



Globalisation, Democracy and Governance in Africa: A Progressive Decline?

Chinemerem Alvan NWANKWO¹ & Isaac Kinikanwo NKOMADU²

¹Department of International Relations, Dennis Osadebay University, Asaba, Delta State, Nigeria

²Department of Industrial and Labour Relations, Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria

Corresponding Author's Email: chinemerem.nwankwo@dou.edu.ng

Abstract

Globalisation is said to, among other things, have transformed the world into a global village. Thus, globalisation has redefined democratic governance across the globe. Not only that, globalisation has succeeded in highlighting challenges of underdevelopment, uneven development, inequality, misgovernance, etc., simply by providing a wide platform on which performance – or lack of it – can be measured. As is to be expected, Africa's catch-up task has in no way gotten easier. Data for this paper were generated mainly from secondary sources, and analysed using the qualitative method. Using Marxist theory of the State, this paper argues that despite the dynamic, intricate relationship between globalisation, democracy and governance, the acquisition of state power has remained paramount in Africa given the high premium attached to it. As a consequence, there is a preponderance of corruption, bad governance, insecurity, repression, progressive underdevelopment and inequality. Through an analysis of economic, political, and social dimensions, this paper examines the impacts of globalisation on democracy and governance structures and processes. The central argument of the paper is that globalisation highlights governance gaps in Africa through recurrent issues like transnational security threats, corruption, political instability and suppression of opposition voices. The paper recommends, among other things, the reformation of political power structures to be more participatory, inclusive, accountable and transparent.

Key words: Globalisation, governance, diversity, inequality, inclusivity.

Citation of article: Nwankwo, C. A. & Nkomadu, I. K. (2024). Globalisation, Democracy and Governance in Africa: A Progressive Decline? *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies, AJPAS*, 17(2):168-188

Date submitted: 24/010/2024 **Date Accepted:** 12/11/2024 **Date Published:** December, 2024



Introduction

There is a nexus between globalisation, democracy and governance as the trio mutually reinforce each other. For a clearer understanding of this assertion, conceptualising globalisation would be pertinent. In the words of Jinadu (2010, p.6753), globalisation is:

A complex set of interconnected multilinear, multifaceted and dialectical and still unfolding historical processes, which are propelled by the transnationalisation of finance capital, in search of new markets, and the logic of capital accumulation. Typically, the processes are characterised by structural differentiation and unequal functional integration or interdependence and exchange between metropolitan and dependent or satellite nations, peoples and markets. They are mediated and facilitated on a world scale by technological advances, world trade regimes, and by hegemonizing and universalising or homogenising cultural and intellectual institutions, even as they generate their contraries or competing responses.

In other words, globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world's economies, societies, and cultures through trade, technology, and migration. From the standpoint of Jinadu (2010), one of the major features of globalisation is the functional integration of metropolitan and satellite states. This feature is paramount given that the search for external markets was one of the major reasons for the balkanisation of Africa. As noted by Rodney (2018, p.161):

European capitalists were unanimous in their decision to colonise Africa. Consequently, the six European nations jostled to have a share of the African land and territory where they establish their formal presence and occupation. The foregoing was the climax of the collective decision at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, where the European robber statesmen sat down ... to decide who should steal which part of Africa.

In the process, states were created albeit with weak structures. At the attainment of political independence also, these new states had political stooges installed to steer their affairs on behalf of the departing colonial rulers. Thus, from the onset, globalisation succeeded in defining the territorial, economic and political structure of African states. No discussion of how globalisation shaped, and has continued to shape governance structure of African states would be complete without a mention of Western democracy and democratic governance. Democracy has been defined from several perspectives. From the classical liberal



perspective, Schumpeter (1942) defined democracy as a system in which power is held by the people, either directly or through elected representatives, and where individual rights and freedoms are protected. From the participatory democracy perspective Pateman (1970) conceived democracy as a system where citizens actively participate in decision-making processes, either directly or through representative institutions, to ensure equal power and influence. Giddens (1998), from the social democracy perspective conceived democracy as a system that combines political equality, social justice, and economic redistribution, ensuring that all citizens have a stake in the decision-making process. In the same vein, the deliberative democracy perspective, as represented by Habermas (1996) defined democracy as a system where citizens engage in rational, inclusive, and respectful deliberation to reach collective decisions, fostering a culture of public reasoning. From the radical democracy standpoint, democracy is a system that acknowledges and celebrates diversity, conflict, and pluralism, recognising that power relations are inherent and must be constantly negotiated (Mouffe, 1993).

Dahl (1971) defined democracy from an institutional perspective as a system characterised by free and fair elections, protection of individual rights, and accountability of elected officials to citizens. To Alperovitz (2011), seen from the economic perspective, democracy has to do with the distribution of economic decision-making power among citizens, ensuring equitable distribution of resources and social welfare. The cosmopolitan perspective of democracy is quite interesting. Here, democracy is seen as a system that transcends national borders, promoting global citizenship, human rights, and democratic governance at the international level (Held, 1995). Recall that a major feature of globalisation is the shrinking and possible elimination of national borders through increasing homogenisation.

The 20th century witnessed significant spread of democracy. This explains why the period, 1974-2005 is often referred to as the 'third wave of democratisation' (Huntington, 1991; Diamond, 1996, 2008; Diamond & Plattner, 1993; Fukuyama, 1992). In this period, democratisation spread to regions like Africa, Asia, Eastern and Southern Europe, and Latin America. States in this region rapidly transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments with the adoption of democratic models like presidential, parliamentary and even constitutional monarchies (Haynes, 2005). Virtually all African states settled for the presidential variant.



Suffice to add that democratic governance wave is driven by globalisation, pressure from key global actors like United States, United Kingdom, European Union (EU), and even the United Nations (UN). These actors, in most cases, work independently or with local civil society organisations (CSOs). Of interest to this paper, however, is the strength of the influence exerted by globalisation on democratic governance in Africa. This is expedient given the seeming tendency of democratic governments in Africa to rapidly slide towards authoritarianism in a bid to maintain a tenacious grasp on political power, and to amass wealth and capital.

Thus, this paper is structured to assess how African states fared on voice and accountability as a measure of governance; examine how politically stable and violence-free are African states; ascertain the level of government effectiveness in Africa; investigate how effective the regulatory qualities of African states are; ascertain the state of rule of law in Africa; and, evaluate whether corruption has been controlled in African states. In addition to boosting extant literature on globalisation and governance in Africa, findings of this study would shed light on best performing African states on the governance scale. The import of this finding is that it could spur further inquiries into how they managed to bridge governance gaps for the benefit of other states. The findings of this paper are also significant because they provide pointers to Africa's developmental trajectory.

Literature Review

An empirical study by Asongu, Efobi and Tchamyu (2016) critically assessed the effect of globalisation on governance in 51 African countries. Using generalised method of moments (GMM), the study found that: political governance is driven by voice and accountability compared to political stability; economic governance is promoted by both regulation quality and government effectiveness from specific globalisation angles; and, globalisation does not improve institutional governance for the most part. The present study differs in the sense that its major aim is to gauge whether the influence of globalisation on governance in African states is declining. Genyi and Akpa (2017) assessed globalisation and democratic governance in Africa. The authors aver that globalisation supports democratisation in raising strong institutions and predictable rules that in turn encourages good governance. External demand for democracy has checked excessive and arbitrary rule no doubt on the African continent. However, internal pressure from within Africa is critical for democracy to realise its



governance promises. Reasonable levels of freedoms are prevalent with strong civil society's mediation of political struggle for power and accountability, Genyi and Akpa (2017) concluded. The present study goes beyond establishing a nexus between globalisation and democratic governance to establishing the strength of this nexus and its continued viability – or otherwise. Asongu and Odhiambo (2023) investigated the comparative economics of globalisation and governance in 40 sub-Saharan African states between 2000 and 2019. The study found that while all globalisation dynamics negatively affect political governance, only political and social globalisation have a negative incidence on economic governance. The study also found that social and general globalisation dynamics positively affect institutional governance. The present study, however, is more comprehensive as it dwells on the impact of globalisation on six key aspects of governance (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory qualities, rule of law and control of corruption). It goes further to ascertain whether these impacts are progressive or declining.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is premised on Marxist Theory of the State. Engels (1942, p.155) defined the state as:

A product of society at a certain stage of development, it is the admission that the society has become entangled in an irresolvable contradiction with itself hence splitting into two irreconcilable opposites. But in order that these opposites, that is, classes with conflicting interests, shall not consume themselves in fruitless struggle it becomes necessary to have a power that seemingly stands above the society to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of order. This seemingly neutral power standing above the society is the state.

Based on Engels' conceptualisation, the neutrality of the state does not go beyond appearance. This is so because when it comes to appropriation of surplus, the state sides with the bourgeois class. Re-echoing this fact, Alavi (as cited in Nwaorgu, 2014, p.28) noted that:

The state assumes a relatively autonomous economic role with the appropriation of a large portion of the economic surplus which is allocated to economic activity of the stated purpose of promoting economic development.



Accordingly, Marx (1970, p.35) declared that *the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie*. Neo-Marxist scholars have advanced this classical theory of the state to address the character of neo-colonial states (Nwankwo, 2016). Alavi (1973) cited in Okolie (2005), noted that in the post-colonial society, the problem of the relationship between the state and the underlying economic structure is more complex than the context in which it was posed in the European society. It is structured by yet another historical experience and requires fresh theoretical insight.

Explaining further, Ekekwe (1986, p.12) pointed out that the difference between the two forms of capitalist states is that *whereas the state in the advanced capitalist formations function to maintain the economic and social relations under which bourgeois accumulation takes place, in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of the development of the productive forces make the state a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements*. By playing contrasting roles, a conducive atmosphere for bourgeois accumulation is created in the first instance, while serving as an instrument of capital accumulation in the second instance. On this second instance also, Ake (1981, p.128-129) noted that:

To begin with, we have a state that is interventionist and involved in the class struggle, that is to say a state already dragged into politics and politicised. Partly because of this fact (whose significance is the perception of the state as being very partial), and partly because the state power in question is highly developed, there is a bitter struggle to gain control of it.

Implied here is the fact that the attractions of the control of the state are what are expressed through vicious struggle and competition for the control of the state. The aim is not just to cling to state power, but to ensure unimpeded capital accumulation. As noted earlier, departing colonial rulers planted indigenous political stooges to guarantee continued expropriation of capital. These same erstwhile colonial rulers have been the champions of democratic governance. Championing the democratic wave, in this sense, is not to be seen as a charitable act. Rather, it is a well-orchestrated strategy to ensure that only malleable pro-West individuals get elected as presidents of their respective states. These 21st century democratically elected stooges are expected to, in addition to ensuring continued expropriation of natural resources and capital, implement pro-West policies and sustain some of the changes. A deviation from the above is unacceptable and usually condemned and



rejected. International reactions to recent waves of military incursions in some African states are illustrative. Thus, governance gaps in most African states might not necessarily be a consequence of democratic governments becoming authoritarian per se, it could be a reflection of necessary changes which needed to be made to facilitate the ideals of globalisation, or rather, capitalist interests. These changes could be by floating/devaluating the local currency without appropriate initiatives to cushion the effects, removal of subsidy, exposure of local industries to rapacious competition, expropriation of capital, deliberate enablement and protection of corrupt individuals, etc.

Methodology

This is a theoretical study. Hence, it requires data drawn from secondary sources. Common sources of secondary data for the social sciences include: censuses, information collected by government departments, organisational records and data (originally collected as primary data for other research purposes), textbooks, journal articles, internet materials, newspapers, magazines, etc. Secondary data refer to data that have been already collected, and are readily available. Such data are cheaper and easier to obtain. In addition, the use of secondary sources of data is advantageous because, among other things, it is economical, saves efforts, expenses and time. Data so generated were contextually analysed – with emphasis on logical sequence of data. Where necessary, tables were also used to present facts. This was done in order to establish clear-cut nexus between globalisation, democracy and governance in Africa. It was also useful for comparison across African states.

Results and Discussion of Findings

Africa's Governance Gaps)

Governance can be measured using indices like Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Democracy Index (DI), Human Development Index (HDI), Rule of Law Index (RLI), Global Peace Index (GPI) and Global Governance Index (GGI). In order to get a firm grasp of governance gaps in Africa, it is expedient to present Africa's scorecard on some of these indices.



Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) was developed by World Bank in 1999 as a parameter for assessing governance from six dimensions – voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The WGI covers 214 countries and territories, of which Africa produced 54.

It should be noted that each of the six WGI dimensions is measured on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5. A score closer to +2.5 indicates stronger governance performance, greater political stability, less corruption, better regulatory quality, and stronger rule of law. A score closer to -2.5 suggests weaker governance performance, higher corruption levels, lower political stability, and weaker rule of law. In addition to the raw score, countries are also given a percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The percentile rank shows where a country stands relative to others. A higher percentile rank indicates better governance compared to other countries. For example, a country in the 75th percentile for ‘Government Effectiveness’ ranks better than 75% of countries in that category.

A look at how some randomly selected African countries have fared in WGI over the years would be expedient here. The first dimension, voice and accountability (VA), is a measure of the extent to which citizens of a country are able to freely participate in the political process. Included here are also freedom of association, freedom of expression and press freedom.



A high score is an indication that political rights and civil liberties are high in the country.

Table 1: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Voice & Accountability) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	19.81	-1.09	19.32	-1.01	20.77	-1.00	21.74
Botswana	0.46	61.65	0.50	62.80	0.49	60.87	0.45	59.90	0.45	60.87
Cameroon	-1.13	17.48	-1.12	15.94	-1.21	15.46	-1.16	17.87	-1.15	21.74
Cape Verde	0.98	79.13	0.95	78.26	0.91	76.33	0.93	76.81	0.94	76.33
Congo (Rep.)	-1.19	15.53	-1.28	14.01	-1.28	14.49	-1.24	14.98	-1.20	15.94
Egypt	-1.32	13.11	-1.44	8.21	-1.48	7.73	-1.51	8.21	-1.45	9.18
Ethiopia	-1.16	16.02	-1.06	19.32	-1.04	20.77	-1.07	20.29	-1.05	20.77
Ghana	0.56	67.48	0.55	64.73	0.55	63.29	0.46	60.87	0.39	59.42
Kenya	-0.37	33.98	-0.31	36.23	-0.34	35.75	-0.36	35.75	-0.21	39.13
Madagascar	-0.32	36.41	-0.23	38.16	-0.26	37.68	-0.27	36.71	-0.29	38.16
Mali	-0.33	35.92	-0.44	33.82	-0.74	28.50	-0.78	27.54	-0.90	23.67
Morocco	-0.68	29.13	-0.62	26.47	-0.60	30.92	-0.60	31.88	-0.56	32.85
Nigeria	-0.42	33.01	-0.43	34.30	-0.58	31.88	-0.64	30.43	-0.60	32.37
Senegal	0.22	54.85	0.23	54.11	0.24	55.07	0.19	54.59	0.16	54.11
South Africa	0.64	69.42	0.64	68.12	0.69	69.57	0.77	71.01	0.71	68.60
Sudan	-1.85	2.91	-1.65	5.80	-1.43	9.66	-1.46	10.14	-1.50	7.25
Tunisia	0.19	53.40	0.27	55.56	0.28	56.52	0.19	54.11	-0.18	40.58
Uganda	-0.68	28.64	-0.65	28.99	-0.71	29.47	-0.82	25.60	-0.80	26.09
Zambia	-0.34	35.44	-0.31	35.75	-0.43	34.78	-0.37	35.27	-0.09	43.00

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

From table 1, it is obvious that many African countries rank very low on voice and accountability (VC) – as a measure of good governance. The overall best performers are Cape Verde (79.13, 78.26, 76.33, 76.81 & 76.33), Botswana (61.65, 62.80, 60.87, 59.90 & 60.87), South Africa (69.42, 68.12, 69.57, 71.01 & 68.60) and Ghana (67.48, 64.73, 63.29, 60.87, & 59.42). Nigeria performed woefully on the VC chart having recorded the following scores: 33.10 (2018), 34.30 (2019), 31.88 (2020), 30.43 (2021) and 32.37 (2022). Thus, it can be averred that African states have not fared well on voice and accountability as a measure of governance.



The second dimension of WGI, political stability and absence of violence (PV), takes into cognisance, the likelihood of political instability, violence – and terrorism – in some cases. Higher scores indicate a lower risk of political instability, violence or terrorism.

Table 2: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-0.84	17.92	-1.06	13.21	-0.85	17.92	-0.99	15.57	-0.74	19.34
Botswana	0.96	82.08	1.10	88.21	1.01	83.96	1.04	86.79	1.08	87.26
Cameroon	-1.40	8.49	-1.56	8.02	-1.51	9.91	-1.39	9.91	-1.35	10.85
Cape Verde	0.83	74.06	0.86	76.42	0.87	75.94	0.89	78.77	0.93	81.13
Congo (Rep.)	-0.35	34.43	-0.30	34.43	-0.21	40.09	-0.23	38.68	-0.02	46.23
Egypt	-1.19	11.79	-1.12	12.56	-1.18	11.79	-1.03	14.62	-1.03	14.15
Ethiopia	-1.27	10.85	-1.30	11.32	-1.75	6.13	-2.18	3.77	-2.04	4.72
Ghana	-0.04	45.28	0.12	52.83	0.17	52.83	0.07	50.00	-0.07	43.87
Kenya	-1.18	12.26	-1.11	12.74	-1.01	14.62	-1.03	15.09	-0.94	15.09
Madagascar	-0.58	25.94	-0.31	33.96	-0.51	26.42	-0.54	26.89	-0.53	25.94
Mali	-2.08	4.72	-2.21	3.77	-2.15	3.77	-2.33	2.36	-2.48	1.42
Morocco	-0.35	33.96	-0.35	32.55	-0.36	33.96	-0.40	31.60	-0.32	34.43
Nigeria	-2.10	4.25	-1.93	4.72	-1.89	4.72	-1.79	6.13	-1.80	7.55
Senegal	-0.11	41.98	0.04	48.58	-0.14	42.45	-0.18	41.51	-0.15	40.57
South Africa	-0.24	38.21	-0.28	36.32	-0.25	39.15	-0.75	20.28	-0.72	19.81
Sudan	-1.82	6.13	-1.70	6.13	-1.66	7.55	-1.99	5.19	-2.00	5.19
Tunisia	-0.87	16.98	-0.88	17.45	-0.59	25.00	-0.76	19.34	-0.60	24.06
Uganda	-0.70	21.23	-0.69	22.17	-0.81	18.87	-0.94	17.92	-0.81	17.45
Zambia	0.08	50.94	-0.12	43.40	-0.13	43.40	0.05	48.58	0.10	50.00

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

Based on data contained in Table 2, African states did not fare very well on political stability and absence of violence between 2018 and 2023. Again, the best performers were Botswana (82.08, 88.21, 83.96, 86.79 & 87.26) and Cape Verde (74.06, 76.42, 75.94, 78.77 & 81.13). Scores for other African countries captured in the table indicate very low political stability and absence of violence. Thus, it can be surmised that most African states are neither politically stable nor free from violence.



The third dimension of WGI is government effectiveness (GE). GE is used to evaluate the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service, and the credibility of the government's policy-making process. Higher scores indicate more effective governance and public service delivery.

Table 3: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Government Effectiveness) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-0.49	35.71	-0.57	32.86	-0.57	31.90	-0.65	28.57	-0.51	32.55
Botswana	0.25	62.38	0.38	66.67	0.17	58.57	0.32	63.33	0.46	67.92
Cameroon	-0.86	18.10	-0.87	17.14	-0.93	17.14	-0.90	16.19	-0.88	18.87
Cape Verde	0.34	66.19	0.28	64.29	0.20	60.48	0.00	52.38	-0.03	51.89
Congo (Rep.)	-1.20	10.00	-1.13	11.43	-1.25	10.00	-1.32	9.05	-1.37	8.96
Egypt	-0.45	37.62	-0.25	40.95	-0.45	36.19	-0.46	34.76	-0.45	33.96
Ethiopia	-0.67	26.67	-0.66	27.62	-0.59	30.48	-0.65	29.05	-0.75	24.06
Ghana	-0.32	40.95	-0.29	39.52	-0.20	45.24	-0.18	44.76	-0.06	50.47
Kenya	-0.49	34.29	-0.44	35.71	-0.40	38.10	-0.32	38.57	-0.30	41.04
Madagascar	-1.21	9.52	-1.19	10.00	-1.05	13.33	-1.03	13.81	-0.99	14.62
Mali	-1.03	13.81	-1.10	12.86	-1.19	11.43	-1.25	10.95	-1.20	11.32
Morocco	-0.35	39.05	-0.25	40.48	-0.19	46.67	-0.17	45.24	-0.13	47.17
Nigeria	-1.12	11.90	-1.21	9.52	-1.14	11.90	-1.03	13.33	-1.04	14.15
Senegal	-0.33	40.00	-0.13	45.71	-0.06	50.95	0.02	53.81	0.00	52.83
South Africa	0.10	56.67	0.13	58.57	0.05	53.81	-0.07	50.00	-0.13	48.11
Sudan	-1.63	4.76	-1.66	4.76	-1.54	5.71	-1.66	5.71	-1.71	4.72
Tunisia	-0.01	51.90	-0.04	50.48	-0.19	46.19	-0.21	43.81	-0.30	41.51
Uganda	-0.69	24.29	-0.65	28.10	-0.62	29.05	-0.60	31.43	-0.58	31.13
Zambia	-0.65	28.10	-0.74	25.24	-0.82	19.05	-0.84	18.10	-1.25	27.83

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

Again, it is no surprise that Table 3 indicates low performance for African countries on government effectiveness (GE). The only consistent best performers being Botswana (62.38, 66.67, 58.57, 63.33 & 67.92) and Cape Verde (66.19, 64.29, 60.48, 52.38 & 51.89). As for Nigeria, scores of 11.90 (2018), 9.52 (2019), 11.90 (2020), 13.33 (2021) and 14.15 (2022) is an indictment on Africa's largest democracy. With these figures, it can be concluded that the level of government effectiveness in majority of African states is low.



Fourth dimension of WGI is regulatory quality (RQ). RQ reflects government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote the development of the private sector. Higher scores signify better regulatory frameworks and policies.

Table 4: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Regulatory Quality) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-1.35	8.10	-1.39	7.14	-1.36	8.57	-1.18	10.00	-1.06	14.15
Botswana	0.62	73.33	0.50	69.05	0.53	70.95	0.60	71.90	0.62	72.17
Cameroon	-0.81	19.52	-0.85	17.14	-0.83	20.48	-0.93	16.67	-0.90	19.34
Cape Verde	-0.04	50.95	-0.02	51.43	0.16	57.62	0.27	60.48	0.26	60.85
Congo (Rep.)	-1.41	6.67	-1.29	8.57	-1.45	7.14	-1.23	9.52	-1.26	9.43
Egypt	-0.80	20.48	-0.76	21.90	-0.57	31.43	-0.52	34.29	-0.71	24.53
Ethiopia	-0.98	13.81	-0.91	16.19	-0.98	14.29	-0.94	16.19	-0.95	16.98
Ghana	-0.14	46.67	-0.19	45.71	-0.13	46.19	-0.22	45.71	-0.18	44.81
Kenya	-0.27	42.38	-0.34	40.00	-0.52	32.86	-0.46	35.71	-0.38	39.15
Madagascar	-0.79	22.86	-0.79	20.48	-0.81	20.95	-0.84	20.95	-0.82	20.75
Mali	-0.60	29.52	-0.62	28.57	-0.67	28.10	-0.63	29.52	-0.63	28.30
Morocco	-0.26	42.86	-0.15	46.67	-0.05	50.00	-0.13	46.67	-0.09	49.06
Nigeria	-0.88	16.67	-0.94	14.76	-1.02	13.33	-0.94	15.71	-1.16	12.26
Senegal	-0.51	46.19	-0.18	46.19	-0.29	41.43	-0.32	40.95	0.30	52.36
South Africa	-0.04	50.48	0.01	55.24	0.02	53.33	-0.09	49.52	-0.19	44.34
Sudan	-1.64	4.29	-1.67	4.76	-1.57	4.76	-1.48	5.71	-1.58	8.49
Tunisia	-0.49	33.81	-0.39	38.57	-0.30	40.95	-0.40	38.10	-0.41	37.26
Uganda	-0.29	42.43	-0.41	36.67	-0.48	36.19	-0.49	34.76	-0.49	33.02
Zambia	-0.53	32.86	-0.61	29.05	-0.69	26.67	-0.57	32.38	-0.53	32.08

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

On regulatory quality (RQ), again, only Botswana and Cape Verde scored 50 and above between 2018 and 2022. Nigeria's best was 16.67 in 2018. That over 90% of African countries scored very low on RQ explains why the private sector in the continent are comatose. Rule of law (RL) is the fifth dimension. RL measures the extent to which actors have confidence in, and abide by the rules of society, particularly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher scores indicate stronger adherence to the rule of law and greater security of property and personal rights.

**Table 5: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Rule of Law) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022**

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-0.81	21.90	-0.86	20.48	-0.80	22.38	-0.83	22.38	-0.83	22.64
Botswana	0.38	64.76	0.43	64.76	0.38	63.81	0.45	66.19	0.47	66.04
Cameroon	-1.10	12.38	-1.14	11.43	-1.17	11.43	-1.12	12.86	-1.05	15.57
Cape Verde	0.39	66.19	0.45	65.71	0.43	64.76	0.33	60.95	0.37	60.85
Congo (Rep.)	-1.13	11.90	-1.11	12.38	-1.12	12.38	-1.10	14.29	-1.09	15.09
Egypt	-0.30	43.33	-0.33	42.86	-0.32	41.43	-0.26	43.81	-0.26	42.45
Ethiopia	-0.45	35.71	-0.48	33.81	-0.41	38.10	-0.62	29.05	-0.62	26.42
Ghana	0.05	55.24	0.02	53.33	-0.08	51.90	-0.11	50.48	-0.08	51.42
Kenya	-0.43	36.67	-0.46	35.71	-0.58	30.48	-0.42	37.14	-0.32	40.57
Madagascar	-0.84	20.48	-1.01	15.71	-0.88	20.48	-0.89	20.48	-0.94	18.40
Mali	-0.82	21.43	-0.86	20.00	-0.95	18.57	-0.92	19.05	-1.00	17.92
Morocco	-0.25	44.76	-0.24	45.71	-0.19	47.14	-0.25	45.71	-0.20	44.81
Nigeria	-0.92	18.57	-0.94	18.57	-0.84	20.95	-0.87	20.95	-0.91	19.81
Senegal	-0.22	45.71	-0.22	47.14	-0.32	41.90	-0.40	39.05	-0.26	42.92
South Africa	-0.22	46.19	-0.18	48.10	-0.24	45.24	0.07	54.29	0.02	54.25
Sudan	-1.14	10.48	-1.18	10.48	-1.09	13.81	-1.22	10.00	-1.26	10.38
Tunisia	0.05	55.71	0.09	55.71	0.14	55.71	0.07	53.81	-0.09	50.94
Uganda	-0.32	41.43	-0.34	41.43	-0.35	40.95	-0.37	39.52	-0.38	39.15
Zambia	-0.36	40.95	-0.47	34.76	-0.65	28.57	-0.61	29.52	-0.52	33.02

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

On the rule of law (RL), Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana and Tunisia are the only African countries that averaged 50.00 and above between 2018 and 2022. This raises questions over the near-absence of adherence to rule of law in many African states. The sixth dimension of WGI is control of corruption (CC). This captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as state capture by elites and private interests. Higher scores suggest lower corruption level.

**Table 6: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption) for selected African Countries, 2018-2022**

Country	Year (Estimate & Rank)									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank	Est.	Rank
Algeria	-0.66	28.57	-0.66	28.10	-0.67	27.62	-0.64	29.52	-0.64	28.30
Botswana	0.72	76.19	0.69	74.29	0.61	71.43	0.67	74.76	0.66	74.06
Cameroon	-1.16	11.43	-1.22	10.95	-1.14	12.36	-1.12	13.33	-1.13	13.21
Cape Verde	0.76	78.10	0.85	79.05	0.85	79.52	1.02	82.38	0.98	81.13
Congo (Rep.)	-1.38	8.10	-1.44	5.24	-1.46	5.24	-1.39	6.19	-1.36	7.08
Egypt	-0.51	34.76	-0.66	28.57	-0.81	23.81	-0.71	26.67	-0.68	26.42
Ethiopia	-0.50	36.67	-0.44	38.10	-0.39	40.48	-0.42	37.62	-0.44	36.79
Ghana	-0.14	51.43	-0.11	52.38	-0.13	50.00	-0.13	50.00	-0.05	52.83
Kenya	-0.86	20.48	-0.81	24.29	-0.88	20.95	-0.74	26.19	-0.76	24.06
Madagascar	-1.02	14.76	-1.05	14.76	-1.01	16.67	-0.95	18.57	-1.01	17.92
Mali	-0.71	26.67	-0.71	26.67	-0.80	24.29	-0.89	20.00	-0.88	21.33
Morocco	-0.29	44.76	-0.34	41.43	-0.41	38.57	-0.42	38.57	-0.36	41.51
Nigeria	-1.08	12.38	-1.12	12.38	-1.12	13.81	-1.10	14.29	-1.10	14.62
Senegal	-0.05	55.24	0.00	55.71	-0.01	55.71	0.04	57.14	-0.03	53.77
South Africa	-0.14	52.38	-0.03	54.29	-0.06	53.33	-0.03	53.81	-0.32	44.81
Sudan	-1.46	6.19	-1.41	6.67	-1.42	6.67	-1.28	8.10	-1.40	6.60
Tunisia	-0.11	53.33	-0.14	50.95	-0.12	50.95	-0.26	46.67	-0.25	47.64
Uganda	-1.05	13.81	-1.18	11.43	-1.07	16.19	-1.03	16.19	-1.04	16.51
Zambia	-0.68	28.10	-0.67	27.62	-0.73	26.19	-0.76	25.71	-0.53	34.43

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

Table 6 indicates that just like in other indicators, Botswana and Cape Verde are Africa's best in terms of control of corruption (CC). While Botswana posted 76.19 (2018), 74.29 (2019), 71.43 (2020), 74.76 (2021) and 74.06 (2022); Cape Verde registered 78.10 (2018), 79.05 (2019), 79.52 (2020), 82.38 (2021) and 81.13 (2022). Aside Botswana and Cape Verde, only Ghana, Senegal and Tunisia reached 50.00 score between 2018 and 2022. In order to present a clearer picture of the endemic nature of corruption in Africa, a look at figures from corruption perception index (CPI) is expedient. Transparency International (TI) publishes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) annually. It is used to measure levels of corruption in the public sector in countries. CPI scores and ranks countries. The scoring is on a scale of 0-100, 0 indicating high level of corruption while 100 equals to little or no corruption. Countries that score above 50 are said to have low corruption levels, while below 50 scores mean high level of corruption. In terms of ranking, the scale is 1-180 (1 = least corrupt; 180 = most corrupt).



Since level of corruption is a measure of governance, it is expedient to take a cursory look at how African states have fared on the ranking vis-à-vis states from other regions over some years.

Table 7: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for African States, 2019-2023

Country	Year (Score & Rank)									
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Algeria	35	106	36	104	33	117	33	116	36	104
Angola	26	146	27	142	29	136	33	116	33	121
Benin	41	80	41	83	42	78	43	72	43	70
Botswana	61	34	60	35	55	45	60	35	59	39
Burkina Faso	40	85	40	86	42	78	42	77	41	83
Burundi	19	165	19	165	19	169	17	171	20	162
Cameroon	25	163	25	149	27	144	26	142	27	140
Cape Verde	58	41	58	41	58	39	60	35	64	30
Central African Republic	25	163	26	146	24	154	24	150	24	149
Chad	20	162	21	160	20	164	19	167	20	162
Comoros	25	153	21	160	20	164	19	167	20	162
Cote d'Ivoire	35	106	36	104	36	105	37	99	40	87
Democratic Republic of the Congo	18	168	28	137	19	169	20	166	20	162
Djibouti	30	126	27	142	30	128	30	130	30	130
Egypt	35	106	33	117	33	117	30	130	35	108
Equatorial Guinea	16	173	16	174	17	172	17	171	17	172
Eritrea	23	160	21	160	22	161	22	162	21	161
Eswatini (formerly Swaziland)	34	113	33	117	32	122	30	130	30	130
Ethiopia	37	96	38	94	39	87	38	94	37	98
Gabon	31	123	30	129	31	124	29	136	28	136
Gambia	37	96	37	102	37	102	34	110	37	98
Ghana	41	80	43	75	43	73	43	72	43	70
Guinea	29	130	28	137	25	150	25	147	26	141
Guinea-Bissau	18	168	19	165	21	162	21	164	22	158
Kenya	28	137	31	124	30	128	32	123	31	126
Lesotho	40	85	41	83	38	96	37	99	39	93
Liberia	28	137	28	137	29	136	26	142	25	145
Libya	18	168	17	173	17	172	17	171	18	170



Madagascar	24	158	25	149	26	147	26	142	25	145
Malawi	31	123	30	129	35	110	34	110	34	115
Mali	29	130	30	129	29	136	28	137	28	136
Mauritania	28	137	29	134	28	140	30	130	30	130
Mauritius	52	56	53	52	54	49	50	57	51	55
Morocco	41	80	40	86	39	87	38	94	38	97
Mozambique	26	146	25	149	26	147	26	142	25	145
Namibia	52	56	51	57	49	58	49	59	49	59
Niger	32	120	32	123	31	124	32	123	32	125
Nigeria	26	146	25	149	24	154	24	150	25	145
Republic of the Congo	19	165	19	165	21	162	21	164	22	158
Rwanda	53	51	54	49	53	52	51	54	53	49
Sao Tome and Principe	46	64	47	63	45	66	45	65	45	67
Senegal	45	66	45	67	43	73	43	72	43	70
Seychelles	66	27	66	27	70	23	70	23	71	20
Sierra Leone	33	119	33	117	34	115	34	110	35	108
Somalia	9	180	12	179	13	178	12	180	11	180
South Africa	44	70	44	69	44	70	43	72	41	83
South Sudan	12	179	12	179	11	180	13	178	13	177
Sudan	16	173	16	174	20	164	22	162	20	162
Tanzania	37	96	38	94	39	87	38	94	40	87
Togo	29	130	29	134	30	128	30	130	31	126
Tunisia	43	74	44	69	44	70	40	85	40	87
Uganda	28	137	27	142	27	144	26	142	26	141
Zambia	34	113	33	117	33	117	33	116	37	98
Zimbabwe	24	158	24	157	23	157	23	157	24	149

Source: Compiled by the authors with figures from Transparency International (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023).

In 2019, as the lowest-scoring region on the CPI, with an average of 32, Sub-Saharan Africa's performance paints a bleak picture of inaction against corruption. With a score of 66, the Seychelles earns the highest mark in the region, followed by Botswana (61), Cape Verde (58), Rwanda (53) and Mauritius (52). At the bottom of the index are Somalia (9), South Sudan (12), Republic of Sudan (16) and Equatorial Guinea (16). In 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, Seychelles ranked highest also with 66, 70, 70, and 71, respectively. Within the same period, also, Botswana (60, 55, 60 & 59), and Cape Verde (58, 58, 60 and 64) recorded impressive scores. Thus, we conclude that there is weak control of corruption in Africa. The study made a number of findings. First, it was found that African states have not fared well on voice and accountability as a measure of governance. In the 2023 election cycle in Nigeria, also, violence was openly unleashed on opposition supporters. In some instances, in



the presence of security agents who stood idly by. The 2023 general election in Nigeria promised so much but delivered very little (Nwankwo & Dode, 2024). It was reported that of “violence obstructed the campaign, disturbed the elections, and suppressed voter participation” (EU EOM, 2023, p.8). Similar scenarios play out in many other African countries. For instance, Amnesty International (2023, p.1) reported that:

Criticising governments remained dangerous in many African countries. Brutal crackdowns against those who protested government excesses, failures, or allegations of corruption, were pervasive and particularly targeted journalists, human rights defenders, activists and opposition leaders and members. The killings of prominent human rights defender Thulani Maseko in Eswatini and journalist Martinez Zogo in Cameroon, and the death in suspicious circumstances of Rwandese investigative journalist John Williams Ntwali, in one week in January, was a dark moment for the human rights movement.

In Nigeria, there have been reports of illegal arrests and detention of investigative journalists too. There is also the use of security agents to disperse protesters, as well as the indiscriminate use of courts to invalidate the constitutional right to protest. It was also found that most African states are neither politically stable nor violence-free. This is especially so given the spate of attacks by Boko Haram insurgents, Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP). There have been cases of military incursions (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, etc.), ongoing war in the Republic of Sudan, seemingly intractable conflict in Somalia, and the recurrent case of militia violence in Libya and South Sudan. In Nigeria, cases of kidnapping for ransom are rife. In short, Africa is inundated with different dimensions of political instability and violence.

Another finding made by the study is that the level of government effectiveness in Africa is very low. This is because in majority of African countries, the quality of public services is very low, and characterised by administrative bottlenecks. Furthermore, the capacity of the civil service is questionable given that most civil servants are not well-qualified, and got employed without merit. Even institutions meant to cater for the general interest of citizens, like Federal Character Commission, would rather pander to the interests of those in the corridors of power. In relation to the credibility of government’s policy-making process, it is often shrouded in mystery with little or no information available to the citizens for proper



scrutiny. Needless to say, most policies are not reflective of the needs and aspirations of the people. For instance, Dangote Refinery and Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) have been at loggerheads over supply of crude oil, cost of lifting refined petroleum products and in what currency, and how many barrels. Neither the NNPCL nor Dangote has disclosed how much NNPCL lifts refined petroleum from Dangote Refinery. Partly as a result of this uncertainty, fuel pump price continues to soar at fuel stations. The study also found that the regulatory qualities of African states are very ineffective. This has been proven given the lack of vibrancy in the private sector in many African states. In the case of Nigeria, the private sector finds it hard to remain competitive due to hostile policies and high operational costs.

Another finding made by the study is that rule of law is nearly absent in majority of African states. This is so given the preponderance of weak institutions that are malleable instruments for the realisation of personal ambitions. Mention should also be made of the cabal-style democracy practised in many parts of Africa whereby members of the same cabal control both the executive, the legislative and judicial arms. Hence, separation of power becomes only a mere formality. The study also found that corruption has not been controlled in many African states. If anything, corruption is still on the rise. Instances from several African states point to the fact that part of the reasons for the quest for political power at all costs is the high premium attached to it. Political power grants unrestrained access to corrupt self-enrichment and even the privatisation of state assets.

Conclusion

Spurred by globalisation, the 'democratic wave' has been blowing across the globe. Thus, democratic governance can be said to be a key aspect of globalisation. Our analysis of globalisation and governance in Africa indicates that being democratised has little or nothing to do with good governance. Using six yardsticks (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption), the paper found huge governance deficits in many African states. The major exceptions being Botswana, Cape Verde and Seychelles. The implication here is that most African states appear to deviate from most of the generally accepted global norms of democratic governance. High premium attached to public offices, perhaps, is at the root of



this crass deviation as it is considered the ultimate target and whatever means – legitimate or illegitimate, moral or amoral – needful to meet it is explored to the fullest.

Future researchers may want to explore what Botswana, Cape Verde and Seychelles did right to become Africa's models of good governance and development. Such blueprints can, perhaps, be applied to other African states.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, a number of recommendations which would see globalisation and governance progress rather than decline in Africa, are considered essential. First, since many states in Africa are determined to micromanage political participation and silence dissenting opposition voices, civil society organisation – both domestic and international – should strategize and work together to, among other things, dissuade and counter such moves. Also, civil society organisations (CSOs), both local and international, should advocate for policies capable of eliminating or reducing electoral apathy and violence. That way, votes could count.

Second, political stability is not to be prioritised over human security. Aside security challenges posed by terrorists, kidnappers (in in the case of Nigeria) and terrorists, state-enforced violence is also rife in many parts of Africa. Thus, the state should desist from inflicting violence on its citizens, and when violence inevitably erupts, state security agents must be seen to be neutral arbiters.

It is also recommended that rule of law be promoted. This is because with effective observance of rule of law, many governance challenges would cease to exist. There would neither be human rights abuse nor abuse of power. In the same vein, there is an urgent need to cut down high premium attached to political offices, while taking deliberate steps to check judicial rascality.

References

- Ake, C. (1981). *A Political Economy of Africa*. Nigeria: Longman Nigeria Plc.
- Alavi, H. (1972). The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review*, 74, 59-81.



- Alperovitz, G. (2011). *America beyond capitalism: Reclaiming our wealth, our liberty, and our democracy*. Democracy Collaborative Press.
- Amnesty International (2023). Africa 2023.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/report-africa/>.
- Asongu, S. A. & Odhiambo, N. M. (2023). The comparative economics of globalisation and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. *EXCAS Working Paper, WP/22/050*.
- Asongu, S. A., Efobi, U. & Tchamyu, V. S. (2016). Globalisation and governance: A critical contribution to the empirics. *African Governance and Democratic Institute (AGDI) Working Paper, WP/16/017*.
- Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. Yale University Press.
- Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. F. (eds.) (1993). *The global resurgence of democracy*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, L. (1996). Democracy's third wave. In L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu, & H. Tien (eds.), *Consolidating the third wave democracies* (pp. 1-29). John Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, L. (2008). *The spirit of democracy: The struggle to build free societies throughout the world*. Times Books.
- Ekekwe, E. N. (1986). *Class and state in Nigeria*. Longman.
- Engels, F. (1942). *Origin of the family, private property and the state*. International Publishers.
- European Union Election Observation Mission (2023). Nigeria 2023 general elections 25 February and March 18: Final report.
<https://www.eods.eu/library/EU%20EOM%20NGA%202023%20FR.pdf>
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. Free Press.
- Genyi, G. A. & Akpa, P. A. (2017). Globalisation and democratic governance in Africa: An assessment. *International Affairs and Global Strategy, 5(2)*, 1-8.
- Giddens, A. (1998). *The third way: The renewal of social democracy*. Polity Press.
- Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. MIT Press.
- Haynes, J. (2005). *The democratic wave: A global perspective*. Routledge.
- Held, D. (1995). *Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan governance*. Polity Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The third wave: Democratisation in the late 20th century*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jinadu, L. A. (2010). Globalisation & state capacity in Africa. *Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, 41*, 6751-6761.
- Marx, K. (1970). *A contribution to the critique of political economy*. Progress Publishers.



- Mouffe, C. (1993). *The return of the political*. Verso Books.
- Nwankwo, C. A. & Dode, R. O. (2024). International election observers' perception of Nigeria's 2023 election: Lessons for 2027. *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies*, 17(1), 584-602. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v17i1.27>
- Nwankwo, C. A. (2016). The state and the challenges of resource conflict management in South Sudan, 2011-2015. *Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, University of Port Harcourt*.
- Nwaorgu, O.C. (2014). Inactive squares and the rumbling state. *University of Port Harcourt Inaugural Lecture Series No. 110*. University of Port Harcourt Press.
- Okolie, A. M. (2005). Theoretical and practical notes on the Nigerian state. In E.A. Obi, A.M. Okolie & S.O. Obikeze (eds.); *State and economy*. Bookpoint Ltd.
- Pateman, C. (1970). *Participation and democratic theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rodney, W. (2018). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. Verso Books.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). *Capitalism, socialism, and democracy*. Harper & Brothers.