



Challenges for the Opposition and Democratisation in Tanzania: A View from the Opposition

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Abstract

In the period after 1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken place and has been largely centred around the dismantling of one party-regimes, the termination of a large number of military-led or dominated governments, the embrace of a multiparty political framework, the introduction of an independent media, the restoration of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries concerned and the convening of multi-party elections. This development was so widespread and overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning of Africa's second liberation (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire 2006).

Potential gains to the peoples from the liberalisation of their national political spaces were undermined since the 1980s by the conditions set by outside suppliers of necessary resources, combined with internal challenges in terms of weak institutions, civil society and media as well as lack of a tradition of multi-party democracy and general poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened by the fact that in many African countries the promise which the opposition once represented as the bearer of the hopes and aspirations of the people has substantially faded away. Several factors have contributed to weaken and, in some cases, discredit the opposition in much of Africa's ongoing experience with multiparty politics.

This is a serious development that begs for further investigation; as the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is a major part of a democratic framework. In this study, we will see how the situation in Tanzania has evolved over the past 17 years of multi-party development; based on rather unique interviews with Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, leader of one of Tanzania's major opposition parties.

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Résumé

A partir de 1990, un retour massif à des formes libéralisées de la politique à eu lieu. Ceci a été en grande partie centré autour du démantèlement des régimes de parti unique, de l'élimination d'un grand nombre de gouvernements dirigés ou dominés par des militaires, de l'adoption de cadres de politique multi-partisane, de l'introduction d'une presse indépendante, de la restitution de certaines libertés fondamentales aux populations des pays concernés, et de l'organisation d'élections, multipartites. Ce développement était si répandu et impressionnant qu'il fut perçu par de nombreux observateurs comme le début de la deuxième libération de l'Afrique (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire 2006).

Les gains potentiels que les populations devaient tirer de la libéralisation de leurs espaces politiques nationaux furent sapés depuis les années 1980 par les conditions fixées par des fournisseurs externes des ressources essentielles, mais aussi par les défis intérieurs à l'instar de la faiblesse des institutions, de la société civile et de la presse, ainsi qu'une absence d'une culture de démocratie multi-partisane et d'une pauvreté généralisée. Encore pire, la promesse que l'opposition a jadis représentée dans de nombreux pays africains comme porteuse des espoirs et des aspirations des peuples s'est fortement estompée. Il existe plusieurs facteurs qui ont concouru dans une grande mesure à fragiliser et, dans certains cas, discréditer l'opposition dans l'expérience de politique multi-partisane en cours de l'Afrique.

Ceci est une évolution de grande portée qui doit être examinée plus en profondeur, d'autant plus que le développement d'une opposition saine et vigoureuse constitue une partie majeure d'un cadre démocratique. Nous verrons dans cet article, comment la situation en Tanzanie a évolué au cours des 17 dernières années d'expérience multi-partisane à travers un entretien plutôt unique mené avec Professeur Ibrahim Lipumba, leader d'un des plus importants partis d'opposition en Tanzanie.

Introduction

In the period after 1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken place largely centred around the dismantling of one party-regimes, the termination of a large number of military-led or dominated governments, the embrace of a multiparty political framework, the introduction of an independent media, the restoration of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries concerned and the convening of multi-party elections. This development was so widespread and overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning of Africa's second liberation (Ake 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bratton 1998; Olukoshi 1998; Ake 2000; Bratton 2004). However this development took place at a time of harsh economic conditions for most African countries leading to rescue operations by the international communities, the so-called structural adjustment programmes (SAP). These operations came only into being after certain rigorous conditions for economic and political reform were fulfilled often leading to situations of non-democracies (Melber 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mkandawire 2006).

Potential gains to the peoples from the liberalisation of their national political spaces were thus undermined by the conditions set by outside suppliers of necessary resources, in combination with all the internal challenges in terms of weak institutions, civil society and media as well as lack of a tradition of multi-party democracy and general poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened by the fact that in many African countries the promise which the opposition once represented as the bearer of the hopes and aspirations of the people has substantially faded away (Ottaway 2003; Salih 2003; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In some African countries the democratisation process has even been reversed in recent years, e.g., in Ivory Coast, Uganda to name a few. In others, like Tanzania, semi-authoritarian rule under the umbrella of formal multiparty system persists.

Today, few dispute the need for a well-functioning multi-party system to promote democracy, even if the presence of a formal multi-party system in itself does not guarantee a deep, broad and substantial democracy (Abrahamsen 2000; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Ottaway 2003; Ayers 2006; Törnquist 2006; Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Tar 2009; Zuern 2009). There are several factors which have acted together to weaken and, in some cases, discredit the opposition in much of Africa's ongoing experience with multiparty politics. In a study of the politics of opposition based on a seven-country case-study edited by Adebayo Olukoshi, the following explanations are given for this deterioration:

- Incumbent governments did only very reluctantly concede to the multi-party framework and stopped at nothing to obstruct, weaken, harass and divide the opposition;
- As part of the strategy employed to weaken the opposition, public sector patronage was withdrawn from anyone that was sympathetic to or identified with the opposition, something that was particularly important for the private business sector representatives. This acted to weaken the financial base of the opposition parties and limit their organisational capacity at the same time as the incumbents freely availed themselves of state resources to finance their bids for remaining in power;
- The opposition did not enjoy a level-playing field with the incumbents against whom they contested. Official, publicly-funded media organisations as well as various state organisations, including especially the security services, were deployed against opposition parties and their activists. Incumbents did also take the opportunity to rig elections in spite of the presence of international and local observers;

- The electoral system operated in most African countries, namely the British first-past-the-post, winner-take-all model worked to the detriment of the opposition. The number of seats won was not proportional to the share of the vote;
- In articulating their demands for multi-party politics, many opposition parties were too quick to allow themselves to be hurried by incumbent regimes into elections without first insisting on the implementation of the far-reaching constitutional changes that were necessary for governing post-electoral political activity;
- In several African countries, opposition political activity came to depend heavily on donor/external support for its sustenance (Olukoshi 1998:29-33).

In most theories on democracy, parties, and in particular an effective opposition, are indispensable for democratic consolidation. Ware defines a political party as an institution with two specific characteristics: (i) it seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in the government; and (ii) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, to some degree, attempts to aggregate interest (Ware 1996).

In the theories of multi-party democracy, political parties are supposed to play a number of vital roles for democratic development, including being a political machinery for the aggregation of interest, representation and governance. In a pluralist democracy the opposition parties hold the ruling party accountable. According to Lipset and Lakin, political parties perform three major functions, namely, (i) the communicative function – to channel communication from the state to the public; (ii) the expressive function – to channel communication from the public to the state; and (iii) the integrative function – to channel communications among different groups within civil society (Lipset and Lakin 2004:64ff.).

Political parties in Africa meet a number of challenges, both in terms of internal capacity, outreach, mobilisation and weak institutionalisation and in terms of external constraint in the form of ruling party dominance and prohibitive legislations (Salih 2002; Olukoshi 1998). The mere presence of political parties does not necessarily indicate more democratic forms of governance. The multi-party systems' democratising role depends on the degree to which the parties manage to fulfil the roles spelled out above and whose interest they represent.

An effective opposition is absolutely indispensable to the emergence and consolidation of a stable democratic order, in liberal democratic theory. In order to be effective, a number of structural and practical conditions must easily be available. Institutionalisation of the parties is crucial for them to develop

democratising capabilities.. The opposition parties need to be distinct from and autonomous of the ruling party. The rules of the political system must allow freedom of organisation by the parties on a level playing field and in a framework that allows the rotation of power based on the free choice of the electorate. The opposition parties would, in the interval between one election and the other, serve as the formal, institutionalised watchdog within and outside parliament, to keep the ruling party in check. At election time, the opposition will provide the electorate with choice, politically and ideologically (Olukoshi 1998; Wiseman 1996; Randall 1998; Salih 2001, 2002; Diamond 1999).

As the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is a major part of a democratic framework, this is a serious development that has to be investigated further. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the situation in Tanzania has emerged over the past seventeen years of putative multi-party democracy through a specific study of the life of Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, leader of Civic United Front (CUF), one of the major opposition parties in Tanzania. And it is against the theoretical context discussed above that we have tried to understand what concrete challenges an opposition party meet in the process when a single party system is dismantled and a multi-party system is established.

The Political Structure in Tanzania¹

Tanzania is still in transition from a one-party to a consolidated multi-party system. The formal and informal institutions of democracy are still weak compared to the ideal in the liberal democratic models. This is in spite of efforts made to strengthen a more liberal democratic ethos, including change of legislations, reforms of central and local government to make them more transparent and accountable, and various projects aimed at strengthening the political parties and institutions. This section analyses the party system in order to identify some of the major challenges for the opposition.

Tanzania had 18 registered political parties in the 2005 elections. In March 2010, a 19th party was given preliminary registration. This was a splinter party from CCM which later ceased to work. Only five of these parties are, however, represented in the Parliament. The ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has a well-developed organisation with elaborate procedures and structures for (relative democratic) decision-making within the party. But it also contains strong central authority and personal networks, with close links to the administration at different levels.² The one-party culture continues to define parts of the party, the administration and the political culture – not least on local level. Nevertheless, changes are taking place.

Although CCM is formally detached from the governmental structures, ties between the party and the administration still exists both formally and informally (Mukandala, Mushi, Barkan et al. 2005). An example of the existence of these formal ties is that all key government functionaries down to district commissioners and judges are directly appointed by – and thus dependent upon – the Presidency. As most ‘political opportunities’ arise within the government administration – rather than the political structures or the private sector – there are incentives even for strong leaders from opposition parties to join CCM. This could be observed during the preparation and campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005.

With a high degree of fungibility of funds, economic support to the government may be indirectly or directly diverted to the ruling party. The opposition is therefore weakened by CCM’s control of the government, administration and media, even at the local level. The strong donor interests in the managerial issues of the public sector may undermine the efforts to build a strong political community and opposition, due to the informal inter-linkages of the ruling party with central and local government administration.

The Opposition

No real challenges exist to CCM, particularly in rural areas, as the opposition parties have neither the organisation nor the resources to fully develop structures at all district/local levels in the vast country. No strong and well-organised nationwide opposition has emerged – as in most other African countries (Olukoshi 1998; Melber 2003; Lumumba-Kasongo 2006; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Zanzibar, and in particular the small island of Pemba, are however an exception. Here, CUF poses a real challenge to CCM, based on the turbulent history of the islands. It is also at Zanzibar that political conflicts have been most intense and at times fiercely violent, with 45 people killed in the peaceful demonstration for rerun of the elections in 23 January 2001.

Most opposition parties lack a comprehensive and realistic political programme, with the exception of CUF and CHADEMA, and, to a lesser extent, NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP. All parties are, to a large extent, based on charismatic individuals, have a relatively narrow social base, and are mostly urban biased (various interviews and (Mmuya 1998). After the election in 1995, the opposition parties disintegrated and became even weaker in 2000 than they were during the previous election. After the election in 2000, the situation changed slightly for the majority of the parties. The CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi and, to a lesser extent, TLP and UDP, might be considered more fully developed parties. The remaining 12 parties are very small. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM was also

one of CCM's critiques against the opposition in 1995, 2000 and 2005 election. This critique is shared by the media, CSO, key informants and voters interviewed.

A large part of the parties' time and energies are devoted to internal power struggles, quite naturally for newly-formed parties in newly introduced multi-party context. The struggle over who should be chairman and/or presidential candidate, as demonstrated by, e.g., the struggles within NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP, is a case in point. The same is true for the struggles and rivalry with other parties in the opposition. Influential individuals could be attracted to leave a party that does not give them what they (most often) consider the prime position they seek, hence they move over to another party with their followers. That was what happened to the strongest and most prominent opposition party during the 1994-1999 period, the NCCR-Mageuzi. It was split in 1999 when Augustine Mrema, a strong and popular former Minister of Home Affairs, left CCM and joined the NCCR in 1995 to run for the presidency on NCCR ticket, leaving the majority of his followers to join TLP. As a result, both NCCR and TLP became preoccupied by internal power struggles, thereby weakening both parties – and most likely the opposition as a whole. These struggles are often related to which faction of the party has the right to government subsidies to the parties or other assets – or who should be the presidential candidate, MP/councillor or occupy some similar position in the party. The struggle within TLP continued after 2000 election, and the party did not manage to reorganise itself to its former strength before the 2005 election. TLP's presidential candidate got only 0.75 per cent of the vote.

With NCCR and TLP thus preoccupied with internal struggles, CUF emerged as the strongest opposition party during the 2000 election and continued to improve on its organisation and policies in the period up to the 2005 election. The CUF is often accused of being mainly an Islamist party, with its strong base being in Pemba/Zanzibar and along the Coast. The party strongly denied this.³ Several of its leading cadres are Christians and the party also had one of the most developed programmes among the opposition parties. By way of contrast, CHADEMA developed its organisation and changed its leadership prior to the elections in 2005. Its presidential candidate, the young and dynamic businessman, Freeman Mbowe, attracted young and aspiring businessmen and women during the election campaigns. Policy wise, both TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi define themselves as leftist/social democratic parties, while CHADEMA describes itself a conservative party and is a member of the African and international conservative alliance. The challenges for the opposition parties are clearly seen in the election results since the multi-party system was introduced in 1992.

The Union Presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005 (Percentage of total votes, mainland + Zanzibar)

	1995	2000	2005
CCM (Benjamin Mkapa 1995 & 2000, Jakaya Kikwete 2005)	61.8	71.7	80.3
CUF (Ibrahim Lipumba (1))	6.4	16.3	11.7
TLP (Augustine Mrema) (2)	27.8	7.8	0.75
UDP (John Cheyo)	4.0	4.2	-
CHADEMA (Freeman Mbowe)		- (1)	5.9
NCCR-Mageuzi (Mvungi Sengondo (2))			0.5

Source: NEC 2001, 2006

- 1) I. Lipumba was a joint candidate for CUF + CHADEMA 2000
- 2) A. Mrema was the Presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi 1995, crossed over to TLP from 2000)

The parliamentary election results show an even more crushing defeat for the opposition. In 2000, the opposition only managed to win 14 (6.1 per cent) of the 181 seats while CCM won in 164 constituencies on the mainland. In the union as a whole, the opposition won 29 seats (12.5 per cent) of the 232 constituencies and CCM 198 seats. In 2005 the loss of the opposition on the mainland continued. It only managed to get seven seats on the mainland (representing 3.8 per cent of the 182 constituencies) and 26 (11.2 per cent) of the total 232 seats in the union. Nineteen of the opposition seats came from Zanzibar, and more over 18 from the small island of Pemba. From the 46 directly elected seats the opposition got in 1995 it was left with only 26 in 2005. In percentage terms, that equals a fall from about 20 per cent of the directly elected seats in 1995 to about 11 per cent in 2005. The deteriorating performance of opposition parties in subsequent elections can be interpreted as an indicator of the weakness or lack of popular support for opposition parties or the increasing capability and expertise of the ruling party and the state to rig elections.

In what follows, we focus on the largest opposition party, CUF, its structure and the challenges it has faced for a proper understanding of why the opposition remains largely marginalised in Tanzania 18 years after multi-party democracy was introduced.

Civic United Front (*Chama Cha Wananchi*)

CUF identifies itself as a social-liberal party, opposing the ruling ‘revolutionary’ party. CUF is a member of the Liberal International and the Africa Liberal Network (ALN).⁴ It was formed in March 1992 through a merger of KAMAHURU, a pressure group for democratisation in Zanzibar, and the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW), a human rights-oriented political organisation based on the mainland. The party has its strongest support in Pemba and Zanzibar, along the coast and in the lake region, as well as in Dar es Salaam.

Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba is the national Chairman of CUF. He had an academic career and received a PhD in economics from Stanford University, USA, in 1983 before venturing into politics. Upon his return back home, Lipumba taught and conducted research in economics at the University of Dar es Salaam. He took active part in national policy debates and was appointed Economic Adviser to President Hassan Mwinyi in 1991. From 1993-1995, Lipumba was a Visiting Professor of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts, USA, and was part of a team that evaluated the crisis of aid donors and Tanzania. Between 1996 and 1998, Lipumba worked at the United Nations University World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU WIDER) and between 1995 and 2000, he was a member of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy.

Lipumba has held the position of Chairman of CUF from 1999, and was re-elected in 2004 and 2009. He has contested in the presidential elections in Tanzania since the country instituted a multi-party system in the early 1990s. Professor Lipumba is a respected economist and a skilled orator drawing large crowds to CUF’s rallies. He still continues his career as a freelance economist on a smaller scale.

Election Results

In the 1995 national election, CUF Presidential national candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba, got 6.4 per cent of the vote, coming third behind Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM and NCCR-Mageuzi candidate, Augustine Mrema. In the parliamentary elections, the party won 24 of 232 elective seats, making it the largest opposition party in the legislature. All CUF seats came from Zanzibar constituencies. In Zanzibar, the CUF presidential candidate for Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad was narrowly defeated by CCM candidate Salmin Amour, winning 49.8 per cent of the vote to Amour's 50.2 per cent. Observers noted serious irregularities in the poll and the CUF rejected the result as rigged. CUF boycotted the House of Representatives and refused to recognise the Salmin government as legitimate. In November 1997, eighteen leaders of the CUF were arrested and subsequently charged with treason. These charges were later dropped.

In the October 2000 national presidential election, Lipumba was a joint candidate for CHADEMA and CUF. He got 16.3 per cent of the votes, second to President Benjamin Mkapa. The party maintained its status as the largest opposition party in the National Assembly by winning 17 of 231 elective seats. In Zanzibar Seif Sharif Hamad won 33 per cent of the vote against 67 per cent for the ruling party's Amani Abeid Karume in elections for the presidency of Zanzibar. In the Zanzibar House of Representatives, CUF won 16 of 50 elective seats. The 2000 elections were considered largely free but not fair on the mainland. However, observers noted serious irregularities in the Zanzibar polls citing widespread irregularities and instances of intimidation of opposition supporters by the security forces. CUF accused the government of rigging the election and called for a complete re-run of the polls. When the electoral commission nullified the results in only 16 constituencies, CUF announced that it would boycott the new elections conducted on 5 November 2000. The Commonwealth Observers concluded that:

The conduct of the elections fell far short of minimum standards. (...) The cause was either deliberate manipulation or gross incompetence. (...) The Group believes that only a properly conducted and fresh poll, throughout Zanzibar, undertaken by a Commission reformed in line with international good practice, with its independence guaranteed in both law and practice and a restructured and professional Secretariat, can create confidence in and give credibility to Zanzibar's democracy (Commonwealth Observer Group 2001)

In January 2001, 45 CUF supporters were shot by Tanzanian Security Forces in peaceful demonstration for a re-run of the election. The event led ruling CCM party and opposition CUF to have a dialogue that resulted in signing of a peace accord named MUAFAKA II, designed to ensure electoral and constitutional reforms. Most of the planned reforms were not implemented by the government, including, crucially, an agreed credible voter's register prior to the elections of October 2005.

In the 2005 national election CUF and CHADEMA did not have an alliance. Ibrahim Lipumba won 11.7 per cent of the vote, a distant second to CCM's Jakaya Kikwete. Out of the 232 National Assembly seats filled through direct election, the CUF won 19. In the 2005 elections for the Zanzibar Presidency and House of Representatives, Seif Sharif Hamad placed second to incumbent Amani Abeid Karume, winning 46.1 per cent of the vote. The party won 19 seats in the House of Representatives. International and domestic observers heavily criticised the conduct of the Zanzibar polls; again CUF disputed the election and refused to recognise Karume as President. The United States boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of Abeid Karume as President.

The Story of an Opposition Leader: Ibrahim Lipumba

The following account is based on a series of interviews over a ten-year period with Ibrahim Lipumba by Lennart Wohlgemuth and Jonas Ewald at different occasions. It is the testimony of a politician in action with all its pros and cons. The series of interviews show that there are capacity and personal commitment in the political opposition in Tanzania. The views presented here are verified in several other interviews we had with several other political leaders in Tanzania, with similar stories on formal and informal constraints (Ewald 2011).

After a long career as an academic and researcher you are now involved in politics in Tanzania. What makes a senior and prominent researcher enter the arena of politics?

I believe that politics is too important for development in poor countries such as Tanzania to be left only to professional politicians. I entered the Presidential race in 1995 to initiate development policy debate. My party was strong in Zanzibar and was expected to win the elections in that part of the country, but weak in mainland Tanzania. I believed that being a mainland I would provide a unifying link if my party won the elections in Zanzibar and the ruling party won the elections in mainland Tanzania. The main opposition candidate in mainland Tanzania was not providing a principled challenge against the past policies of the ruling party and was using the tactic of blaming the Indian business community for the economic problems affecting the majority of Tanzanians. I believed it was my civic duty to accept the challenge and debate the past policies of the ruling party that hindered individual freedom, freedom of expression and deliberately curtailed opportunities for self-advancement and the establishment of a broad-based market economy. I also articulated a socially inclusive market-oriented development strategy that had confidence in Tanzanians' ability to manage their own affairs and establish a vibrant economy.

I did not expect to win the presidential election. My objective was to strengthen democracy by debating and supporting policies that promote an open society, the rule of law, and establishing a socially inclusive competitive market economy. To promote growth requires institutional arrangements that clearly define and protect property rights and encourage the establishment of transparent and accountable government that prioritises its expenditure on education, health, infrastructure and agriculture. As one of the members of Professor Gerry Helleiner's team that evaluated the donor-government relations, I had realised that the level of corruption had reached an astonishingly dangerous level that was threatening political and economic stability. By raising the corruption and governance issues in the campaign I

believed they would be included in the policy agenda by whoever won the presidential elections. After the elections, I returned to the University to teach but I was expelled from the University for political reasons. The official reason was that I had gone to Washington for short-term research without permission from University authorities.

Have you tried to combine your research capabilities with political work?

Yes, I have, for example, spent three months as a guest researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in late 2002/early 2003 in Uppsala, reviewing and rethinking development policy in Tanzania. I started by reviewing the levels of poverty in Tanzania. My estimates at that time indicated that poverty has increased from 48.5 per cent in 1991 to 75 per cent in 2000. The main cause for the increase in poverty is that growth has been modest; an average of 4.2 per cent per year during 1995-2000, and income distribution has worsened. The fastest growing sector is mining but it is capital intensive, does not generate employment and has displaced artisan miners. The agricultural sector has been neglected. The growth of agricultural value added has hardly kept pace with population growth rate. Although the agricultural sector employs 70 per cent of the labour force, in the past seven years the government has allocated only 4 per cent of its total expenditure to this sector.

An appropriate development strategy in Tanzania must focus on transforming the agricultural sector and promoting labour-intensive industries and services. The government has been successful in reducing inflation from 34 per cent in 1994 to 4.5 per cent in 2002. The success in reducing inflation is largely the result of stringent use of the cash budget to contain aggregate government expenditure. Reducing inflation to single digit levels by itself will not mobilise domestic saving and increase investment. Financial sector reforms that included the privatisation of state-owned banks have not improved the availability of financial services. With inadequate financial services, limited access to credit and the prohibitively high cost of credit, sustained high growth rate of output cannot be achieved. There is an obvious market failure in the financial sector that has to be tackled by government intervention.

In order to address mass poverty, Tanzania needs to move beyond the 'Washington Consensus' policies to focus on an agriculture-led development strategy based on enhancing the democratic rights of the rural population and empowering smallholder farmers to increase their productivity. We need to deliberate on the appropriate institutional and policy framework for promoting broad-based development through learning from our past mistakes and successes.

I also continued to work on globalisation and Africa's development. In this research I attempted to answer key questions on globalisation. Is sub-Saharan Africa being marginalised in the global economy because of bad domestic policies, or because of unequal and exploitative terms of integration into the global economy? Does globalisation give the poor African countries an opportunity to leapfrog several decades of development if they combine their low wages with basic education, technical skills and export-led growth to take advantage of the rapidly opening global markets? Can globalisation be managed to promote pro-poor growth that uses abundant labour, generates employment and avoids ruthless growth that increases income inequality and the ranks of the poor?

Even in the era of globalisation, development is a do-it-yourself process. Africa needs policies to integrate into the global economy while promoting poverty-reducing growth. Broad participation of the population in the market economy by utilising Africa's comparative advantage in agriculture is an important initial step. Policies that support smallholder farmers to participate in a market economy and protect rights of peasants, including women, to access land, credit and improved technology are particularly important for broad-based development. African countries' mineral resources have not been fully utilised. Foreign investment is indispensable for the exploration and exploitation of these resources. It is however important to adequately tax the rents to support human development; that is an end in itself but it will also create new areas of more rewarding comparative advantage. Special efforts are however needed to attract FDI in export-oriented manufacturing. Investment in infrastructure, including telecommunications, power, water supply, roads and ports is a pre-requisite. The private sector may provide part of this investment, particularly in telecommunications, but the public sector will have to be responsible for the other investments particularly road infrastructure. A minimum basic level of human development in the form of universal basic education, health, nutrition and housing is necessary for a sustained integration into the global economy.

How do you see the development in Tanzania in the immediate future? As an opposition politician, do you see a development towards a 'real' democracy?

After forty-fifty years of independence, 75 per cent of Tanzanians are poor, spending less than one dollar a day. Life expectancy at birth has decreased from a peak of 52 years in 1991 to 48 years in 2000. Infant mortality is 104 per 1,000 live births. Tanzania needs to initiate a broad-based growth of output of 8 per cent per year, invest in agriculture and rural infrastructure and improve the delivery of education and health services. Agricultural

transformation is the key to long-term development and poverty eradication in Tanzania. In the past seven years, the government has allocated less than 4 per cent of its total budget directly to the agricultural sector. Tanzania is lucky. It has plenty of land. Nevertheless, land-grabbing is now on the increase and the government has unfortunately ignored the key recommendation of the Shivji Commission, the recommendation on its land policy particularly providing security of access to land by peasants.

Tanzania has important characteristics that make it feasible to establish a democratic society and a broad-based socially-inclusive market economy. First, there is a common lingua franca, Kiswahili, that provides a cultural and communication bond. Second, in many rural areas of the country, almost all households have access to land and we do not have a landed gentry and a landless peasantry. Third, the potential of promoting economic growth based on small-holder agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing has yet to be fully exploited. The mineral potential that is just beginning to be exploited can provide government revenues to support human resource development, including investment in education and life-long learning, and improvement in health services. Fourth, the potential for increasing living standards by concentrating public resources on basic health and education is enormous. Fifth, Tanzania does not have a history of civil violence and political extremism, and the people have a tradition of tolerance and compromise. It is possible to encourage competitive political processes based on policy issues rather than ethnic, racial or religious chauvinism and character assassination. Establishing a democratic system of government with free and fair elections and where democratically elected governments are transparent and accountable to the electorate will, however, not be easy. The single party system had entrenched itself. The machinery of government was answerable to the ruling party.

The coercive machinery of the state, including the army, police and the security (secret police) were under the party authority. The judiciary was only nominally independent of the government and the party. The present constitution does not allow independent candidates to contest any elective office at all levels from village government, municipalities, and parliament to the presidency.

How is this influencing you practically as an opposition party?

We are constantly harassed and stopped in our work on reaching the electorate. Problems occur in the period leading up to elections, during the elections and between elections. This becomes most evident at times of elections as the following examples among many shows:

In October 2002 we were stopped from holding a public rally in Kigoma town on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. The rally was called according to the rules but 30 minutes before the start thereof police came and stopped the meeting on the pretext that there was an outbreak of meningitis in Kigoma. (But meningitis does not spread in open areas). After the police cancelled the public rally, we organised a meeting with our district party leaders outside their office. We put chairs outside the office for the meeting because meningitis spread easily in closed indoors. Immediately two land rovers with field force paramilitary police drove in and arrested the district chairman and one supporter on the pretext that we attempted to hold a public meeting without the permission of the police.

In September 2002 we had a good rally and public meeting in Igalula in Tabora District. After the meeting some of our supporters and local leaders were arrested on the pretext that they had abused the deputy minister who was the elected Member of Parliament of that area. The name of the minister was not even mentioned. The rally focused on policies, particularly poor quality education, lack of health services particularly for pregnant women and widespread human rights abuses. They were imprisoned for three days before being charged. The case took more than a year before it was dismissed. The accused had to report to court once every month. We had to hire a lawyer at a great expense given our limited resources.

Such behaviours do strangle the opposition and it is no doubt meant to. And what is the evidence that this behaviour is aimed at strangling the opposition?

After the 2005 election, after having obtained some 85 per cent of the electorate, the CCM still did its utmost to bribe members of the opposition to join their party. One example is Tabwe Hiza, a prominent member of our party in Dar es Salaam. He was a parliamentary candidate in 2000 and 2005 for the Temeke constituency in Dar es Salaam. After the 2005 election we had a small reshuffle of the members of the secretariat of our party. I removed Tambwe from the position of publicity secretary of the Party. He continued to be a member of our Governing Council. He was seduced and joined CCM where he was given a position as Head of the propaganda unit in CCM headquarters. In a supposed thriving democracy, why should a party that has gained 85 per cent of all parliamentary seats work so hard to win over a few prominent people from the opposition after the election. Our district chairman and parliamentary candidate for Kondoa constituency was very strong. He has also been seduced by CCM and given a post as CCM party secretary in Bukoba Urban. I had very strong parliamentary candidates in Rufiji and Maswa districts who have been seduced to cross over to CCM. And so on.

This does not only relate to our party but also the other opposition parties. The national vice chairman of CHADEMA was solicited and [he] crossed over to CCM and was elected by CCM-dominated parliament to become a member of the East African Community Legislative Assembly. These are examples that there are no commitments by the ruling party for a real well-functioning democratic system in our country.

More examples of harassments

The opposition is denied by the ruling party and the state any opportunities to develop and expand. Here is an example from a 2007 by-election in Tunduru District in Ruvuma region. CUF is very strong in that district. In [the] 2005 election we believe that we had won the majority. Officially our parliamentary candidate received 45 per cent of the vote. The CCM MP for Tunduru died after he suffered major injuries in a plane accident that led to a by-election in that constituency. A by-election does not receive the same attention as a regular election. However, in Tunduru the by-election attracted a lot of people. The CUF public rallies attracted many people because of the issues our candidate raised. The conditions of roads in Tunduru were extremely bad, probably the worst in the whole country. Many vehicles were stuck on the Masasi-Tunduru road. The government had set a minimum price of raw cashew nuts – the main cash crop at Tshs 600 a kilo. Traders boycotted purchasing cashew nuts from farmers because the government's minimum price was too high. Poor peasants ended up with stocks of cashew nuts they could not sell while they badly needed the cash to pay for school uniforms and medical expenses. Our candidate was driving these issues over the whole constituency and voters were enthusiastic about punishing CCM for the hardship they were suffering. In addition the CCM candidate did not have full support of his party and the chairman of the district council – a CCM councillor – was opposed to him. He was not considered to be a local person and not popular in his constituency. So we had high expectation. But the election campaign led by the CCM party Secretary-General and the Vice-Chairman changed all our expectation. They unashamedly argued that CCM cannot lose the election they own all state instruments and functionaries, including the representative of the National Election Commission, the District Commissioner and other officials and the Police. The condition for us to campaign became increasingly difficult. The police harassed and teargassed our supporters. Many of them were remanded in prison. The CCM as a party does not have any commitment to democratic change in Tanzania. They could lose the Tunduru seat and still retain more than 85 per cent of MPs in parliament but they were still using state resources, including the police and government vehicles, to make sure that CUF does not win a seat in Mainland Tanzania.

What was even worse, very few voters turned out to vote on the Election Day. CCM had a network of its cadres purchasing voting cards from young voters

who were considered potential supporters of CUF for between 1000 and 5000 shillings. In spite of a very high public interest in the campaign because of the important issues affecting the constituency raised by the CUF candidate and a distrust of the CCM candidate, participation in the election were less than 50 per cent of the registered voters. It is illegal to collect or purchase voters identification cards. We reported the allegations to the police and National Elections Commission but the authorities refused to investigate. Our candidate who got 37 287 (45 per cent) votes in 2005 election, according to the official tally, received only 18 182 (37 per cent) in the by-election less than half of the 2005 votes. There is no reason that our candidate should have fewer votes in the by-election than in 2005. If anything he had a better campaign and should have had more votes in 2007.

The harassment of political parties continues in all districts. I have personally been a victim or witnessed several harassments. A very good example of harassment of opposition parties in Tanzania after the introduction of multi-party politics is my experience in party-building activities. In 2000, we went to Newala, a district bordering Mozambique, i.e., as far away from Dar es Salaam you can go. We wrote a letter to the police that we intend to have a public rally. Because of communication problems our local party secretary did not deliver the letter to the police at least 48 hours before a public rally is to be held, as required by law. The police received the letter 24 hours before the scheduled rally. When we arrived in Newala the police said that we could not hold our rally because we had not notified the police 48 hours before the rally. So we proposed to postpone the rally for another 24 hours to allow 48 hours to elapse. They did not accept that and requested us to write a new letter. Then we had to wait for another 48 hours. Waiting for two days in Newala would disrupt our other scheduled meetings. So we decided to have an internal meeting which legally does not require the notification of the police. We rented a school a hall – that we had to pay for, so our members could come there to discuss policy issues and our political programme. We used our vehicle which had a public address system to announce and inform the public that we were going to have an internal party meeting. As our vehicle moved around Newala inviting members to attend our internal meeting, a police land rover full of armed policemen stopped us. They informed us we are not allowed to invite people to attend our internal meeting using a public address system. If there is an internal meeting we should only inform members by letters. Public announcements are not allowed for an internal meeting, the police told us. We asked the police which law prevented political parties from using public address system to invite members to an internal meeting? They threatened to beat and arrest us if we continued publicising our internal meeting using public speakers. I tried to call the Commissioner of Police in Dar but the telephone connection was too bad. So we ended up going all the way to the border of Mozambique but unable to hold a public rally with the people of Newala or an internal meeting with our members. Thereafter, we went to the regional headquarters in Mtwara. We also wanted to hold a public rally on the 10th of January. Our Party Secretary

wrote a letter to the police but was told that we could not hold that rally because 12th of January was the Revolutionary day of Zanzibar and all the police and armed forces in the country were on a standby so there was no police available to come to our rally - to provide security. We told them that there were no security problems that required the presence of police, but they did not accept. So I went to the Nsa Kaisi, the Regional Commissioner to appeal to be allowed to hold a rally. He told me that a Regional Commissioner could not interfere with police decisions. I questioned: how could Revolution Day celebrations in Zanzibar, affect the security situation in far away Mtwara. With a straight face he responded by saying that the situation in Mtwara could easily be unstable because it is so close to the border of Mozambique and you cannot easily distinguish who is from Mozambique and who is from Tanzania. So we could not hold any rally in Mtwara. Amazingly we now consider Mtwara Region particularly Newala and Tandahimba districts as strong areas of CUF. We did well in the 2009 local elections.

During the 2005 election campaign we tried to reach as many places as possible. We could not afford to hire helicopters and therefore only used motor vehicles. In the campaign trail you cannot reach or stop at every village. Sometimes you are stopped to greet people. Most roads are in poor conditions and therefore sticking to time schedule of political rallies is extremely difficult. We travelled to Sumbawanga in Rukwa region after completing our campaign in Mbeya region. We arrived in Sumbawanga late because of the long distance and the bad conditions of the road. I could only start addressing the rally around 17.40 in the evening. Sumbawanga is in the western part of the country the sun sets rather late, so there was no problem of darkness. At 18.00 hours the police approached the platform to inform me that the law states that we had to stop at 18.00 hours. I tried to continue to complete my speech. The police threatened to arrest me if I continued. This was around 18.10. It is clear that the police did not believe that I was a potential president in waiting. This law however only pertained to the opposition parties. The CCM candidate was well known to be extremely weak in observing time and schedules. He regularly continued addressing meetings as late as eight in the evening.

This rule that limits campaign rallies to six in the evening makes it extremely difficult with the long distances and the bad roads. It always takes longer time to travel than you have scheduled and you always arrive late and then the police stop you. We have 60 days of campaign and have to cover so much ground. So this happens again and again. In some cases police allows you to go on to 6.30 but in most cases they do not. We try to appeal to the National Electoral Commission. In most of the areas in the Western part of the country there is sunlight up to seven. The law is set to ensure peace and security but most political rallies are generally peaceful. During the campaign you have to give your campaign schedule to the National Election Commission and then follow it. If your vehicle breaks down on the road and you are delayed for one reason or another you still have to keep to that schedule. Adjusting your schedule even if

it does not conflict with schedules of other candidates is usually not allowed. For example we were late for our campaign rally in Meatu, Shinyanga region. We could not have our rally as scheduled. We tried to have the rally next day because there was no other political party scheduled to have a rally in Meatu that day. The police intervened and refused us to have the rally because it was not in our official schedule. We explained that we were late the day before but the police insisted that the new date was not in the schedule so that they could not allow the meeting to take place. In some cases the police understand your predicament and accept to reschedule. But often the District Commissioners who are members of the ruling party and head of government operation in the district pressure the police to make the environment as difficult as possible for opposition parties. My NCCR colleague who was a parliamentary candidate for Ngara constituency informed me that Kikwete, the then CCM presidential candidate, arrived in Ngara late in the evening. He had a campaign rally at eight in the evening and another one in the morning. So the ruling party do not have those schedule limitations.

Another story from the 2005 elections is from my campaign rally in Kilwa. We were travelling from Liwale, a district that contains a large part of the Selous National Park. We were given a police escort using a vehicle that belonged to Kilwa District council that was driven at a very slow speed. Most members of my campaign team wanted our driver to overtake the escort vehicle so that we can arrive in Kilwa in time. I insisted that we should respect the police and not overtake the escort vehicle. We arrived in Kilwa around 17.45. I immediately started addressing the rally. Kilwa is a CUF stronghold and there were many supporters at the rally. At 18.00 the police stopped me. I did continue to six-twenty and my supporters escorted us to our guest house. Some of our supporters including our district chairman were arrested and charged for illegal demonstration. We then found out that the reason that the police delayed our entry to Kilwa was that the former President and the ruling party central committee member Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who was not even a candidate, had been in town and giving a speech in support of the CCM presidential candidate. All other police vehicles were used to provide security to the retired President. In fact we discovered later that our police escort vehicle was driven slowly purposely so that we arrive late in Kilwa to sabotage our campaign rally and create a pretext for arresting our local leaders and supporters who were jailed and charged for participating in an illegal demonstration.

A final example: Dr Mvungi was the NCCR Presidential candidate in the 2005 elections. He went to cast his vote with his whole family of six persons. When the votes were counted he got one vote in his polling station so he said to me that this result would imply that even his own wife did not vote for him. CCM and the state have become experts at rigging elections. Election observers who come few days before the election cannot understand the rigging process.

This is how it is to work as an opposition in Tanzania. We have to devote a lot of time and money to get lawyers to represent us. When I am touring the country so much time has to be spent on negotiations with the police and local administration officials. It varies from case to case whether the police act locally on their own initiatives, if they lack knowledge of the rules of the game or whether the central government or CCM directs the activities of the police. Overall the conditions facing opposition parties are deteriorating. The 1995 election was a more level-playing field. The government paid for polling agents and there was no harassment during the campaigns. In 2000 election there was much more unequal access to resources and a lot of more harassment and in 2005 even more so.

The most serious problem is that the opposition has no resources to have polling agents to follow up the elections and the counting of the votes.

Can you give examples of how your financial situation affects you personally?

In 1995 when I entered into the Presidential race in the last minute, I was not very well prepared. My colleagues were also not very well prepared particularly in financing the campaign. At that time, I had just returned from my teaching assignment at Williams College in the USA. I had US\$ 40,000 of savings from Williams College. So I used all my saving for the campaign. This was not much but with the help of supporters who provided food and shelter for us during the campaign we managed. After 1995, the government started providing subsidies to parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats. The bulk of the government subsidy, more than three quarters go to CCM.

The government subsidy is the most dependable source of financing. In 2000 General Election, we had saved some of the subsidy to finance election activities. During 1996-1998 I was a Senior Researcher at WIDER in Helsinki so I had a small saving from there which I also used to finance our party campaign. So we managed, but with minimum resources. As a presidential candidate I had only one vehicle – a two-door short chassis Land Cruiser – that was packed with a public address system, campaign materials, personal luggage and a five- person campaign team. We travelled around the whole country with this vehicle. So we really lived on a shoestring budget. The most discouraging part of the campaign was that although we attracted huge crowds of supporters and discussed pertinent policy issues facing the country, we received limited media coverage. Many days could pass without any mention of our campaign in the media despite many journalists being present in our campaign rallies.

In 2005 we were a little better organised but we also had some luck. We had been underpaid of our government subsidy. We obtained a sum of 400 million shilling as arrears just before the election campaign. The subsidy is not for the election but rather for the period in between elections and is supposed to help the party in its operations. The subsidy arrears helped us finance our campaign. Although we continued having the problem of not receiving adequate media coverage, we had an effective campaign and trained polling agents for more than half of the 45,000 polling stations. Unfortunately the vice-presidential candidate of CHADEMA died only a few days before the election date. The elections were therefore postponed. If we had an independent electoral commission, only the Presidential election should have been postponed, but the parliamentary and council elections should have taken place as planned. But they postponed all elections for 45 days. That allowed the CCM to be better organised because they had financial resources. For us it was a disaster because we had no more money left to travel around the country campaigning. We had budgeted money for allowances of polling agents. The money had already been transferred to parliamentary candidates. These candidates had to continue with campaign activities for another 45 days and ended up using the money budgeted for the polling day activities. So we really did not have effective polling agents in most of the 45,000 polling stations. This was true for all opposition parties, although, CHADEMA seem to have been somewhat better financed even after the elections were postponed. The ruling party CCM spent more money after the election was postponed and had more campaign activities.

Are there any possibilities to act in parliament for an opposition party in Tanzania today?

The Civic United Front is the largest opposition party in parliament with 32 MPs. We have formed an alliance with other opposition parties in parliament and established an official opposition in parliament. The official opposition has done an excellent job in parliament such as exposing grand corruption involving the external payments account of the Bank of Tanzania whereby phoney companies acting as agents of external creditors collected US\$ 113 million from the Central Bank. The power of the opposition in parliament to hold the government to account is however constrained by the parliamentary rules that have vested authority and powers in the Speaker of the Parliament. The Speaker has to agree before a private motion of a Member of Parliament is brought up for discussion in Parliament.

In August 2007, Dr Slaa, a CHADEMA member of parliament and Deputy Leader of the official opposition in parliament, prepared a private motion requesting the parliament to establish a select committee to investigate allegation of misuse of public funds in the Bank of Tanzania, including stealing of US\$113 million from the Central Bank External Payments Account, the use of half a billion dollars in the construction of Bank of Tanzania twin towers and its office in Zanzibar, providing tens of millions of dollars of guarantees to private companies' commercial debt that increased contingent liabilities of the Central Bank, Bank of Tanzania providing commercial credit to Mwananchi Gold Company, a registered private company contrary to the Bank of Tanzania Act. The motion was planned to be tabled in parliament on August 7, 2007. All parliamentary requirements were met but at the last minute it was blocked by the Speaker and was not tabled.

The Opposition in parliament has contributed to the establishment of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the TANESCO tendering of emergency power generation in 2006 that was awarded to Richmond Development Company LLC of Houston, Texas, USA. Hon. Habib Mnyaa, a CUF Member of Parliament from Zanzibar who is an engineer and has in the past worked for TANESCO was the first to raise his suspicion of a fraudulent contract awarded to Richmond that did not have the capacity to implement a power generating project. He wanted to table a private motion for the formation of a parliamentary select committee to investigate the process that led TANESCO to award the contract to Richmond. But members of parliament from CCM told him, 'If you table the motion, it will be blocked'. They suggested that it should be sent as a recommendation of the Minerals and Energy Parliamentary Committee. And so they did. And then the speaker accepted the motion by the committee to be tabled in parliament. For the first time since the multi-party parliament started in 1995, a parliamentary Select Committee was established chaired by Hon. Dr. Harrison Mwakyembe and included Hon. Habib Mnyaa to investigate the Richmond saga. The Mwakyembe Committee Report showed that the selection of Richmond Development Company to implement a 100 MW emergency power generation project violated the Public Procurement Act and did not follow the legal advice provided by Public Procurement Regulatory Authority – PPRA. The Report was tabled in parliament and led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and two other ministers. After the resignation of the Prime Minister, the President had to dissolve the cabinet and select a new prime minister and cabinet. For the first time the parliament showed that it has powers to hold the government to account.

Are there any formal or informal limitations to act as an opposition today in Tanzania? Any major changes in the past years?

After the 2000 election, President Mkapa stated that CCM had won in a big way; it should be given the opportunity to implement its manifesto. Opposition parties should stop political rallies and demonstrations until the next election campaigns in 2005. In January 2001 we held a political demonstration to demand an independent electoral commission, a new democratic constitution and a re-run of the Zanzibar election. Before the demonstration I was beaten up, arrested and imprisoned. My arrest did not prevent the demonstration from taking place. During those demonstrations more than 45 people were killed by the armed forces in Zanzibar. In October 2001, CCM and CUF reached a political accord (MUAFAKA) on Zanzibar. For the first time since the 1995 Presidential debate in 1995, I met President Mkapa face to face on October 10, 2001 during the MUAFAKA signing ceremony. Since then significant changes have taken place.

The major one is a significant decrease of harassment of the top leadership of opposition parties. As a leader of the largest opposition party I have been invited to major events such as national ceremonies, state banquets and festivities and meetings with visiting heads of government and states. When we had foreign visitors in the country, President Mkapa organised for opposition leaders to privately meet them. I met the President of Germany, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the President of Kenya and the Prime Minister of Denmark. We freely discussed with these leaders political, governance and development problems of Tanzania. Most of these improvements took place during the last two years of the Mkapa presidency. After 2005, with President Kikwete at the helm, opposition leaders' meetings with visiting heads of government and states stopped. I have been invited twice to state banquets in honour of visiting Head of State. The first was for the President of Burundi and the other was for the President of China.

At the local level there are still big problems with the ruling party and government accepting the legitimacy of opposition political parties.

For example, in August 2009 we went to Kisarawe District some 40 km from Dar es Salaam. We participated in a number of political rallies in the district and then we went to Msanga a larger village to spend the night there. That evening we were informed that our local party leaders in Vilabwa village who had organised the activities during the day had been harassed and arrested by the village and ward executive officer and remanded in prison. We returned to that village to investigate what had happened. We went to the home of the village executive officer who lived with her parents. We were told that she was not at home as she was meeting with the ward executive officer. We later realised that she actually was inside her house. There was a heated debate. When we were leaving the mother of the village executive officer pretended she had been possessed by spirits and held tightly the leg of one of my party officials. It was a struggle to force her to let alone my party official. Apparently our party leaders had been arrested by the local militia who were given the order by the village executive officer and taken to a Division Executive Officer some 10 km from the village. They were not imprisoned but were told report again the next day. We told our party functionaries not to worry about reporting to the Division Executive Officer. It was their constitutional right to participate in our political activities. As we were leaving, a younger sister of the village executive officer threw a stone and broke a window of my vehicle. We stopped. The girl who broke our vehicle was taken away on a motorbike by one of his relatives. We took the father of the sisters who had instructed her daughter to throw a stone to our vehicle to the Kisarawe police station to report what had happened. I explained what happened and showed the car window to the police. The police appeared to be sympathetic, detained the person we had taken to the police and instructed my driver to report the next day to write a statement. When my driver and Deputy Secretary General of our party returned to the police station to write a statement, they were arrested on the charge of having participated in causing havoc and breaking the peace at the house of the village executive officer of Vilabwa village. Our party leaders in Vilabwa village were also arrested. They were taken to court. We sent people to post bonds for them to be released. When the police found out that one of the people arrested was CUF Deputy Secretary-General, he was immediately released and not charged. But my driver who never left his vehicle when we visited the home of the village executive officer was charged for committing a criminal offence. Since September 2009 my driver has been reporting to court every month. They do not charge the top people but in order to disrupt local activities they use court cases to harass our local leaders. In this particular case the prosecutor knows there is no case to answer but wants to be given some money to dismiss and close the case. We had a journalist with us and she wrote a news report but there is no follow up of the issue.

For the national leadership the situation has thus improved but for the local cadres nothing has improved.

In Parliament also some changes have taken place. The public accounts committee has been chaired for a long time by a Hon. John Cheyo a member of parliament for UDP. A common principle among Westminster parliamentary system is for a member of parliament from the opposition party to chair the public accounts committee. Tanzania observes the principle of a member of the opposition chairing the Public Accounts Committee but does not give the opposition members the right to select who will chair the Committee. All members of parliament vote. CCM account for more than 80 per cent of all members and they decide who will be the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Since 1997 they have voted Hon. John Cheyo to chair this important committee. Recently he has been extremely supportive of President Kikwete to the extent of discouraging opposition parties not to contest the presidency in 2010. Also the parastatal sector committee is chaired by an opposition member this time from CHADEMA and, through the committee, is able to raise a number of important issues.

Members of Parliament can speak freely within the parliamentary rules on basically any policy issue. During the budget session our members can give comments and alternative ideas on the budget. Their questions, comments and speeches are usually covered by the media particularly radio and television. It is possible for members of parliament to challenge the government and bring up new ideas. The parliamentary Hansard is posted in the Bunge website. The Tanzania parliament website is among the best in Africa. It shows the number of questions and comments contributed by each Member of Parliament. The major problem of most members of parliament is that they lack a professional staff to do research and provide relevant information that can be used to challenge the government.

What about availability of strategic information for the opposition?

We really have major problems in terms of obtaining high quality information. Tanzania statistics are still very poor. National accounts indicate that annual GDP growth averaged around 7 per cent in 2000-08, but head count poverty has decreased from 36 per cent in 2001 to 33 per cent in 2007. Recorded growth seems to have an insignificant impact on poverty. The new national accounts show the share of agriculture in total GDP in 2005 was only 27.6 per cent compared to 46.1 per cent in the old accounts. This 18.5 percentage point reduction in the share of agriculture is supposed to have been absorbed by an increase in the share of services. This is not plausible. The 2007 Integrated Labour Force Survey still shows that 75 per cent of the labour

force depends on agriculture as the main source of income. Other information we get particularly through our member of parliament and the parliamentary web site.

In order to control aggregate expenditure, the government continues to use the cash budget system except for priority sectors. Budgeted expenditure may vary greatly with actual expenditure and it is difficult to get the correct information. The website of the IMF and the World Bank contain a lot of information on economic policy. The letter of intent to the IMF contains most of the macroeconomic and financial policies the government intends to implement.

Dr Slaa, a CHADEMA member of parliament and the deputy leader of opposition in parliament, has been excellent at getting sensitive information particularly related to the Bank of Tanzania. Foreign newspapers that are now available on the web have been a good source of information. We were first informed about possible corruption in the purchase of the BAE radar through reading the UK Guardian newspaper on the web.

What about press coverage?

The media was basically bought by CCM in 2005. The press was almost only covering CCM and particularly Kikwete. CHADEMA got some press but the other opposition parties hardly any. We felt as if our campaign activities were boycotted. It became even worse after the elections were postponed. The Zanzibar election took place on 30th of October 2005 as scheduled. The results announced by the Zanzibar Election Commission did not match with the results we received from the polling stations and we protested vehemently. We just did not accept the Zanzibar results. When the results came out there were a lot of demonstrations at our headquarters in Dar es Salaam demanding that we should do something to get the correct results in the Zanzibar election. We had announced a press conference in our Dar es Salaam headquarters. Journalists came as requested. They came in the midst of a heated demonstration outside our offices and some journalists were beaten up. I went to see one particular journalist that was wounded to apologise, and he told me that the person that beat him and kicked him probably was not a CUF member. The perpetrator had worn army boots and he suspected that he was from the security services. I apologised to the journalists and the media house but after that sad incident, the media particularly the IPP media which is the largest media house in the country, with television station that has widest coverage in the country, radio network and numerous newspapers completely boycotted us. We were only covered when there was something negative to report. For example, they did report that my laptop was stolen although it was not my laptop but a flash disk.

So how do you meet these challenges?

It should be a concrete effort to level the playing field for the opposition and other countries should be aware of that and assist. And we in the opposition have come to the conclusion that without an independent electoral commission and a constitution that calls for an independent electoral commission and an independent anti-corruption board it would be extremely difficult to have a real democratisation process to take place. And now we are focusing on how to obtain such a better democratic constitution and an independent electoral commission. We started by forming a committee consisting of not only political parties but also of NGOs, human rights groups to draft a constitution taking in views from all stakeholders in Tanzania. The committee completed a zero draft of the constitution that was discussed and distributed to political parties and other stakeholders for comments. Lack of financial resources have slowed the process of organising constitutional review meetings and it is unlikely that a final document can be available before the October General Election

We have to organise locally, provide our members with simple messages [with which] they can inform their fellow citizens in their localities. The key issues we focus on include human rights, each individual's right to adequate nutritious food, basic health and education. We tell our members that in a day may be they meet 6 – 8 people and if they manage to give them CUF key policy position we can reach a lot of people without being covered in the press. Tell the people what CUF stands for. Tanzania has been independent for 50 years, but what has the common man got out of it. We receive a lot of aid and where is all that money gone.

It is extremely expensive to keep up the party organisation all over the country. We lack infrastructures, transport and communication. To have meetings with chairmen of the districts is a major logistical problem. To organise a national congress of the party is an effort that requires significant financial resources. We have revised the party constitution to reduce the number of these meetings as well as the number of delegates.

What is your forecast for the election of 2010? Will it be fairer than earlier elections?

We still have problems with the National Electoral Commission. We still think that it is very biased in favour of CCM, the party in power. NEC is not transparent in its operations. As an example, we had received tips that voting identification cards had been burned in one of the Government warehouses. I did not believe it so I went with my party functionaries and journalists to investigate the issue. We found a heap of voting identification cards that had

been burnt. Some of them were only half burnt so we collected them. Some were from Zanzibar; some were from 2005 others from 2008. We had not been informed that the National Electoral Commission would burn voting identification cards. The journalists telephoned the chairman of the Commission but he was not aware of the burning of any voting identification cards. They called the executive secretary of the commission who was also not informed that voting identification cards were being burned. He was more interested to know how we had received that information. When the journalist told him that we had seen with our own eyes a heap of burned voting identification cards in the Government warehouse, he was furious and wanted to know who allowed us to go there. The journalist told him that how we entered the government warehouse was not the issue but rather the burning of the voting identification cards without informing key stakeholders.

After some time, the National Electoral Commission gave a press statement in which they explained that they were burning old voting identification cards which were exchanged with new cards. We are suspicious that there were many CCM supporters who have been registered more than once. The burned voting registration cards were part of the excess of double registered cards. The National Electoral Commission had not provided the required information to political parties. They do not provide us with information that they are supposed to according to the rules and regulations. Most serious opposition parties have no confidence whatsoever in the Electoral Commission and we have called for the resignation of the chairman. It is a problem that the Chairman is selected by the president without any consultation. But the key problem is not the Commission itself but the fact that it does not have any independent structure at the district, constituency and ward level. The officials representing NEC at the regional, district and ward level are government executive officers working under the instructions of District and Regional Commissioners who are CCM party cadres. Therefore we have a lot of problems all over the country. We are not competing with CCM but with the state machinery. President Mkapa was an old-fashioned autocrat and had no commitment to laying the foundation of a democratic polity. President Kikwete has enormous political skills but is completely uninterested in thinking about a development vision that includes building democratic structures for Tanzania.

The CCM's lack of commitment to democratic rule was clearly demonstrated by the way the October 2009 local elections – to elect street and village chairpersons and committees – were administered. The Regulations for these elections were distributed to us only a week before the beginning of the campaign for the elections. To increase the confusion, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Administration introduced guidelines that in important parts contradicted the Regulations. The guidelines introduced many changes that were difficult to implement. Previous elections took place in open general meeting of the village or street without any use of ballot papers. The new regulations introduced the use of ballot papers that were organised by the District Executive Directors. Voters had to write the names and the party for each candidate they voted for. They had to master the names of 25 members of the village committee and their parties. In a country where most voters are functionally illiterate, voting by writing names is just not feasible. CCM and state functionaries organised agents to assist those who could not write. In many areas opposition parties were denied the opportunity to have agents who could assist more than one person to vote. The contesters of the elections were required to have their party seal in their application form. The regulations required just a party seal. The Guidelines required a seal from the lowest organ of the party that is a party branch. Many CUF candidates were disqualified because they followed the Election Regulations and not the Guidelines.

We had contestants in 110 villages from Handeni District who were barred from standing for the elections because their application forms had a seal from the CUF ward office and not the branch office. In all those villages, CCM candidates were declared elected unopposed. In past election when there was a single candidate voters were given the opportunity to cast a 'yes' or 'no' vote. We had not been informed about the new procedures in time. The new rules were thus complicated, but the CCM contestants had been informed far in advance. In fact I 'discovered' the Regulation when I visited the Finnish Embassy a week before the beginning of the election campaign. In the course of our discussion I was told that the Embassy had received the Election Regulations three weeks earlier. Finland was providing funds for local government reform and they were given priority to receive the Regulations. CUF a political party participating in the elections had no information. The Finnish ambassador and his officials were surprised to hear that CUF had not seen them so close to the elections. I called a press conference to complain and the minister for local government and regional administration argued that they had sent the regulations to the Registrar of political parties. However, we had not been informed. In the end we got twenty copies and this was for the whole country. One week before the election campaign began. CCM had known in advance so they could train their people in time. CCM won 90 per cent of the local government seats, over 50 per cent unopposed.

Concluding Discussion

This article is an effort to present the situation of the opposition in Tanzania – a country that has been regarded to be well under way towards a consolidated democracy. Methodologically it is questionable to base any conclusion on interview of only one person, however important and trustworthy. We have however, sought to present, in this article, the opinion of one of the most important representatives of the opposition in Tanzania while still in office. And we use this mainly to illustrate his subjective feelings and understandings of his findings over a long period of years. First, his testimonies do very well coincide with many other documented experiences (Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Menocal, Fritz and Rakner 2008; Lindberg 2009; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Second, Jonas Ewald has, for his PhD thesis (Ewald 2011), in addition done many similar interviews with other members of the opposition in Tanzania, which give similar testimonies. While our primary aim is to add to the empirical evidence of the situation of the opposition in many African countries in general and Tanzania in particular, we also feel that some of the findings are of a more general interest.

The most important finding is the feeling of hopelessness in a longstanding and active opposition politician; whatever effort is put into making a positive impact on the political map of the country is hindered by the ruling party with the help of state resources, both manpower, such as police and the legal system, and budgetary means. Added to this is the lack of all kinds of resources to build a strong organisation that could compete with the well organised ruling party. This feeling – subjective or not – is a very important limitation for building strong opposition parties that can compete for power and thereby act as a check on the abuse of power by the ruling party. This is of particular importance in a relatively homogenous country such as Tanzania which lacks broader social or ethnic groups competing for power like in more diversified societies such as Kenya and Zambia. In addition, parties in Tanzania must be active and obtain support in many parts of the huge country. The existing rudimentary infrastructure in combination with the limited resources of the parties makes it more demanding for the opposition to build the required organisation and to campaign effectively. Lipumba's description on how the opposition is failing in its work for a more level playing field for the political parties in the opposition is therefore of utmost importance. Apart from the oppositions parties' internal institutional, financial and human weaknesses, the opposition strongly perceives that the state and ruling party use various methods to hinder the opposition from developing. Tanzania has also been one of the larger receivers of development aid,

not the least from the Nordic Countries. Among the donor objectives in the last 20 years has been the commitment to support development towards democracy. Many steps forward have been taken in that direction, but at the same time, the ruling party's grip on the state apparatus is stronger than during its first multi-party election in 1995. It might be that the unintended side effects of large budget support and public sector reforms has strengthened the executive power, and hence the party controlling the executive, relatively more than other institutions of democracy. This calls for a review of how various forms of aid intentionally or unintentionally contribute to the absence of a level playing field.

The testimonies also confirm most of the points made in the literature referred to in our introduction: The difficulties to campaign, the widespread accounts of harassment of all levels of the opposition both in its party organisation work and particularly in connection with elections; the asymmetry in information and of financial resources; and again the non-neutrality of key state agencies and institutions during elections, etc are all well-documented. Here, again, Tanzania is particularly influenced by the very long period of one-party state during which the ruling party became conflated with the state in a way that is very difficult to change.

The testimonies presented above – however subjective in nature – are very important and must be taken seriously if Tanzania is to develop a democracy worthy of note and which will serve the Tanzanian people.

Notes

1. This section is based on a number of interviews made with representatives of different political parties, the media, civil society, researchers and the donor community for Jonas Ewald's doctoral dissertation (Ewald 2011). As well as earlier writings (Ewald 1996; Ewald 2001)(Ewald; 2010).
2. Apart from various interviews in Tanzania, see Mmuya (1998;); Hyden (1999;); and Hyden (2005).
3. Personal interviews with CUF National Party Secretary and Information Secretary, mainland, in October 2000, June 2001, May 2002, and with District Party Secretary and District Chairman Pangani in October 2000, August 2002, December 2005 and May 2006, April 2010. Also with CUF Chairman in 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2010.
4. ALN is made up of 17 parties from 15 African countries and is an associated organisation of Liberal International ALN whose aim is to spread Liberal values across the Africa and facilitate the development and growth of Liberal parties, organisations and individuals in all African countries.

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