

Building an African Counter-Terrorism Architecture

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Abstract

Following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the world trade centre in the United States of America, the phenomenon of terrorism has attracted increasing global attention. Coupled with this is the observable trend in the proliferation of terrorist groups in many parts of the world. To tackle these issues, nation-states, sub-regional, regional and continental bodies face the daunting task of evolving effective strategies for checkmating or containing the phenomenon. Indeed, many African countries have come to be faced with the problem of how to curtail the activities of terrorist groups, most of who operate on an established external link with notable and wealthy global insurgency groups. The overarching effects of these threats have become unprecedented and worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the search for practical solutions has been a challenge to scholars, state functionaries, and even attack victims. The paper provides an overview of the apparent vulnerability of the continent to increasing terrorist-related activities and the weak capacities of African countries' leaders to respond to the unwholesome trend. Hence the call for developing a continental-counter terrorism strategy for the African continent.

Keywords: Africa; Political Stability; Terrorism; Counter-Terrorism; Insurgency Groups

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Introduction

Terrorism is a threat to global peace and security. Many Nation-states across the globe are embroiled in the cesspool of terrorism. While the terrorists may differ in their ideology and strategy of operations, their goals usually remain the same- to; instill fear in the hearts of the populace, kill innocent citizens, destroy state assets and symbols of authority, and alter existing socio-political, economic, or cultural values. However, differences in geography, culture, techno-scientific advancement make the articulation or adoption of a single counter-terrorism mechanism facile. This is due to differences in policy interpretations.

Lacquer likened terrorism to the workings of a multinational corporation. He postulated that an operation would be planned in western Germany by Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons supplied by an Algerian Diplomat, and financed with Libyan money (Lacquer,2000). It may be added that the casualties of this attack may certainly have diverse nationalities. Today the phenomenon of international terrorism has grown to become a giant monster associated with the constant loss of life, destruction, and unimaginable damage worldwide. The increase in lethality and the unprecedented dangers posed by terrorists become an evident threat to global security, peace, and development. Many African countries are today ravaged by homegrown terrorism with international connections. Some of these include; Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, Lords Resistance, Tuaregs, etc. As a result, African countries have adopted diverse anti-terrorism models with little results. The African Union (AU), AU counter-terrorism framework seems to be only effective on paper. Analysts argue that the African continent needs a unified counter-

terrorism strategy that is homegrown, taking into account the history, culture, and dynamics of existing terrorist groups in the continent (Makinda,2009; Tarek and Joanne,2016; Ramdeen, 2017). A situation where current strategies are anchored, wholly on foreign expert advice and western counter-terrorism models, makes the entire anti-terror pursuit an effort in futility. This paper is thus an attempt to rethink existing paroxysms of counter-terrorism in Africa and make a case for the development and adoption of a concretized Africa model. Besides, the paper provides insights into building sustainable regional counter-terrorism in Africa.

These views are shared by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who insists that by its very nature, terrorism constitutes an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), etc have an indispensable role to play in providing the legal and organizational framework upon which the campaign against terrorism can unfold. Today, the need to combat and contain the spread of terrorism has attracted the activities of the academic community. Schematically, the paper is divided into six parts; the introduction, section two examines some conceptual issues, Section three is the theoretical framework, section four interrogates and illuminates the contours of current debates on counter-terrorism (Soft Power versus Hard power, de-radicalization). And the fifth section explains further the central theme of the paper.

Conceptual issues

In this paper, terrorism, counter-terrorism is properly situated within the vortex of this essay. Terrorism lacks a generally accepted definition. It means many things to different people. This is because one man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter. Contrary to Seteolu's view that terrorism is a recent phenomenon, it is rather, historically, an age long term, which had been used many centuries ago to denote acts of violence or aggression against a constituted authority (Seteolu,2004). The term terrorism is derived from the Latin word "terrere", meaning terror, used to describe the systematic state of fear by an organized group of people in a state. Terrorism, to Schultz and Sloan, refers to the threat or use of extra forms of political violence in varying degrees with the aim of accomplishing certain political goals (Schultz and Sloan, 2009).

Seteolu avers that terrorism is the "resort to violence or terror for political ends by unauthorized non-governmental groups in pursuit of specific goals (Seteolu, 2004). It is a form of political violence that challenges the legitimacy and authority of the state" stressing the view of Jackson on what terrorism is (Jackson, 2008). Seteolu further identified four key characteristics of terrorism to include:

A deliberate and planned strategy of political violence in pursuit of targeted goals (2) a form of political communication used in sending symbolic messages to targeted persons who may not necessarily be the victims of terror or violence but rather the audience(3) action with the intent of causing fear, harassing and intimidating society in pursuit of targeted goals (4) activities targeted primarily but not solely at civilians targets may include the military, police, institutions, and structures.

Lalude argues that terrorism is particularly a phenomenon of harmful extraordinary, extreme and unsettling violence usually caused by certain economic, socio-economic, cultural, and political injustices manifest in perceived depreciation, poverty, lack, illiteracy, unemployment, denials, among others (Lalude, 2011). The United Nations Security Council defines terrorism as

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or group of persons

or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

In addition, the United States of America Federal Criminal Code conceives terrorism as

Activities that involve violent...or life-threatening acts...that violate the criminal laws of the United States or any State and... appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. To influence the government's policy by intimidation or coercion or ... to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping and... occurs primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Terrorism in this paper is therefore seen as a deliberate, strategically articulated, planned violent acts targeted at civilians and government security personnel and institutions, through the use of bombs, chemical or biological weapons, machetes and guns, assassinations, kidnapping intended to coerce both government and civilian population and alter existing order. Terrorist groups influence government policies violently, especially with their activities. In recent times religion and politics are becoming the driving force for terrorism in Africa.

Current Debates on Counter-Terrorism

The term counter-terrorism lacks an acceptable definition and policy. This is because scholars and policymakers across disciplines and national frontiers have diverse understandings and approaches to counter-terrorism. What is more, every conflict involving terrorism has its unique characteristics. However, an attempt is made to situate the meaning of counter-terrorism within the vortex of this paper. Counter-terrorism refers to collectively articulated processes, strategies, and mechanisms toward preventing and eliminating the emergence, growth, development, and outbreaks of terrorist acts in a given society.

Counter-terrorism operations are subject to change according to the nature of the terrorism threat. Indeed, International terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda terrorism, remains persistent and adaptive. However, terrorism is a tactic that cannot be entirely eradicated. Nevertheless, steps can be taken to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat organizations that use terrorism. As such, policy prescriptions in addressing threats coming from 'corrigible' groups like Hamas and Hezbollah will be different regarding the political context. The current threat in the environment and the conduct by the government in counter-terrorism operations will be additional.

Counter-terrorism is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism. Besides, Crenshaw (2010) sees counter-terrorism as the totality of all deliberately planned measures taken by the government and Non-governmental organizations, including civilians, to prevent, protect, and deter terrorism in a given geopolitical locale. The essence of counter-terrorism strategies is to ensure that conditions that lead to terrorism in human society are adequately immune from terrorism through institutional or legislative frameworks. Besides, counter-terrorism also includes a wide range of clear-cut measures such as the use of the military and the creation of viable social, political, economic, and cultural conditions germane for mutual peace and unity among people.

Counter-terrorism strategies connote all the measures and articulated policies designed to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Existing research tends to structure debates around two approaches namely the war model and the criminal justice mode (Wikinson, 2006). The war model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in

military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing a counter-terrorism strategy. On the other hand, the criminal justice model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in western democracies. Doing so puts restrictions on the government and thereby risks reducing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. However, as Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) have argued both models rarely function according to academic theory during an actual counter-terrorism campaign. While democracies tend to champion democratic ideals and the preservation of civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a new framework is needed in order to develop and measure successful counter-terrorism strategies considering the evolution of counter-terrorism, it could be more useful to view counter-terrorism in terms of “hard and soft power” (Schmid et al., 2009). This requires restricting the debate around a direct and indirect approach to counter-terrorism. The direct approach would be an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primary offensive, hard power tactics such as predator and Reaper drone strikes, Special Forces operations, increased policing, and intelligence operations. These are useful tools if the goal is to isolate and destroy groups like Al-Qaeda.

The indirect soft power approach would consist of population-centric methods and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive. The direct approach to counter-terrorism is straight forward but it raises serious questions regarding the ethical and legal use of force –on top of the issue of collection of intelligence and the protection of civil liberties within a democratic society. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if soft power alternatives such as democracy promote economic development and counter-radicalization effectively address the ill-defined “root causes” of terrorism. For example, Jervis (2005) argues that poverty and economic inequality are the root cause of terrorism. Therefore, even though aid is given to weak states such as Afghanistan Pakistan, and Yemen it will be difficult to determine their effectiveness in countering Al-Qaeda’s terrorism.

Providing development and increasing capacity building is questionable from a counter-terrorism perspective since a causal link between weak states and terrorism cannot be proven. Aid increases the standard of living, level of education, and general quality of life in some countries. It is difficult to argue that locals would turn to terrorism or political violence without it. Furthermore, such root theories would have to address the fact that home-grown terrorists radicalize and carry out attacks in democratic countries and weak and failing nations. While poverty and economic inequality are prevalent throughout the world, terrorism is not (Boyle, 2008). Finally, there is the issue of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization in counter-terrorism. Some argue that both are viewed as a complex process consisting of a variety of interdependent push and pull factors and triggering events that drive people into and out of terrorism (Horgan, 2009).

Social networks and group dynamics explain how individuals take up radicalization (Sageman, 2004). Theories of radicalization face difficulties in explaining individuals in terrorism. The reason is terrorist comes from a wide variety of backgrounds and there exists no single individual terrorist profile (Horgan, 2005). Vidino (2009) argues that any attempt to dismantle terrorist networks is similar to playing a game of whack-a-mole. Counter radicalization theories also have trouble measuring success from a counter-terrorism perspective because such programs essentially amount to increase community engagement that requires community leaders to target and mentor individuals who are presumably susceptible to terrorism recruitment.

Yet, it is difficult to prove that they would have turned to terrorism in the first place and more importantly, that they will not engage in terrorism afterward. Soft power can facilitate an exit

for individuals from terrorist groups, arguing that government counter-terrorism programs should offer terrorists a pathway out of terrorism by facilitating disengagement and rehabilitation (Horgan, 2005). In Lebanon, soft approaches such as political engagement and increased capacity building might influence bringing about Hezbollah's disarmament and its full integration into the Lebanese political system. Yet the fact remains that Hezbollah already chose to join the political process in Lebanon many years ago and has yet to decommission its military (Norton, 2007). However, attempts to weaken and isolate Hamas have proved questionable from a challenging power perspective. Hamas showed in 2006 that it could use democracy to its benefit without having to moderate its political aims.

On the other hand, the FMLN in Central America decommissioned its militia and joined a democratic system in early 1990; it is now one of the largest political parties in El Salvador. The records are mixed on whether democracy can offer groups a pathway out of terrorism. However, it is believed that soft power measures could offer specific individuals and groups some sort of pathway out of terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts the collective security theory. The collective security theory is based on the assumption that war and international conflict are rooted in the insecurity and uncertainty of power politics (Koskenniemi, 2004). Collective Security suggests that states as long as they pledge themselves to defend one another, have the capacity either to deter aggression in the first place or to punish the transgressor if international order has been breached. Successful collective security depends on three conditions. First, the states must be roughly equal, or there must be no preponderant power. Second, all states must be willing to bear the cost and responsibility of defending one another. Third, an international body must have the moral authority and military capacity to take effective action (Tuck, 2001). Collective security is the security arrangement in which all states cooperate to provide security for all by all actions against any states within the groups that might challenge the existing order by using force (Tuck, 2001).

Sovereign nations eager to maintain the status quo willingly cooperate accepting a degree of vulnerability and in some cases of minor countries, also accede to the interests of the chief contributing nations organizing the collective security. Collective Security is achieved by setting up an international cooperative organization under the auspices of international law and this gives rise to a form of international collective governance albeit limited in scope and effectiveness (Murphy, 1994). The collective security organization becomes an arena for diplomacy balance of power and exercise of soft power. Unless legitimized by the collective security organization, the use of hard power by states is considered illegitimate, reprehensible, and needing remediation of some kind (Tuck, 2001).

From the above explanations by the eminent scholars, collective security can then be seen as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign States whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack. According to Norman and Howard asserts "a collective security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs (Norman and Howard, 2007). The principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and fight an aggressor if necessary. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith.

Over the years there have been various calls for the formation of an African High Command, a Pan-African Defence (PADF), and an ECOWAS defense pact that would provide for the collective defense

and the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of African states (official journal of ECOWAS 1981). This demand for African collective security has been summed up as African collective security. The collective 'regional' safety is the military aspect of the pan-Africanist concept which implies, a voluntary association of states in which the countries involved pledge themselves to use their military power against any other member state that commits any acts of aggression within the region.

The African concept of collective security, just like that of the UN which makes provisions for regional security organizations is based on the need for states to, 'provide a conflict management method that can be utilized in a relatively peaceful environment through systematically standardized procedures for dealing with unacceptable international behavior (Amistutz, 1982). Hence, in the pan-African context, security is seen in the light of the defense of Africa's independence and solidarity with emphasis on the notion that:

Africa's security is the national security of all African countries since any threat to African security represents direct or indirect to African security represents a direct or indirect threat to all Africans. (As such), Pan-Africanism shapes the strategic and foreign policies of African states. As a security doctrine and movement, it provides African states with a common focus and a common forum in security development matters and foreign policy (Nkrumah, 1961).

The concept of Collective Security was propounded by scholars, philosophers, and policymakers such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson who applied interests in security broadly to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out. Collective Security literature and definitions of collective security are copious and still growing (Baylis, 2005). This assumes that regional security threats exist. It is in the interest of regional organisations to maintain order and stability in their regions. African leaders have established appropriate institutionalised organs within the AU for resolving and managing perennial conflicts in the region such as border clashes, ethnic/tribal differences, and political power rivalries. The AU's attempt at conflict resolution and crisis management is underscored by its principles embodied in the AU charter.

Building a Continental Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The African Perspective

One of the most striking features of how terrorism and counter-terrorism have evolved in sub-Saharan Africa during the last five years has been the resilience of terrorist groups to increasing large-scale national and international responses. There has also been substantial bilateral and multilateral support for counter-terrorism efforts in sub-Saharan Africa by the USA's wider international community (Situpart, 2013). Yet despite this, several of sub-Saharan Africa's most prominent terrorist groups have thrived, with Boko Haram resurgent even after a large scale assault on the group by Nigerian Security forces succeeded in killing its leaders and around 800 Boko Haram members in 2009 (Agbibo, 2013) and with the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi illustrating only too well that Al-Shabaab still can strike beyond the borders of Somalia. This points to another striking characteristic of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the continent. This is its international nature and arguably its ongoing internationalization of which there are multiple dimensions.

We have seen the incorporation of initially national or sub-national terrorist groups into regional and even global networks of terrorists and insurgents. This is apparent convergence of collective action frames and strategic goals. For example, Al Shabaab announced its integration into the Al-Qaeda network in 2008. Although however, Boko Haram does not appear to have become organizationally

joined Al Qaeda, its leadership has reached out to other jihadist groups both in Africa and beyond its splinter group, Ansaru, cooperates with and comprises at least in part of militants trained by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Roggio, 2013).

There are good reasons to be cautious about how the homogenizing tendencies of macro-scale analyses of global terrorism and global responses might shape our understanding of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. As with any broadly conceived movement across the various jihadist terrorist groups, competing interests, ideas, strategic priorities, and tactical tastes can be teased out with detailed empirical analysis. For example, there are forms of association and collaboration between groups such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and the Islamic Movement for the Azawad. These groups have articulated different strategies priorities and have adopted different tactics (Dowd and Raleigh, 2013). Terrorist actions and counter-terrorism responses. Attempts to counter terrorism effectively reduce the risk of terrorist violence and political violence. The leadership of Africa should be proactive. This will assist the people living in these parts of sub-Saharan Africa who have been affected by the diffusion of this wave of terrorist activity.

Given the above security challenges posed by terrorism, there is the need for African nations to intensify efforts to contain the threats. The defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised this need, which was transformed into the AU in Durban 2002. It was borne out of the grasp that terrorism threatens national and regional security and violates international law, including the charters of the UN and OAU, constitutive Act of the AU, as well as the Protocols Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. Based on this recognition of the potential dangers posed by the phenomenon, the Former Chairman of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare declared that the AU strongly condemns all acts and forms of terrorism in Africa and wherever they may occur.

Explicitly, member countries of the AU resolved to adopt a collective approach in combating the common peril and later adopted joint counter-terrorism instruments and decisions, some of which have been ratified by the necessary majority. One such instrument is the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted in Algiers, Algeria in 1999. In the quest to implement this resolution, the Algiers-based African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 as an institution to boost the Union's capacity in Counterterrorism. However, the inadequacies linked with the implementation of the Algiers Convention have led to the search for complementary strategies to boost the war against terrorism in Africa. In line with this, the following prescriptions are proffered (ACSRT, 2004).

Strategic Measures for Capacity Building in Counter-Terrorism in Africa

The challenge of combating terrorism in Africa demands combined and rigorous efforts across national boundaries. The most important is the nature of contemporary terrorism itself, which does not respect international boundaries or the concept of sovereignty. Terrorist groups can and do operate in several countries simultaneously. Boko Haram, for example, has split in northern Cameroon and north-eastern Nigeria and recruits from both countries (Zenn, 2014).

Groups have also become adept at taking advantage of national borders to evade justice. The Lord's Resistance Army, which regularly shuttles between several Central and East African states, making it nearly impossible for authorities to track it down; or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which established operations in northern Mali when the Malian state effectively collapsed in 2012–2013, giving it a safe haven from which to target neighboring countries. Terrorist organizations have become formidable and more robust than many weak states on the continent. The measures proffered here will require practical legislative, political, institutional, and collaborative endeavors by member

nations of the AU. A breakdown of these measures would include Establishment and Implementation of Relevant International Documents, Organizing Seminars, Conferences and Training Workshops, Effective Cooperation and Collaboration, Building Comprehensive and Efficient Domestic Capacity, Efficient and Effective Intelligence Network, Governance.

Establishment and Implementation of Relevant International Documents

The rising complexity and cross-border implications of terrorism demand collective efforts by states in the continent to combat the phenomenon. The OAU convention on the prevention and combating of Terrorism (Algiers Convention) was adopted by African heads of state in July 1999 and came into force in December 2002, 30 states had ratified it. This was the first African instrument on preventing and combating terrorism which provided an African definition of terrorism; Article 1(3). The definition contained in the convention enabled African parties to create criminal offenses in national law on the basis of a shared, internationally negotiated, and accepted definition. The Algier convention is consistent with and complementary to the international legal regime and to the Arab convention; Article 1(3). Endorsement of continental instruments remains essential. Law and fidelity are part of the more comprehensive strategy to overcome terrorism in the long term. Approval of instruments illustrates unity in combating terrorism and provides countries with an internationally agreed basis for drafting national laws and for cooperation as part of national strategies (ACSRT, 2004).

Endorsement is important for its own sake but is not the actual objective of counter-terrorism support or response. The principal objective of the global counter-terrorism community of which Africa is a part is to ensure a seamless global web of national-level counter-terrorism prevention, response and cooperation measures grounded in the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the endorsement was pursued at the expense of real dialogue to ascertain and respond to countries and sub-regions' perceived counter-terrorism needs in meeting this objective. These needs might not involve endorsement. Research-driven policy and legal reform are needed on a country-to-country and sub-regional basis to ensure appropriate proactive and tailored counter-terrorism measures in Africa.

Ewi and Du Plessis (2014) explained that the importance of the convention for counter-terrorism in Africa cannot be overstated ...the convention put in place a solid and fundamental criminal justice framework for the fight against terrorism in Africa. It codified counter-terrorism norms and consolidated common standards. Another institution that could play a vital role is the proposed African Court of justice and Human Rights, which would have the power to prosecute individuals and potentially states contravening the Algiers convention and Protocol (ACJHR, 2004).

Organizing Seminars, Conferences and Training Workshops

This is needed to sensitize the populace, particularly the various stakeholders from the security sector within Africa on the challenges of terrorism. In addition, it will provide an opportunity for capacity building among actors and a platform to appraise their various anti-terror strategies and work out appropriate policy prescriptions for practical actions. Accordingly, the Nigerian Army and African Command of special operations organized a four-day workshop to share lessons learned from counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations from 13 January to 16 January 2014 (Nigerian Army, 2014).

More seminar discourse should focus on preattack, the attack, and post-attack. Sharing framework and best practices, counter-terrorism financing, and deradicalisation programs. There must be constant and realistic joint military training and exercises among sister African nations. The

militaries should introduce some form of flexibility in their various military operations. These should include non-conventional strategies of urban guerrilla warfare, sensitivity to public (domestic and international) opinion, and human rights issues such as handling civilians in line with international humanitarian laws (IHL).

Effective Cooperation and Collaboration

Central Banks and Ministries of finance of all member states should develop financial reforms to scrutinise foreign business interests and a systematic means of tracking international money transactions. In addition, joint border patrols between neighboring countries within the continent should be institutionalized while extradition treaties should exist among AU members to ensure the repatriation of cross-border criminals.

There is also a need for collaboration between such international agencies as the UN Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC), AU, European Union, Paris based Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Eastern and Southern Africa Money laundering Group (ESAAMLG) has also been key for countries in Eastern and Southern Africa in complying with international standards against terrorist financing and money laundering. In addition, technical assistance could be sought from development partners like the IBRD, IMF, and Egmont Group, especially regarding combating money laundering by suspected terrorists within the African continent.

Building Comprehensive and Efficient Domestic Capacity

It is expected that each of these countries ought to have established legislations to regulate and counter-terrorism based on the UN and AU resolutions that criminalize terrorism and acts of terrorism. For instance, resolutions 1368 and 1377 call for information and intelligence sharing among states to tighten immigration procedures to fight terrorism. But, unfortunately, most of the countries in their various sub-region find it challenging to put in place legal structures for countering terrorism.

However, despite the challenges they are confronted with, the critical countries have tried to enact and evolve legislative measures to combat and prevent terrorism. Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Mali, and Mauritania are these vital and threatened countries. They are battling with terrorist activities in their various polities. As noted earlier, 9/11 provided the basis for a concerted global war on terrorism. Several resolutions passed by the UN Security Council called for legislation to combat terrorism. Others like Kenya and South Africa, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups, have struggled to balance the need for new security legislation with the preservation of newly gained civil rights and in Kenya's case to avoid the worst repercussions from the recent developments in Somalia through active diplomacy. Ethiopia and the previous government of Mauritania have used the terrorist threat to solidify policies of suppression and anti-democratic practices while solidifying US support for their anti-terrorist policies.

The country report on terrorism initiated by the UN Security Council in ensuring member states report periodically to the body on their counter-terrorism efforts has been met by an apathetic response from most African countries (UNSC, 2020). Notwithstanding the above, an overview of counter-terrorism measures in critical African nations is vital. African nations should improve their capacities in anti-terrorism legislation drafting and training law enforcement and criminal justice officials in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism.

Efficient and Effective Intelligence Network

There is the need to enhance the intelligence-gathering network in the war against terrorism, this will require the development of a counter-terror intelligence center that will have the mandate of gathering efficient and effective intelligence information on terrorism, trade-in narcotics, and money laundering. This will be complemented through the regional exchange of intelligence on the activities of suspected terrorists and their allies. Ghana established such a center at a national level in October 2001 in response to the terror attacks on the USA in September 2001 (Kafe, 2013).

Nigeria's armed forces have always cooperated swiftly with demands for the investigation of terrorist threats and the sharing of information and intelligence in respect to counter-terrorism. The Nigerian military has a counter-terrorism unit at the Armed Forces and Staff College in Jaji Kaduna which is specially equipped to train officers and men in counter-terrorism tactics and strategies. Senegal also has a regional counter-terrorism intelligence center using its security and intelligence services with support from the United States. The role of the committee of intelligence and Security services of Africa (CISSA) was formed in 2004 whose mandate is to provide AU and its member services with timely and insightful intelligence which would assist in making informed decisions among member states. In 2019 CISSA established a database to track terrorist fighters across the African continent aimed at monitoring their movements and proactively disrupting their activities.

Governance

Governance provides the background with which the war on terror is pursued. Without governance and the rules, norms, and institutions that strengthen it, the war on terror would be unintelligible. However, some strategy through which the war on terror is pursued has the potential to undermine certain forms of governance. At the same time, the best way to weaken terrorism is to augment governance and the values, norms, rules, and institutions on which it is based. It occurs at various levels of social activity, from the village to the state and the global system.

The Commission on Global Governance has claimed that governance is a continuing process through which conflicting and diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). From this angle, governance would describe the structures, rules, and institutions that African people have recognized to manage their political, cultural, economic, and social affairs. Governance has been used to refer to formal and informal sets of arrangements.

As governance is based on values, norms, rules, and institutions, which are dynamic, it can be assumed that governance is dynamic. For this basis, Rosenau (1998) has observed that governance 'is in a continuous process of evolution, a becoming that fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change and emergent properties consolidate and solidify'. In this sense, governance is historically contingent. In practice, governance reflects the preference of hegemonic actors. To the extent that the wellbeing of hegemonic forces shapes governance, the latter does not perfectly reflect the diversity of interests in a particular situation. It must be recognised that what metamorphosed into terrorist attacks is acrimony and bitterness emanating from the actions and inactions of the political leadership of nations. It is argued that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. To this effect, conduct in public office must be oriented to ensure good governance, justice, and equity.

Conclusion

The fight against the growing menace of terrorism requires a broad range of policy responses to address the underlying conditions conducive to its spread. Although the counter-terrorism strategies proposed may not provide a complete answer to the problems of terrorism in Africa, it nonetheless establishes a proactive framework for dealing with the threat of terrorism and thus requires effective implementation. First, there is the need to define terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement that will assist international operations. Having a definition of this kind must depend on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states) and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (between an organisation and a state). The description of terrorism will be the basic and operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It assists legislation and specific punishments against those involved in or supporting terrorism and will permit the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them.

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