The Multiplier Effect Of Interaction Of Taxation And Electoral Franchise On Access To Political Power, And State Building Capabilities In Nigeria

Abstract

Political franchise, as an integral part of representative democracy, was a product of the design and intent of the monarch to extract taxes (from the masses). Its institutional structure, the parliament, has overtime become a bastion of attempt to deny the rulers the power to extract taxation. Today, the continued interaction of (law on) political franchise and taxation has inflicted a far reaching effect on the idea of equity in taxation for the individual and society, and impediment on state building efforts of nations like Nigeria. This paper examines the interaction of electoral franchise and direct taxation and its effect on access to political power, and state building. As a position paper, its primary objective is to raise a controversy on the acclaimed (objective of) equity in taxation, by pointing out the resulting inequity in access to political power over tax fund defined as common pool resource; and, to examine or point out the overall negative impact of this interaction on state building. For explanatory framework, it relies on an amalgam of the Collective Good theory and The Tragedy of the Commons theory. The methodology of this paper is entirely analytical, relying on the force of logic and utilizing existing literature, and its approach is descriptive and prescriptive. The conclusion drawn here is the advocacy that though the right to vote be universal, the right to be voted for should be moderated with high end direct tax contribution over ten or more years as condition