

Power Relations and Implementation of Public Work Initiatives: A Case of Kazi Mtaani in Uasin-Gishu County, Kenya

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ABSTRACT

The implementation of public works projects is globally recognized as an effective response to social and economic challenges. In modern times, however, public works initiatives are taken basically as a response to the bottlenecks inherent in national development processes. In Kenya, the implementation of the Kazi Mtaani projects is largely pursued devoid of an assessment of the power relation as a key antecedent factor. This study examined the contextual influence of power relations on the implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects in Uasin-Gishu County. It argued that the implementation of the projects has largely peripheralized the consideration of power relations as a factor in addressing the social and economic challenges affecting the youth. This entails consideration of the role and interrelations amongst the political elites in project implementation. The study was supported by stakeholder theory that highlights the relevance of actors especially in the project implementation phase. The study employed convergent parallel mixed method with a target population of 1430 youths, 14 employees of the Ministry of Youth and Social Welfare Services and 5 Members of Parliament. Stratified sampling was used to guarantee that all constituents are included in the research. A sample size of 314 respondents, representing 3 employees from the Ministry of Youth and Social Services and 310 youths and 1 Member of Parliament. Primary data were collected using questionnaires, interviews and Focus Group Discussions. Reliability was determined by use of Cronbach Alpha at a level of 0.7. Quantitative data were analyzed using Pearson Correlation and regression analysis. Qualitative data were thematically organized prior to reporting in narrations and quotations. The study found significant negative correlations between power relations and the implementation of the Kazi Mtaani Projects at ($r = .710$ $p = 0.01$). These findings are significant for the analysis of the role political elites in project implementation. The study concluded that that power plays a crucial role for success and sustainability of public work initiatives; Kazi Mtaani not an exception. The study recommends that the Government to empower its citizenry and incorporate the youths in developmental activities which positively enhances their wellbeing in the society. In addition capacity building in all sectors should be activated to create awareness to youths on the usefulness of the short term economic activities initiated by the government.

Keywords: Kazi Mtaani, Project, Project Implementation, Power Relations, Public Works, Stakeholder

I. INTRODUCTION

Public works initiatives are integral to the transformation of nations since human beings contemplated living in organized communities marked by shared common infrastructural facilities. The initiatives transform into projects that later become distinguished by their political, social and economic dimensions that are largely pushed by the political elite in pursuit of specific interests. The implementation of public works initiatives has been undertaken globally as a response to socioeconomic shocks and imbalances as well as the need for social transformation (Alesina & Giuliano, 2014; Besley & Ghatak, 2009). These initiatives are further designed and implemented by the state to address growing unemployment partly due rapid population expansion in many countries. Research conventionally avers that their successful implementation is, however, contingent on resource commitments, project ownership, and acceptability (Grindle & Kelleher, 2017).

During the Roman era, public works were essential to the empire's expansion and integration. Infrastructure projects such as roads, aqueducts, and public buildings were implemented to enhance connectivity and public welfare (Humphrey, 1986). These projects were undertaken by the empire, employing vast amounts of local labor. However, the involvement of the Roman political elite in these projects was significant, as they provided political support in ensuring that their interests were maintained (Millar, 1998). In ancient Greece, particularly during the Hellenic period,

public works were also prominent. Projects like the construction of temples, theaters, and other public structures were funded by wealthy patrons or through public funds (Foley, 1988).

In continental Africa, other than the pre-colonial feudal relations practiced in the East and Central African inter-lacustrine Kingdoms of Rwanda, Burundi, Buganda and Bunyoro Kitara, public works initiatives became key ingredients of the colonization and modernization projects. Though they were detested due to their forced labor manifestations, the initiatives were transformed by postcolonial regimes into an acceptable form that was later integrated into national programs such as the National Youth Service (Were, 2019). In these initiatives, however, the importance of power relations in decision making and resource mobilization scarcely features as a significant factor other than the superficial recognition of 'national interest' which then triggers resources commitments for implementation.

In Kenya, the Kazi Mtaani project represents a key intervention strategy ostensibly aimed at addressing the challenges of engaging the steadily growing population of unemployed youth (Jomo, 2016). Implemented at the county level with the involvement of local leadership, community leaders, and households, Kazi Mtaani has faced numerous challenges related to resource constraints and sustainability. However, the influence of power relations inherent in elitism in the context of project implementation has not been expressly interrogated.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The lack of effective youth engagement in constructive social change in Uasin Gishu is manifested in acute under- and unemployment that have exposed the youth to antisocial and political risks and increased their vulnerability (Arusei et al., 2024). As at 2022, for example, the unemployment rate in the County stood at 15% (County Government of Uasin Gishu, 2023). Whereas the devolution process in the country has attempted to address this phenomenon through sustained financial resource commitments and the implementation of Kazi Mtaani as a dedicated public works project in the Counties, the youth vulnerability risk, particularly in Uasin Gishu, has not been effectively addressed. To a large extent, the implementation of the Kazi Mtaani project has been exposed to the antecedent vagaries of project implementation and pointedly suffered from lack of isolation of power relations in the analysis of political drivers of project implementation.

This study deliberately analyzed power relations as a determining factor of Kazi Mtaani project implementation due to the apparent dominance of political factors in decision making in similar public works initiatives (Mills, 2018, Garg and Arora 2018, Andersen and Smith, 2019). It focused on its contribution to transparent decision making and stakeholder involvement in addressing power imbalances in project implementation.

1.2 Research Objective

The objective of the study was to establish the influence of power relations on the implementation of public work initiatives using a case of Kazi Mtaani Projects in Uasin-Gishu County, Kenya.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Review

This paper was informed by the stakeholder theory, developed by R. Edward Freeman in his seminal 1983 work "*Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*." The theory offers a comprehensive framework for understanding, synchronizing and managing the diverse interests of stakeholders within projects. It emphasizes that project managers ought to consider and satisfy the interests of all stakeholders or actors in project process to assure project success (Freeman, 1983). Stakeholders include a broad range of individuals and groups such as clients, community members, financiers, shareholders, employees, government entities, and religious leaders, among others. The theory posits that for any project to be successful, it must create value for all its stakeholders, not just the shareholders.

This inclusive approach is guided by six key principles: the principle of entry and exit, which pertains to the rules for stakeholder involvement; the principle of externalities, which addresses the impact of stakeholder actions on others; the principle of agency, which focuses on stakeholder responsibilities; the principle of governance, which relates to stakeholder decision-making processes; the principle of contract cost, which considers the costs of stakeholder agreements; and the principle of limited immortality, which suggests that organizations should endure beyond their stakeholders' involvement. Freeman argues that treating all stakeholders as valued participants positively influences project outcomes. This theory is highly relevant to project management as it shifts the focus from solely serving shareholders to recognizing the importance of all stakeholder groups. It suggests that an organization's long-term success is contingent on its ability to serve a broad spectrum of stakeholders effectively. A stakeholder, therefore, is anyone affected by or serving within the organization, including the local community, government groups,

employees, and religious leaders. The theory asserts that corporations should rightfully serve these stakeholders to achieve lasting success. From a project management perspective, the Project Management Institute (PMI) underscores that stakeholders are individuals actively involved in a project whose interests can significantly influence its execution and successful completion. Therefore, stakeholder theory implies that the needs and interests of all parties must be taken into account throughout the project lifecycle (PMI, 2021).

2.2 Empirical Review

Project implementation for strategic change has been recognized as essential for national development and especially by the deployment of inter-organizational projects and programs that depend on striking a balance amongst the diversity of stakeholder organizations (Liu et al., 2022). Through the building of a conceptual framework the study incorporates the dynamics of power relations within and between organizational bureaucracies for purposes of managing intra and inter-organizational conflict. The authors argue that conflict is inherent in inter-organizational structures hence the urgency of contextualizing power relations in project implementation. In essence, they acknowledge that power is a social relation and that “projects can be perceived as temporary organizational entities constructed from and constituting relations of power” yet it has attracted scanty attention in the design and implementation of inter-organizational projects. This was initially highlighted in works by Foucault (1979), Cicmil and Hodgson (2006), Garg and Arora (2018) and Graziano and Grimaldi (2018). This argumentation is still valid especially in Public Private Partnership projects implemented in the UK and Asia (Liu, et al. 2022) and a number of Information Systems projects in Australia (Ye et al., 2022). The studies point out the inherent imbalances in project implementation buttressed by social stratification and access to information that determine decision making and resource distribution. In addition, power dynamics between local government officials and contractors, especially in Italy; tend to affect project outcomes partly due to corrupt practices and collusion between government officials and contractors thus leading to poor quality outcomes and cost overruns.

A study by Mawere and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019) on the politics of development in Africa argues that power relations between state actors and citizens do influence the implementation of public works projects. The authors suggest that power imbalances and elite capture tend to influence the effectiveness of development initiatives especially public works projects. Similar to the studies outside Africa, the study emphasizes the need for more inclusive and participatory development processes to promote transparency and equitable outcomes. Similarly, a study by Ngeywo et al. (2019) on the value of activity schedule and organizational performance of Coffee Cooperative Societies in the North Rift found out that power relations influenced project outcomes, particularly in relation to resource allocation and community participation. The authors suggest that power relations based on gender, ethnicity, and class can lead to unequal resource distribution and community disenfranchisement. The place of power relations in project implementation has been also been discerned in Nigeria where power imbalances among state and non-state stakeholders often led to delays, cost overruns, and poor quality outcomes (Igwe & Ude, 2018). These studies do not pinpoint the stakeholder dynamics that impact state-led public works projects that focus not only on socio-economic parameters but also populist mobilization.

Kenya’s public works initiatives are conventionally designed and implemented with due disregard of the sociopolitical context. This has seen the making of straight jacketed decisions with a focus on redressing immediate socioeconomic symptoms only to be overwhelmed by contingent parasitic factors that have led to the collapse or transformation of the initiatives. What is outstanding is that successive political regimes reinvent the public works initiatives to suit their immediate social and political concerns. A study by Kiprop and Cheluget (2021) on the implementation of Kazi Mtaani in Kenya highlights the importance of power relations in shaping project outcomes. The authors argue that power interactions between government officials, contractors, and project beneficiaries do affect the allocation of resources and the quality of work done. The involvement of government agencies in the implementation of Kazi Mtaani has ensured that the program has access to the necessary resources and expertise to operate effectively (Omondi et al. 2021, Ngeywo et al. 2019). However, this has also created power imbalances, as government agencies have had the final say in decision-making processes, limiting the participation of other stakeholders.

Specifically, according to Nyaoga and Okwemba (2021), the implementation of Kazi Mtaani in Uasin-Gishu County has been influenced by power plays between politicians, government officials, and contractors that have a direct effect to the quality of work. The study points out that some contractors were awarded tenders based on political affiliations rather than their capacity to deliver standard work. Consequently, the quality of work was compromised, leading to low satisfaction among beneficiaries and a negative impact on the program's overall success. Similarly, another study by Kimani et al. (2021) found that power relations between government officials and community members have influenced the identification and selection of Kazi Mtaani beneficiaries. The study indicates that some government officials favored their relatives and friends during the selection process, leading to a lack of transparency

and accountability in the program. This has led to low participation rates among the youth, especially those who feel excluded from the program.

III. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted a convergent parallel mixed methods design. Convergent parallel design is a procedure for collecting, analyzing, and “mixing” both quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study to understand a research problem to draw out an understanding of the phenomena and respond to the research questions (Creswell, 2018). The study utilized mixed research method which integrates both qualitative and quantitative data in the study.

3.2 Study Area

Uasin-Gishu County is one of the 47 Counties established under the 2010 constitution. It is located in Rift Valley region in Kenya and covers an area of 3,345.2km². It extends between longitudes, 34° 50' east and 35° 37' East and Latitude 00° 03' South and 00° 55' North. It is rated as County number 27 amongst the 47 Counties. The County is cosmopolitan in nature with Kalenjin community being the major inhabitants. It boasts of vibrant economy contributed by agriculture, processing and manufacturing industries, trade and commerce. It borders Trans-Nzoia County to the North, Elgeyo Marakwet County to the East, Baringo County to South East, Kericho County to the South, Nandi to the South West and Kakamega County to the North West. The County presents good characteristics whose representation can be considered as the actual situation in Kenya. According to the County Integrated Development Plan 2023-2027 youth unemployment and skills development is a recognized development issue (County Government of Uasin Gishu, 2023). The 2022 statistics recorded the labor force at 766,598 out of which 29.5% of the males and 32.2% of females were unemployed. This is compared to the 1999 unemployment rate of 14.5% in the county (p.122).

3.3 The Population of the Study

The target population for this study was 1,430 youths, 14 employees of the Ministry of Youth and Social Services and 5 Members of Parliament in Uasin Gishu County.

3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

Stratified sampling was used to guarantee that all constituents are included in the research (Sharma, 2017). The sample was selected from the categories employees, youths and Member of Parliament. From these categories a simple random sample of 314 was selected to participate in this study.

3.5 Data Collection and Instruments

A questionnaire was used as the instrument for gathering primary data. Iovino and Tsitsianis (2020) state that a questionnaire is a list of questions or items used to gather primary data from respondents about their attitudes, experiences, or opinions. Sharma (2017) comments that a number of respondents are usually comfortable sharing verbal information than written. The researcher also developed two different interview schedules which were administered to the employees at the Department of Youth and Social Welfare services and the Member of Parliament respectively; the interview's questions were designed in a manner that responded to the research question. The researcher also designed the Focused Group Discussion guide which was meant for the youth leaders putting into consideration the purpose of the study. The questions were formulated in a manner that responded to research objectives and capable of facilitating a productive discussion.

3.6 Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation was used to establish the relationship among variables. Qualitative data were thematically organized prior to reporting in narrations and quotations.

IV. FINDINGS & DISCUSSION

4.1 Response Rate

The study sampled 310 youths who were meant to fill the questionnaires and 3 employees at the Department of Youth and Social Welfare Services and 1 politician (MP). From the 310 youths, 308 respondents were able to fill all the items in the questionnaires leading to a 99.4% response rate. Further, all the 3 employees from Department of

youth and social welfare services participated in the focus group discussions and 1 politician was able to participate in the interview sessions respectively. This means that the response rate for employees was 100% as well as for the politicians. The response rate was as indicated in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Response Rate

Respondents	Sample	Responded	Response Rate
Kazi Mtaani Youths	310	308	99.4%
Department of Youths and Social Services (Employees)	3	3	100%
Politician (MP)	1	1	100%

4.2 Findings

The influence of power relations on implementation of public work initiatives, a case of Kazi Mtaani Project in Uasin-Gishu County Kenya was interrogated under five thematic areas which comprised of the contribution of county politicians whom the study found out to have an influence on implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects, the role played by highly positioned members of the community, the trust that the youths have on county officials and the role of government officials. The descriptive statistical findings are presented in Table 2 and triangulated with qualitative data in the text.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Power Relations Variables

Statements	Mean	Std. Dev	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
County Politicians have influence towards implementation of Kazi Mtaani project	4.36	.969	.453	-.654	308
Highly positioned people have an influence in implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects	4.38	1.009	.324	-.786	308
Youths have trust in the county officials in regard to project implementation	3.69	1.582	.524	-.666	308
Government officials influence project implementation	4.04	1.190	.432	-.236	308
Politicians have vested political interest in mobilizing the youths in implementation of Kazi Mtaani	4.31	.816	.508	-.809	308

From the responses above, it is clear that county politicians influence project implementation ($M=4.36$ $SD=0.969$), highly positioned people influence project implementation ($M=4.38$ $SD=1.009$); youths have no trust in county officials regarding project implementation ($M=3.69$ $SD=1.582$); government officials influence project implementation ($M=4.04$ $SD=1.190$) and politicians have vested political interest in mobilizing the youths in implementation of Kazi Mtaani ($M=4.31$ $SD=.816$). It shows that there was significant power control in the implementation of the Kazi Mtaani Project in Uasin Gishu County. The qualitative data were also analyzed as outlined from the Focused Group Discussions.

From the responses from the FGDs, one thing is clear, that political muscle is a significant influence on the implementation of public projects and Kazi Mtaani project in particular. One of the respondents simply noted that:

People with political connections have great influence on implementation of projects mainly because they want to make some money out of it (FGD, 2, 2021).

From this response, it is clear that politicians and powerbrokers are actively involved in shaping the implementation of projects in the country. Another respondent noted in a more elaborate way that:

It is not just the Kazi Mtaani Project that receives attention from the politicians but all government projects through the tendering process. It should be noted that as far as Kazi Mtaani is concerned, political elite capture does not just happen during implementation but mostly occurs at the project formulation stages. In a more unscrupulous way, the political and power brokers have captured many government projects and have benefitted always unfairly from it. They are the biggest impediment to implementation of projects (FGD 1, 2021).

Literature supports this with a study showing that large swaths of development policy have been designed to systematically appease local and national leaders, with potentially significant costs (Alatas et al., 2013). Competing studies however note that central governments are often reluctant to devolve decision making about who should be chosen as a beneficiary to local leaders, preferring to allocate benefits based on less precise, but less discretionary proxy-means test systems (Coady et al., 2014). More generally, as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2015) articulate, administering these types of programs centrally to reduce elite capture may come at the cost of the local leaders' better

local information and greater advantage in monitoring. Still others advocate for local leader engagement like studies that show that due to the fear of elite capture, however, they are often designed to circumvent existing local leaders, and instead devolve decision-making and implementation of projects to ordinary villagers (Mansuri & Rao, 2012). This may come at a significant cost: as Khwaja (forthcoming) discusses, citizens' ability and skills to actually implement the program may be weaker than the local leaders. As a result, local leaders often have useful skills that remain unutilized, and there may be more long-term effects on institutional and bureaucratic performance because the incentive of local leaders to acquire skills and the opportunity to demonstrate performance is reduced (Myerson, 2009, Shleifer, 2012).

Further, Wong (2010) did a systematic review on Elite capture or capture elites; lessons from the 'counter-elite' and 'co-opt-elite' approaches in Bangladesh and Ghana. In it he argued that community-based development has been criticized for its inadequate understanding of power relationships at the local level, which thus leaves room for elite capture. Further, the study argues that the complexity of elite capture requires a more critical analysis of power. The understanding of power offers a useful analysis to the current two mainstream approaches to elite capture; they are: 'counter-elite' and 'co-opt-elite' approaches. The 'counter-elite' approach conceptualizes elite capture as exploitative and suppressive in nature (Scott, 1985), which is necessarily undesirable because it works against democratic, participatory and pro-poor values. For example, Omondi et al. (2021) consider local elites as 'obstacles to progress with poverty reduction development' (p. 33). This approach characterizes resistance to elite domination as a 'zero-sum' game since undermining elite influence will return power to the powerless. The solutions to elite capture, it suggests, are first, to exclude elites from participating in the newly created or existing institutions and second, to empower poor people to take an active role in the decision-making process by raising awareness and capacity building (Abe, 2009). Using Rowland's analysis of power, the protagonists of the 'counter-elite' approach stress the interdependence of the two dimensions of power: 'power-over' and 'power-from-within'. In other words, from this perspective, confronting elite domination will only make a difference in poor people's lives if local people have a sense of ownership in the process of power seizure.

The 'counter-elite' approach is, however, criticized for taking a simplistic view of power, without acknowledging the diversity of elites and the function of elite interference. Mansuri and Rao (2012) argue that not all elites are bad. They make a distinction between 'greedy' elites (p. 43) and 'benevolent' elites (p. 55), and the latter show altruism and willingness to share some benefits with poor people. This leads Dasgupta and Beard (2007) to highlight the differences between 'elite capture' and 'elite control' as the latter implies that 'the project was controlled by local elites, yet resources were targeted to deserving beneficiaries' (p. 244). Our research on solar lanterns in Rajasthan, India shows that elite interference could be considered as a barometer to indicate the potential values of the projects. If local elites do not show any interest in getting involved, it might imply that the benefits that they could get from the projects are so limited that even power-thirsty elites cannot be bothered (Wong, 2009a).

These ideas shape the 'co-opt-elite' approach. It suggests that confrontation with the elites may not do the poor a favor. Instead, it takes a pragmatic perspective and makes use of the networks and know-how of the elites to facilitate the management of the projects (Rao & Ibanez, 2013). In their experience, Graziano & Grimaldi (2018) find that some of the village elite work with external NGOs to improve village water and sanitation out of 'a sense of public duty' (p. 35). Instead of confronting the elites, they recommend that NGOs exploit the 'politics of reputation' (p. 49) that can bring some benefits to the poor.

The results also agree with the 'subjectivity-institution-structure' theory, which Wong and Sharp (2009) and Wong (2010) argue, is useful in understanding the intertwined relationships between elites and non-elites. It explores how differing subjectivities and institutions govern attitudes and behavior and how they are shaped in the context of wider structural issues. In other words, subjectivity and structure are linked through institutions and expressed in social practice. This understanding of the complex interactions helps contextualize power dynamics in the process of social connectivity between elites and non-elites.

4.3 Implementation of Public Work Initiatives

Table 3 presented findings for the dependent variable which was the implementation of public work initiatives.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics for Implementation Variables

Statements	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
The project is done on scheduled time.	4.19	.787	.543	-.456	308
The project is done on targeted quality	3.90	1.108	.822	-.236	308
Youths are paid on time	3.40	.917	.509	-.876	308
The project is done successfully	4.12	1.029	.444	-.423	308

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for four variables measured for level of implementation of Kazi Mtaani Project cluster. The second column shows the arithmetic mean of each variable, the third column shows the respective standard deviation, the fourth column shows the skewness results, the fifth column shows the kurtosis results while the sixth column shows the sample size in each variable computed. The mean and standard deviations results show that the project were not done on scheduled time ($M=4.19$ $SD=0.787$), the project was not done on targeted quality ($M=3.90$ $SD=1.10$); the payments were not done on time ($M=3.40$ $SD=0.917$); and generally, the project was not successful ($M=4.12$ $SD=1.02$).

Further, the skewness results show that the values are greater than 0 implying that they have a right skewed distribution whereby most values are concentrated on left of the mean, with extreme values to the right. While the Kurtosis results show both negative and less than 3 which indicates a Platykurtic distribution, where the values are flatter than a normal distribution with a wider peak. The probability for extreme values is less than for a normal distribution, and the values are widely spread around the mean. This shows that the results are reliably true.

The result above is supported by responses from the focus group discussion done on the employees from the Department of Youth and Social Services. There appeared to be consensus that the Kazi Mtaani implementation was not up to the expected standards mainly because of delay of funds and power brokers. One of the employees who responded noted that:

Kazi Mtaani is a good idea that the government started to empower the youth of the country. However, its implementation has been lackluster mostly because the funds get delayed and the youths get demotivated. In fact, we see a high turnover of youths in this project owing to demotivation; which leads to poor workmanship. We also see elite-capture especially from politicians who want their relatives incorporated in the project and thus end up delaying the whole process. In addition, the Department of Youth and Social Welfare Services is not given the chance to solely carry out their mandate; most of the time they get instructions of what to be done, how it should be done and who to be involved from the politicians. Sometimes the politicians hijack the funds and insist on diverting the resources to other projects which are not considered KM projects (FGD 1, 2021).

From the responses, it is clear that elite behavior has a significant negative effect on the implementation of the Kazi Mtaani project in Eldoret town. There is lack of authority on the part of employees. The interview with the politician from the region yielded as much but his explanation of elitism was done in a manner intending on making the act an obligation and thus a positive act: He said:

I understand that as politicians we get ahead of ourselves and try to leverage our position and power to get our people into the jobs. However, you should understand that it is my responsibility to ensure that the people I represent, especially the jobless youths, have jobs. Where do you want these youths to get jobs and why do you not want their representative to help them get those jobs? I want to believe that when I convince this youths to vote for me; each and every one of them is expecting to get a job under my leadership, I therefore have nowhere to lay my hands except such programs like KM. The Kenya government has very minimal job opportunities; therefore for me as a MP Kazi Mtaani is one of the most beneficial short term engagements for the youths. We made it short term so that it can give each youth an opportunity to participate (Int, Politician, 1, 2021).

The responses show clear lapses in the implementation of the project and the presence of elite behavior. The results also cohere with significant literature that shows that the implementation of projects in developing countries like Kenya is fraught with challenges. Rigon (2014) engaged in a study to examine elite-capture in the slum-upgrading project in Nairobi noted similar implementation challenges characterized by low quality of works, long lead-times in procurement process, low client satisfaction and projects out of budget. Carrick-Hagenbarth, (2016) in a study in Brazil examining elite-capture in community-driven projects also observed implementation challenges characterized by poor quality, extended duration of work, high employee turnover and low client satisfaction. Other studies also show similar results where projects are not up to standard and where certain elements seem to bear responsibility for those lapses like elite-capture (Zulfiqar & Moosvi, 2022).

4.4 Correlation Analysis

As indicated in Table 4 below, it was found that there was a positive correlation between the independent and the dependent variable where ($r=0.710$, $p< 0.01$). This means that there was a 99 percent confidence level where the r value for power relations was .710 indicating a high correlation with project implementation. This result reveals that with an increment on power relations, there is a negative effect on project implementation. On the other hand, the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant relationship between power relations and implementation was rejected indicating that there was a significant relationship between the power relations and implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects.

Table 4
Correlations

		Implementation of KaziMtaani Project
Power Relations	Pearson Correlation	.710**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0

V. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

This study concluded that there was a significant positive correlation between power relations and implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects ($r=0.710$, $p< 0.01$). This indicates that at 99% confidence level, the r value of the power relations was .710 portraying high correlation with implementation of Kazi Mtaani projects. It further concludes that power plays a crucial role for success and sustainability of public work initiatives; Kazi Mtaani not an exception.

5.2 Recommendations

The paper recommends that government agencies and ministries in conjunction with parliament should enact strict and enforceable legislation that will help handle power relations on projects. This means that the Public participation act should be tightened to stipulate the percentage acceptable to measure adequate participation and the inclusion of youths in every phase of project formulation and implementation

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