

## **Political Parties And Violence In Nigeria: Lessons From The Role Of CPC In The 2011 Post-Election Violence**

Nwali, Richard Chidi<sup>1</sup>  
David M.E. Nwogbaga<sup>2</sup>  
Joseph O. Nkwede<sup>3</sup>

*Department of Political Science  
Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.*  
[nwalirichardchidi@gmail.com](mailto:nwalirichardchidi@gmail.com);  
[dnwogbaga504@gmail.com](mailto:dnwogbaga504@gmail.com);  
[joseph.nkwede@ebsu.edu.ng](mailto:joseph.nkwede@ebsu.edu.ng)

### **Abstract**

This study on political parties and violence in Nigeria: lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence constitutes a serious issue of contention in our contemporary democratic governance; such contentions have led to the questions challenging the achievements of Nigeria's democratic efforts since independence till date. The objective is to find lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence with the application of Frustration-Aggression theoretical framework as well as the adoption of ex-post facto design of political inquiry justified for its comparative techniques with secondary and primary data collection. Indeed, the study found that the Northern region leadership members of CPC used the breakdown of PDP zoning arrangement to induce their members and supporters into post-election violence in the region for their selfish interests; that the 2011 post-election violence persisted owing to the weak state capacity to checkmate the violent excesses of members of CPC. It was equally deduced that the election tribunal and the declaration of emergency rule strategies did not favour the selfish demands of CPC leadership which triggered them into violent activities; and that the whole crises were targeted at the members and supporters of PDP even the individuals, groups or government institutions suspected to have anything to do with the ruling party (PDP) were already culprits. Finally, the study recommended that political parties in Nigeria should be formed with clear and genuine political ideologies without contravention to the constitutional provisions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to avoid infusion of strange clauses such as zoning arrangement into the political system of the Nation; Nigerian government should build a strong capacity to checkmate the violent excesses of the members of every political party to avoid breach of the constitutional provisions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Political party establishment and practices in Nigeria should be devoid of tribalism and sentiment to avoid winner grabs it all syndrome in the Nation's democracy.

**Keyword:** Political Parties; Post-election violence; Elections; Governance; Democracy

### **Introduction**

Political parties have been the major orchestrator of violent activities during, within and most especially post-election periods in Nigeria. These institutions that ought to be the sources of attainment of quality leadership and stable governance have infected the democratic process with persistent violence. The Nigerian political actors have been habituated to issues and conducts that instigate violence in our electoral processes such as fraud, intimidation of voters and candidates which they consider as necessary tools for political victory.

Ettannibi (2011), posited that Nigerian democratic process is a major source of violence since pre-independence till date been necessitated by political parties, their supporters and activities. It was even noticed when the colonial government introduced limited franchise in the nation's democracy. The author further established that the general elections in Nigeria from 1964 till 1965 witnessed serious post-election violence especially in the western zone of the country following the central and regional government elections coupled with the power tussle between late Chief Obafemi Awolowo and late Chief Ladoke Samuel Akintola. According to him, another post-election violence occurred as a result of tussle between the supporters of the political parties that have their origin and major members in the north and the supporters of its counterparts from the western region of Nigeria. Indeed, it was also reported that the general elections held in 1983 was characterized by massive killings and destruction of property as a result of the declaration of another political party as the winner of Oyo and Ondo states elections respectively where the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) considered as her strongholds (Ettannibi, 2011).

The June 12, 1993 presidential election was marred by monumental deprivation which resulted to violent activities in some parts of Nigeria especially in the western region. Falola and Oruozu (2012), observed that the various manipulations that were associated with this presidential election which most observers deemed to be Nigeria's fairest democratic election purportedly won by a businessman from Yoruba tribe; late Chief M.K.O Abiola, that remains the reference point to the factors that precipitate electoral violence in Nigeria was not devoid of the undue interferences of political parties and party interests. The violence that ensued following the annulment of that election by the then military President, General Ibrahim Babangida, on June 12, 1993 left at its wake tales of woes, mayhem, arson, killings and other violent acts that remained a bad reference point to Nigerian democratic development.

In the wake of these crises, several thousands of citizens were killed especially in the western region before General Ibrahim Babangida agreed to step down and handed over power to a civilian leader on the acting capacity on August 27<sup>th</sup> 1993. Unfortunately, the government known as the Interim National Government took on heavy burden of a civilian head of state superintended by dictatorial senior military officers. The over bearing presence of these military officers turned Chief Ernest Shonekan's government into a nightmare for him and Nigerians as the political violence continued unabated. Shonekan's government was soon over thrown in a palace coup that ushered in late General Sani Abacha on 17<sup>th</sup> November, 1993.

Despite General Abacha's attempt to sustain and succeed himself through series of ill-fated democratic transition programmes, the country continued her journey to political precipice with violence in the escalatory. The death of late General Sani Abacha on 8<sup>th</sup> June, 2008 ushered in the regime of General AbdusalamiAbubakar, who took just nine (9) months to organize a transition to civil rule. Under this order, a combination of Nationalist forces resulted to the 1999 election of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as a democratic President. Evidently, this 1999 entry of Nigeria into democratic governance has continued with the orgy or evil of political violence pervading the landscape.

In the collective report of the 170 NGOs emerged as Transition Monitoring Group (2003), titled "Do vote count?" Elections since 1999 were observed as a process characterized by the monumental use of violent activities by political parties either to gain electoral advantage or show grievances over election outcomes. The observations showed that the votes of Nigerians in those elections did not count. However, it is on record that the elections held in 2003 at the central and state governments followed by the 2004 local government elections

witnessed killings of many Nigerians while some were wounded and property were lost (TMG, 2007). The group further reported that there was high degree of fraud, thugs' activities, abuse of some institutions of governance such as judiciary, military, police, electoral umpires, intimidation of voters, maneuvering of electoral materials, crises and above all, the disenfranchisement of the citizens' civic rights witnessed in 2007 by both the international and local observers which through their reports condemned Nigerian democracy. The observed spates of violent reactions to election outcomes have been mostly spear-headed by political parties where thugs were used in many parts of the country to destabilize the conducts of the elections in order to manipulate the elections results. Instances showed that post-election violence championed by various political parties at different times and circumstances have generated political tensions and instability over the years.

Ordinarily, political parties are expected to checkmate the political behaviours of their members and supporters as to encourage smooth transitions and quality governance. But this expectation has been a mirage in the history of Nigeria's democratic experiments. In this light, this study found lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence as variously accused by the citizens, observers and other commentators of been responsible in the post-2011 presidential violence. However, the study focused in the selected states of the Northern region of Nigeria which includes: Bauchi, Niger and Kaduna states.

### **Statement of the Problems**

Despite the various electoral malpractices, irregularities and rigging which took place in almost every part of Nigeria as perpetrated by various political parties, violence did not prominently occur in those other states as obtained in the Northern region. More disturbing was the fact that the post-election violence seemed more severe in the states where CPC had electoral advantage over the ruling party, PDP. Though several scholars like Ebere and Chloe (2010), Arinola (2010), Paul (2007), Aziken&Umoru (2011), Oloko (2013), Ochereme (2011), Femi (2014), (Nkwachukwu and Uzodi, 2012), (Catholic Bishops' Conference of Nigeria, 2011), Okereke (2012), (John, Willey & Sons, 2011), (The Guardian, 2014), Blanchard (2015), Nwangboso (2011), Ekujumi (2013), Ozekhome (2013), Adejare (2013), etc., have all carried out studies in relation to political parties, electoral violence, post-election violence in different places and years yet none of them made a study on the lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence. Hence, this study is therefore an attempt to identify the lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence for posterity.

### **Theoretical Framework: Frustration-Aggression Theory**

In every social research, there are various analytical theories to explain social issues. They have their merits and demerits. In the case of this study, frustration-aggression theory served as a pillar upon which the analysis was based. The frustration hypothesis was first espoused in 1939 by Dollard and his colleagues in a study carried out in Yale. Dollard (1939), submitted that the major orchestration of crisis is when men feel they are helpless in attaining to their needs. According to him, annoyance caused by helplessness perceived as interference with goal directed behaviour motivates man to violence. Furthermore, the central thesis of this model as expanded by Gurr (1970), posited that aggression is always a consequence of discontent of a kind. To Gurr, after series of studies culminating in the book "why Men Rebel" argued that frustration is a necessary condition for violence. He viewed frustration as an identified misunderstanding between man's expected value and the ones available for him. The expected values are the lands and boundaries, ethnic identity, and religious belief as well as the services, commodities, resources, social amenities and infrastructural facilities which the citizens believe they are rightfully entitled to have access to in every given time while the

value available refers to those lands and boundaries, ethnic and religious identities as well as services, commodities, resources, social amenities and infrastructural facilities that are available for them. He however, suggested some factors that could induce frustration into aggression below: Firstly, when men perceive discrepancy in the goods and services they hoped to achieve the more chances to aggression. Secondly, rich people hardly engage in violence when one out of their multiple opportunities fail but when the poor people lose the only alternative opportunity available for them, the more chances to violent activities. Thirdly, the higher the man's expectancy to achieve a particular goal, the higher the aggression when it is missed; Gurr (1970), further added the intervening variables that may affect disposition towards aggression as: the means through which the government gets into power, the institutions of governance and social structures which may condition the perception of deprivation. Okanya (1999), further attributed aggression to low availability of human wants against the high increase of human expectancy. He has a contrary opinion to the Marxian expectations or the assumptions of Alexis de Tocqueville that violence takes place at the time of relatively wealth and increase in the standard of living of the people. Acknowledging the plausibility of this line of arguments, we however observed the theoretical and empirical difficulties. What readily comes to mind is Operationalization of "Expectations". Writing under the title "Rising Expectations and political turmoil" Oberschall (1969), observed difficulty in adequately defining the meaning of expectation. Even with the use of sophisticated tools of expectation and relative deprivation are subject to problems. Implicit in the model is that violence occurs when the "want-get gap" becomes intolerable. However, it is observed that the estimation of intolerability is frequently indexed by the occurrence of conflict itself. Thus, there is need for an independent evaluation of intolerability instead of its behavioural consequences. This criticism notwithstanding is a valid argument to say that frustration arising from deprivation does not in most cases motivate people to violent conflict given the existence of the intervening variables that may affect disposition towards aggression. In essence, it seemed rather narrow and reductionist to argue that frustration will always produce violence. These criticisms notwithstanding, it is a valid argument to say that frustration arising from deprivation does not in most cases motivate people to violent acts given the existence of the intervening variables that may affect disposition towards aggression. In essence, it seems rather narrow and reductionisms to argue that frustration will always produce violence.

## **Review Of Related Literature**

### **Contending perspectives on Post-election violence**

#### **The functionalists Perspective**

This school of thought also referred to as consensus school of thought blamed the issues that precipitate post-election violence on the inability of the parties involved to sustain or maintain an agreement made. The functionalist school of thought is a sociologists school which has its central focus on how social order and stability is maintained in the state but if social order and stability are unable to be maintained, any frustrated party or parties may likely resort to violent activities. Ebere and Chloe (2010), in their discourses, analyzed "Zoning" as a major issue in the consensus school. Arinola (2010) in her view stated that zoning in Nigeria is a strategy for peace in a country with more than 250 ethnic groups. On the contrary, zoning may not provide the right and competent leaders as the electorates will be restricted to those from a particular zone, whether they are competent or not. Another precipitated issue is the chaos caused by Nigerian government power-sharing policies, job and resource sharing formula. Paul (2007), Posited that every nation-state should ensure equal right, fairest and justice in every activities of the government to its citizenry such as power-sharing, allocation of resources available for the state, job employment, etc without sentiment of one's tribe, state or status. But this conceptualization caused more harm than

good in the politics of Nigeria. This is because ethno –religious sentiment is most favoured than meritocracy even at the level of civil service work where some workers sometimes resort to conflict actions following imposition of mediocre to the top civil service departments and boards or commissions. Eberé and Chloé (2010) observed that even the government functionaries instead of making and implementing policies that will favour the entire nation; they will be sentimental and tribal in the discharge of their duties and the distribution of nation's resources; thereby threatening the nations peace and unity. Aziken&Umoru (2011), noted that, AtikuAbubakar ex-vice President of Nigeria challenged his boss for imposing Musa Ya'Adua on Nigeria as president as a punishment to the nation for rejecting his (Obasanjo) third term ambition. In favour of this argument, the aggrieved Northerners viewed it as against the zoning Agreement between the North and the southern region of Nigeria. Olorokor (2013), noted that, the former Niger-Delta activist, AlhajiMujahidDokubo-Asari has argued that Nigeria will be on fire if Dr. J. Goodluck loses his bid as the president. This is against the backdrop statement made in 2010 by LawalKaita that failure of PDP not to allow the northerners to complete their presidential tenure as enshrined in the party's manifesto will create leadership instability in Nigeria irrespective of who takes over power from other geopolitical areas in the country.

### **The Pluralist Perspective**

The pluralists blame the issues that precipitate the electoral crises on multiplicity of rival ethnic and religious cleavages with conflicting differences that continually compete for preeminence and dominance to avoid subordination (Olu-Adeyemi, 2006; Otite, 2000; Akinola, 2000; Nnoli, 1994). They argued that post-election violence will remain as long as these conflicting differences exist among the various rival ethnic and religious cleavages. This is because no group however small wants to die out, or is willing to let its political interests and privileges die. (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010; Ostien, 2009; Olu-Adeyemi, 2006; Onwudiwe, 2004; Akinola, 2000; Amin, 1972; Mosca, 1939). Every ethnic and religious group is therefore constantly engaged in the struggle against political domination (Wale, 2004; Suberu, 1997; Nnoli, 1994; Nnoli, 1978). However, the contention of the pluralists is disputed because political differences are not always divisive but can be integrative if properly harnessed by the leading elites (Dansoe, 2011). Hence, the very facts that a country that has different political interest groups do not sufficiently make- division and violence inevitable (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Empirical evidence reveals that division is dependent less on multi-nationalists country to take its course. It is on record that even countries that have multi-ethnic nationalities like Britain, America, etc witnesses more unity and political freedom unlike other nation-states such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi that are ridden with violence (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). Also, it is not holistically true to assert as this school does, that due to some inherent factors in the nature of groups or in the nature of human beings that they get into goal incompatibility (Dokun, 2005). Hence, other factors may exist to exacerbate political violence. Okolo (2013) expressed the threat of our unity and peaceful co-existence as a nation-state with the recent merger of some major opposition political parties known today as All Progressive Congress (APC) not minding the inability of both the ruling and opposition parties to resolve and maintain their internal differences. Ochereme (2011) noted that, some Islamic extremists moved to eliminate all other religious organizations including Christianity which is another major religious belief predominant in the southern part of the country as against the tenets of federalism which Nigeria stands for.

The post-election violence that was triggered more by the victory of the PDP presidential candidate from the minority, south-south geopolitical region who is also a Christian which induced more Northern-Islamic extremists into violent activities was blamed on the British colonialism. According to the pluralist school of thought in the view of Femi (2014), the

British government divided the earlier peaceful and united people of the northern region of Nigeria into educated and non-educated elite. In other words, those that embraced British education are regarded as educated while those that embraced Islamic education are regarded as uneducated. This is obviously observed that even in the present time Nigeria, the only recognized and wealthy Northerners are those that embraced westernization while the commoners are impoverishing (Nkwachukwu and Uzodi, 2012).

### **Institutionalist Perspective**

Taking a different dimension, the institutionalists contend that post-election violence may persist in the society due to the inability of the institutions of governance and authority to enforce law and order in the country (Wilkinson, 1977). This submission implies that the process through which the various political parties in Nigeria struggle for power generates violence beyond the capacity of the state institutions of governance to resolve. Thus, the character of Nigeria's federalism, fragile civil society organizations, weak institutional arrangements and inadequate Strategy for regular dialogue are responsible for the persistence of post-election violence in Nigeria (Wale, 2004). The institutionalism, therefore focused on structures, actors and the dynamics in terms of the existing relationship to the institutions charged with handling issues concerning crisis resolution and management. Wilkinson (1977) articulated some conditions under liberal democracy when violence may be justifiably persistent: first, when the basic rights and liberties are taken away by the arbitrary actions of government or its agencies; second, when one minority is attacked by another minority without receiving adequate protection from the state and agencies of the law and order. Ngbor (2008) reported that the people of Teyor-Kaani Community, Khana Council were massively massacred by the government of PDP in River state owing to their (community) unanimous allegiance to opposition party. Indeed, Francis Febode Tabai (Judicial Court of Appeal) in the work of Etannibi (2011) reported that armed thugs suspected to be machineries of the ruling party (PDP) perpetrated crises before the Nigeria's security agents during the voting process in 2011 Nigeria's general elections especially in some states in the south east and south-south and no arrest or an attempt was made by the security personnel to stop it. It is surprising that the intuitions of government established to maintain law and order are now breakers of the law they are constitutionally charged to protect. But once these institutional viruses are non-existent, that is, where aggrieved groups enjoy full protection and rights of participation in a democratic state, and their enjoyment of these rights are not attacked by the state, its agencies or rival groups. The argument goes that the violence may not persist because there is no justification for it (Wilkinson, 1977; Wale, 2004). The Catholic Bishops' of Nigeria corroborated this view, when they submitted that the legitimate grievances left unaddressed by the government build up social tensions which tend to provoke violent reactions (Catholic Bishops' Conference of Nigeria, 2011). Okolo (2013), argued that the shooting to death of the leader of the Islamic extremists group by the military triggered the violent actions of his followers against Nigerian military personnel owing to the premise that the Islamic sects are the major operators of 2011 electoral crises. Okereke (2012) blamed the electoral crises in Nigeria to the weak judicial system, injustice, nepotism and a culture of impunity. In his views, people commit all manner of crimes and get away with them. When justice is said to be meted out, a rich man gets a slap on the wrist for stealing or embezzling billions of naira while a poor man is sentenced for five years imprisonment for stealing a goat. There is a widespread notion that justice can be bought or sold in Nigeria depending on one's bargaining power and contacts in the corridors of power. He said, some of the alleged master minders of Boko Haram are said to have been arrested in the past by security agents but promptly released due to intervention of powerful individuals while some of them were jailed for just few months, they come out sooner than later and continue with their notorious activities. In Nigeria, it is well known that any act of election

violence is commonly associated to the ruling party because of its access to the public treasury which they use to finance and or motivate restive youth as well as the security agents to unleash violence and or to intimidate voters from coming out to vote. (John, Willey & Sons, 2011). The misconduct of electoral processes and activities by the electoral umpire motivated crises that have brought instability in Nigeria socio-political and economic sectors. Politically, this syndrome has caused a lot of harm than good in Nigeria's polity owing to the fact that our democracy is no longer on the basis of the right candidate on the right position to deliver the dividends of democracy to the entire country and not to a particular people or a particular group of people but now, it is on the basis of tribalism and religious cleavages. It is on record that these mayhems have laid many Nigerians and non- Nigerians to rest prematurely. It has also displaced many Nigerians beyond return. Socially, it has increased the sense of hatred amongst Nigerians where the spirit of one Nigeria as professed by NnamdiAzikiwe has been buried on the altar of tribalism, nepotism, favouritism and religious polarism which its outcome is to emerge the mediocre on the position of authority to the detriment of all. Indeed, economically, it has a lot of discouragement on the investors mostly in those volatile areas in the northern region of Nigeria, (The Guardian, 2014). Blanchard (2015), professed that even though that the 2011 elections in contrast, were seen by international observers as more credible than previous efforts, but notwithstanding problems, and the protests and violence that followed the polls suggested that many Nigerians lacked faith in the electoral process. Since then, donors and advocacy groups have pressed the government to improve electoral procedures and prosecute cases of electoral fraud and political violence especially those frauds that emanates from the electoral umpire to promote accountability and build public confidence on the electoral institution.

### **Resolving Party Grievances over Election Outcomes**

This part of the study focused on election tribunal as a medium of resolving party grievances arising from election outcomes. However, many election tribunals have existed in Nigeria since 1999 with the major purpose of addressing grievances arising from post-election outcome in Nigeria. In this context, attention will focus on some election tribunals, bones of the contention, the judgments passed and the implications of the judgments on the aggrieved persons in relation to their reactions and also the effects of the judgments on the electorates, political parties and party supporters. Election tribunals address grievances arising from electoral outcomes. Nwangboso (2011), noted that 1999 election tribunals nullified some elections, ousted political office holders from office and called for a re-run election in those areas in Nigeria. Obelgore (2004), observed in the petition by Muhammadu Buhari that the 2003 election that returned Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the president of Nigeria was invalid owing to ineligibility of Obasanjo to contest the election as a serving president and also, the petition raised very serious issues of law relating to the breach of the fundamental principles of the rules of natural justice and section 42(1) (b) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which touched on the fundamental competence of Independent National Electoral Commission to conduct election without nepotism and favouritism to a particular political party or candidate to the detriment of others. However, in the final judgment on the 2003 presidential election tribunal, John (2005) observed that in the delivered judgment on the matter, the Supreme Court resolved that the irregularities during the 2003 election did not materially affect the outcome of the presidential elections and that Obasanjo is the duly elected president of Nigeria. In 2007, PDP filed a petition before the election tribunal in Kano on the 21<sup>st</sup> day of May, 2007 alleging among other things that ANPP candidate for House of Representatives representing Dakwakin Kudu/Warawa Federal Constituency in Kano State was unduly returned by INEC as the winner of the election. In the lead judgment of Baba (2008), he observed that in the said election, PDP candidate scored 22,298 votes while ANPP had 46,600 votes. Therefore, he upheld the ANPP victory and struck out the petition filed by

PDP for lack of merit. Nwagboso (2011), noted to his greatest dismay how the superior courts of higher jurisdiction discredited the judgments of the courts of smaller jurisdiction in some states of the southern parts of Nigeria. Onoyume (2009), it was on record that the court of Appeal leader of 2009 Abia state tribunal got report that some judges under him collected bribe and declared a wrong candidate as the winner which caused him to state thus “I resolved the issues that were raised from the grounds of appeal in favour of the 1<sup>st</sup> and second appellants. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> appellants are returned as governor and deputy governor of Abia State, relying on provisions of the constitution, the court held that Theodore Orji was not a public servant at the time he contested for the governorship election. However, the implications of the judgments of the election tribunals on the aggrieved persons in relation to their reactions manifested through the statement of General Buhari in 2005. John (2005) reported that after the Supreme Court has declared that Obasanjo is the duly elected president of Nigeria, the political establishment must close ranks now and support the president in his attempt to move the country forward. He observed that Muhammadu Buhari said, “I accept but disagree with the verdict”. “I think it is a shame on the political and legal system in Nigeria that an appeal against the 2003 presidential election has taken over two years to resolve. It is embarrassing”. What if the Supreme Court had resolved that Obasanjo did not win the 2003 election? Every law enacted, every appointment made, every money spent would have been illegal as well. Indeed, the post-presidential election violence in 2011 especially in the Northern region of Nigeria could be the implication of the unacceptance of the Supreme Court verdict by Buhari. Therefore, from the above expositions, the effects of the judgments on the electorates, political parties and party supporters is that the ugly trend affected the citizens’ participation in the Nigeria’s electoral process and led to the collapse of various democratic institutions in the country. It even became a culture for those who never won elections not only to be declared winners but be allowed to serve their stolen mandates through the delay tactics of the tribunals. This situation adversely affected the morale of the electorates and the survival of democracy in Nigeria. However, the effects of tribunal judgments could be felt in different dimensions which to the winners, they are doing the right thing but the losers feel otherwise. All these issues combine to make political actors lose confidence in the elections tribunals. The judiciary by and large has not been independent of the federal government from the point of view of all previous federal elections petitions in the country. This has contributed immensely to the post-election violence in Nigeria because the ruling party appoints and influences the decisions of the election tribunal in Nigeria. In his analysis, he said when the ANPP presidential candidate (the largest opposition party in the country) Muhammadu Buhari complained of malpractices in 2003 election, the ruling party was confident in demanding that he should go to court. The Nigerian judiciary is saddled with the responsibilities of upholding the principles of social justice, interpretation of the law as well as protection and guidance of the constitution. However recent activities of the judiciary or weaknesses as a result of certain factors associated with corruption have made the public not only within the country but also the international community to doubt about the independent nature of the Nigeria judiciary. The recent controversial verdict by the court of Appeal in upholding the election of Yar’Adua came with a shock in the minds of many Nigerians and election observers who witnessed the April 2007 polls. The ruling was welcomed with wide criticism as many lost hope for the success of democratization process in the country. Balarabe Musa called it a compromised judiciary” that the Nigerian judiciary is against all expectations, proving to be a handmaiden in the nefarious stratagem of the ruling government and leadership. That it remains the only conclusion that can be arrived at by any reasonable person from the unpatriotic, patently corrupt, dishonorable and contradictory judgments that have so far engulfed the 2007 general election (CNPP 17<sup>th</sup> June, 2008). An investigation by Sahara reporters based in New York, revealed that, the panel of judges were not only massively bribed by operatives of Yar’Adua government but that the

circle of compromised actors reached wide to top editors and columnist, traditional rulers, politicians and religious leaders. It is widely believed that the controversial verdict undermines democratic process in Nigeria as many people have lost hope for the judiciary in promoting Democracy and justice in the country which instigates the aggrieved oppositions into violence because of lack of confidence in the judicial system (John Willey & sons, 2011). Fawehinmi (2007), observed the feelings of disappointment of many Nigerians over the insincerity of some judges who were engaged in the 2003 election tribunal. The human activist cited the case of Anambra south district; the Tribunal found for Prince Nicholas Ukachukwu against the election of Dr. Ugochukwu Uba. Dr Uba appealed to the court of Appeal. Meanwhile, he had been sworn-in as a senator. The matter which came before the court of Appeal and the court of Appeal of three justices was later found guilty of bribery and other forms of corrupt practices. According to the Human right activist, the story never changed as the five member election tribunal constituted to look into Akwa-Ibom state Governorship Election was also found guilty of such impunity.

### **Strategies for Checkmating Post-Election Violence**

Several strategies have been proposed and applied to resolve post-election violence in Nigeria. However, the study focused on emergency rule and the social capital formation which have been closely associated with some states in Nigeria. A critique of these strategies revealed the extent to which they can address the post-election violence in Nigeria.

#### **i. The State of Emergency Strategy**

A state of emergency otherwise called *Justitium* in Roman law bans the operations of elected, some legally and unofficially authorities from functioning for some certain period. Under emergency rule, the laws and the statutory organs or institutions of governance are abolished within the period (Shetaha, 2004). In the period of emergency rule, NGOs and unapproved organization, as well as unregistered financial donations are formally banned (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2011), Three main elements of emergency rule in time of violence (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2011): extra-ordinary powers to the president, regulation of the state of siege, and the suspension of regular procedures. The abuse of rights and privileges of the citizenry became the prime criticism leveled against the declaration of emergency in Nigeria's Western Region in 1962 over crisis in the House of Assembly. Awolowo noted that there had been more serious crisis in Tiv (Northern Region) and Okrika (Eastern Region), which the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa did not invoke the emergency powers (The Guardian, May 19, 2004). Also citing the case of India under Gahndi when his election was characterized by monumental manipulations, the state of emergency was adopted as a tool to keep all the opponents in the prison. The state of emergency declared in the western Nigeria in 1962. Mobolaji (2004) posited that it was due to large- scale of irregularities observed in the 1962 enumeration during the first Nigeria census in which the results were eventually cancelled and the census redone more than a year later, November 5-8 1963. On May 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962 at a meeting of the western and mid- western executive committee of the action group, Chief S.L. Akintola, and then premier of AG-controlled western Nigeria was forced to defend himself for anti- party activities. The head of the government, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared what he called; "Public State of Emergency." At the same vein, plateau state experienced same in 2004 when President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in plateau state following a Christian massacre of Muslims in the state. It is observed that the massacre turned to extra judicial destruction of lives of Christians. (BBC, 2004). Olusegun Obasanjo constituted a caretaker committee thereby banishing the elected authorities while it was also observed that in Ekiti State in 2006 there were Public Order Emergency rules over electoral outcomes which however, mainly faced criticisms especially over its relevance, interpretation and application of the doctrine of extra-ordinary powers by the president Chief Olusgun

Obasanjo. The declaration of state of emergency was criticized because they were not guided by the principles of legality and proportionality (Wikipedia, 2011; Nwabueze, 2004). Arguably, the principle of legality was flagrantly violated because the emergency rule was neither declared nor executed in accordance with the provision of the constitution (Nwabueze, 2004). Also, the principle of proportionality was not observed as the actions taken in respect of the emergency rule were extended beyond the exigencies of the crisis situation. The emergency rule in Plateau state was therefore described as a rape of constitutionality because (a) it suspended the constitutional organs (offices) of the government and not just the occupants; (b) whereas the crisis only affected some sections of Plateau State, the emergency rule was declared in all parts of the state and; (c) the extra ordinary measures exercised were targeted almost entirely at the rights and freedom of the individuals through executive actions rather than the law (Nwabueze, 2004). Ekujumi (2013), noted that the president of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan in a nationally televised broadcast on Tuesday 14<sup>th</sup> May, 2013 declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states has painfully divided the opinions of Nigerians on this matter along sectional, religious and in some cases political lines which portends grave danger for Nigerian's unity and democracy which is not in the interest of the teaming mass of our national life. He noted that, in as much as we condemn violence in whatever form and wish that the perpetrators be brought to book no matter their identity, we must be very careful to ensure that whatever we do in a democratic system is in tandem with democratic norms and not the other way. He said the declaration of state of emergency by Mr. President Amounts to nothing other than cowardice which stands condemned because it's observed undemocratic and uncivilized. Ozekhome (2013) observed that the declaration of state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states was unnecessary as the country is not at war or in eminent danger of invasion. According to him, section 305 of the 1999 constitution does not permit the declaration of state of emergency just because a part of the country is facing security challenges. He also expressed fear that the deployment of more military troops to the affected states would lead to the death of innocent people, adding that it would amount to the violation of the rights of the citizens. Adejare (2013), called on the political class to support Mr. President to the new security arrangement owing to the fact that the security challenge in the country has reached a level where it should not be handled with kids glove.

## **ii. The Social Capital Formation Strategy**

The social capital formation as a Strategy for violent resolution draws from the postulation of the pluralists. They contend that the post-election violence in Nigeria can be resolved by building social cohesion among various communities, ethno-religious cleavages and political parties through sharing of trusts rather than applying repressive measures like state of emergency and coercion (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). Social capital refers to the norms and values that promote cooperation between two or more individuals (Fukuyama, 2002).

Callahan (2005), noted that there are three ways the strategy helps the people to comply with the norms by laws. Ojukwu and Onifade (2010), stated that these dimensions are: the nexus or action connection dimension, the structural and cognitive dimension, and the bridging and bonding dimension. Pretty (2003), stated that being inward looking, bonding bolsters people's narrower selves and can build strong inter-community tolerance. Hence, Ojukwu and Onifade (2010) contend for instance that, the emergence and persistence of the Jos crisis was as a result of itchy togetherness that existed within Jasawa people and people Plateau due to insufficient social capital formation. Hence, it may be stated that indigenes and the residents of the North predisposed them to violent conflicts due to insufficient capital formation. They therefore, suggest that post-election violence can be moderated through social capital formation. However, it should be noted that, building stable and coherent society through social capital formation is more or less realistic in pre-crisis period when

relationship has not been strained or damaged. In other words, social capital formation is more of a Strategy for violence prevention rather than resolution or can still apply to the later when the crisis has not escalated (Ostien, 2009; Ahmed, 2006; Dokun, 2005).

Based on the foregoing review, it is observed that the writings of the scholars in the above mentioned contending perspectives on the lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence; they addressed issues of social capital formation, peace-building and integration, political instability and the constitutionality of the state of emergency strategies in some states affected by post- election violence. Essentially, their studies examined the isolated cases of post-election violence which they highlighted the immediate causes with thorough investigation to the remote issues that chained up the post-election violence over the years. Thus, they did not explain why post-election violence is always more prevalent in the Northern states over the years than other parts of Nigeria especially lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence.

### **The 2011 Presidential Election and the Post-Election Violence**

The 2011 presidential election was arguably one of the freest and fairest elections ever conducted in the political history of Nigeria. Hence, some scholars appreciated and considered the conduct of the 2011 election as the best in the democratic history of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the election generated democratic instability, high increase of loss of lives and property more than other years witnessed, the story of the violent excesses of political parties never changed. Meanwhile, the presidential election results are captured in table 1 thus:

**Table 1: the 2011 presidential election results of the 36 states of Nigeria and the FCT**

State	CPC	PDP
Gombe	459898	290347
Taraba	257986	451354
Yobe	337537	117128
Borno	909763	207075
Kebbi	501453	369198
Adamawa	344526	508314
Jigawa	663994	419252
C/River	4002	709382
Katsina	1163919	428392
Rivers	13182	1817762
Delta	89060	1378851
Zamfara	624515	238980
Niger	652574	321429
Abia	3743	1175984
Kano	1624543	440666
Bauchi	1315209	258404
Benue	109680	694776
Bayelsa	691	504811
Kwara	83603	268243
Ebonyi	1025	480592
Plateau	356551	1029865
Kaduna	1334244	1190179
Edo	17795	542173
Nasarawa	278390	408997
Oyo	92396	484758
Ekiti	2689	135009
Imo	7591	1381357
A/Ibom	5348	1165629
Sokoto	540769	309057
Lagos	189983	1281688
Anambra	4223	1145169
Kogi	132201	399816
Osun	6997	188409
Ondo	11890	387376
Enugu	3753	802144
FCT	131576	253444
Ogun	17654	309177

**Source: INEC, 2011**

The results as captured in table 1 indicated that the CPC had electoral victory in the following 12 states: Gombe, Yobe, Borno, Kebbi, Jigawa, Katsina, Zamfara, Niger, Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna, and Sokoto. But the CPC-driven 2011 post-election violence is seen to have occurred mostly in these states where the CPC had electoral victory as reflected in table 2.

Table 2: Deaths and Destruction of Property in 2011  
 Post-Election Violence in Northern Nigeria.

State	Deaths Estimate	Displaced Persons
Kaduna	680	7,000
Gombe	10	700
Bauchi	3	7,000
Kano	n.a.	4,000
Katsina	n.a.	800
Niger	n.a.	500
Sokoto	n.a.	2,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>22,000</b>

Source: Human Rights Watch(2011)

Based on the data contained in table 2, in the southern region of Kaduna state, the CPC members and supporters killed more than 500 people while about 180 people were reported killed in the northern part of the state at the declaration of Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the election (Human Right watch, 2011).It was also observed that not less than 10 people were killed in Gombe State and another 3 in Bauchi in the post-election crisis that rocked some cities in the northern region of Nigeria less than 72 hours after the results of presidential elections were released.

Notably, as partially reflected in table 2, Human Rights Watch (2011) reported that more than 65,000 people were forced to flee their homes to unknown destinations for safety. Though, the accurate figure of the displaced persons were not certain as Nigerian Red Cross Society released a slightly lower figure indicating that the violence displaced 48,000 persons in the 12 states of the country according to Omenazu and Paschal 2011 who also indicated that the displaced persons were camped at various locations in Nigeria as follows: 7,000 persons at Army Barracks, Zango and Railway area in Bauchi State; 700 persons at Army and Police Barracks in Gombe State; 7,000 persons at Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna State; 4,000 persons at Bompai Police Barracks, Army Barracks, Mobile Police Barracks, and Air Force Base in Kano State; 800 persons at Central Police Station, SabonGari Police Station in Daura and Makera Police Station in Funtua, Katsina State; 500 persons at the Army and Mobile Police Barracks in Niger State; and 2000 persons at Army and Police Barracks in Sokoto State. It was also noted that about 8,400 persons from the Northern Nigeria were taken to Military Barracks in Onitsha, Anambra State for refuge because of fear of being attacked. Human Rights Watch (2011), reported that the rate of death was more intense in Kaduna as Nigerian Police indicated that 401 people were killed during the post-election violence in Kaduna State while attacks in the predominantly Christian communities of Southern Kaduna State, including Zonkwa, Matsirga, Kafanchan, and MarabarRido recorded the death of more than 500 people. Meanwhile, various properties were burnt down and destroyed in Bauchi State including that of the then incumbent governor, IssaYuguda(Ekeh, 2011); and several other properties were destroyed in Kaduna State as captured in table 3.

Table 3: Destruction of Property in 2011  
 Post-Election Violence in Kaduna State.

Property	Number
Houses	1,435
Shops	987
Churches	157
Mosques	46
Police	45
Government	16
Vehicles	437
Motorcycles	219
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,342</b>

Source: Ogbaudu (2011)

Indeed, the 2011 post-election violence left Nigeria with unprecedented colossal losses of both material and human resources. Ogbaudu (2011), reported that the destruction of houses and other properties in Kaduna State alone was unquantifiable as Nigerian Police reported that 1,435 private houses, 987 shops, 157 Churches, 46 Mosques, 45 police properties, 16 government properties, 437 vehicles, and 219 motorcycles were burnt or destroyed.

### **Findings**

- i. The Northern region leadership members of CPC used the breakdown of PDP zoning arrangement to induce their members and supporters into post-election violence in the region to serve their political interests.
- ii. The 2011 post-election violence persisted owing to the weak state capacity to checkmate the violent excesses of members of CPC. It was equally deduced that the election tribunal and the declaration of emergency rule strategies did not favour the demands of CPC leadership which triggered them into violent activities.
- iii. The crises were targeted at the members and supporters of PDP and even the individuals; groups or government institutions suspected to have anything to do with the then ruling party (PDP) were already considered culprits.

### **Discussion**

The elite members of CPC in the Northern region capitalized on the breakdown of the PDP zoning arrangement to manipulate the citizens into 2011 post-election violence as a means of achieving their selfish party interests. Obijiofor (2011), established that the former governor of Anambra state, Chukwuemeka Ezeife, responded eloquently to the claims that post-election violence in the Northern region of Nigeria symbolized the people's reaction to a stolen mandate (an argument CPC leaders pushed repeatedly since the party lost the presidential election). He said no one would argue compellingly that the violence that erupted in Bauchi, Gombe, Katsina, Kaduna and other parts of the North on the weekend of the presidential election in April 2011 was merely spontaneous. He argued that the bloodshed was premeditated and was executed by supporters of CPC. Chineme Okafor (2011) quoted Dakas that the violence exacerbated as a result of high level of illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and the manipulation of religious and other sectional lines of the Nigerian polity citing CPC as a point of focus. Human Right Watch (2011), revealed that 800 people were killed and more than 65,000 people were displaced. Therefore, this is not justifying that there had not been evidence of post-election violence in the history of Nigerian elections but establishing that there were extraordinary massive killings, wounding innocent citizens, foreigners and displacement of people that run into thousands and the destruction of properties that worth over billions of naira with other social vices and atrocities such as kidnapping, robbing, hatred and unnecessary political oppositions, etc.

The scholars argued that CPC leaders played a technical role in using the citizens to achieve their selfish party interests through political violence. In the words of Dakas by Chineme Okafor (2011), the violence exacerbated as a result of high level of illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, and the manipulation of religious and other sectional lines of the Nigerian polity (Tunga, 2011). The most disheartening was the conspiracy of the security agents with the CPC supporters to cause unrest immediately after the declaration of Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the 2011 Presidential election in Nigeria. Tunga (2011), expressed disappointment over the security forces involvement in the riots wrecked areas in the northern region of Nigeria. The scholar argued that the security agents failed woefully over their intervention in Kafanchan, Zonkwa and Madakiya allowing the culprits to hold Kafanchan area at hostage for many hours which resulted in killing many believers of Christianity and setting their major market ablaze and it was regrettably that soldiers on their arrival to the crises affected areas, laid anguish on the residents of the areas and their property that run into millions of naira. It is worthy of note that many lives were lost including Nigerians and non-citizens of Nigeria and also many were hospitalized including some chieftains in this country within those areas. The military men could not vacate Kagoma village until they murdered innocent mothers, youths and wounded many indigenes of the area. Therefore, it is uncovered that the weak rational capacity of Nigerian government did not allow them to think before they act rather, they acted before thinking. Obviously, the military becomes thorns on the flesh of the innocent citizens of any community facing the challenge of electoral violence without recourse to the decorum. This is disappointing that the state through its security operatives could not checkmate and tackle the violent excesses of CPC members and their supporters rather killing the innocent citizens and destroying their properties.

It was equally argued that the election tribunal and the declaration of emergency rule strategies did not favour the selfish demands of CPC elites. Adejare (2013), expressed joy on the declaration of emergency rule in some states of the northern region stating that it made the northern political elites not to achieve their selfish demands, interests and also called the political class and all the well-meaning Nigerians to support the government of President, Goodluck Jonathan in his new security arrangement. He established that the tribunal did not favour the selfish desire of the CPC leadership and demands to cancel the election generally considered to be free, fair and credible in the history of Nigerian politics. Finally, the study argued that there will be future re-occurrence of post- election violence in Nigeria if unable to utilize its sovereign-security powers and apparatuses to curtail the excesses of political parties at all level. The scholar maintained that if nothing reasonable is done by the government of Nigeria to curtail the excesses of political parties and their activities, the members and the elites will always capitalize on the weak capacity of the state in using the citizens to achieve their selfish interests through more controversial post-election violence.

### **The Lessons from the Role of CPC in the 2011 Post-Election Violence**

The lessons from the role of CPC in the 2011 post-election violence that threatened Nigeria's overall democratic development include that:

- i. Political violence is not an act in itself that sprays out from the oblivion or outer space neither is it an act of man's everyday relationship with his fellow man. It is an act of value judgment under which gains and losses are weighed against one another to identify the most satisfying outcome between the two.
- ii. In a competitive ground of winners and losers, under which the winner takes all syndrome dominates as it does in Nigeria's political calculations, the losers have in most cases taken extreme measures as last resort attempt to redress their cases.

- iii. At this level of win versus lose game, the loser often develop frustration based on the fact that dreams, aspirations and gains having been washed down the drain way either take a longer time to be regained or completely lost without chance in the future, faced with the associated frustration, the loser which in the Nigeria case was the CPC, sought to vent the pent up anger occasioned by the frustrated efforts at achieving their political goals. The victims in this case were the citizens of the affected states of Northern Nigeria where CPC felt they ought to have had landslide victory without loss of any vote.
- iv. The frustration-aggression theory adequately addressed the subject under study because the post- 2011 presidential election violence witnessed in these northern states allegedly caused by the CPC were acts of a frustrated group who sought to vent their anger on the most available quarters which happened to be citizens of the affected Northern Nigerian States.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The study has shown that even when elections with limited franchise was conducted in Nigeria till date, Nigeria elections have been characterized by post-election violence posed by selfishness of political actors; individually and collectively because they see politics as “*profit making ventures*” rather than “*problem solving ventures*”. Hence, the study made the following recommendations:

- Political parties in Nigeria should be formed with clear and genuine political ideologies without contravention to the constitutional provisions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to avoid infusion of strange clauses such as zoning arrangement into the political system of the Nation.
- Nigerian government should build a strong capacity to checkmate the violent excesses of the members of every political party to avoid breach of the constitutional provisions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- Political party establishment and practices in Nigeria should be devoid of tribalism and sentiment to avoid winner grabs it all syndrome in the Nation’s democracy.

### **References**

- Adejare, B. (2013), “Jonathan violates Nigerian constitution in declaring state of Emergency” (<http://www.naij.com/34172.htm>). Retrieved on 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 2014.
- Ahmed, A. (2006), “Through the Eyes of the indigenous population innovative and comprehensive Approaches to Mediation And ADR in the Middle-East, in: Journal of peace, conflict and Development, Issue 14, July, 2006” (<http://www.Peacestudiesjournal.org.uk>). Retrieved on 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 2014.
- Amin, S. (1972), Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black African: Origins and Contemporary Forms, Journals and Modern African Studies
- Akinola, A. (2000), “Religion: The Gathering Storm” *The Guardian* (Lagos), 27<sup>th</sup> June, 2000
- Al-Ahram Weekly (2011), “Emergency Rule in Egypt” (<http://www.allafrica.com>). Retrieved on 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 2014.
- Arinola, O. (2010), “Zoning of Political Offices in Nigeria” ( <http://www.discuss.Tigweb.Org>). Retrieved on 30<sup>th</sup> Feb.2014.
- Asika, M. (2006), *Research Methodology in the Behavioural Sciences*, Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Plc.

- Awolowo, O.(1962), “The 1962 State of Emergency in the Western Region” *The Guardian* (Lagos), 19 May, 1962
- Aziken, E. and Umoru, H. (2011),” Obasanjo foisted unhealthy Yar’Adua on Nigerians as punishment-Atiku” *Vanguard* 29 November, 2011. (<http://www.vanguardngr.com>). Retrieved on 30<sup>th</sup> Feb.2014.
- Baba Alkali Ba’Aba, JCA (2008), Hon. Engr. Bako Sarai (PDP) Vs InusaHaruna (ANPP)” *Nigeria Weekly Law Report*”
- Bamidele, Y. (2011), National Electoral Violence Report by *National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria*, Ibadan, NAPEN Publications
- British Broadcasting Corporation, (2004), “Obasanjo declares State of Emergency in Plateau State” (<http://www.m.BBC News .org>). Retrieved on 30<sup>th</sup> Feb.2014.
- Bierenu-Nnbugwu, M.(2004), *Fundamentals of Political Inquiry*, Enugu, Quintagon Publication.
- Black, J. and Champion,D. (1976), *Methods and Issues in Social Research*, New York, John Willey and Sons.
- Blanchard L. (2015), Nigeria’s 2015 Elections and the BokoHaramCrisis,Congressional Research Service7-5700 [www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov) R43881. Retrieved on 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2013.
- Callaham,W. (2005),Social Capital and Corruption: Vote Buying and the Politics of Reform, Thailand, *Arm-polit.Sci.Assoc*.
- Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria(2011), “Nigeria: Our Common Destiny” A (communiqué) issued at the End of the second plenary meeting of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) at Bishop Thomas McGretrick, pastoralcentre, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, *The Citizens Advocate* (Abakaliki) 30th September, 2011.
- Chineme, O. (2011), “How zoning caused post-election violence” ([www.thisdaylive.com](http://www.thisdaylive.com)). Retrieved on 8<sup>th</sup> March, 2015.
- Cohen, D. and Prusak, L. (2001), *In Good company: How Social Capital makes organizations work*, Boston, Harvard Business School Press.
- Conference of Nigerian Political Parties, (2008), “Aborted Democracy” (<http://www.Nigeria.com/mapgif>). Retrieved on 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2013.
- Dansoe, V. (2011), Leadership and political instability in the third world: leadership paper at a conference held at the legion centre for *International Affairs and Diplomacy*, university of Ghana, Accra, Ghana, 22-23 September, 2011.
- Dokun, O. (2005), *Conflict and context of conflict Resolution*, Ile Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd.
- Dollard, J. (1939), *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Ebere, O. and Chloe, B. (2010), *Breaking the cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria*, Washington DC, United States institute of peace Press.
- Editorial (2009), “Free and Fair elections: Cornerstone of democracy-Electoral Reform Committee Report” *Vanguard* (Lagos) 13 February, 2009.
- Ekeh, E. (2011), “Post-election Crisis in Gombe State” (<http://www.enownow.com/news>). Retrieved on 21<sup>st</sup> Nov. 2013
- Ekujumi. N. (2013), “Declaration of states of Emergency as a Setback for Nigerians’ democracy centre for Rights and Grassroots initiative” Fadeyi Street, Ikeja, Lagos. (<http://www.saharareporters.com/2014/08/01/week-after-killingshites-zaira-nigerian-military-authorities-say-investigations-ongoing>). Retrieved on 31<sup>st</sup> Nov. 2014.
- Etannibi, E. (2011), Post-election violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trend and Lessons, Unpublished work.
- Ezeah, O. (2004), “The Rape of Constitutionality in plateau state” In: *Vanguard* (Jos), 6<sup>th</sup> June, 2004

- Falola, T. and Oruozu, A. (2012), *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic 1979-1983*, London; Zed Books.
- Fawehinmi, G. (2007), "The role of the election tribunals" *Guardian* (Lagos) 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 2007.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act. (2006).
- Federal Republic of Nigeria: The Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).
- Femi, B. (2014), *Colonialism Strategies in Nigeria*, Kiyawa, Musa Press.
- Freedom House (2008), "Post-election Violence in Nigeria" (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>). Retrieved on 13<sup>th</sup> Dec. 2013.
- Fukuyama, F. (2002), *Social Capital and Development: The coming Agenda*. SAIS Review Xxii(i).
- Gurr, T. (1970), *Why men Rebel*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Human Right Watch (2011), "Post-election Violence Killed 800" (<http://www.hrw.org>). Retrieved on 20<sup>th</sup> July, 2013.
- Independent National Electoral Commission (2011), 2011 presidential Results of the 36 States of Nigeria and the FCT (<http://www.academicjournals.org>) Retrieved on 6<sup>th</sup> November 2014.
- John, I. (2005), "Buhari vs Obasanjo: The Supreme Court has spoken" (Iyobhebhe@hotmail.com). Retrieved on 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2014.
- John, I, Willey, O. et al; (2011), "Election Rigging in a democracy as a Source of threat to National Security: A case study of the 2007-presidential Election in north-west zone of Nigeria" (<http://www.sulaymandala.wordpress.com/2011/09/06http://www.stephendieseruvwe.files.wordpress.com>). Retrieved on 1<sup>st</sup> December, 2014.
- Kerlinger, F. (1964), *Foundations of Behavioural Research*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Kola, O. (2011), "Kano CAN lost members and property in post-election violence in Nigeria". (<http://www.tribune.com>), Retrieved on 30<sup>th</sup> January, 2013.
- Mobolaji, E. (2004), In: Wikipedia, (2011), "1962----1963 state of emergency in western region of Nigeria" (alukome@aol.com). Retrieved on 15<sup>th</sup> August, 2015
- Mosca, G. (1939), *The Ruling class*, New York, Mcgraw-Hill.
- Ngbor, J.(2008), "The Rivers State Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. In: *Vanguard* (Port Harcourt), 25 September, 2008.
- Nkwachukwu, O. and Uzodi, N. (2012), *The 2011 Post-election Violence in Nigeria*, Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, Open Society Initiative for West Africa.
- Nnoli, O. (1978), "Social Capital, Indignity and Identity Politics: The Jos Crisis in Perspective" In: *African Journal of Political Science and international Relations*, 4(5) (<http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir>). Retrieved on 8<sup>th</sup> March, 2015.
- Nnoli, O. (1994), *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa: Intervening Variables*: CASS Occasional Monograph, Lagos, Malthouse Publishers.
- Nigerian Population Census, (2006), "The Population Census of Nigeria" (<http://www.nigeriastates.gov.ng> accessed, 9/2/2011). Retrieved on 15<sup>th</sup> August, 2015.
- Nwabueze, B.(2004), "The Rape of Constitutionality in plateau state" In: *Vanguard* (Jos), 6<sup>th</sup> June, 2004.
- Nwachi, M. (2009), "Causes of Crises in the Rural Areas, Onueke, Jioke Press.
- Nwagboso, C. (2011), *Election and Electoral Tribunal in Nigeria*, Calabar-Nigeria, University of Calabar press.
- Obasi, U. (1999), *The Morale of Academics in Nigerian Universities: A Study in the Management of Specialized and Professional Manpower*, Final report submitted to the Social Science Council of Nigeria under its National Research Programme on University Governance in Nigeria.

- Obelgore, S. (2004), "Buhari vs Obasanjo" Nigerian weekly law report.
- Oberschall, A. (1969), "Rising Expectation and Political Turmoil" *Journal of Development Studies*.
- Obijiofor, L. (2011), "Buhari as the fall guy" ( [www.igbofocus.co.uk](http://www.igbofocus.co.uk)) Retrieved on 28<sup>th</sup> June, 2014
- Ochereme, N. (2011), "Boko Haram a political tool", *Vanguard*, 1 September, 2011, (<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/book-haram-a-political-tool>). Retrieved on 17<sup>th</sup> January, 2016.
- Odo, A. (1992), *Political Science Research Methods*, Owerri, Wins Publications.
- Ogbaudu, F. (2011). 2011 General Elections Review: Experience Sharing, Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward – The Nigeria Police Perspective', paper presented at a workshop on '2011 Nigeria Elections: Experience Sharing, Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward' organized by Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) at the Sheraton Hotel and Towers, Abuja. (2) (PDF) *Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: Experiences with the 2011 Elections*. Available from: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270215621\\_Post\\_Election\\_Violence\\_in\\_Nigeria\\_Experiences\\_with\\_the\\_2011\\_Elections](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270215621_Post_Election_Violence_in_Nigeria_Experiences_with_the_2011_Elections) [accessed Aug 02 2020].
- Ojukwu, C. and Onifade, C. (2010), "Social Capital, Indignity and Identity Politics: The Jos Crisis in Perspective" In: *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 4(5) (<http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir>). Retrieved on 8<sup>th</sup> March, 2015.
- Okanya, D. (1999), *Political Violence in Nigeria: The Experience under the 2nd Republic*, Enugu- Nigeria, MaryDan Publishing Company.
- Okereke, D. (2012), "the Remote, immediate causes of crimes, insecurity & terrorism and instability in Nigeria and solutions security analyst and consultant, Abuja, Nigeria" (<http://www.nairaland.com/1027585/ramte-immediate-causes-crimes-insecurity>). Retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> April, 2014.
- Okolo, F. (2013), "if I'm arrested Nigeria will be history-Dokubo- Asari" (<http://www.punchng.com/news/ifi-im-arested-nigeria-will-be-history-dokubo-asari>) Retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> April, 2014.
- Olu-Adeyemi, A. (2006), Ethno-religious conflicts and the Travails of National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic" *Journal of Department of Political Science and Public Administration*.
- Onoyume, J. (2009), "Appeal Court Upholds Orji's election" *Vanguard* (Port Harcourt), 13<sup>th</sup> February, 2009.
- Onwudiwe, E. (2004), *Geo-political zones and the consolidation of Democracy*. In: Agbaje et al (2004), *Nigeria's Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.
- Onyeishi, T. and Omemma, D. (2010), *Understanding Social Research*, Enugu, John Jacobs's Classic Publishers Ltd.
- Orji, M. (2009), The Study of Politics: Logic Approaches and Methods. In: Nweke, E. and Orji, M. (eds, 2009), *A Handbook of Political Science*. Enugu, Victory Printing Press.
- Osaghae, E. and Suberu, R. (2005), "History of Identities, Violence and Instability in Nigeria" CRISE working paper No. 6. (<http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk>). Retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> April, 2014
- Ostien, P. (2009), "Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Nigeria" (<http://www.sharia-in-africa-net>). Retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> April, 2014.
- Otite, O. (2000), *Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria*, Ibadan, Shaneson C. Press

- Owulade F. (2014), "Boko Haram How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria" (<http://www.gatestoreinstitute.org/4232/book-haram-nigeria>). Retrieved on 26th May, 2015.
- Ozekhome, M. (2013), "Jonathan violates Nigerian Constitution in Declaring State of Emergency" (<http://www.naij.com/34172.htm>). Retrieved on 26<sup>th</sup> May, 2015
- Oyelere, K. (2011), "Kano CAN lost Members and Property in Post-election Violence" (<http://www.tribune.com.ng>). Retrieved on 18<sup>th</sup> July, 2014.
- Paul, I. (2007), "Federal Character and Quota System in Nigeria" (<http://www.gamji.com>).
- Premont, D. (1996), "Non-Derogable Rights and state of emergency" (<http://www.bruylant.be>). 21<sup>st</sup> July, 2013.
- Pretty, J. (2003), "Social Capital and Collective Management of Resources; cited in Ojukwu, C.C. and Onifade, C.A. (2010), "Social Capital, Indigeneity and Identity Politics: The Jos Crisis in Perspective", in *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4(5) p.173-180" (<http://www.academicjournals.org>). Retrieved on 21<sup>st</sup> August, 2013.
- Putnam, R. (2000), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*.
- Putnam, R. (2002), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Edited.
- Shetaha, S. (2004), "Egypt after 9/11: Perceptions of the United States; Contemporary Conflicts, in Social Science Research Council" (<http://conflicts.ssre.org>). Retrieved on 25<sup>th</sup> Sept. 2015.
- Suberu, T. (1997), *Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism in Nigeria*, New York, University of Rochester Press.
- The Guardian*, 2004, "Violence: the Threat of Development in Nigeria's Democracy" (<http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/opinion/editorial/186395-refugees-from-boko-haram>). Retrieved on 25<sup>th</sup> Sept. 2015.
- The Guardian*, 2014, "Refugees from Boko Haram." November 13. (<http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/opinion/editorial/186395-refugees-from-boko-haram>). Retrieved on 25<sup>th</sup> Sept. 2015.
- Transition Monitoring Group (2003), *Do votes count?* Abuja-Nigeria; TMG Publication.
- Transition Monitoring Group (2007), *Election Programme to fail*. Abuja-Nigeria, TMG Publication.
- Tunga, L. (2011), *An Assessment of the post-election violence that swept Kaduna and some Northern States of Nigeria: A Nigerian perspective on world Affairs*.
- Uphoff, N. (2000), *Understanding Social Capital: Multifaceted Perspective*, Washington D.C, The World Bank Publication.
- Wale, A. (2004), *democracy and Violence: The challenge of communal clashes in*: Agbaje, A.A.B. et al (eds: 2004), *Nigeria's struggle for Democracy and Good Governance*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.
- Wikipedia (2008), "Location of Nigerian-States" (<http://www.nigeria.com/mapgif>). Retrieved on 25<sup>th</sup> Sept. 2015.
- Wikipedia (2011), "Emergency Rule in Nigeria" (<http://www.nigeria.com/mapgif>). Retrieved on 4<sup>th</sup> June, 2013.
- Wilkinson (1977), In: Ojukwu, C.C. and Onifade, C.A. (2010), "Social Capital, Indignity and Identity Politics: The Jos Crisis in Perspective" in: *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 4(5) P.173-180. (<http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir>). Retrieved on 1<sup>st</sup> December, 2014..