Discriminating in favor of local tenderers: Evaluating mainland Tanzania’s domestic procurement preference practices

Abstract

As a result of international collaboration, countries worldwide opened their procurement practices to foreign competition. However, with foreign competition, governments are jeopardizing the achievement of national economic, political, and social objectives through public procurement. Thus, governments have implemented protectionism by stipulating in the procurement laws that domestic tenderers should be granted preference when making government-related acquisitions. Therefore, this study primarily evaluated Tanzania’s domestic preference practice to determine the application of legal provisions and the efficiencies achieved from making acquisitions through domestic tenderers. The study used a doctrinal method, where the expositions of the law were compared with actual practice. Data was collected from fourteen procurement experts using in-depth interviews. The interviews were derived from the Delphi research concepts, where interviews were conducted on a ‘rounds’ basis to establish the consensus of findings between procurement experts. The study found inconsistencies when applying domestic preference, where procuring entities did not state in tendering documents the application of domestic preference while the procurement value fell within the range of domestic preference application. Also, preference for special groups in procuring entity jurisdictions was not included in procurement plans. Additionally, it was found that domestic tenderers are faced with capital challenges that affect their ability to effectively discharge procurement contracts by possessing sufficient resources. The study recommends that procuring entities embrace domestic preference to contribute to domestic economic growth and development by correctly abiding by the provisions of the law when administering tendering processes.