



Security Implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's Military Interventions in post-1991 Somalia: A Regional Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions post-1991 Somalia, focusing on the regional dynamics and consequences of their actions. The study is divided into two main sections, discussing the interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya separately and then analyzing the overall impact on the region. In doing so, the article employed a comprehensive approach that considers the historical, political, and security dynamics of the region. Besides, theoretically, it used a combination of realism and constructivism. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia (2006–2009) was driven by a securitization process within the country, which viewed the conflict in Somalia and the role of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) as a threat to Ethiopian state security. The intervention helped tighten the Ethiopian government's authority and consolidate its state model with the backing of international society. The consequences of the securitization of the "external" conflict in Somalia also extended to "internal" conflicts within Ethiopia. Kenya's intervention in Somalia (2011) was motivated by a series of factors, including national security concerns, the deteriorating situation in the northern pastoralist regions of Kenya, and the personal economic and political interests of senior Kenyan politicians and soldiers from Northeastern Province's Ogadeni Somali community. The operation was partly contemplated by elements of the Kenyan military as early as 2009. The intervention has had both short- and long-term objectives, but its success is uncertain, and it may have unanticipated costs and complications that undermine short-term gains and weaken domestic and regional support. The overall impact of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia on regional security is complex and multifaceted. The interventions have contributed to the fragmentation of Somalia and the emergence of new security challenges in the Horn of Africa. The actions of Ethiopia and Kenya have also complicated the election process in Somalia and intensified old tensions within the region. Furthermore, the involvement of these countries in Somalia has created a complex security dynamic, where their military presence has both supported and complicated the transition process in Somalia.

Key words: security implications, military interventions, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia have significant security implications for the region. The interventions were related with their historical relations and the bad perceptions of each neighboring people to each other. The majority of

Somalis have a low regard and mistrust for their neighbors, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, due to the historical suspicions in the Horn of Africa (Schmidt, 2018). Following the Berlin Conference in 1884, East African lands inhabited by Somalis were taken over by Britain, Italy, and the French Empire, among other

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European countries colonizing the continent (Clark, 2001). In less than a decade, European powers, particularly Britain, divided the Horn of Africa twice. In order to support its colonial allies, the British handed Ethiopia the Ogaden region in 1954. At the time, European countries were restructuring the African continent to suit their interests. The Ogaden region was historically largely ethnic Somali and Muslim (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022).

In 1963, despite the overwhelming vote of the Somalis of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) region in favor of uniting with their brethren in mainland Somalia, Britain seceded the Somali-inhabited NFD region to Kenya. The events led to a lasting state of conflict between Somalia and its neighbors. In 1964, both Ethiopia and Kenya signed a defense pact to restrain Somalia and impede separatist claims. Over the years, Somalia has engaged in several wars with its neighboring countries. Prior to the collapse of the state in 1991, successive Somali governments supported opposition groups and separatist rebel movements in territories controlled by Ethiopia and Kenya, particularly in the Ogaden region. Ethiopia and Kenya increased their involvement in Somalia after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. They saw the resulting chaos as an opportunity to pursue their national interests (Schmidt, 2013 and 2018). During the Somali civil war, Ethiopia supported different warlords and factions, which contributed to the bloodshed and violence in the region. The authorities in Addis Ababa also organized summits and conferences for Ethiopian-backed Somali faction leaders to redesign the Somali state in accordance with Ethiopia's interests. Kenya was seen as taking advantage of Somalia's misfortune as millions of dollars flowed in from the aid sector after a large number of Somali refugees fled into the country. This situation led to Kenya being perceived as benefiting from Somalia's crisis by receiving significant humanitarian aid due to the influx of refugees (Verhoeven and Oliveira 2018).

Accordingly, the above historical mistrusts and hostilities and the post-1991's Somali's immersion into civil war created regional security tension and triggered the neighboring countries military intervention into Somalia. Thus, Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia have significant security implications for the region. Ethiopia's intervention, which began in 2006, was driven by the securitization of the conflict in Somalia and the perceived threat to its own security (Lounsbury, Pearson, and Talentino, 2011). On the other hand, Kenya's intervention, starting in 2011, was a response to cross-border attacks and the need to

address the flow of Somali refugees and national security concerns. These interventions have led to a complex security landscape in Somalia and the region, with implications for cross-border security, the spread of extremism, and the management of refugee flows. The interventions also pose military risks for both Ethiopia and Kenya, as they engage in operations with potentially unanticipated costs and consequences. As Somalia joins the East Africa Community and seeks support from neighboring countries, the security dynamics in the region are further complicated, with implications for peace and stability (Hughes, 2015:200). Therefore, the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia are multifaceted and have far-reaching consequences for the security landscape in the Horn of Africa.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Debates and contexts

The debate surrounding the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia revolves around the role of these interventions in addressing security threats, the impact on regional stability, and the potential consequences for the countries involved. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia (2006-2009) was driven by security concerns and the need to protect its territorial integrity from threats posed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The intervention contributed to the reconstruction and reaffirmation of Ethiopia's identity, political project, and authority, both locally and internationally (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022). However, the consequences of the intervention were not limited to Ethiopia, as the security threat from al-Shabaab, a militant group linked to the UIC, spilled over into neighboring countries, including Kenya. Kenya's intervention in Somalia (2011) was motivated by a desire to protect its North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border and to ease the burden on its military and security forces. However, the intervention has faced challenges and unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences (Olsen, 2017:4). Kenya has a military presence in southern Jubaland, Somalia's southernmost state, and has been accused of trying to make the state into a buffer zone (Schmidt, 2018). The interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia have raised questions about the effectiveness of these military actions in addressing security threats and promoting regional stability. The situation in Somalia remains complex, with ongoing violence and the involvement of various militant groups, including al-Shabaab. The military presence of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia has further complicated the election process and regional security dynamics (Bamfo, 2010:55; Hesse, 2014:3). In general, the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military

interventions in Somalia are multifaceted and involve various factors, including regional security, domestic stability, and the impact on bilateral relations between the countries involved. The interventions have had both positive and negative effects, highlighting the need for a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the underlying security challenges and the potential consequences of military intervention in the region.

Theoretical framework

For this study, the best theoretical framework employed is a combination of realism and constructivism. This approach allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the security implications of these interventions, considering both the material and social factors that influence the actions of the involved countries (Ejdus, 2009: 9). Realism, as a theoretical framework, focuses on the power dynamics and strategic interests of the countries involved in the interventions. It would emphasize the importance of state power, military capabilities, and strategic objectives in shaping the security landscape in the region (Gleditsch et al., 2007). Some key aspects of realism that would be relevant to the analysis include the pursuit of power and strategic interests by Ethiopia and Kenya in their interventions in Somalia. The role of military force in shaping the security landscape and achieving political objectives. The impact of the interventions on the balance of power in the region and the potential for regional instability (Western, 2002:117). Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of social factors, such as norms, values, and beliefs, in shaping the security implications of the interventions. It would consider the role of international institutions, norms, and social constructs in influencing the actions of the countries involved. Key aspects of constructivism that would be relevant to the analysis include: the influence of international norms and values on the decision-making processes of Ethiopia and Kenya. The role of regional institutions, such as the African Union and the East African Community, in shaping the security landscape and the interventions of the involved countries. The potential for the interventions to impact the social constructs and norms within the region, leading to changes in regional security dynamics (Western, 2002:117). By combining realism and constructivism, the article provided a more comprehensive understanding of the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia, considering both the material and social factors that influence the actions of the involved countries.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The study used a comprehensive approach that considers the historical, political, and security dynamics of the region. This includes an in-depth analysis of the securitization processes in Ethiopia and Kenya, the motivations and objectives behind their military interventions in Somalia, and the regional implications of their actions. The methodology incorporated insights from critical security studies, regional politics, and the interconnectedness of domestic and regional security concerns. Additionally, it involved key informant interviews and a thorough review of primary sources, such as government statements, security expert analyses, and scholarly research, to provide a well-rounded understanding of the topic. The article also considered the impact of the interventions on the internal affairs of Somalia, the activities of al-Shabaab, and the role of neighboring countries as stakeholders in Somalia's security. Furthermore, it addressed the challenges and complexities associated with the military presence of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia, including the implications for the election process, state-to-state animosity, and the prospects for efficient cooperation against security threats. In general, the methodology for the article was multidimensional, drawing on a range of sources and analytical frameworks to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia from a regional perspective.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Reasons for Ethiopia's and Kenya's military intervention in Somalia

Kenya's and Ethiopia's interventions in Somalia is related with their hostile historical relations. According to Kisangani and Pickering (2022), Ethiopia's and Kenya's external involvement in Somalia is related to their historically rooted threats and mistrust. A researcher on peace and security in the Horn of Africa also shared this idea, stating that "the hostile security relations that both Ethiopia and Kenya have experienced with Somalia have shaped their objectives of interventions"(interview with Selam Tadesse, Addis Ababa, February 25, 2022). Moreover, both states justified their intrusion as self-defense and to protect their territorial integrity against Somali terrorists like al-Shabaab, who never abandoned the dated agenda of their predecessors. A report by the International Crisis Group (2012) revealed that the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments allege that al-

Shabaab, as an Islamist expansionist movement, aspires to revive and bring back Somalia's "irredentist" claims, which would threaten their territorial integrity.

According to Hesse (2014), The Kenyan and Ethiopian governments believed that their national security and territorial integrity were threatened by the terrorist group al-Shabaab. More importantly, the protracted civil war in Somalia has the "spillover" potential to create security problems for the states of Ethiopia and Kenya, which further shaped their views of intervention to revolve around their national security. As stated by an Ethiopian scholar, like national security, regional security plays a role in and shapes the security orientations of both states in their interventions. In the post-1990s, Somalia became the center of destabilization in the Horn of Africa, causing a spillover effect on the neighboring countries (interview with Dawit Yohannis, Addis Ababa, February 25, 2022). This view of the researcher is also supported by Lake's (1996) argument, which states that states may intervene in the affairs of other states to deter or prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking to other regions or countries.

More importantly, when the EPRDF government took power in 1992, it inherited new security challenges from Somalia's state collapse and the unsolved Ogaden crisis, which had sparked the 1977 conflict between the two countries. The Somalia conflict has given room to a new opponent, AIAI, an armed Islamist and nationalist group that established bases in the Bari region in northeast Somalia immediately after Barre's regime collapsed (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022). *Al Ittihad* or Islamic Union (IU) was created in 1984 and was primarily concerned with internal politics, trying to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. Following the ALAI's defeat in 1992 at the hands of Abdullahi Yusuf, the head of the Somalia Salvation SSDF, the AIAI advanced south from the Bari region, capturing numerous towns along the Somalia-Ethiopia border, notably Luq in the Gedo region (Elmi, 2013:182). The expansion of Islamist groups along Ethiopia's border has become a significant worry as a result of Ethiopia's historical caution over the marriage of Islam and nationalism. The group allied with the ONLF almost immediately, and the two groups collaborated on attacks against Ethiopia (Dagne, 2011:28; Praeg, 2006:155; Jacqueline, 2010). Ethiopia reacted by launching a cross-border offensive, which resulted in the dislodging of both the AIAI and the ONLF from the Gedo area in 1996 and the eventual demise of the AIAI in 1997 (Elmi, 2013:182). Ethiopia's security interests drove such offensives and interventions, with

the primary goal of ensuring that Somalia's war and groups did not represent a threat to Ethiopia.

In 2006, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had taken control of much of southern Somalia. Ethiopia's intervention was also motivated by its own national security concerns, as it feared that the ICU would support separatist movements in Ethiopia (Dagne, 2009:111; Schmidt, 2018:71). In 2011, Kenya intervened in Somalia to address concerns about the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya, national security concerns, and the deteriorating situation in the northern pastoralist regions of Kenya. The ostensible catalyst for the intervention was a spate of high-profile cross-border kidnappings and murders by freelance Somali criminals. However, a longer-term set of ambitions and objectives underlay the operation, which included personal economic and political interests of senior Kenyan politicians and soldiers from Northeastern Province's Ogadeni Somali community.

The intervention was also partly motivated by a desire to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border and ease a huge refugee burden (Mkwale, 2016; Glück, 2019). In general, Chau (2018) argues that even the central strategic purpose of Kenya's intervention was and remains unclear. However, through an in-depth exploration of both primary and secondary data, the objectives of Kenya's intervention were focused on two important areas that were already hypothesized in the theoretical framework. These include defending Kenya's territorial integrity and economic interests against Somalia's aggression (by defeating or containing al-Shabaab); and securing Kenya's borders with Somalia. On the other hand, Somali scholars offer various, albeit somewhat parallel, explanations for Kenya's operation in Somalia (McKnight, 2014; Ndung'u, 2018). The success of these interventions in furthering the countries' objectives is uncertain, and there may be unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences both within the countries and the broader region that undermine short-term gains and weaken domestic and regional support.

Overall, both Ethiopia and Kenya justify their interventions in Somalia as part of their historical obligations to protect their national security and territorial integrity from Somalia's aggression—the Somalis' commitment to unite the entire Somali nation into one state, though the timing and nature of their interventions differ (Olsen, 2017). The objectives of Ethiopia's continued interventions include defending

its territorial integrity by creating a buffer zone and disrupting anti-Ethiopian alliances. Like Ethiopia, Kenya's intervention objectives focused on defending Kenya's territorial integrity and economic interests against Somalia's aggression and securing Kenya's border with Somalia.

Security Implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's Military Interventions in Somalia

Ethiopia's continued military interventions in Somalia have significant security implications for both countries and the broader region. The intervention, which began in 2006, was framed as a response to the threat posed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia. This securitization process not only justified the intervention but also contributed to the reconstruction and reaffirmation of the Ethiopian political regime, both domestically and internationally. The security issues behind Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia have been a subject of scrutiny, with questions raised about the true motives behind the military action (Gonzalez, 2013). While Ethiopia claimed self-defense as the reason for its intervention, there have been doubts about the underlying motives.

Ethiopia's foreign policy dynamics and its role in the region through diplomatic engagement, mediation, and peacekeeping activities has contributed to the complex security landscape in the Horn of Africa (interview with Selam Tadesse, Addis Ababa, February 7, 2021). The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has been characterized as a product of a securitization move, with implications that extend beyond the immediate security concerns (Gonzalez, 2013; Olsen, 2017:4). The successful securitization of the conflict in Somalia not only impacted Ethiopia's external security but also had consequences for its internal conflicts and political identity. In 2020, Ethiopia's disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia over a security issue further underscored the ongoing security challenges and complexities associated with its military involvement in the region (interview with Muhammed Sied, Addis Ababa, February 7, 2021). Overall, Ethiopia's continued military interventions in Somalia have multifaceted security implications, shaping not only the security dynamics between the two countries but also influencing the broader regional security landscape in the Horn of Africa (Pickering and Kisangani, 2022).

Like Ethiopia, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia has significant security implications for both Kenya and the broader region. The intervention, which began in 2011, was prompted by a series of cross-

border attacks by Somali militants and aimed to address concerns about the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya, national security concerns, and the deteriorating situation in the northern pastoralist regions of Kenya. However, the intervention has also led to unintended consequences, including the alienation of Kenyan Somalis, increased vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and the risk of destabilizing the region (Abdi, 2017; Samatar, 2013). While a military approach may provide short-term gains, a long-term solution requires greater inclusion of the Somali government and regional and international stakeholders, as well as alternative ways to combat transnational terrorism. The decision to intervene in Somalia has been the subject of heated debate, with some arguing that Kenya did not follow the right procedure required in pursuit of the right to self-defense. Ultimately, the success of the intervention in furthering Kenya's short- and long-term objectives remains uncertain (Okwany, 2016; Glück, 2019).

The interventions of both countries were motivated by various factors, including border security concerns, the flow of Somali refugees, and national security interests. However, these interventions may also have unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences within both countries and the broader region (Pickering and Kisangani, 2022). Some key security implications of these interventions include:

Increased instability

Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia have been linked to increased instability in the region. Ethiopia's intervention in 2006 to oust the Islamic Courts Union led to a brutal occupation and triggered an insurgency that has lasted to this day (Ingiriis, 2018). Similarly, Kenya's military intervention, such as "Operation Protect the Nation," was a response to Somalia's chronic instability and the spill-over of the conflict, leading to a large refugee influx and security concerns in Kenya. However, these interventions have faced criticism for exacerbating the instability (interview with Matt Bryden, Addis Ababa, December 31, 2021). Kenya's intervention, for example, has been associated with civilian casualties and has raised questions about the country's motives and the reliability of its proxies in Somalia. Additionally, al-Shabaab's continued attacks in the region, including in Kenya, have been a response to the interventions and have contributed to the overall instability (Samatar, 2013; Pickering and Kisangani, 2022). Therefore, while the interventions were initially aimed at addressing security concerns, they have had the unintended consequence of increasing instability in the region (Abdi, 2017).

Regional tensions

Ethiopia and Kenya's military intervention in Somalia created regional tensions. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia began in 2006 when Ethiopian troops moved into Somalia to support the weak interim government (Dagne, 2009:111). The Ethiopian-Somali conflict is a territorial and political dispute between Ethiopia, Somalia, and insurgents. The conflicts most recent intervention began in the late 1940s when the Somali inhabited Ogaden region was handed back over to Ethiopia by the British (Gonzalez, 2013). In contrast, Kenya intervened in Somalia in 2011 to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border, ease a huge influx of Somali refugees into Kenya, and address national security concerns. The Kenyan intervention aimed to capture the main al-Shabaab forces in a pincer operation in arid territory, where the local community is strongly tied to Somalia (McKnight, 2014; Ndung'u, 2018). The intervention led to more than 150 attacks in Kenya by al-Shabaab, targeting civilians, the Somali state, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Hughes, 2015:200). The conflict in Somalia is a long-standing one, which has had a profound regional impact. A more comprehensive and integrated approach involving political and social actors, relevant national stakeholders, as well as regional and international players is a better strategy to adopt (interview with Dawit Yohannis, Addis Ababa, February 7, 2021).

Counter-Attacks

Ethiopia and Kenya have been involved in military interventions in Somalia, targeting the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab, which has been responsible for numerous attacks in the region. Al-Shabaab has retaliated against both Ethiopia and Kenya for their interventions in Somalia. The group has carried out numerous attacks in Kenya, including the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, which resulted in at least 67 deaths. Additionally, Al-Shabaab has conducted cross-border attacks against military forces and civilians in the Gedo region, near the Kenyan border (Olsen, 2017:10).

Refugee flows and arms trafficking

The military interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia have significant security implications, particularly in relation to refugee flows and arms trafficking. Kenya's intervention in Somalia in 2011 was prompted by concerns about the flow of Somali refugees into the country, as well as national security threats and the deteriorating situation in the northern pastoralist regions (Miyandazi, 2012:4; Hammond, 2013:57).

The deployment of Kenyan troops in Somalia was a major security gamble, with potential risks of prolonged operation leading to local armed resistance and terrorist retaliation inside Kenya. On the other hand, Ethiopia has also been involved in Somalia and admits tens of thousands of Somali refugees annually. Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia demonstrates its commitment to addressing security challenges in the region. Additionally, Ethiopia pursued a strict encampment policy for the refugees within its borders, restricting their movement under the 2004 refugee law. These interventions have implications for the security dynamics in the region, including the potential for increased arms flows and the impact on the local refugee populations (Williams and Hashi, 2016:18). It is important to carefully consider the long-term security consequences of such interventions and to develop comprehensive strategies that address the complex security, humanitarian, and political challenges associated with military involvement in Somalia.

Regional impact

The conflict in Somalia has had a profound regional impact, with countries like Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Djibouti contributing military forces to the AMISOM mission. The Kenyan intervention has further complicated the situation, as it has led to more cross-border attacks and increased tensions between Kenya and Somalia (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022).

International involvement

The United States has been involved in Somalia since 2007, providing financial and military support to the Somali government and AMISOM. The Kenyan intervention has further complicated the situation, as the United States has been wary of collaboration with Kenya due to its own counter-terrorism efforts (Bereketeab, 2013:149).

Radicalization of Al-Shabaab

The military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya have had several security implications on the radicalization of Al-Shabaab. These include increased security patrol, displacement of Al-Shabaab members, targeting of civilians, and regional instability. The attacks have prompted increased security patrols in both Kenya and Somalia, with the objective of enhancing overall cross-border security (Williams and Hashi, 2016:18). This increased security presence may have contributed to the radicalization of Al-Shabaab members, as they may feel threatened by the foreign military presence in their territories.

The military interventions have also displaced many Al-

Shabaab members, leading to the formation of new cells and networks in other areas. This displacement may have contributed to the radicalization of the group's members, as they seek new safe havens to regroup and reorganize (interview with Selam Tadesse, Addis Ababa, February 21, 2022, 2021). Al-Shabaab has been known to target civilians in its territories, which may have been a response to the military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya (Moller, 2009:20). This targeting of civilians could further radicalize the group's members, as they may perceive the civilian population as a threat to their existence. The military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya have contributed to regional instability, as the situation in Somalia remains volatile and the threat posed by Al-Shabaab continues to spread. This regional instability may have further radicalized Al-Shabaab, as they seek to exploit the situation to expand their influence and control in the region (Reider, 2014:18). In general, the military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia have had significant security implications on the radicalization of Al-Shabaab. These interventions have led to increased security measures, displacement of the group's members, targeting of civilians, and regional instability, all of which may have contributed to the radicalization of Al-Shabaab (Williams and Hashi, 2016:18).

In conclusion, Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia have led to increased instability, radicalization of the Al-Shabaab group, and regional tensions. A more comprehensive and integrated approach involving political and social actors, relevant national stakeholders, and regional and international players is needed to address the complex conflict in Somalia (Abdi, 2017). Therefore, this article highlights the complexities and challenges of intervening in a country like Somalia, where a military approach alone may not provide a long-term solution.

Comparing the Security Implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's Interventions in Somalia

Ethiopia and Kenya have both intervened militarily in Somalia, but with different security implications. Ethiopia's intervention in 2006 was motivated by the securitization process in Ethiopia regarding the conflict in Somalia and the role of the UIC (Abdi, 2017:108). The main argument for deploying Ethiopian troops was the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia.

The intervention contributed to the reconstruction and reaffirmation of the Ethiopian state both locally and internationally. On the other hand, Kenya's intervention in 2011 was motivated by the spate of

high-profile cross-border attacks and concern about the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya. The intervention was aimed at ridding Somalia of extremists and keeping Al-Shabaab at arm's length from its border. The intervention has prompted increased security patrols in both Kenya and Somalia with the objective of enhancing overall cross-border security. While both interventions have had different security implications, they have both faced unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences both within the countries and the region (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022).

The deployment of Ethiopian troops was supported by the US and Canada, with the main argument being the protection of Ethiopia's integrity. On the other hand, Kenya's intervention, starting in 2011, was motivated by concerns about cross-border attacks and the flow of Somali refugees, as well as national security and economic interests. Both interventions aimed to combat the threat of Al-Shabaab and enhance overall security in the region (interview with Amare Kenaw, Addis Ababa, February 7, 2021). The security implications of these interventions are multifaceted. They have led to increased security patrols, cross-border military offensives, and the deployment of thousands of troops to combat Al-Shabaab (Hesse, 2014). However, the interventions also pose risks for the intervening countries, such as the potential for prolonged and messy engagements, undefined military objectives, and the need to keep the extremist group at a distance from their borders.

Furthermore, the interventions have the potential to impact regional security dynamics, including the spread of small arms, light weapons, and the threat of sea piracy (Eriksson, 2013). Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia have complex security implications, involving a range of factors such as securitization, regional stability, and the threat of extremist groups. While these interventions are aimed at addressing security challenges, they also carry inherent risks and the potential to shape the security landscape in the Horn of Africa (Menkhaus, 2012).

Overall, the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's interventions in Somalia were focused on the following key areas. These include, regional security dynamics, counter-terrorism efforts, geopolitical ramifications, humanitarian and refugee concerns, long-term security and stability, and military and peacekeeping operations. In terms of regional security dynamics, the presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan forces in Somalia has the potential to influence regional security dynamics, including cross-border security, stability, and the overall security architecture

of the Horn of Africa (Barnett, 2018). Moreover, both interventions are part of broader counter-terrorism efforts to combat the threat of Al-Shabaab (Eriksson, 2013). The effectiveness of these efforts and their impact on the security situation in Somalia and the region need to be carefully assessed.

The interventions may have geopolitical ramifications, including implications for the involvement of other regional and international actors, and the broader geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. In the area of humanitarian and refugee concerns, the interventions may have implications for humanitarian operations, the protection of civilians, and the management of refugee flows, particularly given the complex humanitarian situation in Somalia (Williams and Hashi, 2016). The long-term security and stability of Somalia and the region were influenced by the outcomes of the interventions, including their impact on state-building, governance, and the resolution of internal conflicts (Hagmann, 2014:728). The interventions also raise questions about the conduct of military operations, peacekeeping efforts, and the coordination of security initiatives in Somalia, including the role of the African Union and other international actors (Andrew and Nathan, 2016).

CONCLUSION

The military interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia have significant security implications for the region. Ethiopia's intervention, which began in 2006, was driven by the securitization of the conflict in Somalia and the perceived threat to its own integrity and stability. On the other hand, Kenya's intervention, starting in 2011, was motivated by concerns about cross-border attacks, the flow of Somali refugees, and national security issues. Both interventions aimed to combat the threat of Al-Shabaab and enhance overall security in the region. However, these interventions also carry risks, including potential unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences within the intervening countries. Therefore, it is evident that the security implications of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions in Somalia are complex and multifaceted, with potential impacts on regional stability, cross-border security, and the ongoing conflict with Al-Shabaab.

In general, the military interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia have introduced several security implications for the region, including the potential for long-term consequences, unintended consequences, and the involvement of neighboring states. These interventions have also highlighted the need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to

addressing the complex security challenges in Somalia and the surrounding region.

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