what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) calls the net recipient of norms, rules, and policies crafted for them without them. The selective reform of the International Financial Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) advanced by China and Russia perpetuates coloniality that position South Africa, India, and Brazil on the margins of the asymmetrical globe dominated by Euro-American developed countries. This is so because the un-decolonised Council sustain the Western control, domination, and exploitation of the Global South, including the Africa continent. Majority of the Council missions are undertaken on the Global South particularly the African continent, thus their absence in the organ implies that their destiny is designed for them without them. The latter is supported by Carvalho, Gruzd and Mutangadura (2019) argument that majority of issues addressed by the United Nations Security Council are on the African continent. The continent stood at number 27 out of 53 regions that the United Nations Security Council had to deal with in 2018, hosting 14 United Nations Peacekeeping missions.

New Development Bank funds poverty alleviation and gas and biomass projects intended as alternative energy sources (Mazenda and Ncwadi 2016). It also funds traditional projects like hydroelectric dams and coal-fired power stations (Qobo and Soko 2015). In 2016, New Development Bank issued loans of up to \$6.1 trillion to member-states for the development of green energy sources. South African state-owned power utility (Eskom) received a loan of \$811 million to construct transmission lines to connect 500 megawatts of renewable energy produced by independent power producers (IPPs) to the national grid (Neethling 2017; Mthembu 2019). If done properly, the New Development Bank loan to Eskom could reduce loadshedding in South Africa (Bertelsmann-Scott et al 2016). Continental projects in which South Africa is involved and funded by the New Development Bank include the Grand Inga Dam meant to generate hydropower from the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Another New Development Bank funded project is the Lesotho Highlands water project intended to supply South Africa with water. The Mokolo water pipeline is intended to supply the Gauteng province with water (Bertelsmann-Scott et al 2016).

With South Africa being largely rural and her development being skewed in favour of urban areas, the absence of small-scale infrastructure projects on the New Development Bank perpetuates the unequal development patterns of colonial-apartheid regime. The net effects of these are that South African rural areas receive scant attention on national infrastructure development funding and alternative multilateral financial institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank. In view of the above, BRICS New Development Bank is delinked from the South African development disparities, and this limits its ability to respond to South Africa's development objectives. Apart from energy projects, South African rural areas are largely neglected in the projects funded by the New Development Bank. South African should develop and engage BRICS countries with a comprehensive Afrocentric policy that is informed by her interests, needs and problems including her development dynamics.

BRICS Think-Tanks Council

The foregoing idea is already evident in BRICS-Think-Tanks-Council (BTTC), established in 2013. BTTC was established among others,

- To conduct research pertaining to policymaking
- To make recommendations that guide the organisation (Mazenda 2016).

BTTC comprises of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) of Brazil, National Committee for BRICS Research (NRC BRICS) of Russia, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of India, China Centre for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa. For its part, the HSRC was mandated to oversee and finalise the establishment of BTTC long-term vision and strategy. It was further tasked with drafting the strategic vision of the African continent particularly on issues pertaining to global finance, economic and governance (Mazenda 2016). It promotes knowledge production and dissemination, included here is the student exchange program (BRICS 2015).

BRICS Business Council

Other BRICS institutions include the BRICS Business Council (BBC). It was established to advance and deepen business, trade, and investment relations amongst member-states by facilitating regular dialogue between business and governments of BRICS countries. Through these dialogues, problems and logjams are identified and remedies proposed. These measures are meant to deepen economic, trade and investment cooperation between BRICS states (Mazenda 2016).

BBC is composed of five (5) working groups tasked to address areas as infrastructure, manufacturing, financial services, energy and green economy and skills development. They also facilitate interaction between business communities. Among areas recommended for greater cooperation is agro-processing, manufacturing of value-added goods, sustainable development, and financial services. Through the BBC, member-states commit to cooperate with the African continent in areas as agro-processing, beneficiation, energy, development of infrastructure and skills (Mazenda 2016).

Conclusion

The article revisits South Africa-China relations during Zuma's administration to interrogate a question of whether the relationship is mutually beneficial or China benefit at the expense of South Africa. It established that China benefits more at the expense of South Africa and to some extent Pretoria is subsumed to Beijing foreign policy objectives. In this regard, South Africa's foreign policy principle of promoting human rights at home and abroad is relegated to the periphery, while "One China Policy" occupied the apex in the asymmetrical relations between the world second largest economy and Africa's second largest economy.

In her quests to change its development model with high-tech industries in the face of high labour costs, China relocates its labour-intensive industries to South Africa and the latter lead to de-industrialization of the South African economy. China contributes to the colonial project of destroying and marginalising South African indigenous languages, while promoting her languages in the global intellectual space through the exportation of her Mandarin to South Africa, while giving little attention to South African languages and cultural practices at home. The BRICS New Development Bank no-strings attached policies turns South Africa and the African continent on its entirety as a testing ground for alternative policies from China and Russia, while the much-needed reformed global order to stimulate growth and development on the continent is undermined by the

United Nations Security Council member states. Poaching by Chinese nations pose a to the identity of some African South African communities and the tourism industry which generates jobs and serves as a source of revenue to the economy.

Recommendations

South Africa should disentangle itself from Chinese colonial practices by monitoring and enforcing the implementation of agreements meant to reduce trade deficit. South Africa should complement the foregoing agreements by imposing quotas against Chinese manufactured goods and imported labour force. This will facilitate the transfer of skills and technology as well as the creation of employment promoted by South African development policies. South Africa should collaborate with China to incorporate her languages in the Chinese school curriculum. The recent introduction of Isizulu by Beijing Foreign Studies University through its Department of Zulu in 2019, has a potential to promote the South African languages. President Ramaphosa's administration should in this regard put more effort in ensuring that the Zulu language is integrated in other Universities across China and cultural practices of indigenous South Africans are introduced in the Chinese basic and higher education curriculum.

South Africa should join efforts with other African Union member states to draft an Afrocentric policy through which they will lobby BRICS Bank to fund their infrastructure in a manner that is in keeping with their development patterns. The South African national government should coordinate with rural provinces and their local governments to identify infrastructure projects that could be funded by the BRICS New Development Bank. On issues pertaining to global reform, an Afrocentric policy tailored to make the reform of the United Nations Security Council a priority and binding towards BRICS should be adopted. This will curb contradictory postures undertaken by China and Russia on the Council reform.

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An Afrocentric Criticism of World Systems Analysis as a Critical Theory in International Relations

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Abstract

In this research paper, authors provide a comprehensive overview and criticism of the World System Analysis (also read as World System theory). This central focus is driven by the need to bring about a fair and justifiable explanation of the theory and appreciation by examining the work critically as the most persuasive theory in international relations. The aim of this paper is to bring about world system analysis as the best tool in analysing the world politics, understanding world history and key reasons for imperialism, and why core countries such as the United States of America (USA), China and others, often intervene in world crises through grants and other forms of aid. The authors argue that the world system theory, unlike the dependency theory, is broader in perspective and place the world as a centre of attention in the analysis of the world economic distribution instead of the nation-state. Equally, it can also be deployed in understanding global inequality, dependency and power. The above argument which is achieved through the use of a qualitative approach that has taken the form of the adoption of secondary materials and the Afrocentric paradigm.

Keywords: World System Analysis, Dependency Theory, International Relations, Afrocentric paradigm.

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Introduction

Methodologically, this research paper has solely depended on secondary sources such as relevant journal papers, periodicals, books, and websites. The write up is made up of intellectuals' arguments and the authors' opinions. The latter's importance in studies of this nature finds an expression in the Afrocentric paradigm which is a theory that explains every aspect of research and/or education from the perspective of Africans as active participants rather than observers (Asante 2003), which is dismissive of the empty perceptual space between the researcher(s) and the researched (Shai, 2021). Despite the fact that there are multiple theories the authors could have chosen from, Afrocentricity was deemed the most suitable so to co-exist with its counterparts in explaining and analysing the subject under study.

However, there have been limitations during the operationalisation of the research for this paper. This should be understood within the context that in order to access some journals one needs to pay for subscription, and most of the existing and accessible written materials were vague. Thus, this hinders the progression of the reviewed literature. International Relations (IR) is an academic field of study which deals with the study of the interactions and relationships between actors (or participants) in the international system. These actors include states as principal actors and non-state actors including not limited to multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations (Danziger, 1997). Central to the study of IR are theories. A theory can be referred as

a well-crafted and relatively dependable set of ideas which is observable and is built on both logic and empirical grounds. IR as an academic discipline, employs many theories to analyse and/or make sense of different phenomena in the international political and economic system. These theories include but are not limited to: Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, and World Systems Theory (McGowan, 2002).

For this paper, we restrict our focus on the World Systems Analysis, also called World Systems Theory. We use relevant examples to provide a criticism of the theory. There is no theory that is free from criticism as long as academia is concerned, thus, the World-system theory is not an exception. Criticism is the systematic approach in which a work is examined or assessed using critical lenses. Thus, the word criticism simply means to appreciate and examine critically a literary work, and it does not have to be 'to criticise'. This paper is aimed to provide fitting definitions of the theory by scholars; the key assumptions or arguments of World Systems Analysis, the main features of the theory, and to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the theory. For us to enhance a better picture of the theory, we compare it with another Critical Theory (which means any approach to social philosophy that places attention on reflective assessment and criticism of culture and society) of IR, the Dependency Theory. Additionally, we look at the scholarly criticism of the World Systems Theory. Furthermore, we examine the theory in IR by looking at its implications in the field. To conclude, we take positions on the key arguments of the theory.

Before we can delve into the gist of this paper, we deem it necessary to give a disclaimer that we (authors of this paper) are all Africans by blood and by geographic location. We unapologetically enter into this discourse as Africans and our understanding of the phenomena studied herein is in a way affected by our identity. We do not seek to present our word on this subject as the last one. Ours is one among many voices and it should be allowed to co-exist with others if epistemic justice is to be realised (Shai, 2021). While critics of this paper may regard this disclaimer as an act of intellectual arrogance, the basis for this epistemic and ontological standpoint has been echoed by many decolonial Afrocentric scholars including Asante (2003), Mazama (2003), Shai and Zondi (2020).

The Emergence of International Relations (IR)

IR as an academic discipline emerged out of the aftermath of the first World War in Europe. All the notable European intellectuals went on to explore the causes and repercussions of the most catastrophic war ever encountered. Most of them were oriented historically such as David Wight, FH Hinsley and Edward H Carr whom all argued that the international society notion had long been held by major European powers although had been disrupted in the course of the 20th century and that has been the cause of the war (Bull 1977). Overcoming the isolationism and idealism that characterised the United States of America (USA) during the early part of the 20th century, American scholars started to produce scholarly works that initiated the classics of IR genre in the 1940s and 1950s. Both Internationalism and Realism became the central modes of American international affairs and thinking by the 1940s. These scholars include Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers and George Liska who were the first representatives (Morgenthau 1978, Wolfers 1962 and Liska 1977). This time characterized the production of empirical and system examinations of IR. The study of IR did not only cover inter-state relations but also anything that took place outside the USA. All in all, Americans did dominate the IR field during in the 1950s (Hoffmann 1995). The dominance of Americans was shown by the salient throughout the world of the USA publications *World Politics* and *Foreign Affairs*; journals which represented the policy-oriented establishment and academic establishment unitarily (Hoffmann 1995). The following section of the research paper focuses on World Systems analysis.

The World Systems Analysis

This analysis is derived from several disciplines to try to examine world history and the underpinnings of social change. It is centered on the entire world as a unit or world-system but not individual states for its analysis. However, Cartwright (2018: online) argues that “both imperialism and World System Theory involve a state-capital nexus or some kind that places states in the centre of the analyses.” According to Cartwright, they both describe a territorial division of the world based on an order of local economies. To the World Systems theorists, there exists a world economic system in which some countries gain benefits while others are being exploited. It is basically a political approach which tries to solve the economic developmental problems found in the developing countries. It suggests that wealthy countries benefit from other countries through exploitative means, without which, they (the wealthy nation-states) will not reach their levels of development (Shai, 2016).

The World Systems Analysis originated from Immanuel Wallerstein, a sociologist. Wallerstein (1974) quoted in Martinez-Vela (2001:4) who defines a world-system as a “multicultural territorial division of labour in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants.” For him, a country’s economic development is determined by how it is integrated into the capitalist world system. According to some scholars, World Systems Analysis is a theory (Danziger, 1997; McGowan, 2002). But Sorinel (2010) opines that “World-systems analysis is not a theory, but an approach to social analysis and social change developed, among others by the Immanuel Wallerstein.” The author went further to explain the three domains of world-systems analysis Wallerstein relays and they are: the historical development of the modern world-system; the contemporary crisis of the capitalist world-economy; the structures of knowledge. Wallerstein, in his interviews and publications, has shown contention against the concept of a “Third World”, and he claims that there exists only one world connected by a complex network of economic exchange relationship (Sorinel, 2010).

Wallerstein quoted in Sorinel (2010:221), posits that:

A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism; in that, it has a lifespan over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others...

From the foregoing, one can argue that the world-system is just like the human body. It has numerous parts that have to work together to sustain a balance. All the parts depend on one another for survival. For Martinez-Vela (2001: online), “There are three major intellectual building blocks of world-system theory as conceived by Wallerstein: The Annales school, Marx, and dependency theory.” The theory gets its historical approach from this school, which had Fernand Braudel as its key proponent. He as well gets methodological strategy from the school. From Karl Marx, Wallerstein learned five important issues: the basic reality of social conflict among materially based human groups; the concern with a relevant totality; the transitory nature of social forms; the centrality of the accumulation process and competitive class struggles that result from it; a dialectical sense of the notion through conflict and contradiction (Martinez-Vela, 2001). To the dependency theory, the author argues that, World Systems Theory is an adaptation. According to him, Wallerstein draws a lot from the dependency theory, especially its focus on understanding the “periphery” and “core”.

Authors gave a historical background of World Systems Analysis (also called a theory by some). Chase-Dunn and Grell-Brisk (2019) say that, “The world-system perspective emerged during the world revolution of 1968 when social scientists contemplated the meaning of Latin American dependency

theory for Africa.” They give credit to Immanuel Wallerstein, Terence Hopkins, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, and Giovanni Arrighi for having divergent views about the world system perspective. For them, the modern world-system is a self-contained unit based on territorial differentiated division of labour and joined together by a world market. This world market is designed, controlled, and dominated by technologically advanced states (core states) who exploit poor states found in the periphery. Subsequently, the states in the core do employ all means necessary to maintain the status quo (Shai 2016).

World-system theorists do not refute the existence of divisions in the world, however; they believe the best way to understand the world’s divisions is by looking at them as a unit. They opine that the most significant primary unit of social constraint and social decision-making is their theory instead of the traditional modes of analysis.

The term world-system is synonymous with the term ‘capitalist world-economy’. Based on the German word *Weltwirtschaft*, it refers to an entity within whose boundaries there is a single overarching division of labor but which in fact includes a number of separate state structures. This entity, according to world-system theorists, is a historical system whose structures operate at different level from any existing political unit (Griffiths, O’Callaghan, & Roach, 2014:372).

The trio also relay that the World-systems theorists were by radical dependency theorists and Immanuel Wallerstein, the theory’s pioneer, located its origins in what he called ‘the longest sixteenth century’ 1450 to 1670.

The main area of focus of World Systems Analysis is the world economy which is dominated by rich, powerful, industrialised and technologically-advanced states. The theorists divided the world into three groups: the *core*; the *periphery*; the *semi-peripheries*. According to Griffiths, O’Callaghan & Roach (2014: online),

The core of the world-system refers to those regions that benefited most from change. In the initial expansion, this included most of northwestern Europe (France, England, and Holland). The region was characterized by strong central governments and large mercenary armies. The latter enabled the bourgeoisie to control international commerce and extract economic surplus from trade and commerce.

Essentially, the core countries used their mercenary armies to advance their expansionists agenda to control more territories and use those territories for trading activities (Shai, 2016). One would realize that most of those states that were conquered for more markets were found in Africa and Asia. Capital is always located within the core of the world-system and core countries benefit the most from the capitalist world economy. Basically, core countries are dominant capitalist states that exploit peripheral states for labour and raw materials. For instance, the United States of America (USA), Britain, France, and Germany exploit African countries. This is because these core countries do not only own most of the world’s capital and technology but they also have a lot of control over world trade and economic agreements (e.g. GATT). They are also the cultural centers which attract artists and intellectuals from different parts of the world (Shai, 2021).

Like the dependency theory, world systems analysis has a second group called the periphery. Peripheral countries are largely dependent on core countries for capital, and they have underdeveloped industries to produce commodities for the global market. A very good majority of peripheral countries are in Africa and Asia. These countries have low wages, are less industrialised, poorly urbanized, have low literacy rates, not technologically-advanced, and are usually agrarian.

For Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach (2014: online), the periphery refers to “regions lacking strong central governments, dependent on coercive rather than wage labor, and whose economies depend on the export of raw materials to the core.” European imperialism and colonialism created these peripheral states. They killed, enslaved, and exploited people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. By and large, the destitution, poverty, underdevelopment, and plight of countries in the periphery are caused by the core countries that cannot maintain their economic dominance in the world without their exploitative agenda (Shai 2016). Despite the fact that these peripheral countries own most of the world's natural and mineral resources, they lack the industries to process them. All they do is provide the raw materials and cheap labour to the core countries. Sorinel (2010: 222) records that “The core expropriated much of the capital surplus generated by the periphery through unequal trade relations.”

Immanuel Wallerstein, the foremost proponent of the World Systems Analysis, gave *semi-peripheries* as his third region. Countries found in this zone can be geographically located in the core but are on the process of relative decline, or they can include rising economies in the periphery (Griffiths, O'Callaghan, & Roach, 2014). Like the peripheral states, semi-peripheral states are also exploited by the core states. However, the semi-peripheral countries in turn take advantage of the periphery. It is like the game of the jungle, survival of the fittest. Generally, the semi-periphery serves as a buffer between the other two regions (core and periphery). Countries that rose from the periphery to meet the standards of the semi-periphery include: Russia, Brazil, Brussel, Malaysia, China, Singapore, South Korea (which are said to have advanced to the Core), and South Africa (Dunn, Kawana & Brewer, 2000). Portugal and Spain are amongst the few that lost their positions at the core. Thus, this shows that the permanent seats in the Core are reserved only for countries that maintain their economic power and influence.

The World Systems Analysis also talks about *unequal exchange*, as coined by Wallerstein. To him this term refers to “the systematic transfer of surplus from semi-proletarian sectors in the periphery to the high-technology, industrialized core” (Sorinel, 2010: 223). As a consequence, this leads to capital accumulation at a global scale. The surplus or profit provides the necessary finance required to enhance development in the core countries.

The world system theorists also maintain that the capitalist world-economy is characterized by four key contradictions. For them, these contradictions will eventually lead to the demise of the capitalist world-economy though it has global dominance after the collapse of USSR and the end of the Cold War (Griffiths, O'Callaghan, & Roach, 2014). These contradictions are so serious that they will exterminate the world capitalist economy. The trio state the contradictions as: a continuing imbalance between supply and demand leading to perpetual mechanization and commodification; a further production of surplus requires a mass demand that can only be met by redistributing the surplus; there are limits to the extent to which the state can co-opt employees to maintain the legitimacy of the capitalist system; it impedes attempts to develop greater cooperation to counter systemic crisis. These contradictions may be plausible but the capitalist world-economy is stronger than ever. Today, the capitalist world-economy is more global than ever before (Shai, 2016).

World Systems Analysis and Exploitation in the Market-Economy

For the world systems theorists, the world market-economy is all about exploitation. They are of the belief that, the core countries such as USA, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, etc. are exploiting the natural resources of peripheral countries like The Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, and all other poor developing states, mostly found in Africa and Latin America.

Core countries also use their control of international law and international financial institutions like World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to advance their economic policies in both peripheral and semi-peripheral states. While the IMF mainly give excruciating and high interest loans to peripheral countries, the World Bank give conditional grants to these countries. By and large, the core countries use the very financial institutions that they designed and established to promote their economic policies and financial interests all over the world. One must not view these international institutions to be independent from the control of powerful states; rather, they are used as vehicles to implement the national interests of these powerful core countries. According to Cartwright (2018: online), we have:

an international economic order governed by rules established by states, and which benefit commercial interests. These interests are highly profitable and located in the most powerful states. This creates a hierarchy, or world system, concentrating high-value add, profitable and innovative industry in the core.

The current international economic order is said to be dictated by the so-called core countries, who use them to exploit the peripheral countries. Thus, these so-called core countries own all the industries that control the global economy. Without any doubt, the IMF and World Bank are subjected to the dominance of the great powers, the USA and Europe who are core exploitative countries. For many years in the past and even in present times, the relationship between the core and the periphery is that of the exploiter and the exploited. Cartwright (2018: online) argues that “The economies of the core specialize in heavy manufacturing, whilst those in the periphery supply the core with raw materials and commodities—which provide low returns and few prospects for industrialization, maintaining periphery economies in a state of underdevelopment.” This is the point, peripheral countries such as South Africa (diamonds), Ghana (gold), Guinea (uranium) and Nigeria (oil) have the minerals resources needed to industrialize and develop their countries. However, all they do is extract the raw materials and export to manufacturing core countries who process them with added value.

Furthermore, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are also used by core states to promote their financial interests. For example, Apple, Samsung, Toyota, Techno, BMW, Mercedes Benz and other MNCs and TNCs are not as independent as they pretend to. Their states use them to implement their economic policies abroad (Shai, 2016). For Cartwright (2018: online), “it does not make sense to think of MNCs and states as working independently towards distinct international interests. States want to help their MNCs be globally dominant and will seek to set the rules of the international order to facilitate this. Implying that the core states host MNCs and industries that dominate world markets and concentrate wealth in their host states.”

This exploitative relationship does not stop at the core and periphery. There is also an exploitative bond between the semi-periphery and the periphery. Semi-peripheral countries like China exploit peripheral countries like Zambia, Kenya, The Gambia, and Ethiopia. For the past many years, the Chinese have been exploiting the natural and mineral resources of peripheral countries, particularly those in Africa (Rapanyane & Shai 2019; Rapanyane & Sethole 2020). China’s exploitative engagement could be attested in the case of Sri Lanka. The latter lost her port to China; thus, many other African countries are highly indebted to China. Through their concessional loans and benevolent grants, they are able to – through their companies – extract priceless resources in the continent. In addition, the Chinese has infested Africa with their low-quality commodities (Rapanyane & Sethole 2020). Today, Chinese businesses virtually dominate all African countries. The same exploitative trend is followed by other semi-peripheral countries like India in Africa.

It is also important to emphasize that the core countries developed and industrialized their economies through protectionism and subsidies. Despite their campaign for liberal economic practices, these core states protect theirs (Shai, 2016). Economic core powers like the USA give huge protections to their technology companies thus giving them an edge over others. The EU provides subsidies to its farmers which give them a competitive advantage. Therefore, the produce of European farmers become cheaper compared to others. The core states employ the very rules they crafted at the levels of World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to manipulate and exploit other semi-peripheral and peripheral countries of the world. These rules were programmed to benefit these core countries. Consequently, the peripheral countries are at a disadvantaged position as far as international trade is concerned. Recently, we have seen the huge trade war between the USA (core) and China (semi-periphery) due to alleged unfair trade. The WTO which is supposed to adjudicate the trade war is controlled by core countries led by the USA (Vlados, 2020).

Strengths of the World-Systems Theory

There are various positively praises given to the theory. These praises portray the strengths of the theory. Amongst them are:

- For instance, according to Gowan (2004), the theory of World-System Analysis is significantly pivotal in understanding world history and the key reasons for imperialism and also why core countries such as USA normally intervene in world crises through grants and other forms of aids.
- Unlike the dependency theory, the world-system theory looks at development in a broader perspective, and also it makes the world as the centre of focus in analysing the world economic distribution rather than the nation-state. Thus, it can be the best theory to use in explaining global inequality, dependency and power.

Weaknesses of the World-Systems Theory

In Wallerstein own words, he had said in one of his pieces, there are four major categories of schools of thought that are used to critique the world-systems approach and these are: the positivists, the orthodox Marxists, the state autonomists, and the culturalists. (Wallerstein, 2004).

- As for the positivists, their position against the world-system theory is its deficiency such as having no systematic approach, being qualitative and not being quantitative, and being too general. This criticism does not hold in an Afrocentric paradigm, which rejects the binary standing of knowledge as either qualitative or quantitative (Maserumule, 2011)
- The orthodox Marxists has criticised the world-system analysis for ignoring the importance of social class, which is a key principle of the Marxists, thus to them, this has made Wallenstein and other proponents to be too far deviating.
- The third one is the autonomists; they believe that, Wallenstein, in the theory of World-systems, has blurred the boundaries between state and businesses.
- In addition, the culturalists also criticised the World systems for making little or no consideration about culture, but solely concentrates its argument or discourse on economy. Even though these theorists have critiqued and criticised the World system theory or analysis, according to Wallerstein, these theorists are rather myopic, limiting and defective (Wallerstein, 2004).

The world-systems theory has been criticised for its explanation about the relationship between the core and the periphery. According to Wallerstein and co-proponents, the periphery is responsible for supplying raw materials to the core which makes the core get economically stronger and the periphery economically weaker. It is argued that, the core did not exploit the periphery but it developed more sophisticated machine and technologies which merit them for a better products and stronger economies. This can be attested in (Chilot, 1982), he argued that, ‘the development of the West (core) in the 19th century was based more on research labs than in raw materials or labor in the colonies (periphery).’ From the above assertion, the authors are directly indicating that the position made by Wallerstein is incorrect and illogical.

Furthermore, in another voice of Trinchcombe (1982), he argued that the World system theory is rather ambiguous and vague in argument. He further stated that Wallenstein has not done much in explicitly explaining his concepts such as core, periphery, and semi-periphery; thus, making the theory too general. He said, “it is not clear that there is a coherent and determined pattern of growth toward a final world system with defined characteristics so that one could have a theory of the growth of world capitalism.”

Differences Between the Dependency Theory and the World-Systems Analysis

Though the World-systems theory or approach is said to be inspired by the dependency theory, there are various differences between the two theories based on how they believe development should be approached. The lenses they use in analyzing differ even though there are similarities in terms of concepts. According to Reyes (2001), there are five main differences:

- According to the dependency theory, the unit of analysis is the nation-state level, whilst the world-system analysis looks at it in a different perspective, as for them, the unit system of analysis is the world.
- Secondly, looking at their methodologies, the dependency theory employs the structural-historical model, whilst the world-systems analysis deploys the historical dynamics of world system in its cyclical rhythms and secular trends.
- Another explicit difference is that, the dependency theory uses a bimodal (core and periphery) as its theoretical structure, whilst the world-system theory uses a trimodal (core, semi-periphery, and periphery) as its theoretical structure.
- In addition, the dependency theory opines that, the direction of development is hazardous as the core exploits the periphery, whilst the world-system theorists differ in opinion, they believe that there is a chance for the periphery to grow to the level of semi-periphery and the semi periphery to reach the core; this can be realised in the case of China.
- Finally, the dependency theorists focus mainly on the periphery during their research; unlike the dependency theorists, the world-system theorists look at the relationship between the core and the periphery and also the semi periphery and the periphery. Therefore, the dependency believes that the core exploit only the periphery, but the world-system theorists argue that the core exploit both the periphery and the semi periphery, and in turn, the semi periphery also exploits the periphery and that can be realized in the aspect of China in Africa.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we believe that the world-system analysis is the best tool we can use in analysing the world politics and the most persuasive theory in IR. It can be best used in explaining global inequality, dependency, and power. The theory is a trimodal: the core, semi periphery, and the periphery. Unlike the dependency theory, the world-system theory looks at development in a broader perspective, and it makes the world as the centre of focus in analysing the world economic distribution rather than the nation-state. The theory has also demonstrated the uneven distribution of wealth or development in the world. It shows that even though the periphery can break through, but the periphery has to depend on the core for economic support like a father and a child. Of course, this form of dependency has threatened the so-called peripheral states' sovereignties, which can be evident in the Gambia when it withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations, it was economically sanctioned by United Kingdom of Britain (UK), and this is a threat for most African countries. Thus, the relationship between the core and the periphery only mirrors exploitation and coercion.

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
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Kwame Nkrumah and the Pan-African Ideal

Debates and Contestation

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In this book of 10 Chapters, the author lays bare inconvenient truths in the general thought, policy, and strategic African environment that has degraded both the lineage and legacy of Pan-Africanism. The inconvenient truths bear no hubris and arrogance by the author but are in essence meant to be at once emancipatory and provocative. As such, the chapters move us beyond facile reductionism and superficial exegesis and help us to confront serious dilemmas whose various interwoven chapter axes and points of reference draw their inspiration from a reflective temperament and enquiring disposition that is often lacking in current forms and modalities of scholarship on similar subjects and themes.

It is important to note in this regard that the critical quest for African unity and integration is often lost in the interplay and interstices of a highly bureaucratized, unimaginative, and linear governance regime.

This explains why current regional and continental institutional, strategic, and policy dynamics are totally devoid of a Pan-African philosophical anchor, even though there are often rhetorical genuflections to honour the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism. Therefore, there is little to suggest that sufficient intellectual attention is devoted to the relevance of an appropriate philosophical *gestalt* that is rooted in the historicity which provided the normative and political vectors for Pan-African thought and practice. As such, across the African landscape, there is a glaring absence of an alternate African-centric epistemology and ontology that can provide a safe and secure mooring from the high seas of chronic instability, conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment.

This book is thus a welcome and salutary corrective to a neglected area of interrogative study and critical enquiry; indeed, its publication comes at an appropriate juncture when Africa's existential landscape is being buffeted by a variety of centrifugal forces, both internally and externally. Compounded by a *de facto* dysfunctional interstate system and carrying all the patrimonial pathologies of the post-colonial state, Africa seems ill prepared to deal with the continental and global intersections of the viral storm unleashed by the Covid-19 pandemic, rising military tensions and religious extremism, external trade and aid dependence, disruptive trade and commercial relations, environmental degradation, increasing poverty, atavistic forms of ethnicity and nationalism, as well as conflict and political instability.

How the Horsemen of the Apocalypse can be kept at bay is another question, but this book is a timely invitation to reconsider and rethink the current obstacles and hurdles to African unity and integration based on the progressive and pathbreaking insights of Kwame Nkrumah, the widely recognised architect and doyen of Pan-African thought and practice. In Chapter 1, the author brings into stark

relief the tendentious and highly partisan attempts to discredit and distort Nkrumah's thinking about the norms, values, and practices that ought to underpin Pan-African unity and integration. The author's analytical tour and cogent critique are useful antidotes to setting the record straight. In this vein, he demonstrates that conceptually and philosophically, Nkrumah insisted that Pan-Africanism is very much a political project in a rhythmic logic from which all else will and must flow. From this simple yet elegant premise there originate the important and enduring derivatives of self-reliance, self-rule, autonomous agency, a functional and accountable state system, a transcendent African identity, and a secure and prosperous Africa.

This Nkrumahist foundation developed in Chapter 1 is critical for the architecture and organisation of the rest of the book and its *leitmotif* of highlighting the nature of debates, the war of intellectual and academic positions, and the shifting nature of the Pan-African discursive canon, in both its historical and contemporary manifestations. The *leitmotif* is further motivated and informed by careful and meticulous scholarship and research that teases out in dialectical fashion the political struggles, ideological antagonisms, and instrumental interests among the major protagonists in Africa and internationally.

Against this backdrop, there is a unity between Chapters 2 to 5 in terms of the interpretive compass which navigates major philosophical and indeed, ontological issues regarding how to understand the nature of continental integration and how this could be driven by the binaries of political and economic factors; and which set of factors then enjoy primacy in the Nkrumahist configuration? This opens the analytical door for the author to revisit debates about how Africa could be united in the context of a borderless continent, either as a United States of Africa or an African Union Government. The desultory progress and the stultifying ambivalence of Africa's political leaders towards these notions leads the author to a serious critique of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a failed blueprint for continental integration so much so that it has been reduced to an administrative arm of the African Union.

In Chapters 6 and 7 respectively, we encounter the intellectual influence and pedigree of Mbita Chitala and Claude Ake for their formative contributions to the Pan-African ideal and canon. In the case of the Zambian Chitala, it was all about keeping Pan-Africanism alive by pointedly showing how it was being undermined by morally reprobate and politically compromised African heads of state. There is a nice synergy between how the author explains Chitala's ideas and his sensitive treatment in Chapter 7 of the Nigerian Claude Ake's deep ruminations and concerns about the state of democracy and development in Africa. Ake's major work on the subject was written in the 1990s, but as the chapter cogently demonstrates, the struggles and challenges which he highlighted at that time continue to constrain the twin stimuli that democracy and development can provide for African unity and integration.

In Chapter 8, the author wrestles with the question of NATO intervention in Libya and the duplicitous role played by the US and France in the demise of the Gaddafi regime. At first blush, this chapter seems to sit uncomfortably with the rest, but on further reflection it raises salient and first-order questions about imperial overstretch and neo-colonial manipulation which has historically contaminated the Pan-African ideal, often with the collaboration and connivance of Africa's political leadership. Based on the ambiguities of sovereignty and how, in Libya's case, this was violated with impunity and with disastrous consequences, Chapter 9 raises dilemmas about the national question and how articulations of nationalism, leadership, and identity reverberate in Africa's strategic integration environment, with specific reference to case studies of the DRC and Angola.

Finally, this book cannot be taken lightly. It is demanding to read because of the breadth, depth, and scale of its scholarship. Because of this, there will be readers who will find much to applaud

in the book's pages; but equally, there will be those who will find that there is much to argue with. However, that is the intrinsic value of the book because its primary intention is to be an incubator of debate and contestation of an enduring historical and contemporary subject which has different intellectual lineages, ideological proclivities, and interpretive traditions. Whichever side the reader may fall, ultimately this book should be considered as both a backward- and forward-looking teleological journey as will be discovered in the final Chapter 10 where the ends, goals, and purpose of Nkrumah's original vision of Pan-Africanism bring conclusions and recommendations together.

This book has obviously had a long gestation period and should be welcomed as an important contribution to a stagnating subject. Indeed, on the first page of the Introduction, author states the book's objective as follows: "This work attempts to be an excellent piece of academic work". In this reviewer's opinion, it certainly succeeds in that quest.

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
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No Linear Path to Liberation

A Comment on the Political Biography of H. Selby Msimang

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Introduction

In May 2019, South Africa held the sixth general elections for national and provincial government since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Following a trend that began in 2004, electoral support for the ruling African National Congress (ANC) declined and for the first time fell under the 60% mark. Lying behind the decline in its electoral fortunes were myriad factors including general public perception that associated ANC rule with corruption and incompetence in governance. The results also demonstrated that the political sheen that it (the ANC) had acquired for the role it played in the struggle for democracy and liberation in South Africa had started to wear off. With that, the political narrative that the ANC had propagated so effectively, which characterised South African politics, especially in the black camp, as having been divided between heroes who fought the good fight and

villains who collaborated with the oppressive apartheid system was also being contested.

In the midst of this contestation and relook of South African political history, Sibongiseni Mkhize published in 2019 a political biography of Henry Selby Msimang. As Mkhize points out in the introduction, Msimang was a founding member of the ANC in 1912, which was followed by decades of involvement at the forefront of South African politics and public life for seven decades. Despite this impressive history of participation in the country's political and civic life, Msimang, as his biographer notes, has become 'a figure of neglect, who hardly features at all in the grand historical narrative of South Africa's liberation' (Mkhize, 2019: 1). Mkhize seeks to make amends for this neglect by giving an insightful and impressive account of a public life of one of the most enigmatic political figures of South Africa's 20th century politics. I use the word enigmatic to underscore the complexity of Msimang's long career in public life. Having begun his career when African nationalism was forged and solidified in Bloemfontein in 1912, Msimang's long history of political involvement saw him abandoning the ANC to become a founding member of the Liberal Party in the early 1950s, which was followed two decades later by yet another political turn to Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha in which he was both founder and high ranking member from the 1970s until his death in 1982. Mkhize provides various explanations for these political zigzags, some convincing and some not so convincing. I discuss these explanations and other issues in the remainder of the review.

Structure and Themes of Discussion

The primary focus of Mkhize's book is Msimang's long career in public life. It follows a chronological order of his political career, starting with his involvement in the ANC from its founding in 1912, an

event he attended as probably the youngest participant. Mkhize provides an insightful account of his subject's participation in various structures of and activities organized by the ANC, including serving as a member of a committee that raised funding to send a deputation to England to protest the 1913 Natives Land Act. When Msimang and his young family lived in the town of Bloemfontein between 1917 and 1921, he got himself involved by leading various community struggles. His civic activism exposed him to the plight that workers in Bloemfontein faced, which resulted in his active engagement in their struggles. For his leadership in community and labour struggles, Msimang was imprisoned in Bloemfontein—apparently his first taste of the state repressive measures directed at those who were considered to be challenging the existing social and political order at the time. Realising that worker struggles could succeed only if they were organized into strong trade unions, Msimang became one of the founder members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU).

Judging by Mkhize's account, Msimang's active public life in Bloemfontein did not stop him from getting involved in the politics of the ANC. On the contrary, he utilized the experience he gained in trade unionism to become the ANC's spokesperson on labour and economic matters during the 1920s and 1930s. Mkhize discusses this period in Msimang's political life in chapter 4 of the book. Chapter 5, titled 'Native Representation', addresses African opposition to abolition of the Cape black franchise, which ended in defeat with enactment of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936. Like a number of prominent leaders of the ANC in the 1930s, Msimang waged his opposition to the so-called Hertzog Bills as a leading member of the All Africa Convention (AAC). When the opposition to the so-called Hertzog Bills (in which the Representation of Natives Act was a major part) failed and new forms of African representation in the national legislature were established, Msimang, like other African leaders, participated fully in those structures, including standing to be elected as members of the Native Representative Council (NRC). It was during this period (late 1930s to the 1950s) that Msimang's political involvement shifted to the Natal province, where he struck a political partnership with Allison Wessels George Champion. As Mkhize demonstrates in chapters 5 and 6 of the book, Msimang used his political relationship with Champion to gain a foothold in the politics of Natal, which led to his election as secretary of the ANC in the province as well as a member of the NRC.

It was while serving as leader of the ANC in the province that he came to terms with the fraught relations between Africans and Indians in Durban, which ultimately exploded to violent conflict in January 1949. In chapter 8 of the book, Mkhize discusses the ANC's Programme of Action. Although (or perhaps because of) inspired by the Congress Youth League, the Programme of Action deeply divided its leaders, including those from Natal. Some, like Champion, were opposed strongly to the Programme of Action, while others such as Msimang, Mkhize explains, worried about timing of its implementation. Msimang's ambiguous position in respect to the Programme of Action—supporting it but cautioning against timing of its implementation, caught up with him later on. When the Congress Youth League leaders such as Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu started to implement it in earnest by staging popular protests, Msimang abandoned the ANC and joined those who had decided to found the Liberal Party in 1953. Mkhize's explanation for his subject's political 'flip-flopping', which led to his departure is that he (Msimang) was repelled by the influence the Communist Party had on the ANC.

The last three chapters of the book address two main subjects: first, Msimang's defection to the Liberal Party in the 1950s, and secondly, his move to Inkatha in the early 1970s. Chapter 11 pulls together various strands in the book into a conclusion. In this concluding chapter, Mkhize concedes to the fact that Msimang's long political career was marked by contradictions and ambiguities. Msimang, Mkhize argues, should not be judged by the contradictions and ambiguities. If anything,

the contradictions should be expected of someone who ‘traversed the length and breadth of South Africa’s political spectrum and embraced at various times different, often competing, forms of African nationalism’ (Mkhize, 2019: 205). The zigzags in his political career also challenge the “idea of an ‘unbreakable thread’ in the struggle for justice or a suggestion that there is a system or structure in the manner in which political figures pursue their paths, particularly in the struggle for liberation” (ibid.). Though contradictory and ambiguous, Msimang’s long life in politics was defined, as the title of the book suggests, by a politics of principle and pragmatism.

The argument and evidence

One of the main contributions that Mkhize’s book makes to the historiography of the liberation struggle in South Africa is that it tells the story of someone whose political career is difficult to fit into the Manichean narrative of political heroes and villains; those who fought against the apartheid system on one hand and those who collaborated with it on the other hand. In this detailed political biography, Mkhize demonstrates that there was no ‘unbreakable thread’ (p. 205) in the struggle for justice. Msimang’s complex political career, he contends, ‘defies the idea of a linear path taken with a conscious sense of direction and purpose’ (ibid.). Although he followed a convoluted route, Msimang’s political choices, Mkhize contends, were motivated and driven by unwavering fidelity to principle and shaped by pragmatism. This is the theme that runs through the book. It is what gives it coherence.

While this consistent theme is admirable, at times Mkhize uses it to explain away his subject’s inconsistencies and political choices that appear unprincipled. One subject in which Mkhize appears to make excuses for Msimang’s controversial political choices concerns his participation in the ‘Native Representative’ structures that were created through the Representation of Natives Act of 1936. The Act abolished the Cape black franchise and replaced with a system of indirect representation of Africans in the legislature. The indirect representation came into two main forms. The first was election of certain white people to represent Africans in the Senate. The second was establishment of the Natives Representative Council (NRC), which was an advisory body to which a number of Africans was elected. Members of the NRC, referred rather fancily as MRCs, met with representatives of the government, drawn mostly from the Native Affairs department, to give advice on matters that affected Africans. Though initially opposed to abolition of the Cape black franchise and the NRC, Msimang argued for participation in the indirect system of representation when the law was passed. Although he was not alone in calling for participation in the NRC after opposing it, Mkhize presents this significant change in political position as another instance of his subject’s pragmatism. Even when political opinion inside the ANC turned strongly against continued participation in the NRC, Msimang went ahead to stand for election as a member of the NRC in 1948. Mkhize explains away this political ‘flip-flopping’ by his subject as his views evolving in a ‘curiously hybrid direction’ (Mkhize, 2019: 85).

Another subject on which Mkhize tries to justify his subject’s controversial political choices concerns his shift from the African nationalism of the ANC to the liberalism of the Liberal Party and all the way to the Zulu nationalism of Inkatha, which was his final political home. Even for a politician well known for his legendary pragmatism, this political versatility is breathtaking. Mkhize resorts once again to his subject’s long history of pragmatism to explain his decision to become a founding member of Inkatha. He contends that the decision ‘was yet another example of his [Msimang’s] lifelong pragmatism, influenced by the political conditions of the time’ (Mkhize, 2019: 183). Mkhize presents Msimang’s decision to join Inkatha as if it was the only political choice available to him. However, the truth of the matter is that there were other choices, including not participating in politics at all since the ANC had been banned and the Liberal Party dissolved. It is not as if the only

option available to him, for instance, was political exile even though some leaders of the liberation movement chose this difficult route.

There are other points in the book that are debatable. These include Mkhize's analysis of Msimang's relationship with Champion. In recounting the story of their turbulent political relationship, Mkhize clearly takes his subject's side despite available evidence that points to a more complex relationship. As Mkhize correctly points out, Msimang's entrance into Natal politics happened only in the early 1940s when he relocated to the province. When he arrived in the province in the early 1940s, he found that the ANC that had long been dominated by John Langalibalele Dube and his allies was starting to be contested by Champion in anticipation of Dube's retirement. It is worth repeating the point Mkhize makes in the book, which is that Msimang did not have a political base in Natal when he arrived there. This was despite his many decades of public life, which was concentrated mainly in national politics as well as in provinces such as the Free State where he once lived. Champion proved critical in facilitating Msimang's transition into the quarrelsome politics of Natal. It is inconceivable to imagine Champion appointing Msimang as the provincial secretary of the ANC in 1945 and reappointing him to the same position in the late 1940s if he [Champion] thought their positions on important political matters were opposed radically. And yet, Mkhize claims 'Msimang was uncompromising about his belief in following ANC resolutions' (Mkhize, 2019: 145). This statement implies that Champion was not. The cause of their political fallout in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Mkhize suggests, should be attributed primarily to a conservative Champion refusing to abide by the decision of the ANC to implement the 1949 Programme of Action on one hand and Msimang's principled stance to implement ANC's resolutions on the other hand. This interpretation is suspect to say the least. Moreover, Msimang's own record in abiding by resolutions of the ANC is not impressive. For instance, when the ANC asked its leaders to withdraw from participating in the NRC, Msimang defied it by maintaining his membership. Mkhize does not explain the circumstances under which his subject abided by ANC resolutions and those in which he decided the principle of abiding by his party's decisions was not relevant.

A point that is related to Msimang's fallout with Champion concerns his decision to abandon the ANC for the Liberal Party. Mkhize makes an effort to point out that the decision did not strain his relationship with the ANC and its leaders, particularly Albert Luthuli. If anything, Mkhize helpfully points out, Msimang continued to be invited to ANC's events even though he had left. Two points are worth commenting on regarding this matter. The first concerns Mkhize's explanation for his subject's decision to abandon the ANC. He states that Msimang cited the radicalisation of the ANC in Natal as the main reason for his departure. Mkhize also suggests that Msimang might have been driven away by the ANC's perceived proximity to the Communist Party at the time. While his anti-communism was and is well known, what is unclear and Mkhize does not explain is what changed between his support for implementation of the Programme of Action after its adoption in 1949 and 1953 when he joined the Liberal Party. Could it be that his political stance was no so different from Champion's, who had opposed the Programme of Action from the get-go?

I should point out that Msimang was not the only senior leader of the ANC who either left the party or became inactive in the 1950s. Alfred Xuma and James Moroka, respectively the sixth and seventh presidents-general, took a backseat after vacating their leadership positions. In Natal, Champion essentially abandoned the ANC after his defeat by Luthuli in 1951. None of them joined the Liberal Party, not even Xuma and Moroka whose political views may be considered closer to Msimang's. This raises a second matter, which is Msimang's reported liberalism. Mkhize suggests that Msimang's association with liberalism can be traced to the 1920s when he was involved in the Joint Council Movement. The only point that one should mention, perhaps, in this respect, is that a number of senior ANC leaders participated actively in the Joint Council Movement and yet decided not to join

the Liberal Party when it was established. One prominent leader in this connection was Msimang's longtime friend, Selope Thema, whose opposition to the perceived influence of the Communist Party on the ANC led him to establish a faction inside the ANC, which opposed leadership of the ANC by communists and advocated for a return to African nationalism. Once again, it was not as if liberalism was the only political option available to Msimang. It would not have been unexpected, judging by his long association with African nationalism and his closeness to Thema, for him to join the National-Minded group. Instead, he opted for white liberalism.

Finally, because Mkhize's book focuses mainly on his subject's political career, there are certain aspects of his public life that it does not cover sufficiently. Most obvious in this respect is Msimang's status as one of the leading intellectuals of his generation. Msimang was a prolific writer whose published work covered a wide field of different subjects. His columns and opinion pieces can be found in numerous newspapers such as *Umteteli wa Bantu*, *The Bantu World*, *Ilanga lase Natal*, *Inkundla Ya Bantu* and several others for which he was a prominent correspondent. A quick search of his columns for *Umteteli wa Bantu* newspaper in the 1920s and early 1930s brings up approximately 200 articles written by him. For his role as a leading thinker of his generation, Ntongela Masilela, the preeminent African cultural and intellectual historian, credits Msimang and Selope Thema for inventing social and political constructs such as 'New African', 'New African modernity' and other streams of African political thought (Masilela, 2013: 5-6). This important aspect of Msimang's public life does not come through sufficiently in the book despite it being a significant part of his life as a political figure. Part of the explanation for this insufficient treatment may lie in the sources that Mkhize relied on for the political biography. A closer look shows that he, perhaps for understandable reasons, relied significantly on the Alan Paton Centre J.J.W. Aitchison Collection based at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the Historical and Literary Papers located at Wits University and other collections such as the Killie Campbell Africana Library in Durban, and the state archives. Although Mkhize uses newspaper archives, the extent of use appears limited considering the available information on his subject contained there, particularly a rich archive of his columns carried in the *Umteteli wa Bantu* newspaper.

Conclusion

The quibbles I have mentioned in the section above do not and should not take anything away from the outstanding contribution Mkhize's book makes to scholarship. It is not just a fascinating account of the public life of one of the remarkable and complex political figures of the 20th century in South Africa. Through examining the life of one man, Mkhize also provides a rich history of a people and their country. When all is said and done, this book's major contribution may be its challenge to what has become a dominant narrative regarding the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Msimang's long and complex life in politics demonstrates vividly that there was no single path to liberation; there was no, as Mkhize contends persuasively, 'unbreakable thread'. Different people contributed in different ways, some occupying large political stages, while other contributions were made in the obscure and quiet corners of this land. The ambiguities and complexities in Msimang's long career in public life should cause us to question the Manichean view of our past, a world that is inhabited only by political heroes and villains. Mkhize's nuanced discussion of his subject's political life pays attention to these ambiguities and complexities. It is no wonder that it won a prestigious literary award in 2020 for its outstanding contribution to scholarship.

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