AHMR

African Human Mobility Review

VOLUME 8 NUMBER 2
MAY - AUGUST 2022

SIHMA
Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa

UNIVERSITY of the WESTERN CAPE

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AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility in Africa, including socio-economic, political, legal, developmental, educational and cultural aspects.
Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.

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AHMR is accredited by the **Department of Higher Education and Training** (DHET) in South Africa.

ISSN 2410-7972 (online) ISSN 2411-6955 (print).

Editing service provided by On point language solutions

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AHMR African Human Mobilty Review - Volume 8 Nº 2, May-August 2022

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Editorial

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This issue consists of a book review and five articles that promote the practice of original research and policy discussions and provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns, and some of the most important migration-related issues in Africa.

The review was made by **Daniel Tevera** on a book entitled "Citizen and Pariah", by Vanya Gastrow. The reviewer made a critical and scholarly evaluation of the entire book. According to Tevera, the author informs the reader about the violent crime affecting Somali shopkeepers, their ability to access informal and formal justice mechanisms, and efforts to regulate their economic activities. The reviewer further indicates that, from the different chapters of the book it becomes clear that the author uses the term "pariah" as a social and geographical metaphor. The reviewer concludes that this book is an important contribution that is divided into three parts, consisting of twenty-one essays that delicately address the marginalization and victimization of immigrant entrepreneurs. The book clearly indicates that foreign shopkeepers with business interests in urban spaces have been victims of xenophobic attacks in most parts of South Africa.

The first article by **Derek Yu** is entitled "The Impact of International Migration on Skills Supply and Demand in South Africa". Using a quantitative method of research that involved the use and analysis of data from Census 2001 and 2011 as well as Community Surveys 2007 and 2016. This is the first study in South Africa that compares natives and immigrants with emigrants. The study analyzed the most recent census and survey data of the top five emigration destination countries and examined the well-being of South African emigrants in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States of America, Australia, and Canada. The results of this study enhance the understanding of the impact of international migration on skills supply and demand in South Africa, and identify the skills needs of the country. The study also provides stakeholders and policymakers with insights to better identify the priority critical skills needs of the country – critical skills that are lost, and skills that are in great demand but in short supply – so that these skills needs can be prioritized when issuing work and residence permits to immigrants.

The second article by **Emmanuel Quarshie, Imhotep Paul Alagidede, Albert Duodu**, and **Edwin Teye Sosi** is entitled "Moonlighting Behavior among Migrants: Determinants and Implications for Well-Being in South Africa". The study applied quantitative research methods to measure the key determinants of moonlighting, defined as a "situation where an individual maintains primary employment and engages in additional work for pay". The study also examined the differences that

exist between migrants and non-migrants. Furthermore, a model of determinants of happiness was estimated to draw synergies or nuances in the estimated self-reported well-being model. The results of this study indicate that there is a significant relationship between moonlighting and self-reported well-being.

The third article by **Sylvester Kyei-Gyamfi** is entitled "Fish-for-Sex (FFS) and risk of HIV Infection among Fishers in Elmina Fishing Community in Ghana". Methodologically, this paper is based on a cross-sectional study to investigate a relationship between human mobility and HIV risks among 385 fishers in Elmina. The theory of gender and power (TGP) was used to address the wider social and environmental issues surrounding women. The article provides an in-depth analysis of the status quo and the distribution of power and authority, affective influences, and gender-specific norms within heterosexual relationships. The results of this study reveal a strong link between human mobility and engagement in FFS and indicate that mobile women engaged in FFS more than those who were non-mobile. Furthermore, the research established a correlation between high levels of mobility and HIV infection among fish traders. The article recommends the empowerment of female petty fish traders and calls for the intensification of education by relevant agencies involved in HIV education on safe practices in fishing communities.

The fourth article by **Francis Anyanzu** and **Nicole De Wet-Billings** is entitled "Destination Substitution and Social Networks among Urban Refugees in Kampala, Uganda". This study is a cross-sectional survey that was conducted in Kampala, Uganda, with respondents drawn from the Somali, Congolese (DRC), Eritrean, Burundian, Ethiopian, South Sudanese, and Sudanese refugee communities. The researchers employed non-probability sampling strategies due to the hidden or transient nature of the urban refugees. The outcomes of this study suggest that social network factors facilitate the rechanneling of refugees to Kampala. Moreover, individuals who had knowledge of someone living in Kampala or who had ever lived in Kampala were more likely to move to the city after having considered going to alternative destinations.

The fifth article by **Jacqueline Owigo** is entitled "Returnees and the Dilemmas of (Un)sustainable Return and Reintegration in Somalia". The research employed a qualitative research design involving semi-structured interviews conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia and Nairobi, Kenya. This study was grounded in two strands of literature, namely, the sustainable return and reintegration as well as the theoretical studies on the aspirations/ability model. The findings of this research show that returning migrants to Somalia faced a challenging context characterized by insecurity, violence, drought, lack of livelihood opportunities, and widespread humanitarian needs. The study also established that most returnees faced considerable challenges finding employment, decent housing, secure living environment, and educational opportunities for their children.

I would like to thank all Board Members, editors, reviewers, authors, and readers for their continued engagement. Finally, I am confident that the African Human Mobility Review, Volume 8, Number 2, 2022 provides a significant resource for scholars, practitioners, and students.

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Book review

Gastrow, Vanya, 2022.

Citizen and Pariah

Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 233 pages
ISBN: 978-1-77614-739-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-77614-740-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-77614-741-0 (Web PDF)
ISBN: 978-1-77614-742-7 (EPUB)
https://dx.doi.org/10.18772/12022037397

Citizen and Pariah is the title of a book by Vanya Gastrow that is based on her doctoral and postdoctoral research. In the preface Gastrow informs the reader that "the book investigates violent crime affecting Somali shopkeepers, their ability to access informal and formal justice mechanisms, and efforts to regulate their economic activities" (p.xii). As one navigates the different chapters of the book it becomes clear that Gastrow uses the term "pariah" as a social and geographical metaphor. Socially, the "pariah" is economically excluded, and geographically, the pariah's condition of precarity compels them to occupy the street as the space to pursue livelihoods during the daytime and then to retreat in the evening to their ethnicized spaces.

Gastrow produced a very readable book that is divided into three parts consisting of twenty-one essays that delicately address the marginalization and victimization of immigrant entrepreneurs. Foreign shopkeepers with business interests in urban spaces have been victims of xenophobic attacks in most parts of South Africa. The victims' frustrations to access justice mechanisms and protection from such attacks have been highly documented. Drawing from narratives emerging from qualitative research, Part 1, which consists of eight chapters that provide rich personal migration experiences of Somali immigrant entrepreneurs, explores the theme, *arrival and reception*. The chapters offer revealing insights into how social networks, involving established Somali immigrants, help the new arrivals to adjust to a new environment and to livelihood opportunities in the immigrant economy.

The contours of the urban geography of migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa become clear as Gastrow unpacks how "Somali spaza traders have found themselves in a foreign country as modern pariahs" (p.11). As social pariahs residing in ethnic enclaves that are cut off from mainstream society, Somali migrants in South African cities have become entrepreneurs largely because of the various impediments, such as lack of requisite documents, in the path to formal employment. Gastrow argues that in addition to being spatially and socially marginalised, the "Somali migrants are largely unwelcome guests in South Africa and criminals target their businesses with relative impunity" (p.39). Given this intolerable situation, Gastrow

observes that flight and relocation have become the primary responses by the Somali entrepreneurs to the structural xenophobic attacks that are prevalent in the migrant neighborhoods and which have "created a fertile environment" for general lawlessness (p.67).

Part 2, on *regulation and containment*, consists of eleven chapters that provide nuanced analyses of the survival strategies employed by Somali entrepreneurs to remain viable in an environment that is generally hostile to African migrant entrepreneurship. The ethnographic studies conducted by Gastrow in Cape Town reveal that most of the Somali entrepreneurs interviewed were deeply concerned about the xenophobic environment in which they operated and the determination of the South African police to close down their shops. Gastrow asserts that by casting migrants as criminals, the police are perpetuating the unfounded view that many Somali shop owners in South African cities are "engaged in illegal trading" (p.87). She contends that the police raids on foreigners, codenamed "Operation Fiela" – meaning "sweep clean" in Sesotho – should be regarded as part of a grand design "to rid neighbourhoods of unclean foreign criminals" (p.90). Part 3 of the book focuses on *the politics of pariahdom* and it consists of the final two chapters. The last chapter on pariah justice is arguably one of the strongest in the book, suggesting that the pariahs can empower themselves "by becoming conscious of the roles imposed on them and actively rebel against them" (p.185). However, Gastrow readily concedes that Somali traders who reside in the predominantly low-income townships are not empowered to change their status as spatially and socially marginalized pariahs, without triggering a violent backlash. In view of this untenable situation, they are unlikely to resort to anything that would exacerbate their already precarious situation.

Citizen and Pariah is a well-researched and informative book; its well-formulated collection of essays is essential reading for scholars and students seeking a grounded understanding of African immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa. The book contributes substantially to the academic conversation on Somali immigrant entrepreneurship and its attendant challenges and dangers in South African cities.

Prof Daniel Tevera, University of the Western Cape, South Africa

The Impact of International Migration on Skills Supply and Demand in South Africa

Derek Yu[1]

Received 07 February 2022 / Accepted 18 July 2022 / Published 31 August 2022

Abstract

The existing South African migration literature focuses primarily on examining the well-being of immigrants to South Africa, especially their labor-market outcomes. However, none of these studies examined the well-being of South African emigrants in great detail. The objective of this study is to use the data for the period 2001–2016 sourced from the South African Census reports and Community Surveys, as well as the survey data of the top emigration destination countries to investigate the three groups: (a) immigrants to South Africa; (b) natives who remain in the country; (c) emigrants to the top destination countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The study derived empirical findings from the perspectives of skills supply and demand. The key findings showed that emigrants were most educated, enjoyed the lowest unemployment probability (10%), and were most likely to be involved in high-paying skilled occupations and tertiary-sector activities. Immigrants to South Africa experienced worse well-being than emigrants but better than natives. These immigrants were slightly more educated, and enjoyed a higher labor force participation rate (LFPR) (75%) and a lower unemployment likelihood (20%), compared with natives (55% and 30% respectively). Furthermore, for both abovementioned two groups, they were distinguished into three sub-groups – long-term, medium-term, and short-term migrants; and long-term migrants was the sub-group that had the best labor-market outcomes. The study concludes by recommending four policy suggestions: ease up regulations to attract skilled immigrants; promote entrepreneurial activities of immigrants; better develop and retain skills of the natives; and improve migration and vacancy data capture, availability, usage and analysis.

Keywords: migration, labor market, labor supply, labor demand, South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, South Africa has been an immigrant-receiving country; the country was occupied by forebears of the Bushman and Khoisan tribes before the Europeans arrived, whereas a great number of people migrated from Central Africa to South Africa during the seventeenth century (Van Rooyen, 2000). The discovery of minerals led to an increased demand for mining labor and subsequently immigration of workers from other countries (Modi, 2003: 1759). The Documented Migration data released by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA, 2004) found that, between 1940 and 2003, a total of 1.25 million people immigrated to South Africa, whereas 0.61 million South Africans left the country, resulting in a net gain of 0.64 million people. The more recent 2016 Community Survey (CS) (StatsSA, 2016) found that 1.32 million people from other countries moved to South Africa.

These findings suggest that the movement of people and transfer of skills across national borders is a common phenomenon, and it is no longer possible for countries to manage population movement independent of international norms and global trends (Wöcke and Klein, 2002: 442). Thus, as globalization encourages greater specialization and division of labor as well as international transfer of skills across countries, national-level labor-market policy planning and implementation has become more complicated, because global labor issues need to be considered, including international migration.

The high incidence of skilled emigration out of South Africa results in a net transfer of human capital and scarce resources to more developed countries in the form of foregone tax revenues and fiscal cost of educating these skilled workers, along with a potential loss of skills in the next generation, because emigrants most likely take their children with them (Waller, 2006; Leipziger, 2008). The emigration of skilled people may further worsen unemployment in the home country, because skilled and unskilled workers are complementary, especially if skilled labor engage in entrepreneurial activities by hiring unskilled labor. In fact, the International Business Publications study (2012: 67) estimated that each skilled emigrant who left South Africa could lead to the loss of as many as 10 unskilled jobs in the country.

Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa is the most popular destination country for migrants from other African countries. The United Nations (2019) found that the immigrants' share represented by people coming from countries such as Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe gradually increased during 1990–2017, whereas the share represented by Mozambique and Lesotho remained high. African immigrants replenish local labor supply at both ends of the skills spectrum, stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation, and contribute to fiscal revenue. Nonetheless, these immigrants may tighten the labor market by increased competition for local jobs and create social tensions (OECD, 2018).

Many South African empirical studies investigated inter-provincial migration (see, for example, Van der Berg et al., 2002; Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2004; Moses and Yu, 2009; Kollamparambil, 2017; Kleinhans and Yu, 2020), but there are relatively

fewer empirical studies on international migration. The latter group of studies mainly investigated the well-being of immigrants in selected regions with the aid of primary data (e.g., Sinclair, 1999; Wentzel et al., 2004; Theodore et al., 2017), examined the emigration intention of natives (e.g., Mattes and Richmond, 2000; De Jong and Steinmetz, 2004; Mattes and Mniki; 2007), or estimated the macroeconomic impact of skilled emigration in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) foregone (e.g., Bohlman, 2010).

Only a handful of studies investigated if the immigrants enjoyed better well-being than natives in the labor market (e.g., Zuberi and Sibanda, 2004; Facchini et al., 2013; Budlender, 2014; Fauvelle-Aymar, 2014; Vermaak and Muller, 2019). However, these studies did not compare all three core groups, namely immigrants, natives and emigrants. These studies also did not comprehensively investigate international migration in South Africa from the perspectives of skills supply and demand, and possible imbalances between the two (or skills mismatch). Hence, this study analyzes a wide range of local and international data sources to investigate the impact of international migration on skills supply and demand in South Africa by comparing the demographic, education, and labor market characteristics of the three groups.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical framework

Before someone decides to migrate, they first compare the returns (R) and costs (C), before discounting both terms into present values. If there is net real income gain from migration (i.e., $R - C > 0$, in present value), the person decides to migrate (Mincer, 1978). Sjaastad (1962) and Stark et al. (1998) assert that returns to migration are mainly influenced by labor-market earnings and probability of securing employment in the destination country. Also, both money costs (e.g., foregone earnings in the country of origin and the costs involved in searching for and learning a new job in the country of destination) and non-money costs ('psychic' costs of changing environment and leaving family and friends behind) are involved.

Numerous well-known migration theories and models exist, such as push-pull model, dual labor market theory, world systems theory, network theory, and cumulative causation theory, to name but a few (for detailed discussion of these theories, refer to Massey et al., 1993). Since this study examines international migration from a labor supply and demand perspective, it discusses the two most relevant models (push-pull and human capital).

In the push-pull model, natives leave the country due to economic and non-economic factors. Push factors are those aspects in the country of origin that cause emigration, while pull factors are those aspects in the destination country that encourage immigration (Oteiza, 1968). The main push factors include slow economic growth, high unemployment, and poor access to facilities and services (e.g., electricity and water). On the contrary, the main pull factors include better

quality of life, better personal security, more abundant employment and professional development opportunities, and higher remuneration (Van Rooyen, 2000; Rasool et al., 2012).

The human capital model argues that skill-biased emigration prospects increase the expected return to human capital, thereby encouraging more people to pursue further education before deciding if they emigrate or not (Di Maria and Lazarova, 2012; Deuster and Docquier, 2018). Thus, the mere possibility of skilled emigration encourages more people to acquire additional skills, leading to a net increase of human capital. Since not all eventually leave the country of origin, the emigration of skilled people does not necessarily lead to brain drain, but could rather result in brain gain, because people who decide not to migrate have higher levels of human capital than they would have had in the absence of emigration possibility (Vidal, 1998; Stark and Dorn, 2013; Todaro and Smith, 2015). Thus, both the countries of origin and destination enjoy an increase of aggregate human capital level.

South Africa's migration policy

South Africa's existing international migration policy is a regime aimed at attracting high-skilled expatriates. In the initial years since the democratic transition, the African National Congress (ANC) did not place international migration policy among key issues in the economic development and reform strategies. There was a lack of understanding on various pressing issues in the broad field of migration, such as the presence of more asylum seekers, brain drain and brain gain, and skills needs of the country (Segatti, 2011: 31, 39–40).

In November 1996, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) appointed a task team to write the 1997 Green Paper on International Migration, followed by the release of the Refugees Act of 1998 and the Immigration Act of 2002. These two Acts were amended numerous times, before the International Migration Green Paper and the White Paper were published in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The South African government introduced new categories of permanent and temporary residence to gain better control over the types of migrants entering the country, and a points-based system was proposed to replace a stringent quota system on skilled immigration. Nonetheless, the post-apartheid international migration policy instruments remain restrictive and slow to respond to national demands and regional developments (Peberdy, 2001: 17; Van Lennep, 2019a: 2).

The international migration policy instruments are summarized in Table 1 and some of them are explained below. The 1999 White Paper was implemented mainly through the Immigration Act of 2002 and partly through the Refugees Act of 1998. The Immigration Act of 2002 emphasizes numerous principles, including the following: simplify requirements and procedures; expeditious issue of residence permits; issue visas to foreign individuals with skills (i.e., critical skills) that cannot be obtained in South Africa or those with substantial amounts of capital to invest in the country; recruit low- to middle-skilled individuals from SADC countries

only by farmers, mines, and other firms under a temporary Corporate Work Visa; ensure human rights protection in immigration control; and prevent and counter xenophobia (DHA, 2017: 4, 12, 45; OECD, 2018: 62; Van Lennep, 2019a: 5).

Table 1: South Africa's international migration policy instruments since 1994

Instrument	**Document**
Migration Green Paper	International Migration Green Paper 1997
	International Migration Green Paper 2016
Migration White Paper	International Migration White Paper 1999
	International Migration White Paper 2017
Aliens Act	Aliens Amendment Act 1995
Refugees Act	Refugees Act 1998
	Refugees Amendment Act 2008
	Refugees Amendment Act 2017
Immigration Act	Immigration Act 2002
	Immigration Amendment Act 2004
	Immigration Amendment Act 2007
	Immigration Amendment Act 2011
	Immigration Amendment Act 2016

Source: Adapted from Mbiyozo (2018: 3)

Despite these changes being implemented, the 2002 Act has been under criticism on some shortcomings, most notably the argument that the new laws were much like the "two-gate policy" during apartheid by placing restrictions on unskilled immigration while promoting high-skilled immigration. This Act was amended four times. In the 2004 Act, the main refinement was that skilled labor migration was ascertained, by revising the work permit policy to people of a specific class, category or profession, and reducing the number of available quota permits (Van Lennep, 2019a: 6). In the 2007 Act, work permit quotas were once again limited to foreign individuals who fall within a specific category or class as stipulated by the DHA for each sector. Nonetheless, a more outwardly pro-African stance was taken by relaxing the requirement that African students pay repatriation deposits, and making changes that favor cross-border traders, in particular women (Van Lennep, 2019a: 7).

The key highlights of the 2011 Act are as follows: the temporary residence permit was redefined as a visa, whereas the critical skills work visa was introduced; added conditions of capital injection to the country's economy and employment creation were imposed for the business visa application; duration of intra-company transfer permits of foreign executives was extended to four years (OECD, 2018: 62; Van Lennep, 2019a: 8-9). One criticism of the 2011 Act by the businesses was that the

list of skills and professions relevant to the quota system for work permit application was "established without any direct consultation with the business sector, and largely out of sync with the reality of skills needs" (OECD, 2018: 62). The Immigration Amendment Act of 2016 was a response to irregular migration, by extending sanctions on foreigners who overstayed their visas, whereas the confidentiality of applications of asylum-seekers was protected (Van Lennep, 2019a: 9).

In February 2022, the Department of Employment and Labour (DEL), in close collaboration with the DHA, released the draft National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP). The report mentioned that the NLMP aims to address numerous policy gaps, including data for evidence-based policy monitoring and evaluation, migration governance and management, as well as labor migration to and from South Africa (DEL, 2022). The NLMP particularly aims to align better with the skilled planning goals of National Development Plan and National Skills Development Strategy phase III.

The government regularly releases the list of critical skills. The most recently released list in early 2022 included 101 critical skills in total, with 91 belonging to the three high-skilled broad occupation categories. The detailed occupation categories that are most critical to South Africa's labor market are: architects, engineers and related professionals; physicists, chemists and related professionals; computing professionals (RSA, 2022).

While not shown in Table 1, it is worth mentioning that over the years South Africa has issued Special Dispensation Permits to immigrants from countries such as Angola, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. For example, the Zimbabwe Exemption Permits were granted to Zimbabwean nationals who migrated to South Africa before 2009. However, Marawanyika and Ndlovu (2022) recently reported that the Cabinet announced in November 2021 that the holders' permission to stay in South Africa would expire on 31 December 2021. However, they were given a 12-month grace period to apply for alternative permits under the existing immigration framework.

Lastly, to the author's knowledge, there is currently no explicit South African policy framework on emigration. Nonetheless, the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) was founded in 1998, with the primary goal of connecting highly skilled emigrants and encouraging them to contribute their skills to South Africa's economic development, without returning to the country permanently (Brown, 2003). To conclude, while this section highlights the South African migration (especially on immigration) instruments since 1994, strictly speaking, these Green and White Papers are really not migration policies.

Review of past empirical studies

Studies using primary data

Sinclair (1999) interviewed 77 immigrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg; the migrants declared that they responded to hostility with anger and indignation, and formed migrant communities to support one another. McDonald et al. (2000)

interviewed 2,300 immigrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, to examine their reasons for visiting and leaving South Africa. The study found that, seeking work was their primary reason for migrating to South Africa (Lesotho: 50%, Mozambique: 40%, Zimbabwe: 35%), and surprisingly the desire to be a permanent South African resident was not too strong.

Wentzel et al. (2004) interviewed immigrants from six African countries. Two-thirds of the respondents declared that "no suitable employment" was the main reason for leaving the previous area of residence, whereas 76% claimed that the "best employment opportunities" was the key reason for moving to South Africa. Theodore et al. (2017) interviewed 600 Zimbabwean day laborers in Tshwane; the migrants and their dependants endured poverty along with food and housing insecurity, due to low-wage underemployment in the informal sector. Lastly, Kalitanyi and Visser (2010) interviewed 120 immigrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town. More than half of them left their countries of origin because of political instability, 55% were engaged in clothing or footwear businesses, and more than 80% hired South Africans in their businesses.

The next group of studies examined emigration intention and interaction experience with the DHA staff. Mattes and Richmond (2000) interviewed 725 skilled South Africans with at least Grade 12 (or matric level of education). The study found that 31% of participants had intentions to emigrate, 14% already applied for a work permit, permanent residency, or foreign citizenship in another country. A high share of interviewees was dissatisfied with taxation level (74%), cost of living (71%), upkeep of public amenities (70%), family's safety (68%), and personal safety (66%). On the contrary, at least two-thirds perceived things to be better overseas in the areas of personal safety (80%), family's safety (80%), upkeep of public amenities (72%), and customer services (67%). Next, De Jong and Steinmetz (2004) interviewed 3,600 households on their emigration intention. About 25% intended to emigrate in the next five years. Also, these households were associated with a significantly higher propensity to leave South Africa, spurred by the following factors: those headed by older individuals with post-matric qualifications; pressure imposed by spouse to emigrate; poor quality of electricity services; and low levels of life satisfaction. The findings of the above studies all correspond with the push-pull model.

Mattes and Mniki (2007) analyzed the 2002 data collected by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) on 4,800 postgraduate and final-year undergraduate students. About 40% of survey participants strongly considered relocation to another country. Financial resources, family encouragement, prospects of a better life overseas, and previous travel abroad to inform themselves on living abroad were key factors increasing the students' likelihood of leaving the country, whereas patriotism and strong national identity decreased emigration likelihood. Rogerson and Rogerson (2000) interviewed 200 companies to examine how they dealt with the actual and potential emigration of skilled personnel, especially regarding recruitment and training. One-third acknowledged that the impact of brain drain

was significant; nearly 60% used specialist agencies to recruit skilled personnel, and 62% adopted in-house training methods for skilled personnel.

Two studies investigated the efficiency of the DHA but derived completely opposite results. The earlier reviewed Rogerson and Rogerson (2000) study also examined the experience of firms in dealing with the DHA. The authors found that 60% rated the experience as negative when it comes to recruiting skilled people from overseas. The firms asserted that the following structural problems prevented foreign skilled individuals from entering South Africa: time-consuming, obstructive and procedural processes of DHA; high costs of contracting lawyers or consultants; lack of transparency in the decision-making process, internal operations, functioning and staffing at the DHA; and insufficient understanding on the part of the DHA of the demand for skilled workers.

Davids et al. (2005) interviewed 3,000 people and found that the results were positive. For example, more than 80% were satisfied with the attitude of DHA staff by describing them as attentive, considerate, friendly, helpful, honest, and knowledgeable. The mean waiting time at DHA offices was only 20 minutes, whereas 49% of respondents said DHA's efficiency improved, compared to the apartheid period.

Studies using surveys and censuses

Budlender (2014) analyzed data from the third labor market quarter 2012 QLFS conducted by StatsSA, to examine the personal characteristics and outcomes of different groups of South Africans, with one group being immigrants. They (1.23 million) represented 4% of the working-age population. Compared to natives, immigrants enjoyed higher labor force participation (77%) and employment (65%) rates but lower unemployment likelihood (16%). The employed immigrants were more likely to work in construction and trade industries, as well as agriculture and private households compared to their native counterparts. The latter two were low-paying industries often associated with poor working conditions. Foreign-born workers were also more likely to work in the informal sector with fewer benefits (e.g., medical aid and pension scheme), just like the native informal sector workers (Essop and Yu, 2008).

Fauvelle-Aymar (2014) used the same dataset, but unlike the above Budlender study, the author primarily conducted multivariate econometric analysis; the dependent variables of the regressions were employment, time-based underemployment, informal activities and precarious employment likelihoods. The results indicated that employment probability was significantly higher for immigrants; probability of employment in informal and precarious activities (both characterized by low earnings) was significantly higher for immigrants, but this result was only valid for black African immigrants.

StatsSA (2019) used both 2012 and 2017 QLFS migration module data, to examine the socio-economic and demographic profile of the migrant labor force

and investigated the link between employment and immigration. This study not only compared natives with immigrants, but also examined a third group, namely, internal migrants. The study found that one-third of immigrants moved to South Africa to seek work or start a business, and immigrants were twice more likely to be employed than non-movers and internal migrants.

Five studies used the South African Census and Community Survey (CS) data. Zuberi and Sibanda (2004) examined the relationship between migration status, nativity and labor-market outcomes at the time of the 1996 Census, focusing on male individuals aged 20–55 years. What distinguishes this study from the other four studies below is that two groups of immigrants were identified: SADC-born and other foreign-born. Both groups were separated into long-term (those who migrated to South Africa before 1994) and recent (moved to South Africa 1994–1996) immigrants. All four groups of immigrants were more likely to seek work and find employment, compared to natives. SADC-born immigrants enjoyed an additional advantage: most of them faced much lower fixed costs of migrating to South Africa.

Vermaak and Muller (2019) used the 2011 Census data to investigate whether naturalized immigrants and foreigners enjoyed improved well-being, compared to locals. On average, immigrants were more likely to seek work. Interestingly, some immigrants were involved in more hazardous forms of employment associated with lower returns. After controlling for differences in worker characteristics, it was established that both employed naturalized immigrants and foreigners earned less than the locals, but social networks helped them access jobs with higher remuneration. The OECD (2018) conducted a highly similar analysis as Vermaak and Muller (2019), but analyzed both the 2001 and 2011 Census data. It was found that immigrants performed significantly better than native-born individuals in both labor force participation and employment probabilities, but immigrants were more likely to engage in low-paying unskilled occupations.

Facchini et al. (2013) analyzed the 1996 and 2001 Census as well as the 2007 CS data, with specific focus on south-south migration. At district level, increased immigration had a significantly negative effect on natives' employment rates, especially for skilled white native workers. At national level, increased immigration had a significantly negative impact on natives' total income, but not on employment rate. While Peters and Sundaram's (2015) study also addresses aspects of south-south migration, they only conducted a brief empirical analysis to compare the employment prospects of immigrants from seven countries with the 2001 Census data. Immigrants from developed countries outperformed the natives, and educational attainment was positively associated with employment probability for immigrants.

Other studies

Myburgh (2004) used data from the statistical bureaus of the top emigration destination countries (i.e., USA, Australia, UK, and New Zealand) to examine trends in emigration out of South Africa, and found that these trends could be explained

by real wage differentials, political uncertainty, and immigration restrictions in destination countries. The study did not examine personal and labor-market characteristics of emigrants. Finally, to the author's knowledge, Bohlman (2010) was the only time-series, macroeconomic study to estimate the macroeconomic effect of skilled emigration during the 2007–2014 period. Using the computable general equilibrium model and assuming three simulation scenarios, the author estimated that South Africa's real GDP was 3% lower due to skilled emigration.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

This study used data from Census 2001 and 2011 as well CS 2007 and 2016. The primary strength of these four datasets is that they captured comprehensive information on immigration, as a wide range of relevant questions were asked which help distinguish different sub-groups of immigrants, such as country of birth, year of moving to South Africa, place of usual residence, whether the person resided at the same place five years ago (the threshold was 10 years in Census 2011), year and month of moving, and province of previous residence for those who moved within the last five years (or 10 years in Census 2011). These datasets also captured detailed personal information (gender, population group, age, area type, province), education status (highest educational attainment and field of education – if having post-school qualifications) and labor-related information (labor-market status, occupation, industry).

As this is the first study in South Africa that compares natives and immigrants with emigrants – particularly since the local census and survey data does not contain any information on the emigrants – the study relied on international data sources. It analyzed the most recent census or survey data of the top five emigration destination countries to examine the well-being of South African emigrants in the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics, 2019), New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2019), the United States of America (United States Census Bureau, 2019), Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019) and Canada (Statistics Canada, 2019). However, the researcher encountered challenges in successfully obtaining all the required data, as discussed in the limitations below.

Method

The study used the data obtained from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses as well as the 2007 and 2016 Community Surveys to distinguish the immigrants and natives, and the census data of the top five destination countries to distinguish the emigrants. These three groups are investigated by comparing their personal, educational and labor-market characteristics. The working-age population is divided into six categories, based on their country of birth and migration status, as listed below:

(a) Long-term international migrants: individuals born outside South Africa

but migrated to the country more than five years ago.
(b) Medium-term international migrants: those born outside South Africa but migrated to the country more than one year and up to five years ago.
(c) Short-term international migrants: people born outside South Africa but migrated to the country within the past year.
(d) Native return migrants: individuals born in South Africa but returned to South Africa from overseas within the past five years.
(e) Native permanent residents: people born in South Africa who remained in the country within the past five years.
(f) Other/unspecified: those who did not specify their country of birth.

As indicated earlier, the push-pull and human capital models form the empirical framework to specifically examine if the emigrants enjoy better well-being in the labor markets of the destination countries (i.e., brain drain from South Africa), compared with natives and immigrants. The study also examines whether natives enjoy an improvement in human capital or educational attainment during the 15-year period (i.e., brain gain in South Africa).

Limitations

The four censuses and CSs did not pose the exact same questions on work activities (see Table 2). Furthermore, it was not possible to obtain the CS 2016 data on labor-market activities. Even though the information was captured by StatsSA, the data was not released. Additionally, it was not possible to obtain the full census data for the UK (2011), New Zealand (2013), and Australia (2016), as either the data is only accessible to natives living in these countries, or exorbitant costs are charged by the statistical bureaus of these countries to access and construct detailed statistical tables. Hence, only certain tables could be compiled using the free online table generation tool in the statistical bureau websites.

While it is possible to obtain the 2016 Canada Census data, in the country of birth variable, there are only three broad African categories, namely, "Eastern Africa", "Northern Africa", and "Other Africa". In fact, the online information shows that there were 48,015 South Africans (Statistics Canada, 2019), while the actual data shows that there were 185,925 people in the "Other Africa" category. It means that South Africans account for only a 25.82% share. Hence, in some of the tables below, the "Other Africa" results are "proxy" results for South Africans residing in Canada. For this reason, the empirical findings on South Africans' well-being in Canada need to be interpreted with some caution.

Table 2: Questions on work activities of those employed in each Census and Community Survey

	Census 2001	**CS 2007**	**Census 2011**	**CS 2016**
Broad occupation category	✓	✓	✓	✓ ✂
Detailed occupation category	✓	✓ ✂	✓	✓ ✂
Broad industry category	✓	✓	✓	✓ ✂
Detailed industry category	✓	✓ ✂	✓	✓ ✂
Formal/informal sector		✓	✓	✓ ✂
Employer/employee	✓	✓		
Work hours	✓			

✂The questions were asked in the survey but the data was not made available by StatsSA

Source: StatsSA, 2001, 2007, 2011 and 2016

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Examining the profile of immigrants and natives

Table 3 presents the number and share of each of the six groups of international immigrants and natives. The total number of international immigrants (i.e., the sum of groups [1]–[3]) increased from 0.71 million in 2001 to 1.32 million in 2016, and these immigrants as a proportion of the working-age population (WAP) increased from 2.74% to 3.78%. Native return migrants accounted for a negligible share of the WAP. For the remainder of the empirical analysis, they are included as part of total natives, or groups [4] and [5] collapsed into one group called "natives".

Table 3: Number and percentage of people in each migration status category, 2001-2016

	Census 2001		CS 2007		Census 2011		CS 2016	
	Number (1,000s)	Share (%)	Number (1,000s)	Share (%)	Number (1,000s)	Share (%)	Number (1,000s)	Share (%)
[1] Long-term immigrants	616	2.36	877	2.92	825	2.59	923	2.65
[2] Medium-term immigrants	47	0.18	83	0.28	509	1.60	240	0.69
[3] Short-term immigrants	51	0.20	79	0.26	440	1.38	153	0.44
[4] Native return migrants	21	0.08	37	0.12	28	0.09	13	0.04
[5] Native permanent residents	25,403	97.19	28,896	96.19	29,582	92.93	33,475	96.06
[6] Other/Unspecified	0	0.00	68	0.23	446	1.40	46	0.13
	26,138	100.00	30,040	100.00	31,831	100.00	34,849	100.00
[1]–[3]: Total – Immigrants	714	2.74	1,038	3.46	1,775	5.57	1,316	3.78
[4]–[5]: Total – Natives	25,424	97.27	28,933	96.31	29,611	93.02	33,488	96.10
[6]: Total – Other/ Unspecified	0	0.00	68	0.23	446	1.40	46	0.13
	26,138	100.00	30,040	100.00	31,831	100.00	34,849	100.00

Source: Author's own calculations using the 2001 and 2011 Census and 2007 and 2016 CS data (StatsSA, 2001, 2007, 2011, 2016)

Table 4 shows that the male share was more dominant (about 60%) for immigrants, whereas females were slightly more dominant (51%–52%) for the native WAP. As expected, Africans were the most dominant racial group. Long-term immigrants were relatively older with a mean age of about 38 years, whereas the medium- and short-term immigrants were the youngest (mean age of 30 years). Only 38% of the native WAP were married or lived with a partner, but this share was much higher at almost two-thirds for immigrants. This result suggests that immigration to South Africa was more likely to be a household-level decision by the head and spouse.

Table 4: Personal characteristics of immigrants and natives (share of total %) – 2001 versus 2016

		Census 2001						CS 2016					
		[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]	[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]
Gender	Male	57.68	60.16	56.59	57.76	46.64	46.94	61.67	57.11	53.02	59.84	48.90	49.32
	Female	42.32	39.84	43.41	42.24	53.36	53.06	38.33	42.89	46.98	40.16	51.10	50.68
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Race	African	51.76	73.30	72.01	54.63	77.66	77.03	81.80	90.57	91.99	84.58	79.31	79.48
	Coloured	1.42	1.49	1.48	1.43	9.56	9.34	0.90	0.43	0.34	0.75	9.63	9.31
	Indian	3.15	7.12	5.79	3.60	2.84	2.86	4.53	5.78	3.01	4.58	2.67	2.74
	White	43.67	18.08	20.72	40.33	9.93	10.77	12.77	3.23	4.66	10.09	8.39	8.46
	Other	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Age cohort	15-24 years	16.21	32.44	38.58	18.89	33.21	32.82	8.53	31.01	38.22	16.08	29.51	28.99
	25-34 years	27.35	38.56	35.94	28.71	25.47	25.56	33.67	48.05	38.65	36.87	26.76	27.15
	35-44 years	24.54	16.78	15.07	23.35	20.06	20.15	31.96	16.39	15.11	27.16	19.52	19.81
	45-54 years	18.27	8.37	7.00	16.81	13.20	13.30	16.12	3.60	5.69	12.62	14.28	14.22
	55-64 years	13.63	3.86	3.41	12.25	8.06	8.18	9.72	0.96	2.33	7.26	9.93	9.83
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	Mean (years)	38.15	30.81	29.60	37.05	32.97	33.08	37.86	28.98	28.99	35.21	34.12	34.16
Marital status	Married or living together	67.24	52.36	48.10	64.88	41.42	42.06	65.47	53.08	50.31	61.45	34.10	35.15
	Other	32.76	47.64	51.90	35.12	58.58	57.94	34.53	46.92	49.69	38.55	65.90	64.85
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Author's own calculations using the 2001 Census and 2016 CS data (StatsSA, 2001, 2016)

Table 5: Educational, geographical and labour-market characteristics of immigrants and natives (share of total %) – 2001 versus 2016

		Census 2001						CS 2016					
		[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]	[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]
Educational attainment	None	13.64	12.33	10.22	13.31	13.12	13.12	7.41	5.33	6.75	6.95	4.58	4.67
	Incomplete primary	11.24	12.26	11.09	11.30	15.86	15.74	9.98	8.49	11.50	9.88	7.41	7.51
	Incomplete secondary	29.73	36.12	36.55	30.64	44.91	44.52	39.74	49.45	51.06	42.82	44.81	44.73
	Matric	23.99	19.30	20.48	23.43	19.10	19.22	23.89	23.68	19.61	23.36	32.02	31.69
	Matric + Certificate/Diploma	10.68	7.37	7.56	10.23	4.69	4.84	4.39	3.16	2.05	3.89	4.22	4.20
	Degree	10.73	12.62	14.10	11.10	2.32	2.56	10.69	6.97	5.43	9.40	5.18	5.34
	Other/Unspecified	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.91	2.91	3.60	3.69	1.77	1.86
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	Mean (years)	9.29	9.19	9.57	9.30	8.08	8.11	9.74	9.75	9.17	9.67	10.03	10.02
Area type	Urban	80.94	79.31	78.03	80.62	61.05	61.59	84.67	81.19	76.23	83.06	66.37	67.02
	Rural	19.06	20.69	21.97	19.38	38.95	38.41	15.33	18.81	23.77	16.94	33.63	32.98
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Province	Western Cape	10.29	10.32	11.56	10.38	10.92	10.91	10.57	12.15	10.90	10.90	11.96	11.94
	Eastern Cape	3.19	2.65	3.44	3.17	13.35	13.07	3.18	3.95	4.34	3.45	11.89	11.56
	Northern Cape	1.29	0.57	0.65	1.20	1.84	1.82	1.05	1.31	1.08	1.10	2.22	2.17
	Free State	3.67	4.65	5.21	3.84	6.26	6.19	3.56	3.29	3.05	3.45	5.28	5.21
	KwaZulu-Natal	9.62	7.14	6.89	9.26	20.71	20.40	5.01	4.90	4.68	4.95	19.13	18.59
	North West	7.15	6.97	7.94	7.20	8.26	8.23	8.00	8.31	8.75	8.14	6.73	6.79
	Gauteng	49.27	52.57	48.57	49.44	21.76	22.51	54.00	48.19	44.79	51.87	25.03	26.05
	Mpumalanga	7.74	7.70	8.03	7.76	6.58	6.61	7.29	7.54	7.36	7.34	7.79	7.77
	Limpopo	7.78	7.44	7.72	7.76	10.32	10.25	7.34	10.36	15.04	8.79	9.97	9.92
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Labour market status	Employed	60.48	55.45	46.65	59.16	32.56	33.29	66.23	65.35	58.35	64.02	38.25	39.69
	Unemployed	14.24	17.38	20.27	14.88	24.89	24.62	12.14	13.97	15.64	13.54	16.95	16.78
	Inactive	25.27	27.17	33.08	25.96	42.55	42.10	21.63	20.68	26.01	22.44	44.80	43.53
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Author's own calculations using the 2001 Census, 2011 Census, and 2016 CS data (StatsSA, 2001, 2011, 2016)
Note: Since the 2016, the CS did not release labour-market data; the labour-market status results of 2011 are shown in the table instead

Table 5 shows that at the time of the 2016 CS, there were still nearly 60% of immigrants without a matric-level educational qualification. That is, the majority of immigrants to South Africa were not highly educated, despite being relatively more educated on average than native individuals. Both immigrants and natives became more educated over time, as the mean years of educational attainment increased for both groups during the period 2001–2016. The increase in mean educational attainment of natives aligns with the theoretical framework discussion that the possible emigration of skilled people out of South Africa could lead to an improvement of human capital of natives (i.e., brain gain). Furthermore, while not shown in the table, the shares of immigrants with engineering, health, or computer science qualifications (12.97%, 8.27%, and 6.45% respectively, in 2016) were slightly higher compared to the natives (8.33%, 8.16%, and 4.45% respectively).

Over 80% of immigrants resided in urban areas but this proportion was lower (two-thirds) for natives. About half of immigrants lived in Gauteng, and the Western Cape was the second most dominant province of residence (11%). However, the Gauteng share was only about a quarter for the native WAP. That Gauteng and the Western Cape are the two most popular provinces of destination for the international immigrants is as expected, as they are associated with relatively better labor-market outcomes compared with other provinces.

The last few rows of Table 5 show that immigrants were associated with higher LFPR and lower unemployment likelihood, compared with the native WAP. Tables 6 shows the broad occupation and industry categories of employed immigrants and natives. In 2011, only 24% of immigrant workers were involved in high-skilled occupations (managers, professionals, or technicians), and the remaining immigrant workers were involved in semi-skilled or low-skilled occupations (particularly in elementary occupations, service and sales workers, craft and related trades). This result is not surprising, as Table 5 shows that some immigrants did not have high levels of educational attainment. Hence, some high-skilled vacancies might not be successfully filled by both natives and immigrants.

Table 6: Work characteristics of immigrants and natives (if employed) (share of total %), 2001 versus 2011

		Census 2001						CS 2016					
		[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]	[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	[1]-[6]
Broad occupation category	Manager	12.01	8.18	7.53	11.52	5.26	5.56	11.40	7.75	8.32	9.63	8.14	8.28
	Professional	13.56	10.05	12.64	13.29	6.88	7.19	8.58	6.23	5.82	7.27	7.32	7.31
	Technician	9.66	5.35	4.93	9.13	9.91	9.87	7.84	6.71	6.36	7.17	9.98	9.72
	Clerk	9.10	5.54	4.73	8.63	11.51	11.37	10.64	9.25	9.29	9.93	12.42	12.19
	Service and sales worker	11.12	14.09	13.45	11.44	10.28	10.34	16.11	17.94	16.85	16.82	16.24	16.29
	Skilled agricultural worker	2.44	2.96	4.20	2.58	2.61	2.60	0.89	0.76	0.99	0.87	0.94	0.93
	Craft and related trade	15.73	13.67	11.69	15.37	11.76	11.93	15.02	16.68	15.04	15.51	11.99	12.32
	Operator and assembler	4.43	4.63	3.20	4.37	8.73	8.52	6.48	5.96	6.61	6.36	6.77	6.73
	Elementary occupation	17.81	30.17	29.54	19.24	20.04	20.00	14.42	17.57	19.46	16.48	16.68	16.67
	Domestic worker	4.15	5.35	8.09	4.44	13.03	12.61	8.62	11.14	11.26	9.96	9.51	9.56
	Other/Unspecified	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Broad industry category	Agriculture	8.28	16.17	17.94	9.31	9.26	9.27	5.07	6.19	8.35	6.14	5.11	5.20
	Mining	7.17	4.81	4.45	6.87	2.67	2.88	4.68	2.36	2.99	3.62	2.92	2.98
	Manufacturing	13.40	9.79	8.20	12.88	12.90	12.90	9.50	8.28	8.49	8.91	9.89	9.80
	Utilities	0.67	0.32	0.35	0.63	0.74	0.74	0.68	0.62	0.55	0.63	0.87	0.85
	Construction	8.01	7.61	6.70	7.91	5.41	5.53	10.52	11.43	10.89	10.87	7.88	8.15
	Wholesale and retail trade	18.67	23.86	19.73	19.05	15.49	15.66	19.47	23.01	22.11	21.10	16.93	17.32
	Transport	4.03	3.16	3.49	3.95	4.82	4.77	5.34	4.83	4.79	5.07	6.18	6.09
	Finance	12.78	8.17	8.10	12.23	9.61	9.74	16.73	13.98	13.22	15.13	15.16	15.16
	CSP services	22.30	18.94	21.16	22.03	28.73	28.41	17.09	15.27	14.52	15.98	23.69	22.98
	Private households	4.69	7.17	9.88	5.14	10.37	10.11	10.86	13.95	14.01	12.48	11.34	11.45
	Other/Unspecified	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.02	0.03
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Author's own calculations using the 2001 and 2011 Census data (StatsSA, 2001, 2011)

Nearly 70% of immigrants employed worked in the tertiary sector (the corresponding proportion was 73% for native employed), especially in the following broad industry categories: wholesale and retail trade (22.11%), CSP services (14.52%), private households (14.01%), and finance (13.22%). Table 7 complements the results at the bottom of Table 5 by confirming that immigrants enjoyed greater LFPR and lower unemployment likelihood compared with natives.

Table 7: Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates of immigrants and natives (%) – 2001–2011

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[1]-[3]	[4]-[5]	All
Labour force participation rate	Census 2001	74.72	72.83	66.92	74.04	57.45	57.91
	CS 2007	80.15	76.15	75.07	79.45	61.15	61.81
	Census 2011	78.37	79.32	73.99	77.56	55.20	56.47
Unemployment rate	Census 2001	19.06	23.86	30.29	20.10	43.32	42.51
	CS 2007	14.20	17.06	21.98	14.98	33.77	32.91
	Census 2011	15.49	17.61	21.14	17.46	30.71	29.71

Source: Author's own calculations using the 2001 and 2011 Census and 2007 CS data (StatsSA, 2001, 2007, 2011)

Examining the profile of emigrants

Table 8 shows that in absolute terms, despite the censuses and surveys not taking place in the same year, the number of South African-born individuals was the highest (above 190,000) in the UK, followed by Australia (more than 160,000). However, South Africans accounted for the 5th highest number of foreign-born persons in New Zealand (7th in Australia and 8th in the UK), thereby explaining why these South African-born people represented a very high share of African-born individuals (nearly three-quarters) and slightly above 5% of all foreign-born individuals in New Zealand. South African-born people also accounted for a high proportion (48%) of all African-born people living in Australia.

Table 8: South African-born people in the top five emigration destination countries

Country	Number	Rank	As % of African-born people	As % of all foreign-born people
UK (2011)	191,023	8th	14.55	2.55
New Zealand (2015)	54,276	5th	73.54	5.42
USA (2015)	103,180	63rd	4.72	0.21
Australia (2016)	162,450	7th	48.04	2.64
Canada (2016)	48,015	39th	6.96	0.58

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019)

Table 9 shows that approximately half of South Africans migrated to the top destination countries more than 10 years ago. This share was the greatest for South Africans who migrated to the USA (69%) and lowest for those who left for New Zealand (46%).

Table 9: Year of arrival of South Africans in top five emigration destination countries (Share of total %), 2011–2016

UK (2011)	**%**	**New Zealand (2015)**	**%**
Within last 1 year	3.99	Within last 1 year	6.43
Within last 2–4 years	13.11	Within last 2–4 years	17.32
Within last 5–7 years	15.24	Within last 5–9 years	27.88
Within last 8–10 years	18.37	Within last 10–19 years	36.65
Within last 11–20 years	26.08	More than 19 years ago	9.72
More than 20 years ago	23.22	Unspecified	1.99
	100.00		**100.00**
USA 2015	**%**	**Australia 2016**	**%**
Within last 1 year	5.44	Within last 1 year	1.59
Within last 2–5 years	13.29	Within last 2–10 years	41.17
Within last 6–10 years	11.91	Within last 11–20 years	29.00
Within last 11–20 years	30.26	More than 20 years ago	26.51
More than 20 years ago	39.10	Unspecified	1.74
	100.00		**100.00**
Canada (2016)	**%**		
Within last 5 years	12.01		
Within last 6–10 years	11.00		
Within last 11–15 years	11.63		
Within last 16–25 years	22.39		
More than 25 years ago	35.99		
Unspecified	6.99		
	100.00		

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019)

Regarding Table 10, females were the slightly more dominant gender group, whereas a very high proportion of South Africans lived in urban areas in the UK (84%) and Australia (94%). Only slightly above 35% of South Africans living in the UK were Africans, but this share was more than double (77.15%) for South Africans residing in Canada. Moreover, the 25–34 years and 35–44 years cohorts were more dominant in the UK (close to 50% altogether), while the 45–54 years and 65+ years cohorts were most dominant in Canada (about 21% each).

Table 10: Personal characteristics of South African population aged at least 15 or 16 years in the top five emigration destination countries (share of total %) – 2011–2016

		UK 2011)	**New Zealand (2015)**	**USA (2015)**	**Australia (2016)**	**Canada (2016)**
Gender	Male	48.49	48.61	49.13	49.22	49.68
	Female	51.51	51.39	50.87	50.78	50.32
		100.00	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**
Race	African	36.24	Not available	Not available	Not available	77.15 #
	Coloured	4.13				0.36 #
	Asian/Indian	26.32				3.20 #
	White	30.71				18.23 #
	Other	2.60				1.05 #
		100.00				**100.00 #**
Area type	Urban	84.07	Not available	Not available	93.84	Not available
	Rural	15.93			6.16	
		100.00			100.00	
Age cohort	15/16 to 24 years	12.04	Not available	14.14	14.43	10.22
	25–34 years	32.29		17.16	15.43	14.97
	35–44 years	25.22		20.85	21.96	17.23
	45–54 years	11.71		19.68	21.62	20.61
	55–64 years	9.65		15.88	13.61	16.24
	65+ years	9.09		12.29	12.94	20.74
		100.00		**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019).

"Other Africa" results.

Figure 1 shows that the proportion of South African-born people with post-school qualifications ranged between 45.93% (UK) and 81.09% (USA), whereas the corresponding proportions in 2016 were merely 13.29% and 9.40%, to the immigrants to South Africa as well as the South African natives, respectively. These findings suggest evidence of a brain drain out of South Africa.

Figure 1: Proportion of different groups of working-age population with post-school qualifications, 2011–2016



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019); as well as author's calculations using the CS 2016 data

Table 11 shows that the LFPR of South Africans was above 70% in all emigration destination countries (similar to the LFPR of immigrants in South Africa) but was above the LFPR of natives who remained in South Africa (around 55%). South Africans enjoyed a lower unemployment rate in the five countries (from 4.45% in the USA to 12.55% in Canada), compared to the results in Table 7. These findings correspond with the push-pull model that South Africans left the country due to better labor-market prospects elsewhere.

Table 11: Labour-market status of South African-born population aged at least 15 or 16 years in the top five emigration destination countries, 2011–2016

	UK (2011)	New Zealand (2015)	USA (2015)	Australia (2016)	Canada (2016)
Employed	128,603	53,775	68,380	106,998	119,917#
Unemployed	11,378	4,785	3,183	7,132	17,205#
Inactive	36,972	22,044	25,868	35,540	48,803#
	176,773	80,604	97,431	149,670	185,925#
LFPR (%)	79.19	72.65	73.45	76.25	73.75
Unemployment rate (%)	8.13	8.17	4.45	6.25	12.55#
National unemployment rate (%) (including natives)	8.03	5.36	6.27	5.71	7.70

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019)

"Other Africa" results.

To summarize, emigrants to the destination countries enjoyed the best labor-market outcome (high LFPR of approximately 75% and the lowest unemployment rate of around 10%), followed by immigrants to South Africa (high LFPR of 75% and unemployment rate of 20%), and South African natives who remained in the country had the worst outcome (lower LFPR of less than 60% and unemployment rate of around 30%).

Tables 12 and 13 as well as Figure 2 show that, while the broad occupation categorization differ across the countries (in particular Canada), compared with Table 6, a relatively higher proportion of South African emigrants in the destination countries was involved in high-skilled occupations as managers, professionals, and technicians (about 60% employed share), compared with immigrants to South Africa (24%) and natives who remained in South Africa (25%). While not shown in these two tables, a high proportion of South Africans (67%–84%) worked full-time in the tertiary sector in destination countries. These findings once again align with the push-pull model as people moved to the country of destination due to higher remuneration there.

Table 12: Broad occupation category of South African-born population aged at least 15 or 16 years who worked in the top emigration destination countries, excluding Canada (share of all employed, %), 2011–2016

Occupation category	**UK (2011)**	**New Zealand (2015)**	**USA (2015)**	**Australia (2016)**
Manager	13.25	17.06	20.24	16.88
Professional	30.67	31.13	28.90	34.09
Technician	17.40	11.57	19.17	11.45
Clerk	11.30	11.64	9.90	13.77
Service and sales worker	5.03	8.41	11.80	7.26
Skilled agricultural worker	N/A	N/A	0.29	N/A
Craft and related trade	6.80	N/A	3.78	N/A
Community and personal service worker	N/A	7.95	N/A	8.39
Caring, leisure and other service occupation	7.17	N/A	N/A	N/A
Operator and assembler	2.80	2.57	3.35	2.41
Elementary occupation	5.57	5.39	2.13	4.46
Other/Unspecified	0.00	4.28	0.44	1.29
	100.00	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019)

Table 13: Broad occupation category of South African-born population aged at least 16 years who worked in Canada (share of all employed, %), 2016

Broad occupation category	**%**
Manager	7.03#
Business, finance and administrative occupation	15.74#
Natural and applied sciences and related occupation	8.27#
Health occupation	13.02#
Occupation in social science, education, government service, and religion	13.36#
Occupation in art, culture, recreation, and sport	1.67#
Sales and service occupation	18.73#
Trade, transport and equipment operator and related occupation	8.33#
Occupation unique to primary industry	0.28#
Occupation unique to processing, manufacturing and utilities	4.69#
Not available	8.89#
	100.00#

Source: Statistics Canada (2019)
“Other Africa” results.

Figure 2: Proportion of different groups of employed South African-born population aged at least 15 or 16 years in high-skilled occupations in the top emigration destination countries, excluding Canada (%)



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019); Office for National Statistics (2019); Statistics Canada (2019); Statistics New Zealand (2019); United States Census Bureau (2019); as well as author's calculations using the CS 2016 data

Note: It is not possible to clearly and correctly distinguish the people involved in skilled occupations in Canada, given the broad occupation categorization (see Table 13).

Summary

Table 14 summarizes the personal, educational, and labor-market characteristics of immigrants, natives and emigrants. South African emigrants in the top five destination countries were highly educated, enjoyed higher LFPR and very low unemployment probability; if employed, they were highly likely to engage in high-skilled and tertiary sector activities with higher remuneration and better working conditions.

Table 14: Summary of the profile of three groups of people

	Immigrants to South Africa	**Native South Africans remaining in the country**	**South African emigrants**
Home country	Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe	South Africa	South Africa
Host country	South Africa	N/A (remained in South Africa)	Australia Canada New Zealand UK USA
Personal characteristics	Gender: Male (60%) Race: African Age: 40 years (mean)	Gender: Female (51%) Race: African Age: 35 years (mean)	Gender: Female (51%) Race: African Age: 35 years (mean)
Education (% with above matric)	Above 15%)	Above 10%	Above 50%
Geographical characteristics	Area type: urban Province: Gauteng (50%) and Western Cape (10%)	Area type: urban Province: KwaZulu-Natal (20%); Gauteng (20%); Western Cape (10%)	Area type: urban Province: N/A
Labour-market status	LFPR: 75% Unemployment rate: 20%	LFPR: 55% Unemployment rate: 30%	LFPR: 75% Unemployment rate: 10%
Work activities	High-skilled occupations: 25% Tertiary sector: 60%	High-skilled occupations: 24% Tertiary sector: 70%	High-skilled occupations: 60% Tertiary sector: 80%

Source: Author's own calculations

The majority of immigrants originated from other African countries. They were slightly more educated but enjoyed higher LFPR and lower unemployment rates, compared to natives (but their unemployment rate was higher compared to the emigrants – 20% versus 10%). However, employed immigrants were less likely to engage in tertiary sector and formal activities, and less likely to work as employees, compared to natives.

Emigrants enjoyed the best well-being, as they were associated with a much higher educational attainment, a higher LFPR and the lowest unemployment rate (10%). Immigrants to South Africa also experienced better outcomes than natives, as they were slightly more educated, enjoyed a higher LFPR and lower unemployment probability, despite them being relatively less likely to work in the formal sector and tertiary sector, compared with the native employed. Lastly, natives endured the lowest LFPR (55%) but highest unemployment rate (30%) out of the three groups.

As structural change has been taking place in the South African labor market, resulting in an increase in the demand for high-skilled workers, the empirical findings do not suggest that immigrants possess particularly high levels of skills and

education. In fact, only about 24% of immigrant workers engaged in high-skilled occupations. Thus, it is possible that immigration of foreign nationals helps meet the demand for semi-skilled labor to the greatest extent. As occupations of great demand in South Africa require high skills levels – but most of the immigrants (just like natives) did not possess these attributes – skills mismatch has likely taken place in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

This study analyzed the labor-market profiles of three groups. The results enhance the understanding of the impact of international migration on skills supply and demand in South Africa, and identify skills needs of the country. The study benefits stakeholders and policy-makers by better identifying priority critical skills needs of the country, critical skills that are lost, and skills in great demand but in short supply so that these skills needs can be prioritized when issuing work and residence permits for immigrants. Consequently, there will be improvement in national skills planning and skills match, which have direct bearing on the achievement of macroeconomic and social objectives, and effectiveness of government spending on education and training. To conclude, the study suggests four policy recommendations, as outlined below.

Ease up the regulations to attract skilled immigrants

Attraction of foreign skills remains one of the quickest ways to fill the skills gap, to increase capacity and demand for higher levels of skills (Wöcke and Klein, 2002: 451). A strengthened inter-departmental capacity on eligibility and a points-based system for eligibility which can be combined with critical skills are needed, to ensure a thorough implementation and administration of the critical skills visa (Van Lennep 2019b: 2). The DHA should regularly publish a list of scarce skills upon consultation with government departments so that immigrants with the appropriate skills to address South Africa's skills shortage are correctly identified (DHA, 2017: 45–46), whereas eligibility criteria for scarce skills visas should be transparent, clear, and flexible, and facilitate economic growth (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2000: 58).

The government should shift its discourse from the "undesirable African immigration" designation to focus more on the skills that the country can gain from SADC immigrants (Van Lennep, 2019b: 2). South Africa should have a more enabling environment to attract foreign nationals from their home countries; from the most recent Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2019), South Africa was ranked 60th in the Global Competitiveness Index, out of 140 countries. While the country stands out in its financial systems (ranked 19th) and market size (35th), its ranking is dismal in information and communications technology adoptions (89th), skills (90th) and health (118th).

Promote entrepreneurial activities of immigrants

Given the high unemployment rate (35%) and slow pace of job creation in the country, promotion of small and medium businesses by foreign immigrants to help create jobs more rapidly (in both formal and informal sectors) should be encouraged. Wöcke and Klein (2002: 453) suggest that tax and other incentives can be extended by including businesses launched by skilled immigrants that show skills transfer to the native population.

Van Lennep (2019b: 2) asserts that in the Immigration Amendment Act of 2011, one eligibility criterion for a business visa requires the applicants to invest at least ZAR5 million in South Africa, originating from the home country. It is five times greater than what is required in Singapore, for example. There is a need to revisit and revise this criterion, or immigration of foreign entrepreneurs is discouraged.

South Africa may not have a lucrative environment to attract foreigners to migrate to conduct business, as the country was ranked a mediocre 84th in the Doing Business Index, out of 190 countries (World Bank, 2020). The country was ranked low in these sub-indices: enforcing contracts (102nd), registering property (108th), getting electricity (114th), starting a business (139th), and trading across borders (145th). The South African government should address the shortcomings identified in these areas.

Develop and retain skilled natives

To retain skilled South Africans, push factors that most likely drive them out of the country need to be addressed. Crucially, a strong investment climate, adequate opportunities for employees' further education, training and career development, competitive salaries, political certainty, and a low crime rate are required to develop and retain professional skills in the formal sector.

Skills development structures can be improved further by ensuring better cooperation between the government departments, Skills Education Training Authorities (SETAs), Further Education and Training (FET) colleges, and institutions of higher education (Lepheana, 2012), to improve and retain the skills of native workers. For example, the Department of Science Technology (DST) prioritized the Engineering, Mathematics, Science, and Technology fields as key drivers of economic growth; therefore, skilled labor in these fields is expected to be in great demand. Increased financial support from the government and even the private sector for higher education at student, staff and institutional levels, would also be welcomed.

There needs to be ongoing review of the relevance of curricula at FET colleges and universities to the needs of the economy to better align the skills offered by tertiary institutions and skills needs of employers, given technological advancement and digital trends. For example, the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) convened a multi-sectoral task team to investigate what teaching, research, and applications of emerging technologies are required to develop capabilities of

the higher education sector to produce graduates with skills demanded in the labor market (Chetty, 2018).

Improve migration and vacancy data capture, availability and usage

There is a need for more regular data on migration flows and better utilization of this information, to strengthen migration information systems. The DHA should release up-to-date and publicly available data on the number of visas issued per year, and personal, educational, and labor-market profiles of immigrants. It is important for such data to be available to the public, to better understand immigrants' contributions to the country's economy (particularly on filling skills shortage gaps and promoting entrepreneurial activities), and more correctly revise the visa eligibility criteria of the earlier mentioned points-based system, as well as update the list of critical skills (Van Lennep, 2019b: 2-4). Lastly, while there is no official vacancy data in South Africa, it is important to utilize this data to better identify the skills shortage areas as well as occupations that are in great demand in South Africa, to assist with better formulation of skills attraction and retention strategies.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author acknowledges the funding support from the South African Department of Higher Education and Training.

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Moonlighting Behavior among Migrants: Determinants and Implications for Wellbeing in South Africa

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Received: 03 March 2022 / Accepted: 11 May 2022 / Published: 31 August 2022

Abstract

Notwithstanding the wealth of research on migration and subjective wellbeing, the issue of moonlighting and its welfare implication among migrants has not been thoroughly explored in empirical literature. Using rich individual-level panel data from the University of Cape Town's National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), this study established a number of interesting findings: (a) there is moonlighting among international migrants; (b) hours spent on the primary job and financial motive, among other socio-demographic factors are key predictors of moonlighting; (c) international migrants are more likely to have more than one job, very often to meet contingencies, but mostly to help smoothen consumption over the life cycle; and (d) individuals who spend more hours on their primary job are less likely to moonlight. Regarding wellbeing and happiness, it is evident that moonlighting and hours spent on primary jobs negatively influence self-reported wellbeing and happiness. Given the ravaging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the potential change in the dynamics of the post-pandemic migration trajectory, job search strategies and economic activities, gaining a deeper appreciation of moonlighting and its implication on the wellbeing of migrants is essential to national and international policy rethinking in order to achieve a triple win for the migrant, the host and origin countries.

Keywords: migration, happiness, labor supply, COVID-19

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INTRODUCTION

Within the scope of migration research, empirical evidence shows positive self-selection among migrants (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Bertoli, 2010; Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2011; Andersson, 2012; Aguilar Esteva, 2013; Kollamparambil, 2017; Nontenja and Kollamparambil, 2018). Undoubtedly, this partly explains why productivity levels are higher among migrants than their non-migrant counterparts. Migrants are motivated to work more in order to increase their returns on migration as a human capital investment. To realize this goal of higher human capital returns, some migrants engage in moonlighting. Moonlighting, as defined by labor economists, refers to a situation where an individual maintains primary employment and engages in additional work for pay (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Sussman, 1998; Kimmel and Powell, 1999; Averett, 2001; Dickey et al., 2011; Baah-Boateng et al., 2013). Despite the extra earnings that migrant workers may have accrued through their economic engagements abroad, a study by Mulcahy and Kollamparambil (2016) unveiled a decline in their subjective wellbeing, compared to their households left behind. Given this, it is justifiable to conclude that a positive correlation between earnings and subjective wellbeing is not always guaranteed. A key consideration for such conclusion could be traced to low social capital (Ryan et al., 2008), and the lack of frequent engagement with migrants' families left behind (Asis, 2006). Leisure has also been identified as a determining factor for the wellbeing of employees, irrespective of their migration status. Macchia and Whillans (2021) also show a clear link between leisure and subjective wellbeing of individuals from 79 countries worldwide. It is therefore inconclusive to ascertain the inextricable link and the ripple effect of intrinsic rewards, job satisfaction and improved welfare, without highlighting leisure.

Given the growing role of migrants within labor market spaces, this paper explores the moonlighting experiences of migrants by capitalizing on the richness of a panel dataset to address the challenge of self-selection bias that may be prevalent in existing studies. Interviewing the same households across waves may have addressed the challenge of upward biases to some extent, thereby inspiring confidence that the information from respondents reflects their prevailing economic conditions over time. Despite the nuances in existing migration theories in terms of conceptualization, there is consensus that migration is a human capital investment (Massey et al., 1993; Constant and Massey, 2002; Kurekova, 2011; Kumpikaite and Zickutė, 2012). Further, theories that are grounded in the neoclassical thought on migration view the phenomenon as a permanent human capital investment. Thus, an indifferent individual is more likely to migrate, if the expected earnings in the host region are higher than the existing earnings in their place of origin (Massey et al., 1993; Constant and Massey, 2002; Kumpikaite and Zickutė, 2012). Holding other factors of migration constant, the contemporary migrant still sees migration as a cost. Hence, it is not surprising that previous studies that explored wage differentials between origin and destination regions revealed that migrants have a higher propensity to move

from regions of lower retribution rates to regions of higher retribution rates (Gaston and Nelson, 2013; Porumbescu, 2018; Libanova, 2019; Duru, 2021).

Similarly, the proponents of the new economics of labor migration view the phenomenon as a temporal household decision to diversify risk, and insure households against the possibility of market failure. In essence, the decision to migrate is a form of risk-diversifying strategy for the entire household, to alleviate any form of economic, socio-political, and environmental risks (Taylor, 1999; De Haas, 2010). Thus, such a decision must be carefully assessed in terms of its cost and expected benefits to the entire household. Also, it is evident that migration is influenced by some confounding factors in both the host and origin countries (Shrestha, 2017; Simpson, 2017), and Lee (1966) presents this as push-pull factors of migration in a simple framework.

While the core decision by prospective labor migrants is deep-rooted in economic motives, understanding the welfare of these migrants in their host nation is very essential. First, it informs the choices made by migrant households left behind in terms of their economic status through consumption, investment and welfare. Also, the motive to migrate serves as a signaling tool to aspiring migrants by providing them with adequate information on their choice of destination when making migration decisions. While some existing studies observe a positive relationship between migration and subjective wellbeing (Kettlewell, 2010), others find a negative link (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2012; Mulcahy and Kollamparambil, 2016), with yet others presenting a neutral scenario (Ackah and Medvedev, 2012). In South Africa, despite the rise in earnings among internal migrants, there is a decline in subjective wellbeing, compared to their non-migrant counterparts (see Mulcahy and Kollamparambil, 2016). In their work, Mulcahy and Kollamparambil suspected that false expectations as well as the emotional cost of staying away from one's family may have caused the decline. We therefore seek to utilize data that captures information on international migrants to broaden the argument and specifically examine if moonlighting impacts the subjective wellbeing of migrants.

Even though moonlighting is common in both developing and developed countries (Sussman, 1998; Kimmel and Powell, 1999; Averett, 2001; Dickey et al., 2011; Baah-Boateng et al., 2013; Timothy and Nkwama, 2017), the phenomenon is diverse, with little room for a Eurocentric outlook in developing countries. In the context of developing countries, moonlighting is more profound in the informal economy and it is usually manifested through business setups among individual migrants. It is noteworthy that irrespective of the wealth of literature that focuses on moonlighting within the African jurisdiction (Rispel, Blaauw, et al., 2014; Rispel, Chirwa, et al., 2014; Rispel, 2015; Rispel and Blaauw, 2015; Mabweazara, 2018; Asravor, 2021) studies that focus on migrants, especially international migrants have not been found.

Within the South African context, Rispel and Blaauw (2015) assess how agencies and moonlighting affect the health of nurses. While they argue that

moonlighting adversely affects the health of nurses and increases the probability of requesting sick leave, their reliance on cross-sectional data and a smaller sample leaves a room for researchers to further explore the phenomenon in light of varied determinants across time.

Extant literature emphasizes economic reasons as a major predictor of migration; hence, it is imperative to examine the dynamics of labor supply among immigrants in order to provide both theoretically robust and empirically relevant explanations. In their study on moonlighting, Conway and Kimmel (1992) provide empirical insight into existing labor supply theories, focusing much attention on how the labor supply is responsive to changes in the wage rate. This offers an understanding of how existing budget and labor supply constraints alter the behavior of individuals in labor supply decision-making.

Labor supply theories also link work-leisure hours and earning (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Pencavel, 1986). This was manifested in both the static and dynamic labor supply models that demonstrate how an individual's time is traded between leisure and work. The leisure component has been found to be strongly correlated to people's wellbeing and improvements in welfare (Moore, 1971; Macchia and Whillans, 2021). However, some works on moonlighting ignore the welfare implications, but provide substantial evidence on the main determinants (Baah-Boateng et al., 2013; Timothy and Nkwama, 2017). A few also examine how motives are influenced by both financial motivation and time spent on the primary job, as well as how moonlighting affects productivity on primary jobs; while some consider the legal aspects of holding multiple jobs (Averett, 2001; Dickey et al., 2011).

This study considers the welfare dimension of moonlighting among migrants who are more susceptible to vulnerabilities in the labor market. Specifically, it examines the key determinants of moonlighting, as well as the differences that exist between migrants and non-migrants.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOONLIGHTING

Relevant theoretical works underpinning moonlighting behavior can be traced to the seminal work of Shishko and Rostker (1976). They employ microeconomic theories and the demographic profiles of individuals to explain the supply curves of moonlighters. Generally, moonlighting in labor supply is a build-up on already existing static and dynamic labor supply theories (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). The static model posits that an individual's wellbeing (utility) is dependent on their taste, the price of consumer goods, and the hours of leisure consumed at a given period. In other words, an individual is constrained between spending time (24 hours) on leisure or work. A quest to increase the consumption of composite market goods therefore necessitates the reduction of hours allotted for leisure since extra income is usually gained through extra work. This perfectly resonates with the assertion of Arrow and Hahn (1971) that economic agents may arrive at a decision upon considering what they want and what they actually get.

Stated differently, individuals maximize their utility subject to a constraint, which illustrates the fundamental problem in economics – scarcity. An individual who particularly values leisure reduces their hours of work and increases hours of leisure. This also means that fewer market goods are consumed, since a reduction in hours of work means less income is earned. Participation in the labor force is therefore dependent on the available reservation wage, and how the rational individual views work and leisure (normal, inferior, or superior good). This trade-off in labor choice decision-making is grouped into both income and substitution effects, which leads to the derivation of a backward bending labor supply curve. The model therefore concludes that, even though the existing relationship between the labor supply of an individual and the predictors which include wages and property income may be statistically significant, there are other unobserved factors that help to explain an individual's decision to work or have more leisure. Even though the simple static labor supply model has played a significant role in providing theoretical backings on the individual's behavior in choice-making between leisure and consumption of market goods, the model also poses empirical complications. These have been summarized as both *discouraged-worker-effect* and *added-worker-effect*, given the existing business cycles and rates of unemployment (Wachter, 1972; McFadyen and Hobart, 1978; Lundberg, 1985).

Critics highlight loopholes in some of the key pointers of the simple static model, which assumes the consumption of single commodity and the fixed nature of time. There is no doubt that these assumptions do not hold in the real world, hence, the issue of discouraged-worker-effect and added-worker-effect. The former posits that the proportion of job seekers generally falls during periods of higher unemployment. Added-worker-effect, on the other hand, indicates that the labor force participation rate among married women whose husbands are unemployed generally increases compared to those whose husbands are employed. This finding is in line with both the family-labor choice and the male-chauvinist models, which assert that men are income-generating assets for their wives. Hence, during periods of unemployment, there is a fall in the non-labor income received by women, thereby increasing the likelihood of women working (Saget, 1999; Vlasblom et al., 2001; Steiner, 2004). The static model of labor supply does not account for long-term effect making labor market decisions.

Following the theoretical and empirical limitations of the simple static labor supply model, there has been a drift to dynamic labor supply models, which are extensions of the fundamental theory. Key among them is the moonlighting model, which is the focus of this paper. The phenomenon has become important in examining what forms part of the decision to hold multiple jobs, and how this affects (in the present study) the wellbeing of the individual migrant. Becker (1965) clearly states that an individual's utility does not necessarily depend on market goods, time allocated for work or leisure, but rather, on commodities or activities. An individual therefore accepts an offer for a second job if the wage of the job is greater than the

marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure for the first job (Shishko and Rostker, 1976). Other moonlighting-related works that took an expansive dimension beyond the static model also attested that though time constraints force individuals to allot their time between multiple work and leisure, the hour constraint motive can be modified into earnings constraint motive (Hirsch et al., 2016). Hence, the reservation wage that is assigned to a secondary job can induce one to take up multiple jobs at the expense of leisure (Averett, 2001; Partridge, 2002; Reilly and Krstić, 2003; Casacuberta and Gandelman, 2012; Klinger and Weber, 2020). This resonates with the dynamics of moonlighting in developing economies, for which Baah-Boateng et al. (2013) provide empirical justification on how individuals who moonlight eventually become self-employed. However, the decision to moonlight is dependent on the relative wage rates of the primary and secondary jobs, the nature of contractual agreement on the primary job, the reservation wage and how the individual perceives leisure (inferior, normal, or superior good). This is depicted in the equations below.

$$Wellbeing = W(C_{it}\, L_{it}) \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 indicates that an individual's utility is a function of the amount of composite market goods (C) and leisure (L) consumed, at a given time. This implies that, in any given period of time, the individual either works, consumes leisure or market goods, depending on their total income from both labor and non-labor sources. In simple terms, an increase in leisure implies a decrease in hours of work, which leads to a fall in income from labor and, thus, a fall in total income. Given the fall in income, an individual would have to reduce their demand for market goods, assuming goods are considered to be normal goods, "all other things being equal".

Equation 2 demonstrates that an individual's consumption is dependent on their non-labor income (V) and wages (w) from all hours of work (H). This concept supports the optimization approach and follows the underlying assumption of insatiable human wants as opposed to limited resources. In effect, at any given point in time, an individual's desire for both market goods and leisure – or either of them – is subject to a budget line that comprises both labor and non-labor income.

$$C_{it} = C(w_1 H_1 + w_2 H_2 + ... + w_n H_n + V) \quad (2)$$

This wellbeing function in Equation 2 is maximized subject to the constraint in Equation 3.

$$PC_{it} \leq V_{it} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} .w_{it}\ H_{it} \quad (3)$$

Thus, we maximize Equation 4, which represents the time for leisure and work, subject

to the constraint in Equation 3, which reads as an individual's total expenditure. PC_{it} is the sum of their earnings from all jobs $(\Sigma_{i=1}\ w_{it})$ and their non-labor income, at a defined time. Given the panel nature of the data, the subscript i represents each individual and t is the time period of the survey.

$$T = L + H_1 + H_2 + ... + H_n \quad (4)$$

It is important to indicate that, as an extension of the simple static labor choice model, the assumption is that an individual's total time available (T) is shared between work and leisure. Therefore, Equation 4 states that an individual moonlighter shares their time between leisure (L) and work (H). While rational economic behavior suggests that individuals only moonlight for non-financial motives, Shishko and Rostker (1976) established that an individual will moonlight if they are constrained in the number of hours to offer on the primary job. This signifies that an individual cannot exceed a certain number of assigned hours (H) and is therefore restricted in earnings (wH). Another motive to moonlight is caused by the presence of heterogeneous jobs. This occurs when the primary and secondary jobs possess different non-pecuniary benefits and costs.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The study draws on the five waves of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) dataset compiled in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Despite the high attrition recorded in some of the survey years, all five waves have been used, due to the unique nature of the moonlighting variable. This survey, the first national panel study that captures migrant labor market engagements in South Africa, was carried out by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. The first survey began in 2008 with a nationally representative sample of over 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households. Given the repeated nature of the survey (every two years with the same units of households interviewed), the dataset is reliable, valid and representative to achieve rigor in the present panel analysis. As captured in Table 1, migrant status, where migrants were broadly classified into internal, international, and non-migrants offered a layer of opportunity for this study to thoroughly investigate the tendency to moonlight and its impact on individuals along the constituencies of these three broad players in the South African labor market space.[5] We focused on the entire sample who were engaged in at least one job engagement, across all the waves. We were determined not to restrict our analysis to only internal and international migrants, hence, non-migrants who were actively engaged in the labor force were included to serve as a reference sample. Our all-inclusive sampling approach made it possible for us to present findings that capture

5 International migration involves moving from one country to the other; hence, an international migrant is an individual who changes their country of usual residence. Internal migrants are individuals who migrate within the borders of a country.

the experiences of both internal and international migrants.

As seen in the summary statistics below, the education level of participants was categorized into 3: non-educated, secondary, and tertiary. It was observed that the majority of individuals held at least secondary education, irrespective of their migration status across the five waves of the NIDS dataset. Among the groups, 84.75% of South Africans held secondary education and there is less variation across all five waves, whereas 82.49% and 74.53% are internal and international migrants respectively. A cursory look at the gendered dimension indicates that the majority (59.65%) of internal migrants are females while the majority of the men (54.66%) are international migrants. This resonates with existing theories of migration that highlight that men migrate for relatively longer distances than women. It also indicates that migration among females is mostly temporal, at short distances, and circular in nature, despite the recent wave of feminization of migration.

The significant role of social networks among both migrants and non-migrants in terms of job search strategies has been well documented in the NIDS dataset, as the majority of individuals made use of existing social networks in job searching. Among native South Africans and internal migrants, more than 50% made use of social networks in job searching, while among international migrants, about 48%, representing the highest, made use of social networks; with 42.52% employing a manual approach to job searching – which means physically searching for jobs. It is reasonable to surmise that natives and internal migrants are more likely to have high social capital in terms of relatives and friends across all parts of South Africa, which provides a favorable foundation and useful point of reference in job searching. Beyond the job-search strategy, social networks play a significant role in redefining existing migration patterns, flows and dynamics in both sending and receiving countries.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variables	Observation	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Moonlighting	25 890	0.01	0.099	0	1
Hours of work	25 890	0.496	0.5	0	1
Children per household	10 739	2.557	1.552	1	14
Male	25 886	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age group	25 890	2.554	0.509	1	4
Migrant type	24 539	1.403	0.508	1	3
Education	24 539	2.221	0.415	1	3
Job search	7423	2.022	0.737	1	3
Wellbeing	15 007	2.917	0.708	1	4
Happiness	25 530	2.988.	1.081	1	4
Household monthly income	4 091	3320.582	7033.178	0	230 000
Marital status	25 852	3.221	1.824	1	5

Source: authors' own compilation

Subjective wellbeing and happiness, which happen to be key outcome variables that measure labour welfare were captured as categorical variables (see Table 1). A significant number of individuals reported improved subjective wellbeing. A comparative assessment across the various groups based on migration status showed that 77.04% of international migrants reported improved wellbeing, compared to 66.95% and 59.91% for internal migrants and non-migrant South Africans respectively (see Figure 1). While this provides a useful point of departure to further assess what accounts for the improved wellbeing, earlier research reported low wellbeing among migrants (Mulcahy and Kollamparambil, 2016). This notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that this finding does not reflect causal relation, instead, a relationship which only provides a spectrum of distribution among both migrant and non-migrant groups.

With reference to moonlighting, we captured it as a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if an individual holds more than one job and 0 otherwise (see Table 1). The data clearly shows that moonlighting is prevalent among individuals with only secondary education, 71.76% of whom moonlight, compared with 28.24% with post-secondary education. Females are more likely to have more than one job than males. Key reasons for this could be that the majority of females are engaged in household work and informal sector engagements. The majority of moonlighters and single-job-holders reported the use of social networks as a job search strategy, and both categories reported improved wellbeing. The average monthly household income was calculated as ZAR 3,320.582. Each household had an average of three children, which reflects the modern drift towards nuclear household systems in urban South Africa, compared to elsewhere in Africa where households are larger.

Figure 1 : Measurement of subjective wellbeing



Source: authors' own compilation

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND VARIABLES OF INTEREST

This study does not only provide empirical insight and theoretical underpinning to the pressing social and policy needs among migrants and the labor market, but it also contributes to rigorous methodological inputs in understanding labor moonlighting and wellbeing. This research contributes to the methodology in three major ways. Firstly, it established the claim of labor moonlighting among migrants and non-migrants in their country of residence. Secondly, it ascertained the implication of moonlighting on wellbeing. Thirdly, this is the first study to employ panel data including five repeated waves to establish the above findings. These observations make the study seminal and also offer a good background for further inquiry that will be subject-focused.

Despite the theoretical intuitiveness of labor moonlighting, the empirical investigation of its determinant is faced with challenges. The main source of concern is the problem of self-selection. There is positive selection among workers who take up more than one job. In effect, it becomes difficult to delineate the effect of migration status on moonlighting decisions, as indicated in the theoretical literature. Another problem relates to whether the observed determinants correlate significantly with unobserved factors that influence moonlighting.

To overcome these challenges, this study employed a nationally representative panel dataset, which offered an opportunity to investigate the dynamic effect of migrants' behavior on moonlighting. The panel dataset enriched this study, given that it offered the opportunity to undertake the analysis of the same units over a repeated period of time (five waves in this case). In addition, the methodology used accounts for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Another strength of the dataset is its richness and detailed information provision on both immigrants and non-immigrants who reported both their labor and non-labor income, as well as job-specific information for up to two jobs. Information was also available on whether an individual was self-employed or personally engaged in agricultural activities, with corresponding earnings from all respective jobs, which allows for rich specification.

This study achieved two main objectives. The first part estimated the determinants of moonlighting among individuals (both immigrants and non-immigrants) in South Africa, using a Logit regression model. The second part of the paper addresses the implication of moonlighting on the subjective wellbeing of migrants. In the former case, we assume dichotomous dependent variable "moonlight" coded as 0/1 to reflect the probability to moonlight or not given migration status and other covariates. The reduced-form model is estimated as in Equation 5.

$$\Pr(\vec{x}) = \Pr(Y = 1|\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} 1 \; if \; moonlight \\ 0 \; if \; otherwise \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

A more formal estimate is given in Equation 6:

$$\Pr\left(Y_{it}\neq 0 \middle| X_{it}\right)=P(X_{it}\beta+ \nu_{it}+ \epsilon_{it}) \quad (6)$$

The equation represents the probability of moonlighting or not, given the covariates x_{it} – which consist of vector of predictor values such as socio-demographic and economic indicators for individual i at survey year t. These socio-demographic factors include age, sex, marital status, family size, household expenditure, and education levels of prospective moonlighters. The job strategy adopted by individuals and the number of hours spent on their primary job were also considered. Thus, *b* captures the intensive margin estimates of the extent to which the above-mentioned factors explain the likelihood to moonlight. That is, the logistic regression model basically estimates the likelihood that a migrant moonlights, given the independent variables. The composite error term $u_{it} = n_i + e_{it}$ captures other unobserved characteristics that are both time-fixed and time-changing.

The estimate is analytically done via a maximum likelihood estimation technique. If we assume a normal distribution $N(0,s_n)$, for the random effects, the likelihood is given in Equation 7.

$$l_i = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-v_i^2/2\partial_v^2}}{\sqrt{2\pi_v}} \left\{ \prod_{t=1}^{n_i} F(Y_{it,} X_{it} + \nu_{it}) \right\} dv_i \quad (7)$$

where

$$F(y,x) = \begin{cases} \dfrac{1}{1+\exp(-z)} \; if \; \neq 0 \\ \dfrac{1}{1+\exp(-z)} \; if \; otherwise \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of Equation 7 is a consistent asymptotically normal estimator of the coefficient vector *b* (Woodridge, 2010, 473–481). However, by assuming random effect, we invoke strong assumptions about the error term u_{it}. A unit homogeneity of individuals is assumed. That is, there is no unobserved heterogeneity that affects migration status and other covariates. In simple terms, the within-variation among migrants is null. It is also assumed that errors that change over time are statistically orthogonal to the regressors. These assumptions are likely to fail when there is self-selection and errors are not completely random. Though the assumptions seem untenable, we argue that the random effect is still efficient and consistent for our model and context.

The nature of our data is suitable for random effect and simple Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) analysis. We find that covariates do not show enough

within variation to apply fixed effect model (see Figure 2 and Table 13 in Appendix). Sex, marital status and job-search strategy are near-time-constant regressors. As the within-variation among migrants for these regressors is null, the fixed effect drops all observation without within-effect on moonlighting. As the number of observations in the panel setting is large compared to the time dimension, we are likely to run into incidental parameter problems when considering interactions of variables. That is, directly estimating the individual fixed effect n_i will generate a large number of parameters, which leads to inconsistent estimators.

However, with additional assumptions[6] it is possible to consistently estimate the coefficient vector *b*.[7] We therefore employ the random effect due to its greater flexibility and generalizability, and its ability to model the context, including time-constant variables. To confirm the suitability of random effect, we run the Hausman test.

The second part of the paper addresses the implication of moonlighting on the subjective wellbeing of migrants. Since subjective wellbeing is a categorical variable, the appropriate identification strategy is a multinomial logistic regression model. The model helps predict the likelihood of being happy, given a migrant's moonlighting status while controlling for other confounding factors. Unlike discriminant function analysis, this model does not assume normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity. It is seen as an attractive approach (Kwak and Clayton-Matthews, 2002; Hedeker, 2003).

The relationship between the propensities of subjective wellbeing, moonlighting status, and other covariates is expressed in Equation 9:

$$Y_{it} = P(\propto_{it} + x_{it}\beta_j + \epsilon_{itj}) \quad (9)$$

where y_{it} is the latent propensity for each individual i at time t to experience subjective wellbeing category j. In Equation 9, b_j denotes the coefficient vector, with X_{it} being independent variables including but not limited to moonlighting dummy. Similarly, the error term e_{itj} is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across all outcomes j, and a_{ij} is a random variable. With these assumptions, the probabilities of each outcome are estimated, given our determinants of subjective wellbeing.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section discusses the results of multivariate regressions presented below. There are two main estimations: to comprehend the key determinants of moonlighting, and to assess how moonlighting behavior affects the wellbeing of individuals in the labor market, with a focus on migrants in South Africa.

6 The observed covariates are strictly exogenous, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, and the error terms are independent across time.

7 Beck and Katz (2007) show that, with respect to time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data, random effect models perform well, even when the normality assumptions are violated.

Main results

The main empirical results are shown in Table 2, showing the POLS, fixed effect and random effect estimates. We find that the fixed effects are not suitable, as some of the observations are dropped due to many time-constant regressors and too little within-variation among migrants. The credibility of the results crucially relies on the assumption that the observed covariates are strictly exogenous, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, and the error terms are independent across time. This was confirmed by the Hausman test. We find that random effect is appropriate for the context and nature of variables. Specifically, the Hausman test failed to reject the null that the difference in coefficients is not systematic, implying that the issue of unobserved heterogeneity is unproblematic.

Table 2: Determinants of moonlighting

Variables	**(1) Random effect**	**(2) OLS**	**(3) Fixed effect**
Hours of work	-0.005**	-0.575**	-0.743*
	(0.002)	(0.232)	(0.439)
Children	0.0004	0.035	-0.162
	(0.001)	(0.072)	(0.226)
Level of education	0.005*	0.498**	0.810
	(0.003)	(0.248)	(1.205)
Household expenditure	0.0001***	0.0001***	0.0002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.0003)
Migration status			
Internal migrant*	-0.001	-0.072	0.491
	(0.002)	(0.221)	(0.397)
International migrant	0.039***	1.646**	15.987
	(0.015)	(0.755)	(1,651)
Marital status			
Living together	0.005	0.475	1.309
	(0.004)	(0.406)	(1.067)
Widow/widower	0.005	0.432	-14.468
	(0.004)	(0.385)	(963.178)
Divorced/separated	0.012***	0.953**	-1.253
	(0.005)	(0.383)	(1.333)
Never married	0.003	0.309	0.491
	(0.002)	(0.283)	(0.860)
Job search strategy			
Social network	0.005*	0.518*	0.186
	(0.003)	(0.298)	(0.566)
Manual	0.004	0.392	0.121
s	(0.003)	(0.334)	(0.564)
Constant	-0.001	-5.636***	
	(0.004)	(0.438)	
Observations	25,890	25,890	1186

Note: *,**,**,*denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.

The general results align with both the "hours constraint" and financial motive models of moonlighting. Specifically, after controlling for other covariates, individuals working beyond the stipulated 40-hours per week in South Africa are less likely to moonlight and this is statistically significant at a 5% level of significance in columns 1 and 2 respectively. More specifically, people working above the normal working hours are estimated to have a lower likelihood of moonlighting.

In terms of the likelihood to moonlight based on migration status, the researchers realized that international migrants have a higher propensity to moonlight than internal migrants or South African non-migrants. It is important to note that this is significant at a 99% and 95% confidence interval in columns 1 and 2 respectively. This may be attributed to the positive selection nature of individual migrants with the edge for higher returns on migration as a human capital investment. Though this finding has no confirmation from any existing literature, due to the newness of the field, it is logically consistent, empirically verifiable and policy relevant, given the needs of migrants and the overarching motive for their migration trajectory.

The results further highlighted another interesting finding among individuals within different marital groups. The evidence indicates that people who are divorced or separated have a higher likelihood of holding multiple jobs compared to those with another marital status, controlling for other co-variates. While this has no direct theoretical underpinning, it deepens our understanding of how marriage plays a significant role in the livelihoods of people through resource mobilization and sharing of responsibilities. It is important to mention that the case of single and widowed individuals is not similar. Divorce appears in the form of a shock that disrupts an individual's income stream and other socioeconomic responsibilities.

The above-mentioned finding has varied theoretical and policy implications, but this paper focuses on two extremes by providing explanations that may attract further scientific inquiry, especially in a post-COVID-19 political economy in South Africa and beyond. There is heterogeneity in response to divorce by individuals and this is likely to have a positive impact and lead to less or more moonlighting depending on one's position. The paper outlines two main positions that are dependent on the psychological states and income scales of individuals. The same result can be given two major considerations (negative and positive) following the conventional concept of elasticity of demand for income and psychological needs. In effect, a person's degree of responsiveness to divorce based on their income levels at the period of the divorce as well as their psychological fit and degree of responsiveness to divorce as a shock will influence their propensity to hold multiple jobs. Divorce can be a negative shock, especially for couples who might have suffered asset loss, income, wealth and economic securities of survival, among others. This is important in economic, theoretical and policy research designs to avoid any form of (un)foreseen disequilibrium that succeeds divorce. The theoretical concern by the male chauvinist

model[8] presents a significant evidential undertone, as divorcees are more likely to lose their non-labor income during periods of unemployment and divorce, which has a direct relationship with their total income. This, therefore, signifies and partly explains why divorcees are more likely to moonlight compared to those who are not divorced, given other co-variates.

Another important determinant of moonlighting that is highlighted in both empirical and theoretical literature is income level. Household expenditure is used as a proxy to determine an individual's likelihood to hold multiple jobs in South Africa. Individuals with higher household monthly expenditure have a higher propensity to hold multiple jobs. This is statistically significant at a 99% confidence interval. Having a higher household monthly income implies a higher financial burden, which means hours of work must be increased in order to increase income to meet the rising expenditure. Therefore, instead of including the household income variable, we made use of the household expenditure to better explain its influence on the likelihood to moonlight.

There is also a relationship between mode of job search and the likelihood of moonlighting. Individuals reported to have used social networks, advertisements, or a mechanical approach in searching for jobs. The multivariate approach indicates that people who use social networks in job search have a higher propensity to hold multiple jobs than their counterparts who used advertisements or a manual approach. This evidence is statistically significant at a 10% level of significance with a 57-percentage point higher likelihood. It is also imperative to underscore that social networks have played a significant role in the migration trajectory, pre-departure preparation as well as recruitment processes of both internal and international migrants (Awumbila et al., 2017; Vermaak and Muller, 2019). This finding accords with both social network and human capital theories (see Curran and Saguy, 2001) in migration that conclude that migrants are more likely to migrate to locations dominated by their ethnic groups.

In summary, the random effect model predicts that hours spent on a primary job, migration status, marital status, income levels, and mode of job search have statistically significant explanatory powers in moonlighting behavior. While it is surprising that the number of children does have a significant explanatory role in the propensity of holding multiple jobs, there is a positive relationship which explains that individuals with many children are likely to moonlight, all other things being equal. This is in line with previous findings that revealed that having more children increases one's likelihood of moonlighting (Abdukadir 1992; Kimmel and Conway, 2001). This is consistent with the notion that having more children means more responsibilities, which increases household expenditure. In effect, an individual

8 According to this, the wife views her husband's earnings as a kind of property income when she makes labor supply decisions, whereas the husband decides on his labor supply without reference to his wife's labor supply decisions, solely on the basis of his own wage and the family's actual property income. The model predicts that in an advent of any rising unemployment rate or a suspicion of divorce by married people, there is a higher likelihood of devoting additional time to the labor market.

constrained by income will be motivated financially to moonlight.

Our results indicate that international migrant women have a higher propensity to hold multiple jobs than their male cohorts. This is statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval. Similarly, divorced women are more likely to moonlight than divorced men. This is a strong affirmation of the main thesis of the male chauvinist model, which predicts that in a situation of rising unemployment or a suspicion of divorce, there is a higher likelihood that women will devote additional time to the labor market. Another reason to prioritize this thought is deeply rooted in the current pandemic time, which heightens the vulnerability levels of women in terms of gender-based violence, sexual reproductive health, and exploitation at workplaces in South Africa, since women are the majority and front-liners in the most affected sectors.

Women therefore play a significant role in the labor market, yet their remuneration does not always match their level of productivity. While this is not one of the objectives of this paper, it is important to highlight that moonlighting is likely to persist in the labor market and more likely to be common among women, given the current structure of the labor market and the gendered nature of treatment. A key pointer within the policy landscape should be geared towards leveraging the existing platform to achieve a common ground for both men and women within the labor market through a more tailored gender-sensitive policy framework, with workable action plans in order to achieve equality.

Predictors of subjective wellbeing

This section assesses the main predictors of individuals' wellbeing, with a focus on moonlighting. The study made use of the self-reported wellbeing and happiness variables by respondents during the survey years for all the five panels. There are five numbered categorizations for both wellbeing and happiness, with 1 representing very poor wellbeing or very unhappy and 5 representing highly improved wellbeing or extremely happy respectively. While the wellbeing and happiness variables may seemingly explain almost similar concepts, wellbeing basically reports respondents' overall welfare while happiness reports respondents' mood during the survey period. It is important to clarify that these are self-reported and widely accepted in welfare economics and the economics of happiness. It is important to also point out that the subjective indicator for wellbeing has the tendency to be biased as it does not apply any objective indicators. Two separate models have therefore been estimated, with wellbeing and happiness as the dependent variables to assess one's likelihood to have improved wellbeing or to be happy, given that one moonlights or not while controlling for other relevant covariates.

Table 3 (see Appendix) demonstrates an interesting relationship between wellbeing and moonlighting. This is the overarching hypothesis in this paper. It affirms previous studies that revealed that the returns of migrants do not necessarily translate into improved wellbeing. Our quest to understand why this is the case has

remained the main motivation for this research, aside from other important issues. In this paper, the finding indicates that individuals who moonlight reported very poor wellbeing, which is statistically significant at a 5% level of significance.

Specifically, multiple job holders are 22.3 percentage points more likely to report very poor wellbeing than their non-moonlighting counterparts. While explaining this in isolation from other covariates could attribute the outcome to reduction in leisure hours, as underscored by the labor moonlighting theories, this perfectly confirms our earlier findings that hours spent on primary jobs impact on moonlighting. There is evidence that individuals who spent hours above the normal 40 hours per week on the job also reported very poor wellbeing, with a 99% confidence interval (see Table 3, random effect model). The drudgery and daily toil, with little breathing space to relax and indulge in other activities will definitely impact the wellbeing of migrants negatively. It is therefore correct to deduce that the time spent on the job and the number of job holdings among individuals explain an individual's wellbeing.

In addition to the above, individuals paying medical aid reported having poorly improved wellbeing, at a 99% confidence interval. This is also the case for the number of children that individuals have. A higher number of children corresponds to very low wellbeing, also statistically significant at a 1% level of significance. Another interesting finding here is the relationship between marital status and subjective wellbeing. Divorcees expressed a higher propensity to improved wellbeing, while those who were married, single, widowed, or living with partners reported higher propensities of very poor wellbeing, with a 99% confidence interval. One can argue that a divorcee from a toxic relationship is likely to report higher subjective wellbeing, as it is "freedom from bondage". This assertion does not necessarily mean married individuals are with the wrong partners, given the several unobserved factors the study must take into account before concluding on this. However, it relates to the current situation of gender-based violence, leading to divorce, in South Africa. The finding from the current study contradicts several findings that observe a positive relationship between marriage and subjective wellbeing (Larson, 1978; Mastekaasa, 1994; Kim and Moen, 2001; De la Rochefoucauld et al., 2006). This has a significant policy implication.

People with higher levels of education also reported very poor wellbeing, at a 90% confidence interval. This is a policy concern that can be explored further for a different perspective, because it contradicts the findings of mainstream literature from economic, sociological and wellbeing perspectives (Zepke, 2013). Income plays a significant role in determining people's wellbeing. However, due to issues of multicollinearity, other variables like payment of medical bills, and the number of children represent responsibilities to some extent. While anecdotal evidence points to a positive relationship between education and subjective wellbeing, it is imperative to note that the contribution of education to subjective wellbeing is unclear, limited, inexplicit, and fragmented, according to various accounts in the empirical literature.

For instance, a systematic literature study found no significant relationship between education and subjective wellbeing (Kahneman et al., 2004) while others noted a positive relationship (White, 2007; Michalos, 2013).

In order to concretize the above results, the model 2 in Table 3 provides the results of a multivariate regression model with happiness as the dependent variable, given the remaining covariates. Moonlighting has no significant explanatory power in explaining an individual's likelihood to be happy or not. However, there is a negative relationship between moonlighting and staying happy, which suggests that holding multiple jobs has a higher tendency to make an individual unhappy, given other covariates. Supporting this claim, are the hours spent by individuals on primary jobs. The result shows that spending above the normal weekly 40 hours is more likely to make one very unhappy. This is statistically significant, at a 99% confidence interval. This corresponds with the wellbeing results, which also highlight the fact that having more than one job or spending more hours above the usual weekly 40 hours on a primary job negatively affects an individual's wellbeing. A key element to underpin this claim is the role of leisure in defining wellbeing and happiness, which is logically consistent, empirically robust and policy driven (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Conway and Kimmel, 1992; Averett, 2001).

The more children one has, the lower the probability of being happy. This is statistically significant at a 1% level of significance, and is in line with the findings on the wellbeing of individuals presented above. People who pay their own medical aid also reported being very unhappy, at a 95% confidence interval. A variable that did not show any significance, and even with a negative relationship turned out to be positive and even statistically significant at a 5% level of significance, is government housing. People residing in government houses under the state housing programme reported being very unhappy. Presenting this result in isolation may have policy implications, so it is important to disentangle the combined features that may help explain this particular covariate. This is because the likelihood of being poor when residing in government housing is high. This scheme is meant for the poor black population, as a social protection policy to provide a safety net due to the high poverty and inequality rates in South Africa.

Unlike the wellbeing indicator, marital status showed different dynamics in explaining the likelihood of being happy or not. Although it is not statistically significant, people who are living with their partners and those separated or divorced did not report being unhappy, instead, they are more likely to be happy compared to their counterparts. The wave effects for these results have been controlled for all five waves.

Robustness check

In this section, we report the results of a number of further robustness exercises and extensions. Robustness along the line of education (see Table 10), confirms a negative relationship between spending many hours on the primary job and the likelihood of

one to moonlight. Further, we found a significant relationship for individuals with post-secondary education. A plausible reason for this is that such individuals are more likely to qualify for job opportunities that fully engage them, unlike unskilled laborers, who may be underemployed, hence, desire to engage in more moonlighting activities. Also, we found a statistically significant relationship for post-secondary international migrants and divorcees. The results for our primary variable of interest which happens to be hours spent on primary work seem to be significant across our regressions which were estimated along the lines of wave and interaction of variables.

CONCLUSION

Moonlighting and migration have been hypothesized independently in both theoretical and empirical literature. However, the relationship between migrants' likelihood to moonlight, and how this affects their wellbeing, and its implication for policy rethinking have not received the needed attention in both research and policy design. The present work employed an individual level panel dataset from South Africa to estimate the key determinants of moonlighting and its implication on wellbeing. The key variables of interest are moonlighting and self-reported wellbeing among individuals, with moonlighting as the main covariate. A model of determinants of happiness was also estimated, to draw synergies or nuances in the estimated self-reported wellbeing model.

Evidence was found that international migrants are more likely to moonlight. Individuals who spent more hours above the normal (40 hours per week) on their primary job have a lower tendency to moonlight. The paper established a strong incidence of moonlighting among divorcees, individuals with higher monthly household expenditure, and people who made use of social networks in their job searches. Divorced or separated people are solely responsible for their daily upkeep, payment of bills, among other expenses, and therefore their lack of financial support increases their propensity to hold multiple jobs in order to earn more. Higher household expenditure translates into a need for greater household income, which therefore means reduction in leisure hours and a rise in working hours in order to achieve this. Individuals who use social networks in job-seeking are more likely to operate in the informal and private household sectors. This means that returns will be lower than for individuals in formal work. It is therefore reasonable that such individuals hold more than one job to increase their earnings. In effect, it can be concluded that moonlighting among individuals is a rational decision based on sociodemographic and economic factors.

The analysis suggests that there is a significant relationship between moonlighting and self-reported wellbeing. Specifically, moonlighting tends to negatively affect an individual's wellbeing. This conclusion is also deep-seated in the theoretical perspectives of moonlighting, which posit two main constraints – hours and income. Trading off leisure hours will lead to a corresponding rise in labor income. However, the individual is subjected to a constraint from low or no leisure

hours, which affects wellbeing. This partly explains the conclusion drawn in the work of Mulcahy and Kollamparambil (2016), that notwithstanding a rise in income from extra labor, migrants reported lower wellbeing. In order to verify this claim further, another model was estimated, with self-reported happiness as the dependent variable. Although there are slight variations, the general result confirms the wellbeing model, that holding more than one job or working beyond the stipulated hours of work adversely affect one's wellbeing, keeping other covariates constant.

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APPENDIX

Table 3: Moonlighting and self-reported wellbeing and happiness

Variables	**(1) Subjective Wellbeing**	**(2) Happiness**
Moonlighting	0.223**	0.075
	(0.113)	(0.130)
Hours of primary work	0.076***	0.093***
	(0.023)	(0.025)
Number of children	0.048***	0.052***
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Post-secondary education	0.050*	0.037
	((0.029)	(0.033)
Self-paid medical aid	0.142***	0.073**
	(0.032)	(0.036)
Government housing	-0.003	0.068**
	(0.030)	(0.032)
Migration status		
Internal migrant	-1.517***	-0.565
	(0.583)	(0.387)
International migrant	-13.634	-0.686
	(616.276))	((1.270)
Marital status		
Living together	0.127***	-0.072
	(0.046)	(0.048)
Widow/widower	0.136***	0.169***
	(0.046)	(0.049)
Divorced/separated	-0.104**	-0.070
	(0.052)	(0.059)
Never married	0.221***	0.184***
	(0.028)	(0.031)
Constant	2.711***	2.872***
	(0.078)	(0.087)
Observations	4,382	7,548

Note: *,**,***denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.

All tables and figures in the appendix are based on data calculated by the authors

Table 4: Migrant type

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Non-migrant	62244	69.08	69.08
Internal migrant	27372	30.38	99.46
International migrant	483	0.54	100.00

Table 5: Job Search strategy

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Adverts	5732	22.27	22.27
Social Network	13259	51.51	73.77
Manual Search	6708	26.06	99.83

Table 6: Highest education

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Secondary education	148180	78.20	78.20
Post-Secondary education	41302	21.80	100.00

Table 7: Moonlighter

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	25635	99.02	99.02
Yes	255	0.98	100.00

Table 8: Age group

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Children (below 15)	62410	20.92	20.92
Youth (15-34)	66829	22.40	43.31
Adults (35-65)	49653	16.64	59.95
Elderly (above 65)	119493	40.05	100.00

Table 9: Robustness check using individual waves for random effect model

Variables	**(1) All wave**	**(2) wave>1**	**(3) wave>2**	**(4) wave>3**	**(5) wave>4**
Hours on primary work	-0.003	-0.005***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of children	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Internal migrant	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
International migrant	0.056***	-0.010	-0.010	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Living together	0.009**	0.005	0.006	0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Widow/widower	0.008*	0.006*	0.007*	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Divorced/separated	0.018***	0.011**	0.012**	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Never married	0.004	0.004*	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Highest level of education	0.003	0.004*	0.006**	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Household expenditure	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Social network	0.007**	0.004*	0.004	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Manual	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
wave	-0.003***				
	(0.001)				
Constant	0.010*	-0.002	-0.003	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	7,264	9,673	8,129	6,040	6,040
R-squared	0.008	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Robustness check using education for random effect model

Variables	**(1)** **Secondary Education**	**(2)** **Post-Secondary Education**
Hours on primary work	-0.001	-0.011**
	(0.002)	(0.006)
Number of children	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Internal migrant	-0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.006)
International migrant	0.032	0.125***
	(0.020)	(0.041)
Living together	0.008*	0.019
	(0.005)	(0.012)
Widow/widower	0.012**	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.010)
Divorced/separated	0.003	0.046***
	(0.006)	(0.010)
Never married	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.007)
Household expenditure	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Social Network	0.008**	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.006)
Advert	0.005	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.007)
Manual	-0.012	-0.003
	(0.064)	(0.063)
wave	-0.003***	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	0.010*	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.012)
Observations	5,656	1,608
R-squared	0.006	0.026

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Interactions of variables for robustness check

Variables	(1) RE	(2) RE	(3) RE	(4) RE
Hours on primary work	-0.626**	-0.636**	-0.642**	-0.379
	(0.260)	(0.262)	(0.260)	(0.315)
Internal migrant	-0.253	0.076	-0.302	0.152
	(0.486)	(0.459)	(0.303)	(0.290)
International migrant	4.905**	2.586*	1.474	1.843
	(2.416)	(1.434)	(1.238)	(1.288)
Living together	0.411	0.765	0.507	0.456
	(0.471)	(0.583)	(0.467)	(0.467)
Widow/widower	0.488	0.970*	0.508	0.497
	(0.448)	(0.517)	(0.447)	(0.449)
Divorced/separated	0.950**	1.100*	0.916*	0.927*
	(0.474)	(0.608)	(0.472)	(0.474)
Never married	0.294	0.218	0.308	0.295
	(0.327)	(0.413)	(0.327)	(0.327)
Married Internal migrant		-1.054		
		(1.015)		
Widowed Internal Migrant		-1.945		
		(1.218)		
Divorced Internal Migrant		-0.246		
		(0.889)		
Never married Internal Migrant		0.281		
		(0.593)		
Married International migrant		0.000		
		(0.000)		
Widowed International Migrant		0.335		
		(2.068)		
Divorced International Migrant		0.000		
		(0.000)		
Never married International Migrant		0.000		
Highest education	0.483	0.475	0.149	0.487
	(0.301)	(0.303)	(0.384)	(0.301)
Number of children	0.020	0.033	0.036	0.029
	(0.102)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Household expenditure	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Social network	0.555	0.565	0.553	0.578*
	(0.341)	(0.344)	(0.339)	(0.341)
Manual	0.409	0.425	0.397	0.430
	(0.376)	(0.378)	(0.375)	(0.376)
Non-Migrant and Number of children	0.000			
	(0.000)			
Internal migrant and Number of children	0.065			
	(0.152)			
International migrant and Number of children	-1.453			
	(1.356)			
Non-Migrant and Secondary Education			0.000	
			(0.000)	
Non-Migrant and Post-Secondary Education			0.000	
			(0.000)	
Internal migrant and Secondary Education			0.000	
			(0.000)	
Internal migrant and Post-Secondary Education			0.733	
			(0.535)	
International migrant and Secondary Education			0.000	
			(0.000)	
International migrant and Post-Secondary Education			2.279	
			(2.061)	
Constant	-7.372***	-7.525***	-7.305***	-7.498***
	(0.711)	(0.724)	(0.691)	(0.709)
Observations	10,081	10,068	10,081	10,081

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: Summary statistics

Variables		**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observation**
Moonlighting	overall	0.009	0.099	0	1	N= 25890
	between		0.0811	0	1	n= 13583
	within		0.0674	-0.740	0.810	T-bar = 1.906
Hours of Work	overall	0.496	0.500	0	1	N= 25890
	between		0.435	0	1	n= 13583
	within		0.313	-0.304	1.296	T-bar = 1.906
Kids	overall	2.557	1.552	1	14	N= 10739
	between		1.527	1	14	n= 5802
	within		0.446	-4.643	6.057	T-bar = 1.851
Male	overall	0.500	0.500	0	1	N = 25886
	between		0.500	0	1	n = 13579
	within		0	0.500	0.500	T-bar = 1.906
Age Group	overall	2.554	0.509	1	4	N = 25890
	between		0.498	1	4	n = 13583
	within		0.171	1.754	3.354	T-bar = 1.906
Migrant Type	overall	1.403	0.508	1	3	N = 24539
	between		0.454	1	3	n = 13212
	within		0.310	-0.097	3.003	T-bar = 1.857
Education	overall	2.194	0.395	2	3	N = 25887
	between		0.372	2	3	n = 13582
	within		0.119	1.394	2.993	T-bar = 1.906
Job search	overall	4.075	2.124	1	11	N = 25710
	between		1.827	1	11	n = 13526
	within		1.331	-2.175	11.275	T-bar = 1.901
Wellbeing	overall	2.917	0.708	1	4	N = 15007
	between		0.650	1	4	n = 9713
	within		0.389	0.917	4.917	T-bar = 1.545
Happiness	overall	2.988	1.081	1	4	N = 25530
	between		0.914	1	4	n = 13510
	within		0.725	0.588	5.388	T-bar = 1.889
HH monthly Inc	overall	3320.582	7033.178	0	230000	N= 4091
	between		7112.908	0	230000	n = 3771
	within		1402.208	0	230000	T-bar = 1.085
Marital status	overall	3.221	1.824	1	5	N = 25852
	between		1.739	1	5	n = 13571
	within		0.616	0.0208	6.421	T-bar = 1.905

Figure 2: Descriptive statistics



Figure 3a: Change in moonlighting over time per migrant type Moonlight% per migrant type



Figure 3b: Change in moonlighting over time per migrant type. Subjective Wellbeing% per migrant type



Fish-for-Sex (FFS) and Risk of HIV Infection among Fishers in Elmina Fishing Community in Ghana

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Received 20 December 2021 / Accepted 06 June 2022 / Published 31 August 2022

Abstract

This paper is a cross-sectional study that employed mix-methods for data collection and analysis to investigate a relationship between mobility and HIV risks among 385 fishers in Elmina. It discusses the roles of people in fish-for-sex (FFS), the reasons for such transactional sexual activity, and its implications for HIV-risk infection. The study uses the theory of gender and power (TGP) to explain gender dynamics in power inequalities, and their effects on interpersonal sexual relations between males and females within the fishing community. The paper concludes that the gendered division of labor exists in the study area and thrives on socio-cultural norms and power inequalities. These inequalities mainly favor men, who are thus emboldened to exploit women through the supply of fish. The paper further observes that as long as the female petty fish traders require capital for their fish trade and the male fishers have greater control over the supply of the fish, the women will have limited negotiating power. In addition, the paper establishes a linkage between fish-for-sex relations and the risk of HIV exposure among fishers in Elmina. The paper recommends the empowerment of female petty fish traders by granting them trading capital to limit their overdependence on male fishers for capital, thereby eliminating the need for exchanging sex for fish. The paper also calls for the intensification of education by relevant agencies involved in HIV education on safe sex practices through the use of condoms in fishing communities.

Keywords: fish-for-sex, gendered labor division, power, inequality, exploitation

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INTRODUCTION

Fish-for-sex (FFS) is a transactional sexual activity that involves an exchange of fish for sex between male and female fishers[2] in fishing destinations. Earlier studies have reported the occurrence of FFS in fishing communities in many developing countries (Kissling et al., 2005; Camlin et al., 2013). Most of the occurrences of FFS are observed in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, scholars like Camlin et al. (2013) and Merten and Haller (2007) observed the presence of such activity in the Nyanza lakeside communities in Kenya, and among local Ila or Tonga women and immigrant fishermen in the Zambian Kafue Flats. Anecdotal evidence shows that it may be happening in some fishing communities in Ghana too. Béné and Merten (2008) describe it as a transactional sexual relationship between male and female fishers as part of the local fish-trade economy. Kwena et al. (2013) explain that generally, female fish traders enter into the FFS to be assured of a steady supply of fish to sustain their fish trade. Duwal et al. (2015) emphasize that once this arrangement is concluded, male fishers are obliged to grant their FFS partners preferential access to their catch of fish. MacPherson et al. (2012) report that after the sexual transaction, the women become the first to get their supply of fish, while those who do not engage in this transactional sexual relationship often find it difficult to get fish. For this reason, female fish traders are sometimes compelled to look for sex partners among male fishers at fishing destinations. Gordon (2005) reports that in some communities, the female fish traders compete to be part of an FFS arrangement, or risk losing out on the supply of fish, especially during lean fishing seasons (FAO, 2006).

Kissling et al. (2005) maintain that FFS increases HIV vulnerability among those who engage in this practice. Female fish traders who lack trading capital are the victims of FFS in many fishing communities, at the hands of male fishers who demand sex before supplying fish (Kwena et al., 2013). Kwena et al. (2013) also contend that not only do the women become victims of exploitation, but the FFS occurs in unprotected contexts of very low condom use. Further insights into the practice also show that it involves either a small number of female fish traders having unprotected sex with a large number of male fishers or a large number of female fish traders having sex with a small number of male fishers within the fishing destination (Garnett and Anderson, 1996, cited in Duwal et al., 2015).

The extant literature deems FFS both a potentially HIV-risk practice, and an exploitative practice as it increases the vulnerability of not only fish traders but the general population through their sexual partners. It is an issue of power play in which males have an upper hand in the decisions taken to engage in sex, with some men even refusing to use condoms (Kyei-Gyamfi, 2019). Incidentally, very little is documented on FFS in the fisheries literature in Ghana, even though anecdotal evidence shows that this phenomenon may be occurring in some Ghanaian fishing

2 'Fishers' refers to the study participants who were categorized into four groups: those who catch the fish, those engaged in post-harvest activities (drying, smoking, marketing, etc.), those engaged in maintenance and repair activities (boat repairs, net mending, etc.), and those who carry fish from one point of the fishing market to another.

communities. This paper analyzes the roles of people in the fishing activity of Elmina in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) Municipality in Ghana, their engagement in FFS, the reasons for engagement, and the implications for HIV-risk infection among men and women in the fishing community. The paper is based on an earlier study, which established a relationship between mobility and HIV-risk infection among fishers in the Elmina fishing community.

THEORY OF GENDER AND POWER

The theory of gender and power (TGP) is an important theory to consider when designing behavioral health interventions that address issues that adversely affect women. The TGP is a social structural theory that addresses the wider social and environmental issues surrounding women, in the distribution of power and authority, affective influences, and gender-specific norms within heterosexual relationships. The theory was developed by Robert Connell in 1987 and has three constructs: sexual division of labor, sexual division of power, and the structure of cathexis. The TGP has been used in public health research to examine risk factors, also known as acquired risks, as they relate to women's health. It has also been used in earlier studies to analyze gender-based inequalities and disparities that affect women's choices and decisions in sexual relationships. In this paper, the theory is used to explain the division of labor, power, and sexual relationships between male and female fishers in fishing communities, and the implications for the risk of HIV infection. The three constructs of the TGP operate at both the societal and institutional levels, and identify conditions that expose women to HIV risk at both levels. At the societal level, in terms of the sexual division of labor, males and females are assigned gender-specific occupations where females usually find themselves in low-paying positions. At the institutional level, females are often assigned to do work usually described as "women's work", with lower income compared to that of men. This is how most fishing economies are structured, where males engage in actual fishing and have control of fish, and females engage in post-harvest activities such as smoking, drying, and marketing (Mbenga, 1999; FAO, 2016).

There is, however, evidence that women also wield power in the fisheries (Overa, 2003; De Silva, 2011). For example, earlier works in some fishing communities in Ghana indicate that women have significant control within the post-harvest domains such as setting prices. Evidence also abounds where women are financiers of many fishing expeditions, own canoes, and even hire men to fish for them. Through their provision of capital, ownership of canoes, and control of fish pricing, some women secure their supply of fish and wield a lot of power (Overa, 1993, 2003). Regardless of gender-role differences, both women and men play dominant roles in the value chain (De Silva, 2011). Notwithstanding the power some women wield, the fisheries literature generally indicates that most female fishers are engaged in the lower levels of the fisheries value chain and have less access to fish resources and income compared to men (De Silva, 2011). Wingood and DiClemente

(2000) argue that the sexual division of power at the institutional level is maintained by abuse of power, authority, and control in the hands of men. Such is the case in FFS relations, which allows men to use their control over fish to exploit women engaged in petty fish trading for sex (Kwena et al., 2013). Kwena et al. (2013) and Mojola (2011) also adduce low condom use in fishing communities to the division of power, which usually occurs because women have very little say in negotiating for protected sex in FFS. Pitpitan et al. (2012) report that many fish traders are afraid to discuss condoms with male partners for fear of being denied access to fish.

The third construct refers to the structure of cathexis. Connell (1987) used this term to describe the constraints in people's emotional attachments to each other. At the institutional level, social norms and affective attachments are maintained by social mechanisms such as socio-cultural biases, which allow the ascription or references of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' to certain jobs and positions. For example, in the fishing communities, the actual work of catching fish is a preserve for males because that is what society accepts and this tends to discourage women (Odotei, 1990; De Silva, 2011). Hitomi (2009) notes that socio-cultural beliefs limit women's participation in actual fishing, citing the example of South Asian fishing communities, where it is believed that women onboard a fishing expedition brings bad luck. The Fante and Ewe fishers in Ghana also hold the belief that a woman in her menstrual period on a fishing expedition could lead to a bad fish catch or the capsizing of the expedition boat, putting lives at risk (Kyei-Gyamfi, 2019). These cultural beliefs affect women's participation in fishing to men's advantage. In sum, the three constructs of the theory explain the gender division of labor, power dynamics, and sexual behaviors between male and female fishers in fishing destinations.

METHODS

This paper presents findings from the initial study that set out to establish a relationship between the mobility of fishers and HIV infection risks. This cross-sectional study employed convergent parallel mixed research methods for data collection and analysis and was conducted among artisanal fishers in the fishing community of Elmina in Ghana (see Figure 1). The choice of qualitative methods allowed for an in-depth interpretation of mobility and sexual experiences of fishers, while the quantitative method examined relationships between independent and dependent variables in the analysis. The study combined a survey, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and observation for collecting primary data. The population comprised artisanal marine water fishers aged 18 and above engaged in any form of fishing activity and included actual fishers, fish porters, boat (canoe) repairers, fishing gear sellers, and fish traders.

Due to budget constraints, the time needed to administer questionnaires, and the unknown population size of fishers in the study area, the researcher derived the sample size by computing the minimum sample size required for accuracy in estimating proportions. The author reached an estimated sample size of 385

respondents for the survey.

Figure 1 Map of the study area in KEEA Municipality



Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017

The study used purposive sampling in the selection of 30 key subjects for the KIIs. Participants of the KIIs comprised key officials of the KEEA Municipality, and community opinion leaders. The purpose of conducting the KIIs was to explore their views on fishing activity and issues related to the sexual behaviors of fishers. The researcher held two separate FGDs with female and male fishers, with 10 participants in each group. At the landing beach, the researcher made several visits for physical observation of the settlement patterns, state of social infrastructure, mode of economic activities, and living arrangements of the fishers in Elmina. The researcher organized and analyzed the qualitative data gathered during the interviews and FGDs through a five-stage process, using a thematic approach. The study includes narrative descriptions to explain relationships in the data presented, with selected quotations by subjects in the FGDs and KIIs to enrich the analysis.

Regarding the quantitative analysis, the study used both descriptive (frequencies, percentages) and inferential (chi-square test) statistics. The researcher did bivariate analysis by way of cross-tabulation between variables of interest to determine the association between independent and dependent variables.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Socio-demographic characteristics of fishers

The researcher examined the socio-demographic characteristics of the 385 fishers who participated in the study with respect to age, sex, marital status, level of education, religion, mobility status, and type of fishing occupation engaged in, as illustrated in Table 1. More than half (51.4 percent) of the participants were female, while the remaining 48.6 percent constituted males. The large majority of female fishers in the current study indicates active participation of females in fishing, hitherto described as a male-dominated endeavor. In terms of age, Table 1 also shows that participants aged 34–44 constituted the highest percentage (29.9 percent), followed by the 25–34 age group (24.2 percent) and <25 age group (22.3 percent). Respondents aged 65 years and above constituted the least (3.6 percent). The data presented in Table 1 further indicate that fishers below the age of 35 represented 76.4 percent of the respondents. This suggests higher engagement of younger people in the fishing activity in the study area, corroborating earlier works which describe the fisheries sector as an area attracting younger and stronger individuals with the capacity to do physically demanding tasks (Caldwell et al., 1997). Table 1 also indicates that 54.3 percent of the study participants were mobile fishers,[1] while 45.7 percent were non-mobile.

The data in Table 1 further indicate that 53.8 percent of respondents had Middle/Junior High School education, almost a third of respondents had no education, and 12.7 percent had secondary/vocational school and higher education. The results show a high illiteracy rate among fishers in the study area. This was to be expected as some studies undertaken on artisanal marine fishers have shown high illiteracy rates among fishers (Duwal et al., 2015). The majority of respondents were Christians (82.1 percent), and regarding marital status, 46.8 percent reported being married, while 53.2 percent were not in any form of marital union. From Table 1, it is evident that the fishers who engaged in post-harvest activities constituted the highest number (38.7 percent), followed by those engaged in actual fishing (25.5 percent), fish porters (21.6 percent), and boat (canoe) repair and maintenance workers (14.3 percent).

1 Fishers reporting to have traveled from Elmina to other fishing communities to engage in any fishing activity in the last 12 months before the study.

Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Sex	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Male	187	48.6
Female	198	51.4
Age		
<25	86	22.3
25-34	93	24.2
35-44	115	29.9
45-54	50	13.0
55-64	27	7.0
65+	14	3.6
Mobility Status		
Mobile Fisher	209	54.3
Non-Mobile Fisher	176	45.7
Education		
No Education	129	33.5
Middle/JHS education	207	53.8
Secondary/vocational and higher	49	12.7
Religion		
Islam	21	5.5
African Traditionalist	19	4.9
No religion	29	7.5
Christianity	316	82.1
Marital Status		
Never married	112	29.1
Cohabiting/Informal/Consensual	34	8.8
Married	180	46.8
Divorced/separated/widowed	59	15.3
Type of fishing occupation		
Fish Catch Group	98	25.5
Post-harvest Group	149	38.7
Maintenance and Repair Group	55	14.3
Porters and Errand Group	83	21.6

Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017.

Elmina fishing activity and the engagement of women

The roles in the fishing activities in Elmina are sharply divided, with men dominant in the areas of actual catching of fish, boat repair/maintenance and sale of fishing gear, and fish porterage, with women dominant in the post-harvest activities, as seen in Table 2. 'Actual fishing' refers to the fishers who go out to sea on fishing canoes/boats to catch the fish. In an interview with the Regional/District Fisheries Officer, he indicated that there is no record of any woman going to fish in the sea in Elmina. Actual fishing is exclusive to males, as the study results confirm in Table 2. In an earlier study on gender and traditional authority in the artisanal marine industry in Ghana, Odotei (1990) describes the sea as an entity that is recognized as a god

who abhors uncleanliness. Participants in the male FGD reported that women are perceived to be unclean during menstruation and cannot go near the god of the sea and fish in that state. The fishers in the community hold the belief that women carry a lot of bad luck during their menstrual period and may be displeasing to the sea god, who might show his wrath with a poor fish catch or capsizing an expedition boat (Kyei-Gyamfi, 2019). The perception of women causing bad luck at sea demotivates their engagement, as noted by Hitomi (2009). It is important to note that the lack of engagement by women in actual fishing does not in any way place all-female fishers at a disadvantage in terms of fish supplies. The women also have power and control over retailing and fish pricing, which give them significant power within the post-harvest space (Overa, 1993).

Table 2: Type of fishing activity engaged in among respondents by Sex

Response	**Type of fishing activity engaged in**							
	Actual fishing		**Post-harvest activity (processing, marketing, storage, transportation etc.)**		**Boat repair/ maintenance and sale of fishing gears etc.**		**Fish porters (mending of nets, carrying, errands etc.)**	
Sex	Engaged	Not engaed	Engaged	Not engaged	Engaged	Not engaged	Engaged	Not engaged
Male	52.4	47.6	4.8	95.2	18.2	81.8	24.6	75.4
Female	0.0	100	70.7	29.3	10.6	89.4	18.7	81.3
P-Value							0.000	

Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017.

According to the study results, post-harvest fishing activity in Elmina is a female-dominated area. Table 2 shows 70.7 percent engagement of females compared to only 4.8 percent of males. The post-harvest activities relate to a variety of activities by women, such as processing of the fish through drying, smoking, and frying. It also involves marketing, where the fish traders either buy or sell the fish on a retail basis. The post-harvest also includes storage and transportation, which is dominated by large-scale female fish traders referred to as fishmongers. According to some fishmongers interviewed, many of them acquire their trading capital through loans, which are accessed from rural banks and savings/loans companies. Since they have access to capital, they serve as financiers of many fishing expeditions and also buy portions of fish from fishers who work on the canoes. In an interview with one fishmonger, she expressed the following:

> Most of the fishing trips are financed by women who provide money for fuel, food, and maintenance of boats and nets. Most of us pre-finance the fish expeditions to secure access to the catch from the fishers on the canoes. Some of our women even own canoes/boats and engage male fishers as the crew of their boats. They always have money with them and buy fish from the fishers who work on the canoes.

The statement above indicates the power that some women wield over fish supplies, either because of their access to capital, investments in expeditions, or ownership of fishing boats, corroborating the findings of earlier studies (Overa, 1993, 2003; Quagrainie and Chu, 2019; USAID/SFMP, 2020).

In the female FGD, participants also reported that just as women are not encouraged to catch fish, the men are also not encouraged to engage in post-harvest activities, which are the preserve of women. The following was expressed by a participant:

> In Elmina, women don't go fishing. Only our men are permitted to go. So, we also have taken over post-harvest activities, which are usually regarded as female activities. When a man smokes fish or fries fish, people in the community will refer to him as Kojo basia (a male who behaves like a female). Owing to this, many of our men are not even interested in processing, and marketing.

The observation expressed above accounts for the predominance of men in the actual catching of fish and of women in post-harvest fishing activities. It further clarifies the structure of the division of labor in the fishing economy of Elmina and the players within it, as documented earlier by Britwum (2009). The description of the post-harvest roles as a female enterprise is a common community perception, which demotivates males to accept certain post-harvest roles, in order not to be branded Kojo basia. The feminine ascription attached to post-harvest fishing activities also affords women considerable influence in fisheries governance as their roles make them the primary processors and marketers of the bulk of the harvested fish (Overa, 2003; Britwum, 2009; Quagrainie and Chu, 2019). Though the prevailing narratives in the fisheries literature have described post-harvest activities as the domain of women, there is evidence that seems to suggest that the situation is changing as a few males now engage in post-harvest fishing activities (Overa, 2007; Quagrainie and Chu, 2019; USAID/SFMP, 2020).

Overa (2007) notes that the meager formal job market in Ghana forces men to cross gender barriers and enter domains described as female-dominated. The statement above confirms that the changing dynamics have also affected the fisheries job market.

The boat repair and sale of fishing gear also has a higher percentage engagement of males (18.2 percent) compared to females (10.6 percent), as seen in Table 2. Although the sale of fishing gear has significant participation of females, the fisheries literature describes the aspects of boat repair/maintenance as dominated by aged male fishers (FAO, 2006; Kyei-Gyamfi, 2019). Participants in the FGDs indicated that older male fishers do boat repair or maintenance work because it requires experience, expertise, and less physical strength.

The fish porters are young males and females who carry fish from the canoes/

boats at the landing sites to the markets. The FGDs revealed that the work of the fish porters is laborious and requires extreme physical ability to carry it out. This may explain the engagement of more males than females in this area (see Table 2).

Fish-for-sex in Elmina

Earlier studies have described FFS as a transactional sexual relationship between male and female fishers as a part of the local fish trade economy in which fish is traded for sex (Kissling et al., 2005; Béné and Merten, 2008; Mojola, 2011). Participants who reported engaging in FFS were asked if they had engaged in the practice in the previous 12 months. As shown in Table 3, a proportion of 13.9 percent affirmed.

Table 3: FFS in the last 12 months by sex, age, mobility status, marital status and type of fishing activity

Background Characteristics	**Respondents who engaged in FFS**		
	N	**Percent**	**P-value**
Sex			**0.000**
Male	31	24.8	
Female	6	4.3	
Age			**0.000**
<25	20	32.8	
25-34	10	15.9	
35-44	6	7.1	
45-54	1	3.0	
55-64	0	0.0	
65+	0	0.0	
Mobility Status			**0.024**
Mobile Fisher	28	17.7	
Non-Mobile Fisher	9	7.8	
Marital Status			**0.001**
Never married	22	27.8	
Cohabiting/Informal/Consensual	2	11.1	
Married	10	7.4	
Divorced/separated/widowed	3	12.3	
Type of fishing occupation			**0.000**
Fish Catch Group	16	23.9	
Post-harvest Group	3	2.9	
Maintenance and Repair Group	3	7.5	
Porters and Errand Group	15	27.8	
Total	37	13.9	

Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017

Higher engagement is reported among males (24.8 percent) than in females (4.3 percent), confirming earlier findings (see for example, Idowu et al., 2012). The result of the engagement in FFS needs to be interpreted with caution. The FGDs revealed that male fishers were more outspoken in sharing their FFS experiences than female fishers. This was to be expected because according to Kwankye et al. (2007) and Kyei-Gyamfi (2019), in Ghana, it is easier for males to openly discuss personal sexual experiences than for females. Adiku (2017) also notes that women in Ghana hardly talk about their sexual issues with strangers. Based on these earlier findings, it is, therefore, possible that some of the female respondents who reported not engaging in FFS may have engaged in it but were shy in disclosing their engagement. It can also not be ruled out that the males may have exaggerated their engagement as a way of bragging about their FFS exploits.

In terms of age, respondents who reported engaging in FFS were younger fishers. Table 3 shows a statistically significant association ($P<0.000$) between age and engagement in FFS, with higher engagement being recorded among respondents younger than 25 years (32.8 percent) and those in the 25–34 years age group (15.9 percent). This finding confirms the findings of Idowu et al. (2012), who found that younger fishers are more prone to engaging in FFS. Participants in the female FGD reported that FFS occurs among a few young unmarried fishers. This was corroborated in a KII with the Fish Queen, who affirmed it as follows:

> These days it is not easy for fishers to make a good catch, and for an entire crew to give away their fish for sex, is impossible. If any of them would use their portion of fish for sex, then it may be the young boys on the boats.

During the interview with the Chief fisherman, he also indicated that FFS is common among younger fishers who work on canoes:

> Most of the young male fishers on my boat engage in all kinds of risky behaviors, including sexual encounters with fish traders. Since they don't have money to have fun, they use part of their portion of the fish catch I give them at the end of a fish trip to indulge in alcoholism and sex.

This statement suggests that in Elmina, FFS occurs among younger fishers, suggesting that being young influences one's quest to engage in risky sexual behavior such as FFS (Duwal et al., 2015). From the narratives, it is evident that younger fishers are more exposed to HIV risk through their sexual behavior in the fishing destinations.

The results further show that engagement in FFS is common among mobile fishers,[2] and this is also affirmed in Table 3, where a higher rate of engagement (17.7 percent) was reported among mobile fishers than the non-mobile fishers (7.8

2 A mobile fisher is any respondent who traveled outside of Elmina (point of origin) to engage in any fishing-related activity in any other fishing community during the 12 months preceding the study.

percent). The FGDs revealed that it is common to find mobile female fishers engage in FFS because their identities are usually unknown in other fishing destinations, and they are less likely to be found out even if they engaged in it. One participant in the female FGD explained:

> I have heard that some women from other communities exchange sex for fish when they come here but I doubt if the local women can do the same. If community members hear that a local woman engages in FFS, she will be branded as a prostitute.

Another participant indicated that he has engaged in FFS relationships for several years and has never had sex with a woman domiciled in Elmina:

> None of the women I have had sex with lives in Elmina. Many of my partners are from other towns. I believe the local women do not engage in FFS because of fear of local gossip.

The above statements indicate that mobile female fishers are more likely to report FFS engagement than non-mobile ones. Conversely, female fishers who are domiciled at the fishing destination may be branded as prostitutes if they were found to be engaging in FFS, which is not the same case as mobile fishers whose identities are not known. The current finding conforms to earlier studies that documented higher FFS engagement among mobile fishers (see for example, Skeldon, 2000; Mojola, 2011).

In chi-square analysis, marital status and engagement in FFS are significantly associated ($P<0.001$), with higher engagement observed among respondents who were never married. Participants of the FGDs reported that the higher engagement could be because of the involvement of migrant fishers on the boats, most of whom were unmarried. One participant in the male FGD said:

> Most of the men on the boats have wives and give them their fish portion. Those who give their fish to other women in exchange for sex are the young unmarried fishers.

The likelihood of unmarried fishers engaging in FFS was emphasized in the following statement by another participant in the male FGD:

> The unmarried fishing crew hold no allegiance to anyone. They neither have marital commitments nor wives to hold them in check and are always free to decide on what to do with their fish. This accounts for some of them exchanging their fish for sex.

This finding of unmarried men having a higher involvement in FFS is not unique

to this study. The current results conform to earlier studies that found risky sexual behavior among unmarried fishers at fishing destination points (see Zafar et al., 2014; Duwal et al., 2015).

The chi-square test indicates a significant association between type of fishing activity and engagement in FFS (P<0.000). Based on the type of fishing activity, engagement in FFS was found to be highest amongst actual fishers and those engaged in the porterage of fish, but the lowest among respondents engaged in post-harvest activities, which are dominated by females. This was to be expected due to the high composition of males and young people in the first two categories.

Though the result shows a 13.9 percent rate of engagement in FFS, it is quite high considering the risk involved in this practice, and earlier findings of fishers consistently not using condoms in casual sexual encounters (Kwena et al., 2013).

Factors accounting for FFS

In Elmina and the other immediate fishing destinations (see Figure 2), the crew on fishing boats are not paid cash at the end of a fishing expedition but receive portions of fish as payment (wage). The KII with the Chief fisherman revealed that many of the fishing expeditions are not financed by boat owners, but by other financiers, some of whom are large-scale female fish traders (fishmongers). The fishmongers usually prefinance the fish trips to secure fish supplies from the catch. At the end of a fishing expedition, the crew has to account to the financiers for the fish catch and pay the cost of the trip. After counting all the fish, the financier is given an amount of fish that covers the cost of investment. When that is settled, the boat owners are then given their portion, and the remainder is shared among the rest of the crew. The portion given to the crew is what is referred to as edzidzinam. After receiving their portions of the fish, it is up to the fisher to decide to whom to give their fish to sell. The married fishers usually give their fish to their spouses and the unmarried ones to their girlfriends or local contact fish traders. Incidentally, most of the local contact fish traders (most of whom are female petty traders) are not able to make outright payment for the fish, so the male fishers give it to them on a credit basis, for payment on an agreed future date. This initially starts as some sort of business arrangement but may later turn into a sexual relationship if the fish traders default on their payments.

Figure 2: Map showing immediate fishing destinations



Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017

Several reasons account for the FFS in the study area. Participants in the male FGD reported that most men engage in FFS for sexual gratification, and they do so by exploiting women who owed them money. One participant who claimed to have engaged in FFS corroborated it in the following statement:

> The woman I had sex with owed me money for fish I gave her to sell. We agreed to defray some of the cost by having sex with her. Since then, anytime she defaults on payment, she offers sex in return.

In the male FGD, a participant indicated that there are instances where some male fishers refuse to give out fish even when the fish trader has money to buy some outright. He explained:

> Some of the fishermen are very bad. During lean fishing periods when fish is hard to come by, they use their fish to get women to have sex with them. These fishermen only give their fish to traders who will agree to have sex with them before giving out the fish.

It was also reported in the female FGD that there are young female fish traders in the community who have little or no capital to sustain their fish trade. Such women are the targets of some fishers who lure them under the guise of doing them a favor by giving them the fish at reduced prices or on a credit basis. When these women default on their payment, the fishers ask for sex to defray or settle payment because they know the women have no means of settling the debts. This finding indicates how some male fishers exploit female fishers through the supply of fish. It also depicts how some female petty fish traders were pushed into FFS due to their inability to either settle their debts or secure capital for their fish trade. This finding corroborates earlier research, which notes that FFS occurs when fish traders are unable to secure capital or supply of fish on credit from fishermen (Kissling et al., 2005; FAO, 2006; Lungu and Hüsken, 2010; Idowu et al., 2012).

The highly gendered roles within the fishing labor and activity chain offer some advantages to both men and women in terms of income (De Silva, 2011). For example, the trader power of fish pricing in post-harvest activities often resides with women, granting them a considerable advantage in terms of earnings (Britwum, 2009). The men, on the other hand, have a competitive advantage over women as some of their areas of engagement in the fisheries value chain also generate better income than their female counterparts. For instance, the actual harvesting of fish, and the maintenance/repair works are all dominated by men. With regards to the sale of fishing gear, it was also observed that though women participated, the larger wholesale fishing gear shops around the fishing harbor in Elmina were all owned by males, and the smaller retail shops were owned by females. It was also gathered from the KII with a Fisheries official that except for a few elderly large-scale fish traders who can secure loans for their business capital, the majority of the female petty fish traders lack capital for their fishing trade. Due to the lack of an adequate and reliable source of capital, many women who were engaged in petty fish trading tend to borrow from friends and relatives. However, the amount they can mobilize is usually meager to serve as trading capital.

In sum, compared to women, the male fishers (though not exclusive) in the study area have better sources of income since their areas of engagement yield better income. Though some large-scale female fish traders wield power and have control over fish supplies and pricing, the situation is not the same for the vast majority of the women engaged in petty trading who have no access to capital and depend on the male fishers for fish. In effect, some women engage in FFS because they have very limited sources of income and can hardly raise capital for their fish trade, so relying on their male counterparts seems the easiest and most convenient source of raising capital.

Fish-for-sex as risky sexual behavior

FFS is risky because it is done under unprotected circumstances with less condom usage (Kwena et al., 2013; Kyei-Gyamfi, 2019). Concerning condom usage in

FFS practices, Table 4 shows that 67.6 percent of the respondents who reported engagement in FFS in the last 12 months did not use a condom, with non-use of condoms being higher in males than in females.

Table 4: Respondents who used condoms with FFS partners and reasons for non-use of condoms by Sex

Response	**Sex**		**Total (percent)**
	Male (percent)	**Female (per cent)**	
Used condom	30.0	42.9	32.4
Did not use condom	70.0	57.1	67.6
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	30	7	37
Reasons for non-use			
Condom reduces sexual pleasure	18.2	25.0	19.2
My partner does not like to use condoms	4.5	25.0	7.7
Trust partner not to be promiscuous and didn't think it was necessary to use a condom	72.7	50.0	69.2
Condom not available	4.5	0.0	3.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	30	7	37

Source: Fieldwork, July-August 2017

When asked to explain the reason for the non-use of condoms, the majority (69.2 percent) said they trusted their partner not to be promiscuous. In the male FGD, some participants explained that most FFS partners they have had sexual relations with are women they trust to be decent and disease-free. One participant in the group who engaged in FFS explained:

> I don't use a condom with my FFS partner because I trust her. A lot of our FFS women refuse condoms during sex because they perceive that condoms are only for prostitutes.

The current results corroborate earlier work by Cassels et al. (2013) that mentions the non-use or inconsistent use of condoms in FFS because partners claim to trust each other. The other reasons mentioned were that condoms reduce the pleasure of sex (19.2 percent), refusal due to dislike of condoms by partner (7.7 percent), and unavailability of condoms at the time of the sexual act (3.8 percent).

The inability of female fishers to negotiate for the use of condoms even when their male FFS counterparts are not interested, also makes sexual relations risky to HIV infection exposure. The FGDs revealed that many women who fall victim to FFS do so because of the expectation of getting fish. As a result, they are unable to

deny the male fishers who solicit unprotected sex, for fear of losing the supply of fish. One participant who claimed to have engaged in FFS without the use of a condom corroborated this when she made the following statement:

> The male fishers in this community don't like using condoms. Even when you ask for it, they object angrily and sometimes threaten to leave you for another trader.

The reasons offered by females in their FGD were similar to those of the males. For instance, one male FGD participant said:

> I don't like using condoms and so I avoid women who require the use of a condom during sex. If my partner insists on the use of a condom, I always object, and if she is still persistent, I leave her for a partner who is willing to have sex without a condom. It is as simple as ABC.

The above statements indicate how female fishers find it challenging to negotiate condom use in FFS encounters. It also depicts how some female fish traders are pushed into having unprotected sex out of desperation for fish.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This paper has shown that fishing activity roles in Elmina are sharply divided, with men dominating the aspects related to actual fishing, boat repair/maintenance, sale of fishing gear, and fish porterage. The women, on the other hand, dominate the post-harvest activities. The division of labor is associated with social norms of tagging maleness and femaleness to certain roles within the fisheries value chain as the structure of cathexis espouses in the TGP. Whereas the females do not engage in actual fishing due to socio-cultural norms and beliefs, the males are also discouraged from engaging in post-harvest activities, for fear of being labeled 'female'. Incidentally, Overa (2007) indicates that the lack of opportunities in the job market compels both men and women to cross gender barriers to engage in activities traditionally labeled as either female or male domains. This is an indication that the labeling of certain roles, occupations, and activities as masculine and feminine domains may be changing.

In fishing communities, fish is the most important resource every fisher strives to have, and so the one who owns the fish has the power to dictate. In line with the TGP's structure of cathexis, FFS thrives on gender inequality within the fishing communities, as it allows men more access and control over fish than their female counterparts. Additionally, FFS constitutes a high-risk factor for the transmission and spread of HIV among women.

The study found that almost 14 percent of respondents had engaged in FFS in the 12 months preceding the study, and only a little above three in ten FFS respondents

used condoms. The study also found lower condom use among females. From the qualitative results, the low use of condoms stems from the trust FFS partners had for each other, men's objection to condom use, and women's inability to negotiate for its use. The issue of trust stems from ignorance and comes with significant sexual risks as the FFS partners may have other non-regular partners. Again, having unprotected sex with an FFS partner is risky as it exposes both partners to HIV infection. It is problematic and signifies that people in FFS relations, according to the results, do not perceive themselves to be at risk, even when they do not use condoms with their partners.

The vulnerability of female fishers is driven by the economic power vested in male fishers by their control over the supply of fish. Since most women lack capital and depend on their male counterparts, many are pushed into subservience, losing their confidence to insist on condom use when their male counterparts propose not to use them. If women lack capital for their fish trade and depend on men for the supply of fish, the disparities espoused by the TGP will always prevail, and HIV risks will constitute an ever-present phenomenon in fishing destinations.

The results of this study suggest a link between mobility and engagement in FFS. The findings indicate that those female respondents who were mobile during the 12 months preceding the study, engaged in FFS more than those who were non-mobile. This research shows that the identities of female mobile fishers are usually not known in the fishing destination points, thus making it much easier for them to engage in FFS than non-mobile female fishers. The implication is that mobile fish traders are more prone to HIV infection due to their high rate of mobility and low condom use. There is also the possibility of transmitting the virus to their casual partners at the destination points, and to their regular partners back home.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The TGP presented in this paper was intended to analyze and explain the gender-based inequalities that affect choices and decisions in sexual relationships. In this paper, the TGP offered important insights into the prevailing challenges faced by female petty fish traders in carrying out their roles in the fishing community and the fisheries value chain as a whole. The paper concludes that the gendered division of labor exists in fishing activities thriving on socio-cultural norms and power inequalities.

The paper outlined that although actual fish harvesting is carried out by men, their control of fish supplies is not absolute. Women also have many advantages in terms of fish supplies and earnings over the fishermen in some cases. Consequently, the results show that a few large-scale female fish traders wield a considerable amount of power being financiers of fishing trips, and owners of boats. The results indicate that most of the women engaged in petty fish trading are exploited due to their lack of trading capital and resultant dependence on male fishers for fish supplies and trading capital. According to the TGP, the gendered nature of power is maintained

by abuse of power, authority, and control in the hands of men. Such is the case in FFS transactional relations, which allow some men to have control over fish supplies and decide who to sell to, or who to give the fish to.

Furthermore, the results show that women are unable to negotiate safer sex in FFS sexual relations for fear of being denied fish by their partners. In line with the TGP construct on the division of power, FFS transactional sexual exchange is deemed exploitative and likely to elevate HIV infection rates amongst both male and female fishers due to low condom use. In sum, if the female fishers need fish or capital for their fish trade and the male fishers have power and greater control over the fish, women will have very little basis on which to negotiate. There is therefore the need to find ways of putting in place interventions that seek to address how to successfully negotiate safer sex and improve partner norms favorable to consistent condom use in fishing communities.

The TGP provides an explanation regarding how women can protect themselves from the abusive power of their male counterparts in the fishing communities. From the findings, it is evident that without control over fish supplies, male fishers have no leverage to exert power over the female petty traders for sex. The results showed that large-scale fish traders are not exploited because they have access to capital and control over fish supplies. Since the lack of capital is the main motivating factor for the engagement of female petty fish traders in FFS, they should be empowered by granting them trading capital or encouraged to form cooperative associations, which will offer them financial support. If the female petty fish traders are given the means to buy fish, they will not have to exchange sex for fish and expose themselves to HIV infection.

The revelation of low condom use is a risky sexual behavior likely to expose FFS partners to the risk of acquiring sexually transmitted diseases. Special efforts are required from the agencies engaged in HIV education to intensify education on safe sex practices. Emphasis should also be on attitudinal change since education alone may not be enough to address risky sexual behaviors. Ongoing and future programs need to explore ways of supplying free condoms and urging the fishers to consistently use condoms in their sexual exchanges.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Putting this manuscript together would have been impossible without the invaluable contribution of some individuals. The author would like to express special thanks to Professor Delali Margaret Badasu, Professor S.O. Kwankye, Professor Mariama Awumbila, Professor Joseph Teye, Dr. Leander Kandiligi, Dr. Mary Setrana, Dr. Ada Adoley Allotey, Ben Amoh, Daniel Coffie, Michael Abiaw, Joseph Otchere Martey, and Zita Kyei-Gyamfi for the encouragement and guidance in writing the paper. The author is equally grateful for the support and inputs received from the Komenda Edina Eguarfo Municipal Assembly officials during the data collection exercise.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author has no potential conflict of interest to report regarding the contents of the manuscript.

FUNDING

This research received no form of a grant from any funding agency and was solely funded by the author.

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Destination Substitution and Social Networks among Urban Refugees in Kampala, Uganda

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Received 01 March 2022 / Accepted 02 August 2022 / Published 31 August 2022

Abstract

A significant number of refugees and asylum seekers live in Kampala as opposed to the rural settlement areas. However, what is less known is the extent of destination substitution among these refugees and factors associated with changes in destination. Using a survey of 479 refugees from eight nationalities, this study examined the influences of social networks on destination substitution among refugees in Kampala. It found that more than half of the refugees substituted their initially intended destination with Kampala. Refugees with social network ties in Kampala are likely to substitute their preferred destination for Kampala compared to those who do not have social network ties in Kampala. The study contributes to the literature on destination choices and social networks by showing that the refugees have destination preferences, but these preferences can be constrained by prevailing circumstances. Facilitated by social networks with alternative destinations, refugees may substitute their preferred destinations with a proxy destination in cities in neighboring countries.

Keywords: social networks, change, destination, refugees, Kampala

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INTRODUCTION

Over 6% of the refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda live in Kampala and its metropolitan areas (UNHCR, 2020). The majority of the refugees are from the Horn of Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Kampala also hosts a significant number of refugees from Burundi, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Sudan. Moreover, Ugandan laws allow free movement of refugees, implying that refugees can relocate from settlement areas, cities, and rural areas in Uganda to Kampala. However, free movement is possible where one has evidence of self-sufficiency and the prevailing political regime remains favorable to refugees (Republic of Uganda, 2006; Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019). Refugees also cross to Kampala from their first countries of asylum in the neighboring countries. Refugees and asylum seekers are among the main contributors to the urbanization of Kampala (UBOS, 2019). Some of these refugees have lived in a protracted refugee situation in Kampala for over five years (Gusman, 2018). However, many urban refugees face difficulties in securing stable livelihoods, accessing social services, and building trust across communities (Den Boer, 2015; Lyytinen, 2015; AGORA, 2018; Kasozi et al., 2018). The restrictions on movements during the COVID-19 pandemic also aggravated loss of livelihoods among refugees who depend on informal livelihoods (Bukuluki et al., 2020). It is important to investigate destination substitution because this phenomenon will likely add to these already existing challenges affecting refugee response (Buscher, 2012; Monteith and Lwasa, 2017; Ahimbisibwe, 2019). However, the extent of destination substitution and how social networks of the refugees associated with changes in destination plans are less established in Kampala.

To some extent, refugees make preferences about certain destinations according to regulations regarding refugee admissions and socio-economic conditions of destination countries (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016). However, studies on urban refugees in Africa have shown that refugees' motivations change as they live their experiences of displacement where refugees imagine settling elsewhere other than the current city (Landau, 2006; 2021). Whereas socio-political factors may compel migrants and refugees to move to some cities in Africa, their mooring in such cities may owe to their inability to move onwards due to changes in management of migration flows (Fusari, 2018). Some cities may also be chosen as intermediate destinations when the ultimate destination is perceived to be more accessible through such intermediate cities (Shaffer et al., 2018). External and internal restrictions regarding refugee movements may result in refugees getting stuck or stranded in certain places (Snel et al., 2021). Currently, only 1% of the refugees can get resettlement to third countries through official channels (Hansen, 2018: 137). Because of the limited third-country resettlement opportunities, refugees who initially intended to relocate to more developed countries may end up getting stuck in intermediate cities (Jacobsen et al., 2014).

The classical approach to migration tends to dichotomize population movement in terms of origin and destination with a neglect of in-between destinations

(Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 2019; Crawley and Jones, 2021; Snel et al., 2021). In destination choices, scholars investigating refugees at the destination look at why refugees choose particular destinations (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; Suzuki, 2020). On the other hand, scholars investigating prospective migrants from their origin inquire about the intentions to migrate to certain destinations (Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011; Sandu, 2017; Ikanda, 2018). Others who use macro-level spatial flows of refugees focus on ties and patterns of flows between two points of origin and destination (Suleimenova et al., 2017; Rüegger and Bohnet, 2018). These approaches may overlook the impacts of migration on intermediate destinations, particularly when migrants get stuck in certain places. This aspect is important for Kampala and other cities in the Global South where refugees conglomerate when attempting to make onward migrations. Refugees who, unintentionally, end up living in such cities might find further difficulties in integration since these cities are not chosen out of desire but because of prevailing circumstances.

For refugees, their decision to leave their home country is circumscribed by the persecution or armed conflict. However, where the conflict takes a gradual deterioration of conditions or flight occurs in stages, the refugee might have some limited aspirations about better destinations (Kunz, 1973). The ability to reach such destinations may depend on a range of factors, including the availability of financial resources, individuals' knowledge and skills, and availability of social capital (De Haas, 2021). Without disregarding other factors such as human and financial capital, the focus of this study is on social networks, which also constitute a source of social capital. Available family members, friends, or relatives at the destination are important because they can support the movement to the destination not only by providing emotional support but also providing information and financial resources to migrate. Migration studies have underlined the importance of social networks in channeling migrants to specific locations and thereby perpetuating migratory flows (Massey et al., 1993; Munshi, 2003; Haug, 2008; Zell and Skop, 2010). Increasingly, the need to extend factors such as social networks in the investigation of forced migration has also been recognized (FitzGerald and Arar, 2018: 810). Some studies have, for instance, shown that social networks can facilitate internal migration of resettled refugees from one city to another (Mossaad et al., 2020). The presence of kinship and friendship ties in cities also encourages and supports the relocation of refugees from camps to urban areas (Rhoden, 2019). Once in the urban areas, these social networks provide support for newly arrived refugees, particularly given the dearth of humanitarian assistance (WRC, 2011). Most of this social capital is linked to the ready availability of co-ethnic or co-nationals in the urban areas (Lyytinen and Kullenberg, 2013). Social ties elsewhere can also be instrumental in identifying alternative routes and transit destinations as the refugees' journey to their desired destinations (Shaffer et al., 2018). In the context of Uganda, it is therefore possible that social networks play a role in rerouting refugees to Kampala when access to destinations with the best options are constrained by immigration policies and

fluctuating security conditions in refugee settlements. This study investigates the effects of social networks in destination substitution among refugees in Kampala.

The definition of a refugee in this study is based on the African Union's (former Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) Convention on Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa, which includes victims of identity-based persecution and generalized violence (AU, 1969). "Urban refugee" here refers to a refugee whose habitual area of residence is a government-designated urban area, as opposed to a camp or settlement (Jacobsen, 2006: 274). De Haas et al.'s (2019: 907) concept of "spatial substitution effect" was used to frame the study. Spatial substitution occurs when migrants are redirected to some destinations with fewer restrictions about migrants of certain characteristics (Czaika and De Haas, 2017). The concept is used not so much in examining the relationships between regional and global restrictions and diversion of refugees, but the extent to which the current place of residence is not the initially targeted destination. Destination substitution is used here in two ways: the first is when refugees prefer to come to Kampala because they could not go to their primary desired destination. The second is when the refugees choose to come through Kampala instead of moving directly to their desired destination as a step to their primary destination.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Migration, refugees, and social networks at global level

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019), by the end of 2018, about 61% of the total refugee population lived in urban areas. Most of these urban refugees reside in the Global South on a protracted basis (Netto et al., 2022). Prolonged conflicts lead to refugees not returning to their home countries, resulting in onward migration to urban areas (IOM, 2019). Refugees sometimes prefer to settle in urban areas because of unstable security in camp areas (UNHCR, 2018). Cities are also the locus for reunification of families and friends, and for accessing remittances from abroad (Verghis and Balasundrum, 2019). Refugees are thus part of a broader processes of urbanization (Hoffstaedter, 2015). Refugees sometimes make preferences about a destination prior to moving to a destination (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016). In addition to financial resources and perceptions about places, one crucial factor that facilitates decisions about subsequent destinations are social networks (Mallett and Hagen-Zanker, 2018).

This study draws on the field of social networks and migration studies to explore how refugees moved to Kampala (Massey et al., 1993). Social networks refer to interpersonal ties of kinship, friendship, community, or organizational memberships that link migrants between their places of origin and destination (Boyd, 1989; Massey et al., 1993). Actors in the social networks, especially at the destination, act as sources of information and social support impacting on migration to a destination (Massey et al., 1993; Munshi, 2003). Information, knowledge, and social support

provided by the actors in the social networks reduce the costs and risks of migration and settlement (Boyd, 1989; Awumbila et al., 2017). Additionally, migrants in the destination areas link non-migrants from places of origin through the "weak ties" to non-migrants and organizations (Granovetter, 1973). These latter actors in the social networks assist in matters pertaining to documentation and advocate for migrants in the destination areas (Keely, 2000; FitzGerald and Arar, 2018).

The role of social networks in explaining the patterns of refugee movement has been recognized in migration studies (FitzGerald and Arar, 2018). Najem and Faour (2018) show that refugees tend to disperse to various destinations along patterns of existing ethnic networks. Social networks ties of family, kinship, ethnic members, and friends link migrants to home, transit, and destination (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018). In addition to financial availability and perceptions about destinations, actors in the social network ties may influence when, where, and how to move (Mallett and Hager-Zanker, 2018; Najem and Faour, 2018). Refugees who migrated to cities and other destinations serve as nodes of social capital and information sources that perpetuate refugee movements to cities (Palmgren, 2014). The likelihood of a refugee living in a camp or city may also be influenced by the presence of family members or relatives in the camp or city (Rhoden, 2018). Social network ties in places of origin, transit and destination are important sources of social support and information about the prevailing policy context in the destination (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015; Fiedler, 2019). Further, weak ties in the social networks can be consolidated through social media that further support information transmission (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). Information obtained from people met at different locations may aid the individual in discovering potential destinations (Bakewell and Jolivet, 2015). Information received from social networks can influence the decisions of refugees because of the trust established within the networks (Carlson et al., 2018; Dekker et al., 2018).

Migration, refugees, and social networks in Africa

In most African countries, the camps or settlements have been used to settle refugees to contain refugees in rural settings (Marfleet, 2007). Despite the camp system of refugee management, a significant number of refugees resided in urban areas long before the UNHCR's policy on refugee protection in urban areas (Jacobsen, 2006). Both micro and macro level factors pertaining to migrants in general and specifically to refugees contribute to flows to cities (Hopkins, 2015). Refugees' movement to cities has been associated with a search for better health care and other social services that are lacking in camps, employment opportunities, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement opportunities (Jacobsen, 2006; Muggah and Abdenur, 2018). More often, movements to urban areas are linked to the harsh socio-economic conditions and unstable security in the settlement and camp areas (Willems, 2005; Hopkins, 2015).

One critical factor that sustains refugees in urban areas are their social

networks (Lyytinen and Kullenberg, 2013). The importance of social networks for refugees grew concomitantly with the urban socio-economic problems that refugees experience and the limited humanitarian support in urban areas (Jacobsen, 2006). Several studies show that refugees in urban areas of Africa rely on their social networks for their livelihoods (see, for example, Landau and Duponchel, 2011; Betts et al., 2018). In Cape Town, relatives and non-relatives were identified as major sources of financial support for business start-ups (Crush and McCordic, 2017). Similarly, in Nairobi fellow refugees are the main sources of social support and finance (Betts et al., 2018). Further, refugee flows in Africa are patterned on existing social networks of co-ethnics (Rüegger and Bohnet, 2018). Among the Somali refugees in South Africa, the narratives shared through migrant networks shaped the refugee's migration decision to South Africa (Shaffer et al., 2018). Similarly, through interactions with kinship networks in the diaspora, Somali refugees in Danghaly camp in Kenya idealize Minnesota (home of Somali-born American politician Ilhan Omar) and the desire to migrate there (Ikanda, 2018).

Migration, refugees, and social networks in Uganda

The settlement system, where refugees are allocated land to regain their livelihoods, is the de facto model Uganda employs for refugee management (Schiltz et al., 2019). Indeed, a limited period of residence in cities, specifically Kampala, is accepted, conditional on proof of self-sufficiency, as determined by Uganda's Refugee Act (Republic of Uganda, 2006). In addition, refugees in UNHCR caseloads for resettlement or special protection needs are permitted to reside in Kampala (Mulumba, 2010). Yet, for a variety of reasons, including those less related to self-sufficiency and special protection needs, refugees choose to settle in Kampala. Some studies have pointed to the lack of information on registration at borders, the need to search for gainful employment, and access to basic services that have contributed to refugee flows to urban areas (Bernstein and Okello, 2007). The lack of security in the settlement areas also account for the migration to Kampala (Mulumba, 2010). The settlement areas also have limited market opportunities, thus contributing to movement to urban areas where market opportunities are available. Over the years, there has been a sustained decline in land size in settlement areas, leading to migration to urban areas (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019). Although some of the refugees move to Kampala without specific intentions, a few others, especially those who have families, had specific plans to move to Kampala (Lyytinen, 2015). There are also cases of mixed motives where some individuals from conflict-affected countries move to Kampala to pursue career opportunities and to attain refugee status (Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019). Despite the attraction to Kampala, a good number of refugees envision onward migration as the only permanent solution to their future (Den Boer, 2015). Hence, a few others move from elsewhere to Kampala with the aim of relocating, usually to developed countries (Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019).

With the limited humanitarian and state assistance in urban areas, many of these refugees turn to their social networks to sustain themselves (WRC, 2011). Existing studies on urban refugees demonstrate how refugees use their social networks to access livelihood opportunities in urban areas – a pattern that is similar elsewhere in Africa (Clark, 2006; Mulumba, 2010; WRC, 2011). Mulumba (2010) found that the Eritreans, Ethiopians, and Somalis use their national-based networks as channels for receiving remittances from family members resettled in other countries. In a similar way, members of the Somali community – especially men – rely on ethnic networks to access employment opportunities and sell their goods to fellow Somalis (WRC, 2011; Buscher, 2012). Further, a few refugees also use their cross-border networks to run their businesses in selling animal products or to access cross-border employment opportunities (WRC, 2011). Although these studies reveal the importance of social networks, the focus on livelihood strategies falls short in explaining the role of social networks in influencing the decisions to move in Kampala.

A few studies in Uganda also explored the role of social networks in destination choices. Rwandan refugees in Uganda, for instance, were not willing to return due to the need to maintain the social ties established during exile (Karooma, 2014). Furthermore, one study among the Somali refugee community shows that the established ethnic ties in Uganda sustained onward movements to Kampala (Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019). This study also shows that the Somalis use their social networks to connect through Kampala to other countries (Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019).

The reviewed literature confirms that the refugees move to Kampala for various motives, including movement to a city with an intention of onward movement, and that social networks play a crucial role for movement and settlement in the city. However, none of these studies adequately discuss the relationships between social networks and destination changes. This study fills this gap by showing how having social ties at a destination may enable refugees to move to some alternative destinations. This study differs from a similar study by employing a cross-sectional survey of broader refugee communities (Iazzolino and Mohamed, 2019). Within regional and global discussions, the study contributes to the case of Uganda where refugees do not only have trajectories of movement to more developed countries but also to the settlement areas within Uganda.

METHODS OF THE STUDY

Study population and sampling strategy

The study is a cross-sectional survey conducted in Kampala, Uganda, between November 2020 and March 2021. The sample was drawn from the urban refugees who were 18 years and older. Respondents were drawn from the Somali, Congolese (DRC), Eritrean, Burundian, Ethiopian, South Sudanese, and Sudanese refugee communities. A nationality was included in the study if it had at least 1,000 refugees

in Kampala as per 2020 refugee statistics. A sample of 500 participants was targeted using Cochrane's method of sample size determination. The study successfully interviewed a total of 479 refugees and asylum seekers.

The researchers employed non-probability sampling strategies due to the hidden or transient nature of the urban refugees (Singh and Clark, 2013; Bozdag and Twose, 2019). The researchers first inquired from refugee community leaders, local authorities, and organizations about the key locations of the selected refugee communities within the city. The researchers then identified places such as bistros, restaurants, internet cafés, shops, refugee centers, and meeting places where refugees congregate. The researchers then invited those who were willing to participate. From the gatherings, participants were then randomly selected using a ballot draw according to the required number. Where there were fewer people than the required number within a gathering, all the participants were interviewed. The participants were then asked where potential participants could be found, and that set up a chain referral process. To cater for some communities such as the Burundians and Congolese who did not have common meeting places, the snowball method was used, commencing usually with a seed.

Study variables and data analysis

Researchers used a pre-coded questionnaire to capture information about the refugees' demographic characteristics, patterns of migration, and social networks. To assess the extent of destination substitution, refugees were asked in the questionnaire whether the respondent had "planned to move to some other destination before coming to Kampala" from their last place of residence, with a "Yes" or "No" response. This question was used as an indicator for the dependent variable for the destination of interest, which is Kampala. Respondents were further asked about the descriptions of the places they had planned to travel to and the reasons why they did not go to the proposed place. They were also asked whether they moved to Kampala directly from their home countries or lived in camps, cities, towns, or rural areas elsewhere in Uganda or another country between leaving their home country and arrival in Kampala. Without disregarding the limitations, those who moved to Kampala directly from their home countries were included in the study because a few individuals might have moved to Kampala directly from their home areas, with the intention of onward migration. Hence, focusing only on cases of secondary movements from settlements or other proximate cities would exclude a few refugees in such category. The indicator used here was retrospectively measured by posing these questions to refugees who were already in Kampala. While this approach may have some limitations in measuring migration intentions, it was deemed a better approach to measure changes in the intention given the lack of longitudinal data that follow up refugee movements to Uganda.

Social networks are the independent variable of interest. The social network indicator was obtained by asking whether the respondent "knew someone who was

either living in, or ever lived in Kampala at the time of migration to Kampala" ("Yes" or "No"). In addition, questions were asked about the number of ties at the destination, nature of relationship, frequency of communication, and support received from the actor. However, these latter variables are not included in the current study because they are outside the domain of the current study. The questionnaire also included questions about the demographic characteristics of the respondents at their previous place of residence. The questionnaire was pre-tested with 10 refugees selected from the different nationalities.

The study used descriptive statistics to present the profiles of the respondents from their previous places of origin, their desired destinations, and the reasons for not moving to the desired destinations. Researchers used a binary logistic regression to assess the effects of social networking on destination substitution. The results were interpreted in odds ratios; an odd ratio greater than one indicates a greater likelihood in destination substitution given a covariate. An odds ratio of less than one indicates a lesser likelihood in destination substitution given a covariate. An odds ratio of one indicates no significant effect of a covariate on substitution of destination. A P-value of 0.05 (or 0.5%) and 95% confidence interval were used to interpret the level of significance of the variables.

The study was conducted under the ethical standards provided by the Human Subject Research Ethics Committee (Non-medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand (H20/04/02), and the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (SS519ES).

RESULTS

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the profiles of the refugees at their last place of residence before Kampala, indicating whether they had planned to settle elsewhere other than Kampala. For over half of the refugees, Kampala is more of a substitute destination than an initially intended final destination. There are also significant differences among these refugees in terms of their nationalities, occupations and the characteristics of the places from which they came to Kampala. In terms of demographic representations, slightly more adults (53.62%) had planned for some other destinations compared to children (42.55%) and youths (53.06%), as expected. However, the difference between adults and youths is marginal. There is also a marginal difference between male and female, although slightly more male respondents (54.07%) reported having planned to move to some other destination compared to female respondents (50.21%). Most of these refugees who had other destinations in mind apart from Kampala were mostly from Eritrea (63.38%), Somalia (63.25%), and South Sudan (61.7%). On the other hand, respondents from the Burundian and the Congolese refugee communities reported the least changes in destination plans as seen in 23.08% and 37.7% respectively.

Regarding the socio-economic backgrounds of the refugees, those who changed their destinations for Kampala were mainly single (53.76%) by the time they left their

previous place of residence. Those who already had tertiary education by the time of arrival in Kampala also had higher representation among those who changed their previously planned destinations (58.5%). Similarly, 57.89% of respondents who came to Kampala as students or who were unemployed also changed their initially preferred destinations. This level is higher than all the other categories of occupational status. Further, 73.1% of the respondents who substituted the initially intended destinations lived in refugee camps or settlement areas before proceeding to Kampala. In contrast, only 44.8% of those who came from urban areas, and 35.94% of those who came from rural areas substituted their intended destinations with Kampala.

Figure 1: Distribution of age, sex and nationality by destination substitution



Source: Authors' fieldwork, 2021

Figure 2: Previous marital status, education, occupation and residential status by destination substitution



Source: Authors' fieldwork, 2021

Figure 3 shows the characteristics of the intended destinations and the reasons for failing to move to such destinations. The sample focused only on those who had planned for alternative destinations. The finding indicates that the majority of refugees in the study reside in Kampala due to failure to reach cities outside Uganda. Over 85% of these refugees had planned to settle in cities or urban areas outside Uganda. Fewer than 10% had planned to settle somewhere else in Uganda before changing their decisions to settle in Kampala. The least-intended destinations were rural areas and camps outside Uganda, represented by 2% each for the two categories. Considering the reasons for moving to Kampala, as opposed to the desired destination, the lack of opportunities for resettlement to third countries was the leading reason (39.6%), followed by the lack of security in the desired destination (34%). Interestingly, only 3.6% of the respondents came to Kampala because of lack of socio-economic opportunities at their desired destinations.

Figure: Preferred destinations and reasons for substituting preferred destination



Source: Authors' fieldwork, 2021

In the final analysis, the effects of social networks on destination substitution were modeled using a binary logistic regression, only reporting the results for the adjusted models. All the first categories in the independent variables were fitted as referent categories. The Likelihood Ratio is significant at Pr.< 0.05, indicating that the model is a good fit. However, the McFadden's Pseudo R2 for the model is 15% indicating that much of the variances in the model were not explained by the predictor variables. The results are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Logistic regression results on the effects of social networks on destination substitution among refugees in Kampala

Planned alternative destination	Odds Ratio	P-value	95% Confidence	Min.
Social ties in Kampala				
No (RC)				
Yes	2.14	0.001	1.37959	3.32694
Sex				
Male (RC)				
Female	1.31	0.238	0.83448	2.06919
Nationality				
Congolese (RC)				
South Sudanese	3.00	0.007	1.35545	6.65295
Somali	3.20	0.000	1.82179	5.60632
Burundian	0.42	0.111	0.14715	1.21768
Eritrean	2.54	0.007	1.28763	5.00494
Rwandese	2.01	0.228	0.64532	6.27987
Ethiopian	0.72	0.594	0.22006	2.37715
Sudanese	0.71	0.609	0.19112	2.6361
Age at migration to Kampala				
Child (RC)				
Youth	1.42	0.326	0.70427	2.87326
Adult	1.72	0.228	0.71172	4.17193
Education at migration to Kampala				
No formal (RC)				
Primary	1.08	0.877	0.42546	2.72015
Secondary/vocational	1.61	0.229	0.74229	3.47818
Tertiary/university	1.82	0.132	0.83513	3.97044
Marital status at migration to Kampala				
Single (RC)				
Married/living with a partner	0.93	0.801	0.50527	1.69446
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.73	0.477	0.31249	1.72265
Occupation at migration to Kampala				
Student/unemployed (RC)				
Employed formal	1.08	0.878	0.39519	2.96276
Self-employed	0.91	0.810	0.42416	1.95443
Unpaid worker	0.51	0.100	0.23101	1.13594
Casual or subsistence farmer	0.93	0.871	0.40971	2.12961
Previous place of residence				
Rural (RC)				
Urban area	1.49	0.217	0.78937	2.83135
Settlement/camp	4.52	0.000	2.24813	9.07188

The social network variable in the model remained a significant predictor of destination substitution at Pr.< 0.05 even after controlling for all the other variables. Respondents with social connections in Kampala are more likely to substitute their desired destinations for Kampala (OR 2.14, Confidence Interval (CI): 1.37959 - 3.32694).

Regarding the control variables, some nationalities and places of residence yielded significant results (Pr.<0.05), while occupation lost its significance in the adjusted model. Two of the nationalities with significant results were Horn of Africa countries, namely Somalia and Eritrea. The Somalis and Eritreans are 3.20 (CI: 1.82179 - 5.60632) and 2.54 (CI: 1.28763 - 5.00494) times more likely to substitute their destinations for Kampala respectively, when compared to Congolese refugees (the referent category). Apart from the two Horn of Africa countries, the South Sudanese, also with significant results (Pr. < 0.05), have 3.00 times (CI: 1.35545 - 6.65295) more likelihood of substituting their intended destinations. Originating from camp or settlement areas, whether or not the camp or settlement is within Uganda, has positive effects on destination changes when compared to those who came from rural areas. Refugees who came to Kampala from settlement or camp areas are 4.52 times more likely to have substituted their preferred destinations for Kampala (CI: 2.24813 - 9.07188).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this study was to investigate the extent to which changes in destination plans have contributed to refugee flows to Kampala, and the influences of social networks in diversion of refugees to Kampala. This study is important, given that a significant number of refugees live in Kampala, yet access to social services, and social integration in the city have, hitherto, remained a challenge (Kasozi et al., 2018; Bukuluki et al., 2020). For instance, the recent restrictions regarding the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the loss of livelihoods of refugees (Bukuluki et al., 2020). Refugees often rely on informal livelihood activities for self-sufficiency (Monteith and Lwasa, 2017). Yet, the difficulties that refugees experience in Kampala are concomitant with the reduced resettlement options to more developed countries (Hansen, 2018). The reduced resettlement options and limited socio-economic opportunities in settlement areas imply that some refugees are likely to substitute Kampala for other destinations, adding to the already existing challenges that refugees experience in Kampala.

The key finding in this study is that social network factors facilitate the rechanneling of refugees to Kampala. Moreover, individuals who had knowledge of someone living in Kampala or who had ever lived in Kampala were more likely to move to the city after having considered going to alternative destinations. The finding thus agrees with previous empirical literature on social network-based patterns of refugee flows (Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016; İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018; Rüegger and Bohnet, 2018). It further confirms that migrants move to specific locations because

social capital, as a component of social networks, is location-specific (Massey et al., 1993). More importantly, knowledge of families, relatives, friends, or acquaintances residing in Kampala contributed to the alteration of the trajectories of the refugees, redirecting them to Kampala (Mallett and Hagen-Zanker, 2018). This is possible, given that refugees who had specific considerations about coming to Kampala, had some families, relatives, or friends prior to their movement to Kampala (Lyytinen, 2017). Individuals with knowledge of Kampala could have advised the refugees to move to Kampala either as an alternative to the desired destination, or as a transit route to access the desired destination. In addition, social networks have been important sources of social support for refugees in urban areas (Lyytinen and Kullenberg, 2013). Hence, the social support provided by the networks in the city compensated for the emotional and psychological stress of pursuing destinations with better socio-economic opportunities but were unattainable. In this sense, social networks play a vital role in the flow of refugees to cities in low-income countries that neighbor refugee-sending countries.

In addition to social networks, the Somali, Eritrean, and South Sudanese refugees are more likely to alter their destinations. Changes in destination among the Somali and the Eritrean refugee communities are not unique to refugees living in Kampala. One study using a threshold approach shows that Somali refugees seeking to resettle in the United States divert to South Africa, hoping the process of resettlement would be easier (Shaffer et al., 2018: 161). Similarly, Eritrean refugees in Milan and Rome did not intend to live in Italy but their objectives were affected by the regulations regarding migrant movements within the European Union (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015). The findings of this study add to the magnitude of this destination alteration previously explored in qualitative studies. The diversion of refugees toward Uganda, and then to Kampala is likely to be motivated by the relatively relaxed regulations regarding freedom of movement, livelihood activities, access to resources, and the perceptions that resettlement is easier once in Uganda compared to the neighboring countries (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019). However, as in the case of the Somalis in South Africa, substitution for Kampala does not necessarily entail ideal conditions or lasting solutions for the refugees (Shaffer et al., 2018). Difficulties regarding employment and access to resources persist once refugees live in the city, further driving the desire to be resettled, which often does not occur. The substituted destination once again becomes temporary and undesirable, perpetuating a dream for onward migration (Shaffer et al., 2018).

Furthermore, refugees originating from refugee settlement areas are more likely to engage in destination substitution than those originating from non-institutionalized refugee hosting areas. This result reflects resettlement to third countries as one of the main reasons why refugees leave camp areas and move to Kampala (Bernstein and Okello, 2007; Mulumba, 2010). The result also confirms the fact that refugees leave their countries without any specific destinations in mind (Lyytinen, 2017: 505). The idea about destination substitution evolves when

refugees cross borders to camps and settlements in Uganda or in the neighboring countries due to security and socio-economic problems in these areas (Betts et al., 2020; Bagonza et al., 2021). The result is as expected, since cases of refugees who applied for resettlement are handled in Kampala (Bernstein and Okello, 2007). The bureaucracies surrounding resettlements, however, result in refugees getting stuck in urban areas, perpetuating a protracted refugee situation.

There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, this study is limited to urban refugees in Kampala. Refugee situations in other urban spaces in Uganda might be different. Kampala's context may also differ from that of other regional cities traversed by refugees. A comparative study of different cities might yield a more generalizable result. Secondly, owing to the nature of urban refugees as a "hidden population", the study employed non-probability sampling strategies. Therefore, the study may not be representative of the characteristics of the entire urban refugee population. Moreover, the small sample size implies that there might be some problems with precision of the sample in this study. Thirdly, participants were asked about their characteristics in previous places of residence when they were already in Kampala. This retrospective approach might result in recall biases and inaccuracy in measuring changes in migration intentions. Future studies can employ a longitudinal approach that follows refugees from their previous places of residence to their destination. Fourthly, there may be some ambiguities regarding the indicators. A "Yes" response to whether a refugee had planned for some alternative destination could imply that the initially preferred destination either is second to Kampala, in case of failure, or at the same level with Kampala. Lastly, the study is a cross-sectional study and therefore causal processes cannot be inferred. Future studies can build on those that can trace causal processes. Qualitative studies can also be used to better understand the mechanisms through which the social networks operate.

Regarding the study's contributions: it addresses a gap in discussions about destination intentions, and destination preferences among refugees in Uganda's context of a settlement system by highlighting the importance of investigating refugee flows to initially unintended destinations. Scholarship on refugees in African cities has shown how refugees sometimes reside in cities that were not intended as final destination. These cities are chosen either out of circumstances that circumscribe refugee movement, or as a strategy to reach some other destinations. This study adds to this body of literature by presenting the case of Kampala in a context where the focus has been on refugee settlements by showing how social networks may redirect refugees to, or through Kampala when refugees find it difficult to access their intended destinations. Moreover, the study provides useful data on refugee movements in countries of first asylum that can be utilized in designing programs for planning refugee assistance. In this sense, the concept of substitution effect was extended to the prevalence in destination changes.

In conclusion, with the protracted refugee situation and limited third-country resettlement options, refugees may be diverted to cities of low-income countries.

Connections through social networks would play a central role in this diversion through encouraging migration to the destination and providing alternative support systems. However, since these cities do not necessarily provide lasting solutions, exploration of further substitute destinations is likely to continue. In the meantime, a burden will also be shifted to these cities in low-income countries as well as social ties providing support in the interim time. The implication of destination substitution is that the protection of urban refugees that focuses on assisting refugees on special cases or the acceptance of refugees on the basis of self-reliance is likely to exclude those who reside in urban areas because of their inability to access their desired destinations – whether that desired destination is a settlement area in Uganda or abroad – thus perpetuating their vulnerabilities. Hence, it is important that the protection of refugees in urban areas should also focus on those who for some reasons cannot reach their intended destinations. Since the substitution of destination is associated with social networks, refugee families and communities could be appropriate channels to use to identify and assist refugees who diverted to Kampala. In addition, alternative pathways to resettlement – such as family reunification – should be expanded for those who cannot move. Lastly, this study opens the possibilities for more exhaustive study on the challenges associated with destination substitution, including long-term impacts of the destination substitution on refugees and host communities. Focusing on destination substitution will contribute to addressing challenges involved with refugee burden-sharing across different countries and locations within a country.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors acknowledge the financial assistance from the Society of Jesus, Eastern Africa province for the field work. The authors also acknowledge the technical support received from the Department of Demography and Population Studies, University of the Witwatersrand. .

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Returnees and the Dilemmas of (Un)sustainable Return and Reintegration in Somalia

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Received 06 June 2022 / Accepted 15 August 2022 / Published 31 August 2022

Abstract

Voluntary return is identified as one of the durable solutions for refugee protection under the international refugee regime. There is limited research on returnees' experiences and aspirations when they return to a home country with a high level of violent conflicts, and with severe lack of safety and stability. This article draws from semi-structured interviews held with Somali returnees who returned through the voluntary repatriation program from Kenya. The article shows the complexity behind their return experience by advancing the discussion on return based on Jørgen Carling's aspiration and ability model. The findings show that for the majority of the returnees, return is not sustainable as they do not return to their homes and as a result are displaced in camps where they face considerable challenges finding employment, decent housing, secure living environment, and educational opportunities for their children. However, their transnational networks in Kenya boost their return aspirations – the majority of the returnees interviewed possess aspirations to re-migrate, but cannot do so due to financial costs and therefore they remain trapped in immobility.

Keywords: Somalia, return and reintegration, UNHCR, voluntary repatriation, capabilities-aspirations, sustainable return

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INTRODUCTION

The collapse of political and economic institutions in Somalia has led to massive forced displacement, leading to Somali refugees and migrants seeking refuge or better economic opportunities in other countries (Haji-Abdi, 2016). The majority of the refugees remain within the region – primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia – but others have moved to their destinations through resettlement programs, or by navigating their way to other countries in search of asylum or onward migration projects (Shaffer et al., 2017).

In the recent phase, Somalia continues to experience intersecting causes of displacement, due to overlapping episodes of conflict, drought, and erratic weather patterns resulting in the internal displacement of 2.9 million Somalis as at January 2021 (UNHCR, 2021a). Furthermore, there is an increase in return migration of Somalis to their home country, both from the East and the Horn of Africa, as well as from Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as at August 2021, 133,166 Somali returnees have been recorded and assisted with the majority of the returnees coming from Kenya through the UNHCR-initiated voluntary repatriation program (VRP) (UNHCR, 2021b). The VRP is based on the Tripartite Agreement between the Government of Kenya, the Federal Government of Somalia, and the UNHCR to oversee the phased voluntary repatriation of 435,000 Somali refugees during the period 2013–2019 (UNHCR, 2015).

Return is increasingly happening to urban areas that are not returnees' areas of origin, as returnees choose not to return to rural areas before peace and security are re-established (REF, 2018). The security situation in Mogadishu and the southern and central areas of Somalia remains unstable. The presence of Al Shabab, which still controls large areas in rural Somalia, has resulted in violent clashes with pro-government forces, the imposition of punitive Sharia law, and heavy taxation of citizens (Indermuehle, 2017). Given the reality that large-scale returns to many parts of Somalia may not be possible due to the challenging context as explained above, it follows that the processes of return and reintegration for the returning refugees present significant policy challenges for the government of Somalia and the international community.

Scholars have illustrated that return itself is often not always a straightforward homecoming and neither does it mean the end of the "refugee cycle"; instead, returnees are faced with numerous challenges upon return (Black and Koser, 1999; Hammond, 1999). Similarly, the main focus of many governments and international organizations dealing with migrants and refugees has been on the return of refugees and migrants, but much less attention has been given to the situation and lives of refugees after return (Arowolo, 2000). Whether the return is sustainable and what contributes to the sustainability of return remain contested. Also, there are gaps in understanding how various processes of return and reintegration influence returnees' aspirations. Drawing from the literature on aspiration, return, and reintegration, this

article aims to advance the theoretical discussions around refugee returns and to contribute to the empirical research on Somali refugees.

The next section presents the theoretical discussion – including an exposition of key concepts – with a focus on the literature on refugee returns, reintegration, and aspirations. This is followed by a brief overview of the return situation in Somalia. The article then outlines the data collection strategy, sampling, and methodology adopted for the analysis. The findings are then presented, following the thematic analysis of the data. The final section presents the discussion and conclusion.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Return of refugees as the preferred durable solutions

Traditionally the three main solutions to refugee crises include: voluntary return to the country of origin, local integration in the country of first asylum, and resettlement to a third country. All three are regarded as durable solutions because they promise an end to refugees' plight and their need for international protection and dependence on humanitarian support (Black and Koser, 1999). Despite its categorization as one of three "durable solutions" by the UNHCR, the return of refugees has not always been a high priority internationally and there has been a shift in emphasis depending on the context. Initially, between the World War II period and the 1980s, the main preferred option by the international community was resettlement, which was extended to refugees from communist countries to meet the ideological interests of the West (Chimni, 1999). Since the end of the Cold War, international attention shifted to the emphasis on the return of refugees as the optimal solution. The UNHCR pronounced the 1990s as the decade of repatriation as a result of the growing refugee challenges in Eastern Europe, Central America, Africa, and Asia and therefore reinforced the belief that repatriation was the best option to end refugee situations (Crisp and Long, 2016).

This study is grounded in two strands of literature: first, is the literature on the concepts of "sustainable return" and "reintegration", and second are the theoretical studies on the aspirations/ability model (Carling, 2002). In academic literature, the concepts of "sustainable return" and "reintegration" are employed to conceptualize the successful return of refugees and failed asylum seekers (Lietaert and Van Gorp, 2019). In outlining the sustainable return, Black and Gent (2006) distinguish between the reintegration of individual returnees into their home societies and the wider impact of return on the community. Within a narrow conceptualization focusing on individual returnees, sustainable return refers to returnees' physical return and stay in their country of origin and thus not re-migrating. In the first seminal study commissioned by the United Kingdom (UK) Home Office on sustainable return, individual sustainability of return is achieved if the "returnees' socio-economic status and fear of violence or persecution is no worse, relative to the population in the place of origin, one year after their return" (Black et al., 2004: 29) The absence of re-

migration is considered by policymakers as removing the international dimension of displacement and thus ending host states' obligations toward a particular group of refugees (Long, 2010).

Various researchers have questioned the validity of using the duration of return migration as an indicator of sustainable return. Based on Carling's aspiration/ability model, which forms the main theoretical framework for this paper, the absence of re-migration could be a result of involuntary immobility where a migrant has the aspiration but not the ability to migrate (Carling, 2002). According to Carling's (2002) aspiration/ability model, migration first involves a wish to migrate, and second, the realization of this wish. The model proposed three mobility categories: mobility (when there is both aspiration and ability to migrate), involuntary immobility (when there is the aspiration but not the ability to migrate), and voluntary immobility (having the ability but not the aspiration to migrate). In addition, Schewel (2015, 2019) added the concept of "acquiescent immobility" to highlight a category of people who prefer to stay but lack the ability to migrate, signaling an acceptance of one's inability to realize initial plans to emigrate.

In other cases, re-migration can be continued mobility that provides essential livelihood opportunities for families (Iaria, 2013; Ochan et al., 2019; Manji, 2020). In his now seminal paper on reconceptualizing return migration, Cassarino (2004) theorizes return migration as a process that requires resource mobilization and preparedness to have a successful return outcome. When forced migration involves protracted situations in refugee camps, refugees' mobilization and preparedness for their return – a key precondition for a successful return – is often hindered.

Alternatively, within the broader conceptualization, successful return and reintegration is considered as a long-term and multidimensional process, often complicated by multiple factors such as time, the context of return, and so on (Lietaert and Kuschminder, 2021). Building on the work of Black et al. (2004), Koser and Kuschminder (2015: 8) define sustainable return as occurring when "the individual has reintegrated into the economic, social and cultural processes of the country of origin and feels that they are in an environment of safety and security upon return." Van Houte (2016) adopts the concept of multidimensional embeddedness as a holistic approach to the post-return experience of migrants beyond "reintegration" or "going home" and highlights the interplay between social, cultural, economic and institutional dimensions. Most importantly, the UNHCR definition of reintegration is "equated with the achievement of a sustainable return – in other words, the ability of returning refugees to secure the political, economic, [legal] and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity" (UNHCR, 2004: 4). In general, five domains of reintegration are included in various studies on reintegration processes: political, economic, legal, social, and cultural (Cassarino, 2008; Kuschminder, 2017; Mohammadi et al., 2018). For purposes of this study, the emphasis is on the social, economic, and psychosocial domains.

Context of migration and return in Somalia

Protracted conflict in Somalia has pushed over 1.5 million Somalis into the diaspora (Shandy, 2016). The majority of the refugees are housed in neighboring countries, mainly Kenya. The economic survey released in July 2021 notes that Somalis accounted for over 54% (272,490) of registered refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya – the majority of whom live in the Dadaab refugee complex (KNBS, 2021). Most of the returnees come from Kenya through the 2013 Tripartite Agreement between the UNHCR and the governments of Kenya and Somalia (UNHCR, 2021b).

The Tripartite Commission adopted a Joint Strategy and Operational Plan, which envisaged a phased voluntary repatriation of "215,000 Somali refugees from Kenya and their reintegration in Somalia over the period July 2015 to December 2019" (UNHCR, 2015: 11). Refugees who are supported to return through the voluntary repatriation process are provided with core relief items and cash travel grants to cover the travel cost by air or road depending on the area of return. Once the refugees arrive in Somalia, they are provided with return and reintegration assistance by the UNHCR together with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in specified areas of return (UNHCR, 2015). Since 2014, 85,171 Somalis have been assisted to return to Somalia from Kenya through a VRP with women and children representing 80% of returnees (UNHCR, 2021b).

Efforts to address refugee issues in Somalia are closely linked to the challenges of responding to internal displacement. Armed conflict and violence, drought, floods, and forced evictions have also resulted in the internal displacement of 2.9 million Somalis as at January 2021 (UNHCR, 2021a). Even though the conflict continues in Somalia, scholars document an alarming trend advocating for return, even forced or involuntary. Garre's (2017) study highlights the experiences of returning refugees from Dadaab camp who reported that even though they were not physically forced to leave, their return to Somalia was involuntary due to factors such as reduction of food rations and mistreatment by Kenya's armed forces. On the other hand, the Research and Evidence Facility (REF, 2018) study found that a substantial number of returnees faced displacement upon arrival in Somalia, hence transitioning from being returning refugees to internally displaced persons (IDPs). The high costs of rent and land in Mogadishu have led some returnees to settle in IDP settlements and around family and clan members who provide support and safety (Menkaus, 2017).

To support the refugees and returning migrants, the Federal Government of Somalia and the international organizations are supporting return and reintegration activities that assist returning migrants in trying to overcome the challenges they face upon return to Somalia. The need for sustainable return and reintegration efforts is articulated in the National Development Plan (NDP), which is intended to guide the application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Forum (CRRF) in Somalia (Federal Government of Somalia, 2020b). The implementation of the CRRF in Somalia is entrenched in the regional process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions adopted

in 2017 (Federal Government of Somalia, 2020a). One of the CRRF objectives is to support the creation of conditions in countries of origin for safe and dignified return. Other goals include easing pressures on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, and expanding access to third-country solutions (UNHCR, 2018: 4).

METHODOLOGY

The data was collected between 2018 and 2020 as part of the researcher's doctoral research conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia and Nairobi, Kenya. Relying on snowball sampling methods through professional and personal networks, the researcher conducted semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 22 returnees. The sensitive subject of return and the security challenges made random sampling difficult to achieve. Returnees were therefore contacted through as many entry points as possible. To achieve this, the research team adopted two strategies: first was the "top-down" approach where the researcher obtained a list of names through the local organizations implementing activities in various research sites; second was through the "bottom-up" approach through the use of research assistants' social networks and with the aid of the camp leaders who also acted as gatekeepers (Frisina, 2018: 189).

The requirements for eligibility included: first, the participant had to have returned a minimum of six months prior to the interview; and second, the participant had to have returned from Kenya through the UNHCR's voluntary repatriation program. The study involved collecting data in the Somali language to allow the returnees to express themselves freely in a language that they could understand (Flick et al., 2017). To overcome the language barrier and take into consideration the power relations around the lines of gender and ethnicity, the researcher recruited two community researchers – one male and one female, to facilitate trust and access. The research team was trained on the interview guide and did a one-day pre-test of the tool.

The age range of participants was between 18 and 53, and 16 participants were women. A third of the participants indicated not having formal education, while others had been educated to a secondary level or underwent religious or vocational training. Half of the participants were married while 10 women participants were divorced or widowed. A broad, open-ended interview guide was used to allow individual perspectives to emerge and for key lines of inquiry to be pursued.

The university Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the research design for this study. The research team explained the principles of research ethics to the gatekeepers to prevent them from inadvertently making returnees feel coerced into participating. All the participants were verbally informed about the research and were made aware that their answers would be confidential, that their participation in the research was voluntary, and that they had the right to stop the interview at any time. The researchers audio-recorded the discussions where this was agreed, and took detailed notes. The research assistants organized and conducted the interviews with the participants and transcribed the data. Given their experience working on

migration issues for several NGOs in Somalia and Kenya, the research assistants had the competence required to conduct the transcription in the Somali language. To ensure the accuracy of transcription, a translator was recruited, who also randomly verified some of the original interview recordings and transcripts.

The research team analyzed the transcripts of interviews with returnees through a combination of inductive and deductive analysis with the aid of MAXQDA software. A codebook was developed with deductive or "theory-driven" codes (Saldaña, 2016). The codebook was further updated with inductive or "data-driven" codes derived from the data. To promote inter-subjectivity, two researchers coded each of the transcripts based on the codebook and compared the codes they assigned to specific segments in the transcripts. In the case of conflicting views, a consensus was reached through discussion and the codes were mutually defined. The qualitative data collection was supplemented with secondary data on the return of refugees to Somalia.

FINDINGS

The findings showed that returning migrants to Somalia faced a challenging context characterized by insecurity, violence, drought, lack of livelihood opportunities and widespread humanitarian needs, which are elaborated below.

Social conditions and insecurity

Few returnees are able to return to the homes they originally left. The majority of those interviewed felt they were abandoned upon return to Somalia and ended up being displaced in camps and left to fend for themselves. Apart from their poor living situations, the participants' main concerns at the time of the interviews were the high cost of rent and land-related issues. The accommodation was inadequate, with some of them housed in temporary shelters in IDP settlements, as reported by these participants:

> It has become hard to cope. First, I was in the settlement but now I can't afford to pay rent; and now I live in a camp [on the] outskirts of Mogadishu. I don't have a house and I live in a plastic sheet house (female returnee_17; 33 years).

> Since I returned, I have been living in a temporary settlement reserved for internally displaced people. My former residence was grabbed by other people and I cannot claim it back. I normally get intimidation from those who grabbed my land (male returnee_3; 53 years).

Women and girls face a high risk of sexual and gender-based violence, especially in camps when moving around using latrines, fetching water or working outside the home. For the respondents, the risk of rape was always lurking, and this hindered

their freedom of movement. The volatile insecure situation in Mogadishu had also led to traumatic experiences for many of the returnees. One female participant lamented:

> I don't feel safe in Somalia; there is always a bomb, gunshots everywhere. I don't move a lot; most of the time I stay in the house with my husband and children and sometimes when I get the opportunities to go and do some housework, I go get my small salary for the day then I come back to my husband … the security is very bad; there are rape cases every time (female returnee_3; 30 years).

Kinship and family play an important role in Somali society and many returnees view their clans as key to their reintegration. When returnees need financial, social, and psychological support, they rely on their kinship and social networks. Some of the participants mentioned leaving some of their family members behind in Dadaab as part of their household strategies to allow them access to opportunities offered in the host country, as related by this returnee:

> I came back with my wife and some of the children. I left my sister behind and some of my children. The reason being is that I wanted them to continue with their schooling as education is more superior in Kenya (male returnee_21; 47 years).

Economic situation

The economic and political deterioration in Somalia has not provided an enabling environment for the reintegration of the refugees repatriated from Kenya. Low investment caused by insecurity has led to high unemployment in Somalia, particularly among returnees with no clan connections. Most returnees cited a lack of job opportunities as a challenge to their reintegration. Food insecurity, lack of access to education for their children, and lack of decent housing are all directly related to economic difficulties. One female returnee recounted her experience:

> My situation is worse. We cannot eat even two meals in a day. I struggle a lot and now I am just a vulnerable mother who cannot afford to send kids to school due to my financial status (female returnee_16; 32 years).

Many interviewed returnees worked in the informal sector doing menial jobs like cleaning, hairdressing, domestic work, street vending, and working in construction sites. Some had applied the skills and training they learned while living in Kenya to find opportunities to earn a living.

Furthermore, some participants pointed out that they had better opportunities for building networks and gaining social capital during their stay in the Dadaab

camp in Kenya than in Somalia. They had access to better education, health systems and other social services in Kenya. However, returnees without a strong clan protection who possess an education and vocational skills were unable to find work and livelihood opportunities to utilize their acquired skills. Access to livelihoods and employment is mediated through connections and clan networks, leaving returnees from the minority groups at a significant disadvantage, as explained by the following respondents:

> I did not find any job at all. Everything is nepotism and connections. I don't think I can even get any work. If you don't know anyone in the office, you would not get any opportunity (male returnee_18; 32 years).

> In Kenya, I had more independence than in Somalia … Some people disrespect you because you have nothing. It makes me feel bad and ashamed. The greatest challenge is not being able to find work. I try my best every day to go outside and look for work and I'm still searching (male returnee_006; 38 years).

Psychosocial challenges and gendered stigma

Different returnees mentioned a lack of a supportive social network, which made them feel isolated and uncared for, or insecure because they did not return to their place of origin and therefore did not have social networks to offer them protection. Some participants mentioned they had no support from wider society or the state and felt stranded because they were in unfamiliar surroundings. According to one respondent:

> Nobody respects you if you don't have money. I feel like I'm nothing since I can't raise money to meet my daily needs. I feel like the world is against me. I want to go back to my hometown in Hiraan right now. I don't have money to leave, but if I get any assistance from anyone, I will migrate to my home town (male returnee_022; 53 years).

For the male returnees unable to find work, due to the challenging context, women are forced to take on domestic work to support their families. As a result, men face gendered stigma because they must relinquish the provider role and become dependants, as articulated by this respondent:

> I didn't have any job; hence, my wife was the breadwinner for the family. In fact, she works for other families as a housemaid to earn a living. And you can understand, the problem is that a mother of six children is working as a maid in people's houses so that she can put food on the table for us. That makes me feel guilty for not performing my duties as a father and a husband (male returnee_05; 47 years).

The findings show that returnees are not a homogenous group. Individual characteristics such as gender, age, family migration history, clan, social status, and educational attainment impact on returnees' reintegration experience.

Re-migration plans

The lack of livelihood opportunities, access to basic services and the inability to access education are some of the factors that have contributed to returnees' aspirations for a further migration plan. Returnees who reported aspirations for re-migration also tended to be jobless with little access to income and lacked clan protection. They often reported feelings of shame and unworthiness within their communities.

The interviewees expressed the need to find a longer-term solution to their displacement by seeking opportunities in the previous host country – in Kenya or other destinations. For some, re-migration was an aspiration but not a possibility due to financial constraints. Other reasons included policy constraints, such as not being recognized as a refugee if they should return to Kenya, as they had already relinquished their status upon signing up for the repatriation program. These returnees lamented:

> The situation is worse [in Somalia] in terms of getting access to livelihood. I don't want to migrate because my ration card was canceled and I wouldn't get assistance. Depending on the current circumstances, if I could see anyone requesting to return to Kenya or any other country, I would encourage them to go and find a better life since the situation here remains worse (female returnee_17; 33 years).

> In case the situation worsens, I might go back to Kenya as don't think I am hoping for the best life in my country … I prefer Kenya because of free education for our children and free distribution of food, free medical services; and Kenya is a peaceful country (female returnee_03; 35 years).

Many of the respondents expressed a desire to re-migrate as a fallback plan due to the challenging context. However, due to their financial constraints, they remained unable to realize their migration project:

> I want to go back to Kenya as it is better there, but I currently cannot afford it. I don't have money to go back to that country. When you have the money, you can travel wherever you want (male returnee_09; 33 years).

On the contrary, respondents who were not interested in re-migration had the support of their family and stronger relationships with their communities. A female returnee explained:

> I am feeling good since I came back. I am now with my people in Somalia, and I have everything since I returned home to be with my family (female returnee_03; 37 years).

DISCUSSION

Within policy contexts, the end of re-migration is one of the main benchmarks of the effectiveness of repatriation programs; returnees are expected to go back home and re-establish their lives, and this is defined as a sustainable return. This article puts forth the argument that the return to Somalia can be understood as a new form of displacement, as returnees have been resettled to areas they have no familiarity with. Returnees' re-migration aspirations are without doubt shaped by an individual's vulnerabilities faced during reintegration. Drawing from Carling's (2002) aspirations and ability model, the study sheds insights into returnees' experiences of immobility. Immobility could result from a preference to stay or an inability to fulfil migration desires. In this case, the desire to re-migrate would constitute a migration aspiration. However, only those with enough resources, or greater migration capabilities, can act upon this aspiration, resulting in either involuntary immobility or re-migration. The study's findings shed light on the socio-economic outcomes of the returnees who, due to the challenging context, have aspirations to re-migrate but are unable, due to financial constraints.

Recent research has shown that returnees who are well off adopted circular migration back to Kenya to access services such as health services and education, which are considered to be of better quality (Ochan et al., 2019). Manji (2020) also found that returnees are going back to Kenya to escape the insecurity, violence, and lack of basic services in Somalia. The case study sheds light on the problem of involuntary immobility in refugee repatriation programs. As Hammond (1999) pointed out, return is not always a straightforward homecoming or end of the displacement cycle. Returnees who can re-migrate and have the economic means, adopt circular mobility as a key livelihood strategy. In contrast, those who stay behind are rendered involuntary immobile due to financial constraints and other personal circumstances despite having aspirations to leave.

Secondly, this paper argues that sustainable return should be viewed as part of a wider process encompassing several dimensions, rather than simply an individual's aspiration to re-migrate or not. Sustainable return and reintegration are longer-term multidimensional processes, often complicated by several factors, including the migration experiences abroad and structural conditions in the country of origin (Koser and Kuschminder, 2015). The findings show that the return context in Somalia is characterized by economic and security challenges and the returned refugees faced several challenges re-establishing their lives and consequently increasing their vulnerability. The lack of decent shelter, job opportunities, and education remain big challenges. These findings corroborate Majidi's (2019) research on Somali women returnees, whose expectations to be economically active were not realized upon

return, and consequently impacted negatively on their psychosocial wellbeing. Even though the Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Government of Kenya and the UNHCR specifies that all returns should be voluntary and take place in safety and dignity, the interviews illuminate a different picture. The majority of the returnees have, instead, been placed in an involuntary immobile situation whereby, respondents have the aspirations to re-migrate due to the challenging context but lack the ability to migrate. Therefore, their experience fundamentally challenges the voluntary repatriation option, which is regarded as a durable solution to end displacement crises. As noted by Crisp and Long (2016), returnees who become internally displaced, who struggle to survive in squatter camps, or who are compelled to move again in another country in pursuit of opportunities, cannot be considered to have found a durable solution to their displacement.

Lastly, in adopting a transnational approach, the return of refugees cannot be viewed as a single linear movement from the host country back home. The findings from Manji's (2020) work show that when faced with economic and security challenges during their return, returnees adopt continued mobility that provides essential livelihood opportunities for their families. This trend reveals that voluntary repatriation "doesn't necessarily mean the end of the displacement, even when accompanied by reintegration" support (Manji, 2020: 7). In addition, the majority of the returnees are not returning to their areas of origin and instead, end up settling in the urban areas. Some of them had previously been living in rural areas, and they do not have land in the urban areas where they now live (Garre, 2017; REF, 2018). Given the gap between the return policy objectives and returnees' experiences, both governments of Kenya and Somalia and the international community should explore pathways to enhance cross-border opportunities for returnees. Return is evidently not a final solution for displacements; instead, it is only a part of migration, within a country and across borders.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATION

This study offers insights into the experiences of Somali refugees recently returned from Kenya through the VRP. It concerns a highly relevant context, as the crisis in Somalia continues to be complex and protracted in the world owing to the armed conflict and insecurity, climate change and environmental degradation, and socio-economic fragility, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and an upsurge in desert locusts leaving many at risk of famine (UNGA, 2021). However, the findings are not representative of all returnees in Somalia and it is based on short-term reintegration experiences that may change over time. There is a need for longitudinal studies on returnees to understand more clearly what influences patterns of reintegration and the broader sustainability of the return process.

CONCLUSION

The literature review in this article identified three core arguments as challenging the return of refugees as a durable solution and contributing to widening the debates on the complexities of sustainable return and reintegration. The article argues that a return to Somalia should be understood as a new form of displacement as returnees have been resettled to areas that are not their places of origin, thus increasing their vulnerability and immobility. From a migration management perspective, a possible definition of sustainability of return is that people remain in their country of origin and do not re-migrate. Drawing from Carling's (2002) aspirations and ability model, the study found that returnees can be "unsustainably returned" and not successfully reintegrated but lack the ability to re-migrate. Therefore, when re-migration aspiration and ability are distinguished, sustainable reintegration cannot be determined by examining whether a returnee re-migrates. Secondly, return to the place of origin – which in many cases has been transformed by war and conflict – without considering the conditions that people have returned to, obscures a whole host of challenges facing people upon their return. This underscores the fact that sustainable return should be seen as a wider process, rather than as simply an individual's aspiration to re-migrate. Lastly, for some returnees, re-migration could be part of continued mobility that provides the essential livelihood opportunities for returning refugees faced with economic and security challenges.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author would like to thank the reviewers for their invaluable insights. The author would like to acknowledge the support of Mr. Omar Yusuf for his assistance in organizing the fieldwork logistics in Mogadishu and to the returnees for sharing their stories. In addition, the author is grateful for the funding support from Mawazo Institute and the Social Science Research Council Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship, with funds provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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ISSN 2410-7972 (online) ISSN 2411-6955 (print).