

## **Security, National Integration and the Challenges of Development in Nigeria**

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### **Abstract**

This study engaged in the analysis of the relationship among security, national integration and development in Nigeria. The central argument in the study is that the relationship among these variables is not linear but dialectical and reinforcing. In other words, while security challenges in Nigeria have had a profound influence on national development, the crisis of national integration has equally impacted on the collective perception of the origin and causes of the security challenges on the one hand, and national development on the other. Thus, in line with mainstream submissions in extant literature, findings in the paper indicated that that development, whether in socio-cultural, economic, or political terms, cannot take place in any form or degree in an environment characterized by insecurity and uncertainties as is the case in Nigeria. To address the negative resultant effects of security challenges and crisis of national integration on development, the paper recommended, among other things imperative of structural, institutional and sectoral reforms in Nigeria as policy options for addressing these challenges of security, national integration and development.

**Keywords:** Nigeria, Security, Development, National Integration, Terrorism

### **Introduction**

Though security-development nexus, otherwise referred to as ‘securitisation of development’, which establishes the impact of security crisis on national development, is a recent entrant into security and development discourses generally, the debate has however, remained a recurrent one. The central submission or assumption of the security-development debate in the extant literature is that development in whatever form, can neither take place nor be achieved in an environment characterized by insecurity and political instability (Chauvert and Coller, 2005; Adetula, 2005). As Bazergan (1991) has asserted, security issues are moving rapidly up the development agenda. Behind the emerging concept of ‘security first’ is the recognition that a secure environment is a necessary foundation for sustainable development. Duffield (2001) equally agrees with this. According to him, the very notion of development has been radicalized. This radicalization is closely associated with the redefinition of security because conflict is understood as stemming from a developmental malaise; underdevelopment itself is now seen as a source of instability. It is also in this context that Akindoyeni (2005:5) has argued that “development must be perceived in terms of security, good health facilities, unhindered access to potable water and freedom to live, work and to go about personal businesses without let or hindrance.”

This debate has, however, been sustained by developments in international political system, especially since the collapse of USSR in 1991. While this epochal event signaled the end of the Cold War rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs, it has also witnessed another significant development, much more dangerous than the Cold War rivalry; the transformation in the nature

and dimension of international conflicts. Armed conflicts have increasingly gravitated from inter-state to intra-state dimension. As Nnoli (2006) has observed, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a shift in the nature of armed conflicts from inter-state to intra-state so that it has now become impossible to address security matters without taking account of related questions of human rights, humanitarian affairs and development.

A careful examination of the submissions of this debate will most certainly prove its validity, especially when applied within the African context. Since, the mid-twentieth century, Africa has been in a state of atrophy, characterized by the outbreak of sporadic and violent social conflicts, insecurity, and political instability including the outbreak of deadly diseases and pandemics such as HIV/AIDs and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). From Sudan to South Sudan; Burundi to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia to Central African Republic (CAR); Mali to Libya; Guinea to Liberia; Sierra Leone to Nigeria; Tunisia to Egypt; Zimbabwe to South Africa, African States have been in one form of intra-state conflict or the other. According to Ogonnaya (2013:7):

*These conflicts, have been occasioned by a number of factors, namely, weak domestic security architecture and institutions, governance failures, political exclusionism, mass poverty and expansive inequality, porosity of national borders and underdevelopment of border communities, religious extremism and radicalisation, proliferation of weapons from destabilised countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the influence of the process of globalisation.*

However, a review of the extant literature on security-development nexus reveals that not much has been done with regards to the place and significance of national integration, as a process in nation building, to the escalation or otherwise of security and development challenges, especially in pluralistic societies such as Nigeria. Yet, experiences have severally shown, especially among European countries, that there is an intricate relationship and nexus among security, national integration and development. As has been noted here, achieving development is easier in a well-integrated and secured society just as insecurity on the other hand, poses a threat not just to national integration but also to the territoriality and sovereignty of nation-states and the legitimacy of political regimes. In fact, one of the characteristics of national integration established by Amitai Etzioni as far back as 1963 is that an integrated system is one, which among other things, has developed mechanisms through which conflicts are resolved without a resort to violence (Etzioni, 1963).

This paper takes up the challenge of bridging this gap in the literature. Using Nigeria as a focus, it examines the nexus between national integration and security and how this affects or influences development. In doing this, much efforts will be made to provide answers to the following questions;

1. What are the challenges of development in Nigeria?
2. What is the impact of these challenges on security and national integration?
3. To what extent have the nature of security and national integration exacerbated the challenges of development in Nigeria?
4. In what ways can the challenges of development be transformed and their negative impacts on security and national integration ameliorated?

Providing answers to this question will not only give more insights into the dimensions of the interactions and nature of the relationship among these variables, it will also help in the understanding of their fundamental causes, how they reinforce each other and possible policy measures that can transform the challenges of development and ameliorate the negative consequences of insecurity and crisis of national integration in Nigeria.

### **Nigeria and the Crisis of National Integration**

National integration remains one issue that has since independence in 1960 dominated scholarly, political and policy discourses in Nigeria. The reason for this may be located in the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian state. In these discourses, national integration has been described in various terminologies; national cohesion, national unity, nation-building, among others (see Kuna, 2005; Ojo, 2009; Nnoli, 2010). The various descriptive terminologies given to national integration has resulted in the concept being subjected to a myriad of interpretations. For instance, while Coleman and Rosberg (1964) defined national integration as the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities in the process of creating a homogenous political community, Frank and Wilfred (2013) defined it as the processes in which the different people in a state transfer primordial allegiance to one central authority, which becomes the representative of the people, who take conscious steps towards nation-building. For Tahir (1999), national integration refers to the process of creating a mental outlook, which will prompt and inspire every person to place loyalty to the country above narrower sectarian interest.

The foregoing definitions indicate the following;

1. That national integration has to do with the “bringing together of different parts into a whole” (Frank and Ukpere, 2013: 483);
2. It is a process that results in political cohesion and shifting of individual, group or regional sentiments and loyalty to a central authority and institutions;
3. The process also results in members of the system developing escalating sequence of contact, cooperation, consensus and community through the building of unifying strong bonds that are maintained and sustained over time through awareness by members of the system of a common heritage; and
4. That the central authority must also evolve a system through which people of different backgrounds do not just regard each other as members of the same state but also have obligation towards one another (Frank and Ukpere, 2013: 483). In other words, national integration must evolve an understanding, respect and appreciation of the differences of the individuals, groups and entities being integrated.

However, like many other African countries with historical and cultural diversities and heterogeneity, such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, and Somali, among others, development in Nigeria has since independence been marred by crisis of national integration. Nnoli (1980), Joseph (1991) and Ake (2006), among many scholars, have attributed this to colonialism. In a very copious and succinct way; Ake has traced the origin of the crisis of national integration and its attendant fallout in socio-economic and political underdevelopment to the processes that characterized the nationalist struggles that culminated into political independence across Africa. According to him;

*The nationalist movement was essentially a coalition of disparate groups united by their common grievances against colonial oppression. It was typically a network of nationalities, ethnic groups, religious organizations... and professional interest groups. But even though they cooperated against the colonial regime, their relationship was never free from tension and conflict. As the prospects for political independence improved, the solidarity of the movement grew weaker and competition between its component units became more intense. Although the members of the coalition fought against the colonial power, they worried about the enormous power they were trying to wrestle from it, power they could not entrust to any one of them or even share... So while agitating to overthrow the colonial regime, the constituent elements of the coalition were also trying to block one another from appropriating it. Increasingly, their attention turned from the colonial regime to one another, and eventually the competition among these groups came to dominate political life.... By the time independence was achieved in the early 1960s, the centrifugal tendencies had grown strong enough in many countries... to threaten not only the transition to independence but, more importantly, the political viability of the new governments. In trying to deal with these forces of disunity, some African countries, like Nigeria, came to independence with such complex constitutions that systemic breakdown was inevitable (Ake, 2006: 4-5).*

This inherent mistrust among the citizens, and especially the political elite, has continued to determine the nature and pattern of political development and seeming efforts at national integration in Nigeria. For instance, from pre-independence era to the Second Republic, political party formations and alliances, political loyalty, patronage and allocation of state resources bore the imprints of ethnic rather than national considerations. According to Ake, the formation of political parties along ethnic or regional lines was occasioned by the entrenchment and institutionalization of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria. This was because, “the regions and political constituents tended to be homogenous in ethnicity. Thus, to win an election you had to win an ethnic group and if this happened to be large, a political base was guaranteed” (Ake, 1973: 350).

Azeez (2009) and Bande (2014) have contended that Nigeria’s national identity has been at odds, since the colonial era with the appeal of more exclusive ethnic identity. While tracing this to colonial administration, they noted that the division of the country into three regions for administrative convenience by the Richards Constitution of 1946 led to the development of strong regional feelings, so that in pre-independence Nigeria, party politics and party formation assumed an ethnic complexion, even as it metamorphosed into the post-independent First Republic. For instance, while the Action Group developed from the political wing of the cultural association of the Yoruba elite, the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, the NCNC was closely allied with the Igbo State Union, which played a significant role in the internal affairs of the party. In the same vein, the NPC was founded by the Fulani aristocracy. Similarly, in the smaller ethnic groups, a local political party was often indistinguishable from the group’s cultural association.

The consequence of this was such that by 1953, the major political parties in Nigeria – AG, NCNC and NPC, were associated with the major ethnic groups and the three regions, Western, Eastern and Northern regions, respectively. To further crystallize the tripartite ethnic cleavages, the party leaderships were structured accordingly, viz: the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello led the NPC of the North; Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe held the ace for the Igbo NCNC, while Chief Obafemi

Awolowo led the AG in the Yoruba West, each representing its ethnic/regional divides. This ethnic and regional inclination of the pre-independent political parties also manifested in the voting pattern during the December 12, 1959 general elections (see Table 1);

**Table 1: Regional Voting Pattern in 1959 General Elections**

Political Parties	Presidential Candidates	Regions			
		East	North	West & Lagos	Total
AG (& Allies)	Chief Obafemi Awolowo	14	25	34	73
NCNC/NEPU	Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe	58	8	23	89
NPC	Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa	-	134	-	134
Others		1	7	8	16
Total		73	174	64	312

Source: Compiled with Data from African Elections Database. Available at <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html>

A careful study of the Table reveals that the Action Group (AG), which was a predominantly Western Regional party, featured a Yoruba candidate (Chief Obafemi Awolowo) and had the greatest support from that region. Similarly, the NCNC, which was predominant in the Eastern Region featured an Igbo candidate (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe) and received the highest number of its votes from the region. And despite its alliance with a Northern-based party, Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), NCNC did not record substantial votes from the Northern Region. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) also featured an Hausa/Fulani candidate (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa). The Party did not win a single vote in both the Eastern and Western Regions.

Against this background, Diamond (1988) has articulated that the structure and political dynamics inherent in ethnic politics in Nigeria played fundamental part in the pre-independence political development and the 1964 federal election crisis that resulted in the subsequent collapse of the First Republic. This dominant nature of political proclivity towards ethnic nationalism than nationalist preferences was equally a major factor that contributed to the collapse of the Second Republic (Joseph, 1991).

The Fourth Republic has not been an exception to this practice as political party formations and party politics still bear to a large extent, the imprints of ethnic rather than national considerations. For instance, the build up to the 2015 general elections was characterized by unprecedented level of campaign of calumny and character assassination founded upon ethno-religious differences rather than on party ideology and issues of national interest (Bande and Ogbonnaya, 2016).

This crisis of national integration has also shaped individual and group perceptions of governance and public institutions as well as collective understanding of public policies, and responses to security and development challenges in Nigeria. For three solid years, the Nigeria-Biafra war was completely seen as an Hausa-Igbo affair. While millions of lives and property were wasted, other ethnic nationalities watched with indifference and maintained studied aloofness (Ezeani, 2013). A good understanding of the crisis of national integration will also explain why the Niger Delta crisis was seen largely as an Ijaw affair by all and sundry until late President Yar'Adua came to leadership. This was despite its negative implications to national security and economy. For instance, it was reported that by 2008, Nigeria's petroleum productive capacity had dropped from

2.1million bpd to 700,000 bpd due to militancy in Niger Delta region (Agbonifo, 2011). Until recently, it was with indifference that many saw the Boko Haram insurgency as a northern affair, yet it has in its wake killed citizens from different parts of the country and devastated Nigeria's national economy.

Summarizing the profound consequences of crisis of national integration in Nigeria, Kukah (2011: 20) asserted that;

*Nigeria has remained trapped in a time warp. It has not succeeded in extricating itself from the colonial trap that is suffused with inherited prejudices, and distorted social histories. History has continued to serve as a platform for the reinforcement and concretization of age old regional, ethnic and religious prejudices. The result is that in politics, economics, education, academia, religion and every area of our national life, these prejudices continue to dog and shape the choices we make in our relationships [and governance]. Regionalism, religious affiliation and ethnicity still weigh heavily as determinants in the choices and appointments of political officers.... The result is that the nation lives under the weight of this contradiction.*

Beside violent ethnic militia groups, there are, in various regions in Nigeria, many socio-cultural and political groupings, most of which are founded on the philosophy of non-violence. Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and its splinter group, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) in the South East, the Odua People's Congress (OPC) in the South West, and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the South-South are cases in points. Others such as Afanifere, Ohaneze Ndigbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, and South-South Peoples Assembly also exist. All these are clear pointers to the general lack of trust, confidence and belief in the Nigerian state as a federal entity, which are indispensable evidences of crisis of national integration.

A major fallout of this crisis of integration in Nigeria is its threat to development. The proliferation of secessionist groups such as MASSOB, IPOB, OPC and MOSSOP, among others, is a case in point. This not only raises the questions of loyalty to the Nigerian state as against group interest, it is also an indispensable evidence of challenges of national integration facing the Nigerian state. Thus, when secessionist groups like MASSOB, MOSOP, OPC, etc, develop identities like flags, coat of arms and anthems different from that of Nigeria, they are simply threatening national integration. When Boko Haram declares some part of the country as its sovereign Caliphate and imposes a religion contrary to what is provided for in the Constitution on the secularity of the Nigerian state, its action amounts to a threat not just to the sovereignty and territoriality of the Nigerian state but also to the corporate existence of the Nigerian state and the unity of its citizens.

### **Challenges of Development in Nigeria**

Evidently, some of the major development challenges in Nigeria include mass poverty, socio-economic inequality, youth unemployment, food insecurity and insufficiency, climate change and unfavourable climatic conditions, among others. According to the National Baseline Youth Survey Report, youth unemployment rate in Nigeria stood at 54 per cent in 2012. Of this figure, 51.9 per cent were females while 48.1 Per cent were males (NBS, 2012). However, by June 2014, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had provided statistics that suggested that 80 per cent of Nigerian youths were unemployed. Such astronomical rise in unemployment rates clearly points to a

country that is a danger to itself. As experiences from Middle East and North Africa (MENA Region) have shown, rising youth unemployment constitute potent threats to socio-political and economic stability and national security. The ‘Arab Spring’, which swept through Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and other Arab countries was, among other factors, caused by youth unemployment. Till date, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are grappling with some of the highest degrees of economic, security and political crises in recent African history. The reason is because, as African Development Bank noted, all three countries failed at job creation, especially for the young. Between 1980 and 2010, North Africa’s economies failed to grow fast enough to create sufficient good jobs. While per capita income growth in the region averaged only 0.5 per cent per year (the worst in any region in the world), unemployment averaged about 12 per cent (ADB, 2012).

Though statistics from NBS indicate some level of economic growth in Nigeria, this growth has been ‘a jobless growth’ that is not inclusive as unemployment and poverty continue to threaten Nigeria’s existence. In its 2014 World Poverty Index, the World Bank reported that Nigeria is one of the countries in which over 70 per cent of the population lives below US\$1.25 per day. According to the report, 7% of the 1.2 billion people living below poverty line in the world are Nigerians. Specifically, the Report asserted that “...three-fifths of the world’s extreme poor are concentrated in just five countries: India, China, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)” (World Bank, 2015:2).

Apart from oil, agriculture remains a major income earner for Nigeria. Beside this, the sector provides jobs for an estimated 71 per cent of Nigeria’s population. It is also estimated that Nigeria cultivates over 25 million hectares of land for various forms of food crops. In addition, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) records that Nigeria has 19 million heads of cattle, the largest in Africa; 82 million of its 91 million-hectare land area is arable, while the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development estimates that the country’s coasts, rivers, lakes and streams make 230 billion cubic metres of water available for fishing and aquaculture.

Despite the vast arable lands that lay across the country with abundant agricultural resources at its disposal, Nigeria remains a country stricken by food insufficiency. For instance, while Nigeria produces only 500,000 tons of rice, its annual consumption is 2.5 million tons. The consequence of this is that Nigeria has become the second largest world importer of rice and other food materials after Singapore. In May 2015, the Central Bank of Nigeria showed that between January 2014 and May 2015, Nigeria spent N1.18 trillion on food imports including toothpick. Out of this amount, \$1.39 million was spent importing fish, \$1.33 million on rice, \$375.67 million on milk, and \$1.32 million on toothpick. A critical examination of this will show that apart from the non-sustainability of this in the wake of current decline in oil revenue, the damage of these in revenue and job losses and negative consequences on industrialization are also manifest.

Unfortunately, the crisis of food insufficiency in Nigeria has been made much more complex by increasing rate of flood across the country, mostly caused by natural occurrences such as climate change. However, human activities have largely contributed to this national crisis. The 2012/2013 floods, which began in July 2012 has been termed the worst in 40 years. It affected 30 out of the 36 states of the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and by November 5, 2012, had killed over 363 persons and displaced about 2.1 million others. On the whole, an

estimated total of seven million people were affected and according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the estimated damages and losses caused by the floods were worth N2.6 trillion. Despite state responses to the flood crisis, Nigeria is not yet free as Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara and many other states were as recently as August 5, 2015 submerged by flood leaving in its trail, deaths, displacement, hunger and ultimately, poverty (Channels Television, August 5, 2015). This is against the backdrop of the projections by both the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) and the Nigerian Hydrological Services Agency (NIHSA) that 12 States in Nigeria are prone to flood in 2015.

### **Development Challenges and Security Crisis in Nigeria**

There are no doubts, as recent events have shown, that the challenges of development to a very large extent impact not just on human security but also on national security on the one hand and national integration on the other. A critical examination of recent security challenges in Nigeria; militancy in the Niger Delta, Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, herdsman-farmer clashes in North Central, fratricidal wars in the Southern regions (Umulere-Aguleri, Ife-Modakeke, Ijaw-Itsekiri communal clashes), ethno-religious intolerance, kidnapping and armed robbery, among others; will reveal that they are rooted in the following factors;


1. Identity crises, group belongingness, minority rights and loyalty;
2. Class relations and political exclusion;
3. Crisis of wealth creation and distribution; and
4. The increasing inability of the Nigerian state to meet the needs, expectations and aspirations of its citizens, among others (Bande, 2012: 80).

**Table 2: Incidences of Armed Robbery, Kidnapping and Murder in Nigeria: 2000-2012**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Armed Robbery</b>	<b>Kidnapping</b>	<b>Assassinations/Murder</b>
2000	1,877	243	1,255
2001	2,809	249	2,120
2002	3,889	337	2,117
2003	3,497	410	2,136
2004	3,184	349	2,550
2005	2,275	798	2,074
2006	2,863	372	2,000
2007	2,327	277	1,981
2008	2,340	309	1,956
2009	5,909	703	2,055
2010	2,240	738	1,828
2011	NA	NA	2,116
2012	2,988	600	2,233

Sources: 2000-2002, Nigeria Police Force Crime Abstracts; 2003-2009, Nigeria Police Force Annual Reports; 2010-2012, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).





Sources: Compiled with data from 2000-2002, Nigeria Police Force Crime Abstracts; 2003-2009, Nigeria Police Force Annual Reports; 2010-2012, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Among the three variables, armed robbery and assassination/murder have been in the increase since 2000. The same scenario is also replicated in human trafficking as shown in Table 3;

**Table 3: Data Analysis of Rescued Victims of Human Trafficking in Nigeria: 2008 - 2013**

Reported Cases	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
External trafficking for sexual exploitation	113	112	62	152	226	186
Internal trafficking for sexual exploitation	48	58	89	80	55	58
External trafficking for labour exploitation	-	69	26	21	39	25
Internal trafficking for labour exploitation	273	197	169	302	53	96
Nigerians deported as illegal migrants	8	73	9	44	14	21
Child labour	207	89	63	100	205	212
Child abuse	166	110	88	64	60	37
Child abduction from guardianship	2	4	1	5	4	8
Forced marriage	2	4	2	1	0	3
Rape/sexual abuse	5	10	36	34	16	4
Others	357	231	470	173	77	314
<b>Total</b>	<b>1181</b>	<b>957</b>	<b>1015</b>	<b>976</b>	<b>749</b>	<b>964</b>

Source: NAPTIP Human Trafficking Reports, 2000 – 2013

The contemporary Nigerian society has risen to question our commonly held traditional notions of society, especially in the African context “in which the individual is a member of some kind of fellowship” (Glickman, 1967: 3) and where everyone is viewed as equal. As Nyerere (1960) had

noted, the traditional African Society whether it had a chief or not was a society of equals and it conducted business through discussions.

In Nigeria today, this equality, membership and belongingness are under serious threats. One major source of violent social conflicts has been disputes over group and national membership: ethnic, racial and religious populations have been identified as illegitimate members of local communities and ethnic-nationalities, and their exclusion has been used to legitimize individual persecution, ethnic violence and civil wars. Targeted populations have been forcibly displaced from their homes, social networks and governmental protection, and have been forced to seek refuge within their own countries and across borders.

Another source of social conflict in Nigeria is class relation and political exclusion. Valid as the arguments by mainstream analysts such as Ake (2006), Nnoli (1980), among others may seem, that political exclusion in Nigeria is occasioned by ethnicity that has its root in colonial administration, their analytical framework is ahistorical. Otherwise, history reveals that up to the early part of the Nigeria's independence, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, a nationalist of Igbo extraction and his NCNC party dominated the politics of the Western region. The party also had strong affiliations with the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). History also reveals that the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was not predominantly an Hausa-Fulani party as has been asserted in extant literature. The truth, though difficult to agree with, is that pre-independence political struggles, championed by nationalist, were aimed at ensuring a strong and united Nigeria irrespective of ethno-religious differences.

Apart from being ahistorical, the analytical framework of mainstream analysts is also asocial because they failed to take into consideration the role of class and elitism in the political struggles and equations of post-independence Nigeria. The betrayal of Dr. Azikiwe and his NCNC in the Western region was not informed by ethnic considerations but by class and ideological differences. Otherwise, how does one explain the continued crisis between Chief Awolowo's faction of Action Group and that of Chief Samuel Akintola, which ultimately resulted in the 1962 Western region crisis that contributed significantly to the collapse of the First Republic?

Experiences have shown that political elites have exploited ethno-religious differences in Nigeria to advance their personal and class interest. Over time, ethno-religious differences have influenced the pattern of political development. Party formations and alliances, political loyalty, patronage and allocation of state resources now bear the imprints of ethnic rather than national considerations and outlook. The consequence of this has been the escalation of violent social conflicts, which in turn threaten political stability, human security, maximization of social welfare and socio-economic development.

Social conflicts and security challenges in Nigeria can also be located in the crisis of wealth creation and distribution and the increasing inability of the state to meet the needs, expectations and aspirations of its citizens. The agitations for resource control that metamorphosed into militancy in the Niger Delta region and the pastoralist crisis in the North Central, especially in Plateau and Benue States, which are gradually but steadily spreading across Nigeria, can be explained from this perspective.

In any agrarian society as in Nigeria, land remains a major factor of production. When access to land is threatened either by environmental degradation, as is the case in the Niger Delta region, or by the questioning and challenging of a group's belongingness and membership of a given community that has control over land, violent social conflict is a natural consequence. Secondly, when certain groups of individuals or a whole collectivity feel excluded or alienated from what they consider to be collectively owned resources, resistance to such exclusion, real or imagined, is a natural consequence. Evidently, the whole gamut of violent social conflicts in Nigeria that has assumed religious and ethnic dimensions, result from the feelings of exclusion and alienation from the commonwealth and resources of the Nigerian state. The increasing rate of mass poverty in Nigeria and the obvious inability of the Nigerian state to address it, largely underpin the escalation of security crisis that has prevailed over the years.

However, the emergence and upsurge in militant Islamism and terrorism remain the greatest challenge to security and development in contemporary Nigerian society. Boko Haram, a domestic terrorist group with affiliation to international terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has since 2003 occasioned complex and overlapping security and humanitarian crises, especially in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. In cumulative terms, the group is believed to have killed over 30,000 persons (including security operatives, civilians, women and children) and caused the displacement of about 1.6 million people and 17,738 refugees (IDMC, 2016; Sule, 2016). In 2014 alone, Boko Haram abducted more than 200 girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok, Bornu State and carried out attacks that led to at least 7,000 deaths (ICG, 2015). Apart from the killings and internal displacement of persons, the activities of the insurgent group is also threatening the sovereignty and territoriality of the Nigerian state as well as the stability and legitimacy of political regimes as the group has declared some conquered territories as its sovereign Caliphate and imposed Sharia rule.

As has been established in extant researches and studies, development, whether in socio-cultural, economic, or political terms, cannot take place in any form or degree in an environment characterized by insecurity and uncertainties (Adetula, 2005). For instance, in its 2011 World Development Report, the World Bank argued that institutional and personal insecurity has become the primary challenge for economic development not just in Nigeria and Africa, but across the world. This is because security crisis not only threatens economic growth and development and public income, it reproduces itself in massive black marketeering, organized crimes, humanitarian crises such as internal displacement and refugee flows, among others. The consequence of this is that public resources meant for infrastructural development in health, education, etc. are diverted in an attempt to attend to humanitarian and emergency situations. As scholars and analysts have argued in several fora, security crises will for some time remain a threat to lives and livelihoods of Nigerian citizens and the corporate existence of the Nigerian state unless the fundamental issues that beget and sustain them are interrogated and resolved.

### **Concluding Remarks**

This paper has sought to identify the challenges of development in Nigeria and to establish the impact of these challenges on security and national integration. The forgoing has shown that the relationship among development, security and national integration in Nigeria, is not linear but dialectical. They not only impact on each other, they also reinforce and sustain each other. In fact the relationship is an endemic cycle in a perpetual motion in which one begets the other. As has been pointed out, development cannot take place in an environment characterized by insecurity and instability.

However, the politicization of development initiatives and overt proclivity towards ethno-religious identity in all policies and programmes of the state and group activities are clear and indispensable evidences of the nature and character of not just the Nigerian state but also its ruling class. Apart from its negative impact on security and development and threat to the unity and corporate existence of the Nigerian state, it also explains why these challenges have remained recurrent and endemic in Nigeria.

Be that as it may, beyond the examination of the interface among development, security and national integration, there is the urgent need to identify and further interrogate the negative consequences and the destructive outcomes of this interface on the one hand and the recommendations of practical and sustainable policy measures that will address the problems of security and national integration as well as the challenges of development that they engender.

To set the tone, there is need for scholars and analysts to consider issues of structural, institutional and sectoral reforms in Nigeria as policy options for addressing these challenges. Such reforms must be made to refocus the role of the Nigerian state in ensuring the wellbeing and protection of its citizens irrespective of ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations and identities.

Secondly, beyond the need for institutional and sectoral reforms, attention must first be laid to those factors that give rise to and sustain the security crises that threaten development and national integration. Thus, addressing issues of poverty, unemployment, group identity, among others, must become primary responsibilities of the Nigeria state.

Thirdly, governments at all levels must identify the urgent need for national attitudinal re-orientation and through intensive and extensive enlightenment programmes and policies seek to redirect Nigerians towards the transfer of loyalties from primordial ethnic and regional nationalities and associations to the federal government. To this end, the National Reorientation Agency, religious groups and associations, schools and institutions of learning must be mandated to preach and teach values and ethics that direct all to the benefit and importance of service to the Nigerian state more than to one's ethnic or regional group.

Finally, while the ideological underpinning of Boko Haram insurgency may require strategic interrogation, especially in the face of the on-going counter-insurgency operations by the Nigerian security agencies, what is important here, and this must be stressed with every amount of emphasis, is the need to completely reject in its entirety, any group by whatever name, ethnic origin or religious affiliation, and ideology, whose operations threaten the security of the lives of Nigerians and the corporate existence of the Nigeria state.

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