



# MILITARY DIPLOMACY STRATEGIES APPLIED BY AMISOM IN RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Musoma Albert Lusiola<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Musoma A. Lusiola is a holder of B.Sc. Military Science, M.A. in International Studies from the University of Nairobi and Master of Arts in Diplomacy Intelligence and Security from Strathmore University. He also holds CSMP Certificate from ISMI and many other certifications in security intelligence. He is a serving Major in the Kenya Defence Forces.

## ABSTRACT

*Somalia has a long history of internally inspired terror, mainly arising from the threat of terrorism that has threatened both domestic and international interests and has drawn increased military efforts from both African continent partners and China and the United States. The aim is to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. The study adopted an exploratory and mixed-methods research design. A mixed-methods approach allows for the investigation of a broader and more complex research problem, enabling the researcher to utilize more than one approach, both quantitative and qualitative, for data collection. The study's target population included AMISOM staff, and relevant respondents provided sufficient information to answer the research questions. Currently, AMISOM has 22,000 military troops, 234 police officers, and 81 civilians. Moreover, the study equally targeted the Somali civilian population since they were important stakeholders in providing information on the effectiveness of military diplomacy in the country. Thus, the target population comprised 22,315 AMISOM staff and civilian contingents. Out of these, the study sampled 100. Primary data was collected from study respondents by means of a research questionnaire and an interview schedule. The data analysis process involved both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Content analysis was mainly used to analyze the qualitative data, which would be reported normatively. Quantitative research findings were analyzed and reported using descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts, and inferential statistics in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v23). Moreover, the data analysis was structured objectively to address each of the study's research questions. This study suffices to demonstrate that AMISOM's involvement in Somalia was an act of military diplomacy occasioned by the need to foster peace and regional stability in the Horn of Africa region. The study demonstrated that AMISOM employs different military diplomacy strategies, although at different capacities. From the foregoing, the study points to the need for restructuring AMISOM's peace and security architecture to bring focus and responsiveness to the dynamic nature of the conflict and the enemy. The study recommends the need for further exploration into military diplomacy in Africa, especially given the dearth of empirical literature that is mainly from the West. Following this exploration of the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the Horn of Africa, this study points to research gaps on the influence of the civilian component in military diplomacy efforts on peace and security. Further, there is a need to understand the psychological effects of AMISOM troops participating in military diplomacy efforts in Somalia.*

**Key Words:** Strategies Applied by AMISOM; Military Diplomacy; Horn of Africa; Peace and Security

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM-	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF-	African Peace Fund
APSA-	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF-	African Standby Force
AU-	African Union
CEWS-	Continental Early Warning System
IGA-	Interim Galmudug Administration
IGAD-	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGAD-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IJA-	Interim Juba Administration
ISWA-	Interim South West Administration
KDF-	Kenyan Defence forces
MSC-	Military Staff Committee Panel of the Wise,
NGO-	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU-	Organization of African Unity
PSC-	Peace and Security Council
TCCs-	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG-	Transitional Federal Government
US-	United States



## I. INTRODUCTION

Somalia has a long history of internally inspired terror mainly arising from the threat of terrorism that has threatened both domestic and international interests and has drawn increased military efforts from both African continent partners and China and the United States.<sup>1</sup> That military diplomacy has utility in the management of conflict is not contestable, but rather the objectivity lies in how in an analytical sense and when in an exploratory sense can military diplomacy lead to restoration of peace and security. Notably, a narrow focus on defence diplomacy involving military intervention possesses only limited capacity in prevention of conflict. Military diplomacy can be contextualized within the framework of a country's diplomacy, which also entails the foreign diplomacy. On the other hand, it can also be in the context of defence diplomacy.

Military diplomacy can also be considered as one of the tools of a country's diplomatic practice in continuance of the objectives within their policies. It is logical to argue that military diplomacy is within the limits of the traditional practice of diplomacy of any state. In many circumstances, military is doubted if it conducts diplomacy, and this brings us to what is military diplomacy giving a clear distinction from the previous allusion of the normal traditional diplomacy. Military diplomacy has gained relevance over time due to the significant transformation that has been experienced especially between the last periods of the 20th century. This can be alluded to the erosion of the barrier of sovereignty that has suppressed states from meddling in the internal affairs of other states.<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 configures the present system, that is, the acquisition of sovereignty in different states meant that the newly formed states had new political organizations that were equal and no supreme authority overarched over the other authorities. In spite of this relationship, the relation between these groups is characterized by competing self-interests in an anarchical state internal system. This therefore makes it a forever present conflict in the international system because of the lack of common authority. Indeed, the core of a state's relation to another is to influence the relations between them. It is within this relationship that diplomacy gains credence. Therefore, the whole process entails, building alliances, prevention of aggression, cautioning the enemy and seeking for international support in order to have legitimacy.<sup>3</sup>

In Africa, there are several organizations within the regions that were not formed purposely to focus on conflict resolution and management. For instance, IGAD's primarily aimed to develop the North-East Africa region but gradually assumed the role of restoring peace and security, pretty much in Sudan and Somalia. Recently, African regional institutions have made significant steps in assuming the primary responsibility of promoting peace and security.<sup>4</sup> The conflicts experienced in Africa need more proactive ways of approach. In reality, unless the conflicts that have spread across different regions are solved, there would be no hopes for development, economic integration and prosperity. Achievement of many goals is impossible in atmospheres of instability. This is the reason why African regional and sub-regional organizations have considerably been involved in security and conflict resolution through conflict prevention or mediation form.<sup>5</sup>

The African Union (AU), established in 2002, has played an active role toward addressing protracted conflicts in the continent, deploying peace operations and venturing into conflict zones neglected by multilateral organizations including the United Nations. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to AU was marked by the change in principle from that of non-interference to that of non-indifference. Consequently, this has allowed member states to intervene in internal affairs that span issues of crimes against humanity and genocide.<sup>6</sup> The formation of a comprehensive security agenda, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) comprising six components sought to redefine handling of African problems by recommending African designed solutions. This way the APSA had the clear mandate to deploy peace operations in conflict zones across the continent. The components of APSA include the African Standby Force (ASF), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Peace and Security Council (PSC), Panel of the Wise, African Peace Fund (APF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ailton Jose F. Barbosa, "The Challenges and Difficulties of Sino-US Military Diplomacy in the African Continent." *European Scientific Journal, ESJ* 10, no. 10 (2014).

<sup>2</sup> K., Hamilton and R. Langhorne, *The practice of diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. Routledge, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Derek Croxton, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty." *The international history review* 21, no. 3 (1999): 569-591.

<sup>4</sup> E. Berman and K. E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities*. United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Francis, D. J. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Article 4 (h), *Constitutive Act of African Union*, (adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo), and entered into force in 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Article 2 (2) – *The Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council*, (Addis Ababa, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol\\_peace\\_and\\_security.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf), accessed 1 April 2018)



Military diplomacy is an important activity of foreign policy for several states, primarily encompassing the pursuit of foreign policy interests of different states within the context of defence policy and security. State representatives and the state defence bodies carry out a set of activities and which are informed by the use of negotiations and the use of other diplomatic instruments.<sup>8</sup> During the 19th century, military diplomacy focused on almost entirely on the performance functions that entailed the collection and analysis of information concerning the armed forces concerning the situation in different foreign countries. Their main emphasis at that time was on the threats and possible military interventions. This can be seen from the instructions that were given by the Austrian imperial military officers who were working in the positions of the military diplomats during the diplomatic missions of the Austrian Empire abroad. From these past military diplomacy activities, several roles of military diplomacy can be learnt. Comparing the past portfolio of military diplomacy with today's, the role of military diplomats has diversified.<sup>9</sup>

Precisely, Johnson makes clear the role of military diplomats in the developing world.<sup>10</sup> He posits that the role of military diplomats involves; information gathering and analysis of the security situation; promoting cooperation, mutual relations and communication between the armed forces of the receiving and sending state; providing support for the business contracts with armed military equipment between the sending states and the receiving states; Organizing visits and representations for the defence authorities to ensure a peaceful stay for the military units of the sending states who are to work in the receiving states; and providing representation of the state sending a representative to the receiving state at official ceremonies and other official events in the receiving states. Military diplomacy therefore is instrumental in promoting peace and security within the continent, which informs the focus of this study.

### 1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

Despite a relative consensus on the efficacy of military diplomacy for peace and security, it remains unknown its relative contribution to shortening cycles of civil war and violent conflict and lengthening or prolonging cycles of peace given limited empirical evidence. In Africa, areas under regional peacekeeping mission organizations including UN peace and security organizations constantly experience cycles and resurgence of violent conflict, which underpins challenges that counter diplomacy in areas of Somalia, Sudan, Western Sahara, DRC Congo and lately South Sudan. The Somalia conflict largely accounts for the instability experienced in the horn of Africa region, a conflict that has claimed 350,000 to 1,000,000 deaths due to conflict<sup>11</sup> and seen total breakdown of country infrastructure. International and regional actors have made significant strides in Somalia notably through the security council of the United Nations approval of a unilateral UN military intervention in 1992.<sup>12</sup> Other African countries including Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have equally been involved in finding a lasting solution to conflict but with limited progress worth accountability.

While military diplomacy technique is entrusted to solely attain lasting peace in Somalia, how successful this could be, and its progress are prospects that determine how well the cycle of violent conflict could be shortened. Fundamentally, the resurgence of violence and conflict in areas under peace and security operations, say AMISOM in Somalia considerably highlight the challenges that counter military diplomacy efforts. There is still yet minimal progress in attempts to restore peace and stability and ordinarily previously peaceful countries including Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti increasingly witnessing insurgent attacks within their borders.<sup>13</sup> The strategies employed including disarmament strategies have yielded minimal progress<sup>18</sup>. The relevance of the study resides in the fact that it links military diplomacy and peace and security to determine how and when military diplomacy makes a substantial contribution to peace and security. Therefore, this study sought to explore and explain the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa with specific focus on Somalia.

<sup>8</sup> J. Melissen, "The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice," *The new public diplomacy* (pp.3-27). Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005.

<sup>9</sup> David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. "Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture." In *Politics at the Edge*, pp. 14-28. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> J.A. Johnson, *Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton University Press, 2015

<sup>11</sup> G Brookes, J.A. Pooley and J Earnes, *Terrorism, Trauma and Psychology: A Multilevel Victim Perspective of the Bali Bombings*. Routledge Tailor and Francis Group. London, New York. Pg. 8, 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Harper, Mary. *Getting Somalia wrong? Faith, war and hope in a shattered state*. Zed Books Ltd., 2012.

<sup>13</sup> Eriksson, Mikael, ed. *External Intervention in Somalia's Civil War: Security Promotion and National Interests?* Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2013.



## 1.2 Research Objective

To investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Theoretical Literature Review

This study is anchored on the classical liberalism theory. According to Sally, both the classical and the non-liberalists play an important role in organizations and view them as instruments of the states more so great powers.<sup>14</sup> This is reflected in the distribution of power within any international system. Therefore, this school of thought suggests that great powers not only suggest what an organization can do but also suggest what they think is best when done unilaterally. Both the classical and the neo-liberalists put a lot of emphasis on institutions thus granting them autonomy and their own identity. The institution of liberalism therefore, foresees a self-help group that is anarchical in nature in terms of international relations. When such kinds of integrations exist, then there is stronger potential of the democratic process. This entails the promotion of peace strongly and transforming the warring regions into communities with security.

This study therefore, adopted the liberal institutional theory of international relations that is anchored on the good nature of human beings that see to it that peace becomes a normal state of affair among citizens of a given state. This theory makes wars to be viewed as both irrational and unnatural. The democratic process and the institutions in place help break the power of the ruling elite and deal with the violence that they propagate. This helps to bring bringing the communities involved in the process together and such collective activities broadens self-interest and the scope of cooperation. When the whole state complies with the rules of the organization, the pursuit of national interests is discouraged and weakened and the state of sovereignty will apply throughout.

The importance of this theory is anchored on the concept of interdependence between communities. Collective scrutiny is therefore one of the means that is used by the liberals to maintain international peace and each state or man is allowed to realize their potential. The relevance of this theory is premised on the fact that it explains the role that is being played by AMISOM in terms of military diplomacy in a bid to restore peace and security in the Horn of Africa. An underlying potential weakness of this theoretical aspect is that some states pursue their national interests either under the international laws or under international organizations.

### 2.2 Strategies Applied in Military Diplomacy

The issue of instability and conflict that arise among states have diverse causes. These causes range from political discrimination, ethnic hatred, to unequal distribution of resources. All these end up spilling across borders.<sup>15</sup> Societies in which there is a dearth of dissent ideologies highly stand the risk of nurturing appealing ideologies to those who feel insecure because of the existing norms. In most occasions, the authentic grievances pave way for corrupt leadership and subsequently exploitation and aggravation of tensions. As such, unstable relations among the states potentially harbour threat to the relative wealth, ambitions and power. The transformation in the democratic system cuts across the world and this provides support for the stability by doing away with the possible conflicts that may occur.<sup>16</sup>

Over the past decades, there has been the view of durable peace against great powers based on the strategic placement against common security threats. In spite of recent developments in matters security and intelligence, regional tensions and crises in varying degrees threaten the national security of states. Such tensions constrain the alliances and threaten the peace creating a good ground for terrorism to thrive, consequently threatening the regional peace and stability. It is therefore fundamental to secure peaceful and stable relations as a traditional goal for diplomacy. To promote the objective of peace and security, addressing issues of root causes of conflict are vital. In every region, effective ties will be built with the friends, partners, allies, and organizations to ultimately resolve the existing conflicts that emerge. In spite of the tremendous influence of power by those in command, their involvement in creation of regional foreign policy objectives and implementation of the programs on military diplomacy is limited. This only enables the achievement of goals but not in agreement with recommendations of established state authorities.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Razeen Sally, *Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History*. Routledge, 2002.

<sup>15</sup> K.A. Muthanna, "Military diplomacy." *Journal of Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.

<sup>16</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.

<sup>17</sup> Marc A. Levy "Is the environment a national security issue?" *International security* 20, no. 2 (1995): 35-62.





In view of the fact that common strategic thinking amid allies and partner's effective communication includes shaping an effective communication, it remains one of the strategies that is used by military diplomats in their operations. This is usually done through strategic communication to decipher and establish requisite conditions to foster national interests and objectives using useful information, programs and plans that are in synchrony with the national power. Cumulatively, strategic communication comprises the elements; defence support to diplomacy, public affairs, military diplomacy, and public affairs.<sup>18</sup> The state department exists as the lead federal agency for strategic communication although this does not undermine the need to equally engage the department of defence. The US military for example is well trained, equipped, and organized to plan analyse, coordinate, and integrate the spectrum of responsibilities that are put in place to promote the interests of Americans.<sup>19</sup> Subsequently, the Department of Defence ensures the ability to conduct good strategic communication is increase and offer support to institutionalize the whole process. Effective communication is key in any military operation to keep the whole process of operation in sync with the relevant bodies concerned with the security of any state.<sup>20</sup>

Another strategy used by the military diplomats is the idea of presence. This is ability to appropriately place the militants in positions to be able to defend their territory when attacked by the combatants. This strategy has been employed by the U.S to provide support to the state to ensure there is regional stability, a projecting power, and a support in providing deterrence to ensure there is continued access and security commitments.<sup>21</sup> Since 1990s, there has been a general trend in the reduction of forward posture as the forces are not expected to engage in fight where they are positioned unlike the period of the cold war. The 1989 case of the United states provides a classical example where the European command forces was reduced in 1989 from approximately 240,000 to a force of roughly 100,000 people. Generally, the United States turned over the local government oversees installation by 60% in the 1990s.<sup>22</sup> In like manner, the EUCOM changed its geographies south and east to be involved in Eastern Europe and Africa. Since 2004, empirical evidence points to a declining trend as echoed in the global posture review and BRAC 2005. At the same time, the Navy fleet has been reduced too based on the shrinking of the time base inventory. Even though the shrinking took place, the small force is still able to engage as the global posture review primarily focuses on the efficacy relative to tasks for zero operation phases.<sup>23</sup> The U.S Navy has also crafted other ways of enhancing presence by including global fleet stations that will enable the establishment of self-sustaining activities that will help conduct the general regional operations using tailor-made adaptive packages. This is the same case with the military whose presence matter a lot in their operations. The AMISOM has always put in place good strategies on ensuring militants are deployed in various parts of Somali to provide the required protection to the citizens of Somalia. The KDF of Kenya have been deployed along the Kenya Somalia borders in various positions to provide counter-terrorism help.

Security cooperation is another strategy that is employed by most militants and it mainly includes the building of relationships that within the foreign defence establishment in order to promote specific security interests. For instance, in the U.S, the specific security interests have seen to it that there is the development of allied and friendly military competences for self-defence and collective operations.<sup>24</sup> This cooperation includes improvement of information exchange, intelligence sharing, and transformation of allies to help in harmonizing various views on challenges of security and provide access to peacetime and contingency in the U.S forces. The main objectives of security cooperation are to help combat terrorism, build coalitions for the future, cooperate with regional disputes, transform alliances, combat mass weapon destruction, realign global defence posture, deterring and isolating problem states, and combating terrorism. Cooperation has worked well for most military groups when dealing with terrorists.<sup>25</sup> For instance, the AU, UN, IGAD among other state unions, have brought countries together to not only look at issues to do with development but also those that deal with the security of the states exiting within the unions. It is the collective security agreements that have led to establishments like AMISOM, to foster the restoration of peace and conflict in the Horn of Africa.

<sup>18</sup> Timothy C. Shea, *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Center APO AE 09053 European center for security studies, 2005.

<sup>19</sup> E.V. Larson, D. Eaton, B. Nichiporuk and T.S. Szayna, *Assessing irregular warfare: A framework for intelligence analysis*. Rand Corporation, 2009.

<sup>20</sup> C.F. Wald, *New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign*. National defence university Washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2006.

<sup>21</sup> D.A Reveron, *Shaping and Military Diplomacy*. Article, *US Naval War College*, 2007.

<sup>22</sup> R. Henry, *Transforming the US global defence posture*. Naval War Coll Newport Ri, 2006.

<sup>23</sup> D.A Reveron, *Shaping and Military Diplomacy*. Article, *US Naval War College*, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> D.S. Reveron, *Military Diplomacy and the Engagement Activities of Combatant Commanders*. In *Inside Defense* (pp. 43-54). Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

<sup>25</sup> D.S. Reveron and K.A Mahoney-Norris, "*Military-Political Relations: The Need for Officer Education*." National defense univ washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2009.



Building of military partner capabilities has also been used by military diplomats in dealing with issues security. Different approaches have been employed including; foreign military finding, training programmes, foreign military sales, and international military education. Under the umbrella of Joint Combined Exchange Training, foreign militaries have benefited from assistance on novel ways of dealing with security threats including drug trafficking, conduct rescue hostages, and conduct insurgencies. The collaboration of militaries has been so beneficial to the personnel trainings and has enhanced new relations with the foreign counterparts. For instance, in the American training there is always an obvious benefit in terms of financial assistance and the training and these activities help in bridging the gap in interoperability.<sup>26</sup>

The importance of Militaries across the world cannot be overemphasized. Most of the successes experienced after militaristic efforts are fully based on the strategies laid down by the militaries to ensure that their operations go as planned. Even though different states have contradictories strategies, it is important to for the forces that come together to do one mission support other countries militaries so that their impact may be experienced in the society and the goals are achieved. These strategies are therefore important when aligned to the benefit of all the countries within the union.

### III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted an exploratory and mixed methods research design. According to Streb<sup>27</sup>, exploratory research designs suffice where there are limited or fewer studies, important for obtaining background information about a given topic and is flexible, able to address a variety of research questions. Mixed methods approach allows for investigation of a broader and complex research problem enabling the researcher to utilize more than one approach, both quantitative and qualitative approach of data collection.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, the approach produces complete knowledge and understanding of the research problem hence chosen by the researcher for the investigation into the role of military diplomacy in peace and security in Horn of Africa Region, the case of AMISOM in Somalia.

The study target population entailed AMISOM staff who relevant respondents provided sufficient information to answer the research questions. Currently, AMISOM has 22,000 military troops, 234 police officers and 81 civilians (AMISOM, 2018). Moreover, the study equally targeted the Somali civilian population since they were important stakeholders in providing information on the effectiveness of military diplomacy in the country. Thus, the target population comprised 22,315 AMISOM staff and civilian contingent. Out of these, the study sampled 100 using the simplified formular set forth by Yamane;<sup>29</sup> The formular is as follows:

$$n = N1 + (e)^2 = 99.9$$

Where:

n= the sample size

N = the size of population

e= the error of 10%

**Table 1 Sample Size**

Categories AMISOM Component	Population size	Sample size	Sampling Procedure
Military	22000	50	Purposive Sampling
Police contingent of AMISOM	234	30	Purposive Sampling
Civilian contingent of AMISOM	81	20	Purposive Sampling
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,315</b>	<b>100</b>	

Primary data was collected from study respondents by means of a research questionnaire and an interview schedule. This comprised a set of well-structured and unstructured questions defined by the research questions as well as interview schedules. These allowed room for detailed responses from the study respondents. For reliability and validity of the findings, relevant documents constituting AMISOM literature was reviewed to provide qualitative data

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Christoph Klaus Streb, "Exploratory case studies." Encyclopedia of case study research (2010): 372-373.

<sup>28</sup> Abbas Tashakorri and John W. Creswell. "The New Era of Mixed Methods." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (January 2007): 3-7

<sup>29</sup> Taro Yamane, "Statistics: An introductory analysis." (1973).



for analysis. The researcher carried out a pilot test of the research instrument. Pilot testing is important as it helped establish the suitability of the tool and any identifiable errors before undertaking the study. The researcher carried out a pilot study at the East African Standby Force headquarters in Karen, on a sample of 20 respondents.

The data analysis process involved both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Content analysis was mainly used to analyse the qualitative data and which would be reported normatively. Quantitative research findings were analysed and reported using descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v23). Moreover, the data analysis was structured objectively to address each of the study research questions.

## IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

### 4.1 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy in Somalia from Secondary Data Sources

This section presents data from secondary sources.

#### 4.1.1 Supporting dialogue and Reconciliation

The UN Security Council on November 2012 at its 6854th meeting resolved that one of the tasks AMISOM was to carry out in Somalia is to support the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia by facilitating the free movement of people and guarantee the security of all stakeholders involved with the peace process within the country including the political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and civil society representatives.<sup>30</sup> AMISOM has continued to play an important role in Somalia, supporting the current unfolding political process of the dialogue and reconciliation efforts. Among top of priorities has been to stabilize the security situation and strengthen the functionality of established government institutional frameworks. The previously existing stalemate of political differences between the interim parliament and the transitional Government have consistently undermined the peace process, although concerted AMISOM efforts have realized much achievement.

Under heated up engagements, AMISOM has significantly recognized home-grown peace players or aspects that can moderate rigidities in addition to lure the societies together. Clan leaders in Somalia have historically in the previous year fundamentally engaged the state's mandate in security and law. They have amalgamated their customary role as difference intermediaries and implementers of accustomed regulations, together with the locals, that standardize supreme characteristics of community life within and between clans. In this regard, traditional leaders have been instrumental personalities in fostering the establishment of governance structures alongside being supportive in conflict resolution between clans and regulating access to water and pasture especially in Northern Somalia.

Besides sustaining a crucial mandate in local conflict resolution as a key decision-making authority, traditional leaders have assumed positions of being the legitimate leaders as bestowed on them by their clan members. In the wake of fundamental and authentic location of the customary structures in Somali civilization particularly in the aftermath of the state downfall in 1991, it suffices to mention that their involvement in the actual peace processes in the re-establishment of Somalia state is important to support dialogue and reconciliation.

#### 4.1.2 Protecting Somalia Key Infrastructure and Authority

The establishment of the Somalia Federal Government in 2012, governed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was part of efforts to bring the country under rule of law. Clan elders were selected to represent the people in the House of the People of the Federal Parliament. On elections carried out during the year, former transitional government president Sheikh Shariff conceded defeat while the in the Puntland and northwest of Somalia the self-declared regional governments ruled.<sup>31</sup> In the Central part of Somalia was established the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA), with other establishments including the Interim South West Administration (ISWA) and the Interim Juba Administration (IJA). Despite the presence of these regional establishments, the IGA, ISWA and IJA weakly governed their regions thus enabling Al-shabaab to gain control of several towns in the South and Central regions including those of Bardheere and Dinsoor before being acclaimed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali Authorities.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> D. Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre (2013).

<sup>31</sup> L. Hammond, Somalia rising: things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013):183-193.

<sup>32</sup> A. Mohamed, T. Beza, J. Ondo, et al. (2012). *The AMISOM Response to Conflict and the Implementation of Peace and Security in Somalia*. New Generation University College: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.



Government security forces and associated local militia, personnel wearing uniforms, local uniformed militaries, Al-Shabaab, and anonymous aggressors committed uninformed or illegitimate homicides. Government and regional authorities hanged individuals without due procedures and widespread impunity persisted as a norm.

According to the temporary federal constitution, the responsibility to protect and guarantee the sovereignty of the state was a function of the military troops while the State Police whose effectiveness has been limited responsible for protecting the lives of people and property while promoting the rule of law. AMISOM primarily manned the South and Central regions deemed to be under control of to be under the control of Al-Shabaab, but nonetheless chiefly relied upon by the federal government to execute police functions. AMISOM has equally been widely involved in the execution of roles engaging with the relevant ministries including the Ministry of Defence responsible for controlling the armed forces and the Ministry of National Security and local and regional administrations responsible for the operations of the national Police.<sup>33</sup>

With increased support from the African Union Mission in Somalia, the Ministry of Defence's control over the army has greatly improved. The army comprised about 23,000 soldiers and at least 17 independent brigades, with the bulk of forces located in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle, as well as the Bay, Bakool, and Gedo Regions. In the environs of Mogadishu and areas extending the lower and middle Shebelle regions, Merca, Baidoa, Jowar and the Bay region the Ministry of defence has increased heavy presence of the Somali National army to operate alongside AMISOM deployment areas.<sup>34</sup>

The Central government and the Benadir Regional administration have maintained command of two separate police forces in Mogadishu, maintaining their presence in 17 districts of the capital although police officers more than often paying allegiance to their clans and familial links that to government authorities. Complementing federal government and Benadir policing efforts in Mogadishu are the AMISOM-formed police units, providing support on strategies for emergency response, crime prevention, community policing, human rights support among other police functions. Mohamed<sup>35</sup> postulates that over 300 AMISOM police officers worked alongside the Somali national police while providing basic training support.

The conflict laden Somalia landscape has considerably contributed to a lag in infrastructure development, a highlight being the one paved road extending to Kismayu through Mogadishu and from Berbera in the north. The country road network for instance is often impassable over rainy seasons, and only spans about 22,100 kilometres, only 2,608 kilometres having been paved. Moreover, the country only served by a single international airport at Mogadishu, 8 paved civilian airfields and less than 20 additional widely-scattered gravel airfields. The power systems within the country are no different with electricity produced entirely from diesel and, petrol powered generators, run entirely from imported fuel, but only able to produce about 300 million kilowatt hours (kWh) from these privately-owned generators. With recurrent cycles of conflict, exploitation of resources as the hydroelectric potential on Somalia's rivers has been impossible.

Despite the port modernization programme in the late 80s supported by the US aid to support the establishment and expansion of deep-water facilities at Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayu and a lighter port at Marka and Maydh that significantly improved cargo handling capabilities, increased the number of births and deepened the harbour at Berbera, the is limited to show for as a result of conflict. Communication systems within the region are no different either, having been completely destroyed by the rebel forces during engagements with the peacekeeping forces and organizations offering peacekeeping or relief having to depend on their own private systems. This has however changed following the recent establishment of local cellular telephone systems in Mogadishu and in several other population centres. International connections are available from Mogadishu by satellite.<sup>36</sup>

AMISOM continually supports federal government objectives, providing protection to the country's Federal Institutions in carrying out their mandate and secure Somalia's key infrastructure including its airports and seaports as a strategy to achieving peace. In all the four regions of Somalia, AMISOM has established footing to further these objectives. The AMISOM military constituent has formed a moderately protected atmosphere which has permitted the Somali reconciliation process to yield fruit, allowed indigenous populace the opportunity to instigate accountable

<sup>33</sup> A.I. Amadi, *An Analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom)* (Doctoral Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi) (2014).

<sup>34</sup> I. Lewis and J. Mayall. *Somalia: The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (pp. 94-124). Cambridge: University of Cambridge (1996).

<sup>35</sup> A. Mohamed, T. Beza, J. Ondo, et al. *The AMISOM Response to Conflict and the Implementation of Peace and Security in Somalia*. New Generation University College: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2012).

<sup>36</sup> A. Kinfu, *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (2002).





home-grown authority of traditions that can provide amenities as well as re-establish the local economy and build relationships to the countrywide economy and government.

#### 4.1.3 Carrying Out Counter Offensive and Deterrent Measures to Minimize the Threat of Al-Shabaab

AMISOM has for the longest time worked out ways to do away with Al-Shabaab from the capital Mogadishu until August 2011 when they managed. This was a combination of efforts between the troops deployed from Africa together with the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) forces. A lot of the contributions were experienced from the troops that were deployed into Somalia from Djibouti and Kenya who were member states. The neighbouring countries contribution was coupled with greater coordination from the TGF forces and the AMISOM together with a thorough training on the Somalia intelligence operatives by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). This was the main reason for the turnaround of the events and it was the first success AMISOM and Somali forces experienced. Since then, a lot of improvements have been experienced as the security situation in Somalia is taking root.<sup>37</sup>

The involvement of the well-equipped Kenyan navy, air force and the Kenyan Defence forces (KDF) has in great ways contributed to the achievement of the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. The KDF managed to liberate the Juba, Gedo, and the Kismayo areas of Somalia. Furthermore, the Ethiopian nation also redeployed troops into Somalia who managed to capture the Beledwyne; they also moved further into the central regions of Galgadud and Hiraaan and extended further into the Shebelle Rift valley. This great coordination of the AMISOM, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya has had a great impact on the degree of the peace being experienced in most parts of Somalia.<sup>38</sup> Also, the Burundian and the Ugandan armies cannot be forgotten having worked so hard in the insurgency warfare. The experiences they gained, in the past protracted civil wars that their countries went through helped them to play a part in the countering the attacks in Somalia. They demonstrated more resilience to the asymmetric warfare and proved invaluable in pushing out and defeating the al-Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu.

The US also appears to have increased its operations in Somalia against al-Shabaab in response to the attacks however temporarily. This was depicted in the Obama administration that began to target the low-level and the mid-level operatives. This was first witnessed in the March 2016 airstrike that killed approximately 150 al-Shabaab fighters in their training camp that was located 120 miles north of the capital Mogadishu. This led to a threat to the US forces that had combined efforts to work with the local force. The US in turn provided air transportation to the Gashaan forces during the actions raids in 2016. The American strategy of containing and defeating the al-Shabaab has always relied on the AMISOM and the National Army of Somalia. The United States has provided training to the AMISOM contingents and also equipped them to develop into elite Somalia counterterrorism units. Currently AMISOM is inclusive of troops from five African countries. Burundi has (5,400), Uganda has (6,000), Kenya has (3,600), Ethiopia has (4,300), and Djibouti (1,000). In total they sum up to approximately 22, 000 troops that helps Somalia in conducting counter offensive and deterrent measures to do away with al-Shabaab in Somalia. AMISOM has continued to receive enormous support from the American Logistical and Intelligence support. Between 2007 and 2015 alone, the UN mission and the AMISOM forces of Somalia has received nearly one billion to help in countering the al-Shabaab attacks.<sup>39</sup> Counter offensive and deterrent efforts have so far been felt in Somalia since the fight to kick al-Shabaab out began. It was a good strategy that AMISOM applied to counter al-Shabaab.

#### 4.1.4 Facilitating the Implementation of the National Security and the Plan of Stabilization

The implementation of a National security architecture in Somalia was anchored on the close working between the federal government, federal member states and the Benadir Regional Administration. In an agreement reached in November 2017, these institutions agreed to facilitate the political decisions and atmosphere to guarantee implementation of the national security architecture implementation of the National Security Architecture, The Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States and the Benadir Regional Administration agreed to work closely together to accelerate agreement on the political decisions necessary to ensure full implementation of the National Security Architecture, improve working relations on constitutional and federal issues and enhance security within the region. Key elements to the implementation of the national security architecture entailed the political agreement on implementation among the three parties, definition of roles and responsibilities of each arm of the

<sup>37</sup> M. J Thomas, Exposing and exploiting weaknesses in the merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 24 no. 3 (2013): 413-435.

<sup>38</sup> D. Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre. (2013).

<sup>39</sup> Jones, S. G., Liepman, A. M. and Chandler, N. (2016). *Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Somalia: assessing the campaign against Al Shabaab*. Rand Corporation.



security forces, integration of regional forces into the country's security institutions and forces as well as the operationalization of regional security councils in tandem with those of the National Security Council.<sup>40</sup>

Security sector reforms have been a primary focus of the federal governments' efforts to establish a stable and peaceful Somalia as pointed out in the National Security Architecture agreement of April 2017 and the Security Pact at the London Somalia Conference of May 2017. Notably, the progress and the considerable efforts of AMISOM troops and the police contributing countries are acknowledged in the support of peace and security to spur development efforts in Somalia.

To allow Somalia protect its political process, the presence of AMISOM remains critical, alongside strengthening the security institutions, and assuming responsibility for security. The commitment from all partners has been instrumental, working in coordination and coherence through approaches reached at the London Somalia Conference. Notable achievements encompass the implementation plan agreement for a National Security Architecture in Somalia, integration of approximately 3000 Puntland troops into the Somali National Army, as well as the completion of the Operational Readiness Assessments widely agreed upon as an essential component for „right-sizing“ and reforming the SNA and the National Police Force. Participants commended this first realistic assessment and looked forward to the assessment of regional and local forces to complete the picture and form the foundation for transition over the coming years.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4.1.5 Consolidating and Pursuing Political and Diplomatic Settlement of Armed Conflict

The world is fast transforming in decades since the end of the cold war and it is so easy to identify the changes that are taking place in the new system. The end of the bipolarity era to the beginning of a new wave of democratization that has increased globalization of information as well as the economic power, increased efforts of international coordination in matters of security, a redefinition of sovereignty that imposes the states with new responsibilities for the entire world community. This changes and transformations have even shaped the organized crimes being experienced in the world today.<sup>42</sup> Conflict transformation approach has been used since the 1960's as one of the sets of techniques pioneered by the NGO's and academicians. In this approach, meetings of the members in conflict were facilitated so that both parties could understand the other's position as well as the views of the world in order to create a conducive atmosphere for resolving conflicts. In the course of the meeting, the participants will now be able to realize and reinterpret their relationships and thereafter live a more peaceful future. This was done back in the days and it is also evident as a strategy of resolving disputes in this era. This was applied by the commissions of South Africa and some other Latin American countries whenever they worked to construct a shared understanding of history. This kind of reconciliation led to an emotional reconciliation, reduction of tension, and the creation of an environment that is more cooperative in terms of political climate.<sup>43</sup>

For a long time, AMISOM have been mandated to monitor, interpret, and provide reports on the political and other diplomatic developments throughout the regions of Somalia. They are also to assist in advising the political processes that are taking place in Somalia. Also, they are assigned with the obligation of implementing political decisions in Somalia with the help of the African Union Peace and Security Council in order to aid in capacity building of the nation's public service. The collaboration AMISOM has had with Somalia following the country's current political situation, has realized a general improvement that has been noted in terms of the political situation.<sup>44</sup>

According to William,<sup>45</sup> the federal government has continued putting effort to implement a six-pillar plan which is a comprehensive strategy outlined by the president of Somalia for the sake of stabilization and reconstruction of the country. These plans are supposed to be aligned with the supporting communities which are the AU and the International community at large. The first pillar talks of full stability of the country. This pillar is to see to it that the supremacy of the laws and good governance incorporates both security and rule of the law. The second pillar is economic recovery of the country at large. This pillar is to help boost livelihoods and the economic infrastructure of the country. Third, is the pillar of peace building which entails conducting of social relations through building bridges of trust where there were none or where trust ceased. The fourth pillar is service delivery. This pillar ensures that the health, environment and the education system of the country is dependable by the citizens and the Somalia nation at

<sup>40</sup> A.P. Kasaija, The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: results and problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28, no. 3 (2010): 261-282.

<sup>41</sup> D. Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre (2013).

<sup>42</sup> Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Ecpr Press (2008).

<sup>43</sup> O. Ramsbotham, H. Miall and T. Woodhouse, *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Polity (2011).

<sup>44</sup> K. Menkhaus, The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. *African Affairs* 106 no. 424, (2007): 357-390.


<sup>45</sup> P.D. Williams, AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper*, 13. (2013).



large. The fifth pillar talks about international relations. This is the pillar that exists to ensure collaborative relations are built. In the end, this ensures the national image of the country is polished. Lastly, the sixth pillar is that which represents the unity and integrity of the country. This pillar stands to ensure that the country prevails together in order to achieve a better future.<sup>46</sup> The Somalia nation has been on a journey towards achieving the peace they have been striving for and most of the achievements have been reached because of the laid down strategies of attaining the peace.

#### 4.2 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy in Somalia from Primary Data Sources

As presented in figure 4 below, most of the respondents agree there are military diplomacy strategies applied by AMISOM for the restoration of peace in Somalia.




**Figure 1: Utilization of Military Diplomacy Strategies by AMISOM**

However, only about two-thirds of the respondents agree that military diplomacy strategies contribute to peace experienced in Somalia. Further, there are significant differences with only a third of the respondents (33%) indicating that the strategies have little impact, 22% indicate they have moderate impact and slightly less than half of the respondents (45%) pointed out that these strategies are of great impact.


On understanding the activities undertaken by military diplomats, most of the respondents agree fostering ties with other countries and the discerning the national security threats were important roles of military diplomats alongside conduct of trainings of concerned personnel to respond to certain emergency situations as presented in figure 2 below. Study findings reveal differing levels of agreement with fewer respondents agreeing to the need for equipping militaries with equipment and conducting sales and purchases of weaponry and other military technologies.

<sup>46</sup> D. Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre, 2013.



**Figure 2: Activities undertaken by military diplomats**

Moreover, the study sought to establish the strategies applied in military diplomacy, findings that are presented in figure 4 below.



**Figure 3: Strategies employed by AMISOM in military diplomacy**






Study findings presented above reveal that training of military to respond to emergency situations was the most common strategy employed by AMISOM in military diplomacy, followed by the to fostering of ties among countries, defence consultations and the establishment of spheres of influence. Other important strategies entailed engagement in bilateral and multilateral security exercises among countries, strategic dialogues, professional military education exchanges while the least commonly employed approach was arms transfer and regional activities.

### 5.5 Challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy

The study further sought to establish challenges facing AMISOM in its military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Findings are presented in the figure 4 below.



**Figure 4: Challenges facing AMISOM military diplomacy efforts**

Study findings reveal the lack of an AMISOM exit strategy as the biggest constraint in their military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Notably, the competing interests among the TCCs that comprise AMISOM and organizational internal dynamics limit its functionality and effectiveness. However, with the increased commitment of more African states to the course of peace in Somalia, *“there has been a renewed sense of optimism in AMISOM military diplomacy efforts to salvage Somalia given the pan-African outlook that greatly transformed the overall efficiency of the peacekeeping mission.”* As established in the findings, AMISOM continues to suffer an insufficiency of troops although at present things are considerably better as pointed out by a key informant who underscored: *“only few countries considering Somalia an active warzone agreed to committing their forces to AMISOM. In fact, initially it was only Uganda and Burundi, but the KDF came in while other states like Nigeria declined initially to commit their troops. Even with the commitment of Djibouti and Sierra Leone, there’s much more need to expand troop levels to attain full control of Somalia.”*

The findings in figure 7 above indicate the lack of a multilateral approach in addressing security challenges as third most commonly cited challenge facing the institutions military diplomacy efforts. Insufficiency of troops, poor coordination among external partners, limited civilian component and the lack of local strategic support suffice as other key challenges inhibiting the success of military diplomacy efforts. Especially at the beginning of the mission, the poor coordination among external partners proved a great hitch, a key informant respondent said: *“initially the arguments between the UN and the AU on whether military diplomacy was an appropriate approach undermined efforts”*. This is equally captured by a key informant who mentioned: *“earlier on there was widespread international pessimism across most states over the role AMISOM would play in Somalia, in Africa and even beyond. Many felt that given the earlier failures of the UN intervention, AMISOM may simply never succeed and although this has declined overtime, partly is still existent.”*



## V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Conclusion

This study suffices to demonstrate that AMISOM involvement in Somalia as an act of military diplomacy occasioned by the need to foster peace and regional stability on the horn of Africa region. The study demonstrated AMISOM employs different military diplomacy strategies although at different capacities. From the foregoing, the study points to the need for restructuring of AMISOM's peace and security architecture to bring out focus and responsiveness to the dynamic nature of the conflict and the enemy.

### 5.2 Recommendations

There is need for further exploration into military diplomacy in Africa, especially given the dearth in empirical literature that is mainly from the West. Following this exploration of the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the horn of Africa, this study points to research gaps on the influence of civilian component in military diplomacy efforts on peace and security. Further there is need to understand the psychological effects in AMISOM troops participating in military diplomacy efforts in Somalia.

## REFERENCES

- Amadi, A. I. *An Analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom)* (Doctoral Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi), 2014.
- Article 2 (2) – *The Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council*, (Addis Ababa, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol\\_peace\\_and\\_security.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf), accessed 1 April 2018).
- Article 4 (h), *Constitutive Act of African Union*, (adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo), and entered into force in 2001).
- Barbosa, Ailton Jose F. "The Challenges and Difficulties of Sino-US Military Diplomacy in the African Continent." *European Scientific Journal*, ESJ 10, no. 10, 2014.
- Berman, E. and Sams, K. E. *Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities*. United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2000.
- Brookes, G, Pooley, J.A. and Earnes, J (2015). *Terrorism, Trauma and Psychology: A Multilevel Victim Perspective of the Bali Bombings*. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. London, New York. Pg. 8
- Buzan, B. *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Ecpr Press. 2008.
- Croxton, Derek. "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty." *The international history review* 21, no. 3 (1999): 569-591.
- Eriksson, Mikael, ed. *External Intervention in Somalia's Civil War: Security Promotion and National Interests?* Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2013.
- Francis, D.J. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2006
- Hamilton, K. and Langhorne, R. *The practice of diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. Routledge, 2010
- Hammond, L. Somalia rising: things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013):183-193.
- Harper, Mary. *Getting Somalia wrong? Faith, war and hope in a shattered state*. Zed Books Ltd., 2012.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. "Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture." In *Politics at the Edge*, pp. 14-28. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000.
- Henry, R. *Transforming the US global defence posture*. Naval War Coll Newport Ri, 2006.
- Johnson, J.A. *Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton University Press, 2015
- Jones, S.G., Liepman, A. M. and Chandler, N. *Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Somalia: assessing the campaign against Al Shabaab*. Rand Corporation, 2016
- Kasajja, A.P. The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: results and problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28, no. 3 (2010): 261-282.
- Kinfe, A. (2002). *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development.
- Larson, E.V., Eaton, D., Nichiporuk, B. and Szayna, T.S. *Assessing irregular warfare: A framework for intelligence analysis*. Rand Corporation, 2009.
- Levy, Marc A. "Is the environment a national security issue?" *International security* 20, no. 2 (1995): 35-62.
- Lewis, I. and Mayall, J. *Somalia: The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (pp. 94-124). Cambridge: University of Cambridge. 1996.



- Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.
- Melissen, J. The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In *The new public diplomacy* (pp.3-27). Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005.
- Menkhaus, K. The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. *African Affairs* 106 no. 424, (2007): 357-390.
- Mohamed A., Beza, T. Ondo, J. et al. (2012). The AMISOM Response to Conflict and the Implementation of Peace and Security in Somalia. New Generation University College: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Muthanna, K. A. "Military diplomacy." *Journal of Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.
- Nduwimana, D. (2013). *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre.
- Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H. and Woodhouse, T. *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Polity, 2011.
- Reveron, D.A. Shaping and Military Diplomacy. *Article, US Naval War College*, 2007.
- Reveron, D.S. Military Diplomacy and the Engagement Activities of Combatant Commanders. In *Inside Defense* (pp. 43-54). Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.
- Reveron, D.S. and Mahoney-Norris, K.A. *Military-Political Relations: The Need for Officer Education*. National defense univ washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2009.
- Sally, Razeen. *Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History*. Routledge, 2002.
- Shea, Timothy C. *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Center APO AE 09053 European center for security studies, 2005.
- Streb, Christoph Klaus. "Exploratory case studies." *Encyclopedia of case study research* (2010): 372-373.
- Tashakorri, Abbas and Creswell, John W. "The New Era of Mixed Methods." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (January 2007): 3-7
- Thomas, M.J. Exposing and exploiting weaknesses in the merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24 no. 3 (2013): 413-435.
- Wald, C. F. *New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign*. National defence university Washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2006.
- Williams, P. D. (AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper*, 13, 2013.
- Yamane, Taro. "Statistics: An introductory analysis." 1973.