

Civil-Military Relations in the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Mozambique

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Résumé: Ces dernières années, l'Afrique australe s'est vue obligée, dans un contexte d'après-guerre particulièrement complexe, de s'atteler à la redéfinition de ses priorités en matière de sécurité. Des questions comme la démilitarisation, le redéploiement et la restructuration des forces armées, d'une manière qui puisse intégrer des factions naguère belligérentes, sont devenues plus brûlantes dans cette région qu'ailleurs. L'article s'attarde sur la restructuration des services de l'armée mozambicaine qui se déroule dans un contexte de profondes mutations politiques, tant au plan local que régional. Son argumentaire tourne autour de deux points majeurs: premièrement, il soutient que les démocraties émergentes en Afrique devraient adopter un concept de la sécurité nationale qui puisse correctement prendre en charge les préoccupations des citoyens autant que celles de l'Etat, au plan interne, et promouvoir une approche régionale commune ou régionale; et deuxièmement, il affirme que dans le contexte, les services des forces armées devraient être orientés de manière à ne pas constituer une menace au nouvel ordre politique, mais à contribuer, plutôt, et de façon positive, à la consolidation de la paix et de la réconciliation nationale.

Introduction

In many African states, where governments often lack internal legitimacy, the search for domestic peace and security is a difficult endeavour intimately related to the destiny of the armed services,¹ which are frequently employed to ensure the maintenance and political survival of the ruling elite. In this process, the distinction between the

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1 For the purposes of this paper, 'armed services' include all state-controlled security forces, i.e. the armed forces, police, intelligence and state security agencies.

various branches of the coercive agencies of the state becomes blurred, since the armed forces tend to be deployed internally to deal with domestic threats to the state more frequently than they are used to face external aggressions. The police and intelligence services, in turn, tend to be highly militarized and are frequently employed interchangeably with the military in civil wars or counter-insurgency operations.

This is at variance with the practice in the stable democracies of the West, where there is a clear distinction between the role and functions of the military, the police and the intelligence agencies, and the notion of civil-military relations refers particularly to the interaction between the military and civilian elites. For this reason, although occasionally the armed forces are specifically mentioned in this paper, the analysis is generally valid for the armed services as a whole, i.e., the military, the police and the intelligence agencies.

Experience suggests that peace and security become even more elusive when regular and guerilla forces have to be merged into one army in the aftermath of a civil war.

The countries of Southern Africa, forced to address the legacy of past conflicts, have built an impressive and possibly unique body of knowledge around the complex issues associated with the post-war redefinition of security priorities and consequent restructuring of armed services.

Thus, in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the creation of truly national armed services was carried out more or less successfully. In Angola, however, the integration remained incomplete and allowed the contending parties to the Bicesse Peace Accord to return to war after the 1992 elections. In South Africa, the process is not completely smooth and its critics argue that it is a case of the former apartheid defence and security forces absorbing the equivalent bodies of the liberation

movements and the former 'independent homelands', rather than a true integration.

This paper focuses on the restructuring of the Mozambican armed services, which is taking place in the context of profound political transformations both at the domestic and regional levels. Its argument evolves around two main considerations: (i) that emerging democracies in Africa should espouse a concept of national security which responds to the concerns of the citizens as much as those of the state, domestically, and promotes a common approach regionally; and (ii) that in this context, the armed services should be oriented in such a way that, at least, they do not threaten the new democratic political order and, at most, they contribute positively to the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation.

By way of background, the first section discusses the regional dynamics in Southern Africa. Next, the paper examines the general principles and mechanisms of a stable interaction between the security services and the civilian authorities in democratic states. Finally, the paper examines the challenges to the implementation of such principles and mechanisms in the early stages of the war-to-peace transition in Mozambique.

This analysis of the Southern African and Mozambican experiences is provided with a view to eliciting useful insights to other African regions and countries similarly undergoing war-to-peace transitions.

Southern Africa: Between Hope and Despair

With the end of the Cold War, the international system has lost the spasms—and certainties—of bipolarity, and is adapting to the ambiguities of an emerging multipolar order. Coupled with the demise of apartheid, this has resulted in important political developments in Southern Africa, captured in the new and unanimous discourse on

democracy, respect for human rights, market economy and common security, in regional political and academic circles.

The new discourse reveals a more fundamental process of conflict transformation that radically changed Southern Africa's strategic landscape. Finally liberated from the ideological divisions of the past, the subcontinent evolved from a region at war to a region at peace, where yesterday's enemies are now partners in the common project of building the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Moreover, within the states authoritarianism has been replaced, or is in the process of being replaced, with democratic rule, centralized economic policies with economic liberalism; and an emphasis on the security of the states with a focus on the security of citizens.

The instability inherent in changes of this magnitude is compounded by two important external factors. First, the increasing of the continent as whole. African leaders have expressed the fear that Africa 'has moved from the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy—the permanent political underdog, the world's basket case for which there is little hope' (Nathan 1992:5).

Second, the extreme poverty of most African countries, including those in Southern Africa, determines a high level of dependency on foreign aid which, as a rule, is offered under stringent conditions. These conditions invariably include demands for political pluralism and economic liberalism. This powerful foreign pressure creates an unhealthy tension between process and product: in the haste to establish the formal symbols of liberal democracies, the need for these states and societies to develop a correspondent political culture and economic base can be neglected.

This is not to deny the need for political and economic reform. However, democracy stands little chances to succeed if it is imposed from the outside; democratic states will only emerge when the societies

concerned have taken possession of the concepts and values that underpin democracy, anchoring them in their own specific cultural, political and social universe.

Similarly, the implementation of economic liberalization programmes through structural adjustment normally sharpens, instead of alleviating, the countries' economic crises, since the search for monetary stability and the holding back of public expenditure extract an enormous social cost for the millions of Africans who live in conditions of extreme poverty. As a result, their most elementary security requirements, such as access to food, to shelter, to education, to employment, to medical care and to other basic services, are not being satisfied. Invariably, this has generated high level of conflict.

Thus, in the immediate future, the security of the states and peoples of Southern Africa seems to hang between hope and despair. An outline follows of the main intra and inter-state challenges to regional security.

Inter-State Dynamics: A New Regional Security Order?

In recent decades, the debate on security has been dominated by the controversy around the definition of its primary object. The traditional approach, based on the logic of the Cold War, responds above all to the concerns of the state rather than to the needs of citizens, and grants priority to military stability. This approach neglects non-military threats to security, and ignores non-military methods of conflict resolution and transformation. Inevitably, this perspective leads to the 'security dilemma' when measures taken by one state to ensure its own security may be interpreted as threatening by other states, who consequently take counter-measures. The resulting escalation in the arms race is normally extremely expensive and significantly increases the probability of the outbreak of war.

In post colonial countries, where the state and the nation do not coincide, and governments often lack internal legitimacy, this way of dealing with security can result in situations where state security is opposed to the security of important sectors of the population. In the words of Ken Booth, it 'becomes a code privileges to the security of the country's political regime and of its social elite' (Booth 1994:4).

South Africa under apartheid, Malawi under Banda and virtually all African countries under a one-party regime offer examples of this statement by Booth.

A further negative consequence of the state-centred and militaristic perspective on security in developing countries is the excessive weight of military spending in the state budget. This factor considerably reduces the ability of these states to employ their limited resources on more productive socioeconomic development programmes, and invariably increases their foreign debt.

Reflecting the growing dissatisfaction with the traditional model among policy-makers and academics, a new approach has emerged expanding the concept in its horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontally, the notion of security is broadened to cover political, economic, social and environmental issues. Vertically, security is deepened beyond the state and inter-state levels, in order to respond to the concerns of citizens (Booth 1994:3), enabling them to live in peace and stability, enjoy fair access to resources and unimpeded participation in the process of governance (Nathan 1992:7).

This broader concept acknowledges that peoples, rather than states, are the primary object of security. It also sets a wider security agenda since the threats to human security such as poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, environmental degradation and the abuse of human rights deserve as much attention as the military threats to state security.

A wider security agenda has been opposed with the argument that it becomes unrealistic and unmanageable, since no state can deal effectively with all military and non-military threats to the security of its citizens. This new perspective on security has also been criticized on the grounds that it gives the security forces, and in particular the armed forces, good reason to claim a central role in practically all aspects of political decision-making and governance, since practically every aspect of life is 'securitised'.

Both arguments miss the point.

New thinking on security sets an agenda for radical change, while the traditional approach promotes the maintenance of the status quo. If people are the primary referent, then threats to their security cannot be simply ignored and should be accorded priority treatment. The difficulties with the management of an expanded agenda must be addressed through a careful selection of priorities in the process of policy-making. Further, raising the profile of non-military threats to human security allows for the involvement of actors other than the security forces in the search for solutions. The security forces, in turn, are thus led to confine their activities to addressing military threats to the state.

By late 1992, in recognition of the new opportunities and challenges of the post-apartheid era, and drawing from the experience of co-operation in the 1980s, the SADC had decided that as in the economic sphere, so in the domain of defence and security there was a need for closer cooperation and integration.² However, progress in the materialization of this vision has been slow as the region's politicians and analysts are manifestly divided on the character of such cooperation.

2 See *Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*, SADC, Harare, January 1993.

Some states were of the view that the informality that characterized the Frontline States Organization and its agencies should be retained in post-apartheid regional security mechanisms. That *modus operandi*, it was argued, delivered an efficient response to colonial rule and apartheid destabilisation, while respecting the sensitivities around the national sovereignty of member states. These states, therefore, proposed the creation of an Association of Southern African States (ASAS), which would inherit the functions of the Frontline States and operate as the political and security mechanism of the SADC, maintaining the informal style of its predecessor organization.

In contrast, other states believed that the Frontline States informality was successful because of the combination of a number of factors which are currently changing. First, apartheid and its strategy of regional destabilization was the single most important common threat to the survival of the Frontline States and, therefore, a powerful incentive to bring these states together.

Secondly, the struggle against white rule was the only item in the regional security agenda. That struggle has been successfully completed and, needless to say, it is always easier to unite against a common threat rather than for a common goal.

Thirdly, leaders such as Julius , Kenneth Kaunda, Samora Machel, Agostinho Neto, Seretse Khama, Robert Mugabe and Oliver Tambo shared the same vision of the process of liberation of the sub-continent from white minority rule. Their vision led them to create the Frontline States and the SADC. Moreover, political and military cadres from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, lived and trained together in the refugee and military camps in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In that process, and similarly to their leaders, they developed strong and lasting personal friendships amongst themselves and with their hosts. After liberation, a number of these former freedom-fighters became senior

politicians, military officers and security officials in their respective countries.

Of that generation of leaders, only President Mugabe is still active in the forefront of regional politics. New national leaderships have emerged in some states who do not have that powerful common background and bonding. In addition, the current focal point of the common agenda (economic and social development) entails much more competition and potential for conflict among the member states than the national liberation struggle. Under these circumstances, the informal tradition of the Frontline States may not be enough to bring about an effective common approach to defence and security in Southern Africa.

After nearly three years of debates and consultations, a broad consensus finally emerged in the region around the themes of common security, demilitarization and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a result, the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) was revitalized and an SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was established.

Created in 1983 as a substructure of the Frontline States, the ISDSC was traditionally an informal forum gathering ministers responsible for Defence, State Security and Public Security. Its primary function was to operationalize the decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government of the Frontline States with regard to the common effort in support of the liberation movements in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Over the past few years, the ISDSC has evolved towards a more complex and less informal organization with the establishment of three Sub-Committees respectively on Defence, Public Security and State Security, and subordinate sub-structures.

The ISDSC is likely to be incorporated into the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which was agreed upon at the SADC

Ministerial Meeting in Gaborone, in January 1996. The Organ will work to achieve the following objectives, among others:

- to promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political values systems and institutions;
- to co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- to promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
- to develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere in the continent,
- to promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security.

Two factors may contribute to slow the materialization of this common vision of regional security. First, the scarcity of human and financial resources places a major challenge to common structures which, inevitably, will reflect the limitations of national institutions (Nathan 1994:14-15).

Secondly, the overwhelming military superiority of South Africa relative to all other SADC member states, despite the obviously friendly intentions of the ANC government towards its neighbours, raises some concerns in regional political and military circles. Those fears are aggravated by both the perception that the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still dominated by the apartheid military elite, and the notion that some western powers are encouraging South Africa to play a 'benign' hegemonic role in securing stability in the region and elsewhere in Africa.

These obstacles notwithstanding, the reality of interdependence has been unambiguously acknowledged and regional cooperation is now firmly on the Southern African security agenda.

Is the Region demilitarizing?

One important result of the improvement in inter-state relations in Southern Africa is the current wave of drastic cuts in force levels and military spending, which contributes to reinforcing the emergent climate of regional stability.

Thus, South Africa, by far the most significant regional military power, has reduced its defence budget by 51 per cent since 1989 (*International Security Digest - ISD* 1996) and will downsize the SANDF from 121,000 to 75,000 over the next 5 years (1995); Zimbabwe is currently reducing its defence force from 51,000 to 40,000; Mozambique's new defence force is at the level of 12,000, less than half of the planned 30,000; and Angola, under the Lusaka Protocol, will reduce its military to 70,000 (Cock 1996:12).

Botswana is the only SADC state to manifest a contrary tendency with the recently announced acquisitions of 13 CF-5 aircraft from Canada (*ISD* 1996); and 54 Leopard 1-V Main Battle Tanks, 50 Carl Gustav (84 mm) recoilless guns and 279 DAF trucks from the Netherlands (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 1996:17). Some analysts fear that these acquisitions may introduce a measure of instability in the region.

Does this mean that, with the intriguing exception of Botswana, the states of Southern Africa have engaged in a process of demilitarization?

A brief consideration of the concept of militarization may be useful in assessing the degree to which Southern African states are demilitarizing. First, it is important to draw a distinction between the following three interrelated social phenomena: the military institution, the ideology of militarism and the process of militarization (Cock and Nathan 1989:2). Some analysts define militarism as, '... a set of attitudes and social practices which regard war and the preparation of war as a normal and desirable social activity (Mann n.d. p.35).

Others view militarism as,

... first (...) an aggressive foreign policy, based on a readiness to resort to war; second, the preponderance of the military in the state, the extreme case being that of military rule; third, subservience of the whole society to the needs of the army which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance with the pattern of military organization; and fourth, an ideology which promotes military ideas (Andreski 1968:429)..

Quite frequently, militarism is also used to describe large armed forces and excessive defence expenditure. This leads to a problem of criteria: how do we define 'large armed forces'? In relation to the total population of the country? To the size of the territory? To the armed forces of neighbouring states? By the same token, how do we measure 'excessive defence spending'? Just as a portion of the GDP? Or as compared to spending in social areas such as health, education and the provision of basic services?

More generally, the different meanings of 'militarism' have attracted the criticism of making the term descriptive with very little, if any, analytical value (Smith and Smith 1983:9-13).

Cock provides the useful suggestion that militarization is a multidimensional social process which 'involves both the spread of militarism as an ideology, and the expansion of the power and influence of the military as a social institution' (Cock and Nathan 1989:2).

Apartheid South Africa presents a well documented typical example of such a process,³ whose central features can be summarized as:

(a) the development of a perception of an eminent domestic, regional and international threat, encapsulated in the theory of 'Total Onslaught';

(b) the promotion of a militarist ideology legitimizing the massive use of force by the state to counter that threat, codified in the concept of 'Total National Strategy'; and

3 For detailed studies of the process of militarization of apartheid South Africa see Frankel 1984; Johnson 1988; Grundy 1988; Cock and Nathan 1989.

(c) the development of civil-military relations characterized by the extension of the powers and influence of the security forces to virtually all areas of government domestic and foreign policy.

In Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, similar processes of militarization developed as a result of, first, the national liberation wars and, later, the resistance to apartheid destabilisation.

As stated earlier, the states in Southern Africa have engaged in significant reductions of force levels and defence budgets. Four interrelated factors seem to have contributed to this:

(a) The perception of receding external military threats to the countries of the region, as a result of the progress in inter state relationships,

(b) the fact that foreign aid, on which most states in the region are heavily dependent, is provided under conditions which invariably include political pluralism, economic liberalism and the reduction of defence spending;

(c) domestic pressures for increased resources to meet the pressing needs of social and economic development, and

(d) the presence of governments sensitive to those needs, either because of a genuine commitment to good governance, or just to guarantee their own maintenance in power.

These defence cuts occur simultaneously with a tendency towards committing more resources to the police forces, as a response to the proliferation of small arms in the hands of private citizens and security companies, poachers, crime syndicates, 'vigilante' groups, mercenaries and extremist political formations, in a symptom of what Cock (1996:1) calls a 'privatized militarization'.

In some instances, the sharp raise in organized criminal activities, such as poaching (Zimbabwe), weapons and drugs smuggling (Mozambique), require that the police be trained and equipped to conduct military-type operations. In other cases, the levels of political violence and instability determine the deployment of a sizeable military

force (KwaZulu/Natal). In any event, the distinction that stable democracies make between the roles of the police and the military is blurred, as the policing function becomes militarized and the armed forces are deployed against their own fellow citizens.

This suggests that demilitarization can not be measured just as a function of reductions in defence spending and force levels. To these indicators, undeniably important, should be added a move away from the employment of military methods to deal with 'civilian crimes', and political and social conflicts; and a significant reduction of the power and influence of the military institution.

Further, a comprehensive programme of demilitarization in Southern Africa also needs to take cognizance of, and address, the question of privatized militarization. This requires both enhancing the states' capacity to maintain law and order, and resolving the systemic causes of crime and violence. Like (1996:4) suggests, transformation is needed at the level of attitudes, social values, practices and relations.

Domestic Outlook: Peace Without Justice?

In their current format, neither the ISDSC nor the SADC Organ directly address the more urgent domestic security concerns of the member states.

Indeed, as the external military threats—real or perceived—recede, new—and old—internal non-military threats to the security of states and peoples pose a formidable challenge to the region. Such threats result from factors like the presence of fragile democracies; the lack of effective governance; unstable civil-military relations, the proliferation of small weapons in private hands; internal political and ethnic conflict; countless refugees and displaced persons; thousands of demobilized soldiers and guerrillas who are destitute; chronic underdevelopment

and attendant poverty; and rampant disease and environmental degradation.

In the war-to-peace transitions in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, the above problems are exacerbated by the thorny issue of peace and justice. It is common knowledge that in wars which end with the unconditional defeat of one party, the winner invariably exerts the right to judge and punish the vanquished for the human and material cost of the strife. The victor's abuses are conveniently underrated, explained, excused or ignored and the defeated party carries all the blame. Peace comes with a measure of justice, however partial and biased.

From a military perspective, the major internal conflicts in Southern Africa ended inconclusively. Such were the cases in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. Angola is equally moving, painfully slowly, towards a negotiated solution. In all instances, the parties involved accepted that a conclusive military victory was not possible and peace required a measure of accommodation of their respective opponents. In my view, it was this realization that prompted the political will to seek peaceful settlements.

South Africa and Mozambique illustrate different approaches to post-war reconciliation and justice in the region. In South Africa, the ANC held the moral high ground, but was far from scoring a military victory; the apartheid regime, in turn, with all its military power, had no domestic nor international legitimacy, was unable to obliterate the liberation movements and could no longer resist the heavy economic pressure of the sanctions.

After the settlement, the new regime, was in a position to impose the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the granting of indemnity to those individuals who acknowledged the commission of crimes in defence of apartheid or in the struggle against it, and the prosecution of only the 'unrepentant criminals'. This is

possible thanks to the unparalleled moral stature of a leader like Nelson Mandela, the presence of a relatively sophisticated state, and a vibrant, well informed and demanding civil society.

However imperfect, this selective approach to justice has created a fundamental social healing space upon which all South Africans can build a new sense of South Africanness.

Mozambique offers a contrasting example. Here, both the FRELIMO⁴ government and the RENAMO⁵ rebels were unable to win the war. RENAMO could not claim the legitimacy of a liberation movement, in view of its history and terrorist tactics; the government was rapidly losing the prestige and popular support it had enjoyed in the early years of independence. Moreover, the government was under tremendous domestic and international pressure to engage in negotiations with RENAMO.

The transformation of the rebel movement into a political party was a critical pre-condition to ensure that RENAMO had a stake in the peace process. Accordingly, Protocol III of the Peace Accord that ended the war stated that

The Government undertakes to assist in obtaining installations and means so that RENAMO may secure the accommodation and

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- 4 FRELIMO is the Portuguese acronym for Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the nationalist movement that led the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism (1962-1974). After independence, FRELIMO became a Marxist party and established a socialist regime in Mozambique. Following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, FRELIMO once again re-invented itself, this time along the lines of a social-democratic party, and presided over the transformation of the political system into a liberal democracy in the early 1990s.
 - 5 MNR was the initial acronym for Mozambique National Resistance, and was replaced with RENAMO after 1982, when the movement adopted the Portuguese version of its name: Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique. For a detailed description of RENAMO's origins and tactics, see Vines, A., 1991, *RENAMO — Terrorism in Mozambique*, James Currey, London.

transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities in all the provincial capitals and in other locations to the extent that the available resources so permit. For these purposes, the Government shall seek support from the international community and, in particular, from Italy (United Nations 1995:111).

In this connection, an important and innovative feature of the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was the establishment of a trust fund to help RENAMO become a political party. The UN Secretary General noted that

The transformation of a guerrilla force, experienced only in war, into a political force with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the most significant legacies of the United Nations operation (United Nations 1995:4).

What also needs to be stated, though, is that RENAMO's war experience was in fact one of the most brutal campaigns of systematic terror against civilian populations since World War II. In spite of that, one of the foundations of the peace process in Mozambique was the understanding that there would not be investigation of allegations regarding war crimes.

Whether or not RENAMO would have resumed fighting if it were not bought out of the military option remains an open question. What is clear, though, is that not only was RENAMO not held accountable for its massive violations of human rights during the war,⁶ but was also rewarded with international community funds. And, sad irony, this was done in compliance with the Peace Accord, and in the name of peace, reconciliation and democracy.

Under these circumstances, the war crimes have been ignored, allegedly to avoid reopening the wounds of war and for the sake of national reconciliation. In other words, justice was the price paid for peace; and national reconciliation, in these terms, perpetuates a culture

6 For an independent account of RENAMO's violations of human rights during the war see Gersony R. (1988).

of impunity. It raises perceptions of an unethical partnership between FRELIMO and RENAMO, without any serious attempt to establish harmony and justice among all Mozambicans.

In their discourse on national reconciliation, FRELIMO and RENAMO leaders have often said that the war in Mozambique ended with 'no winners and no losers'. This may be so for them as politicians, either in government or in the opposition, now entitled to the generous salaries, the cars, the houses and the social status that come with high public office. For the 'anonymous' people of the land, though, it may not be true. Those were the real losers whose quest for justice failed to stimulate the attention of the authorities, the international community and media.

It is against this background that post-war restructuring of security forces in Mozambique is examined below.

Restructuring Security Forces in the Transition: The Case of Mozambique

The point was made earlier in this paper that the emerging African democracies will thrive only if the peoples and institutions acquire democratic values and develop an indigenous democratic political culture. This is certainly true for Mozambique and particularly relevant for the restructuring of its armed services.

Consistently with the transformation of the political system, from one-party socialist oriented regime to a multiparty liberal democracy, the security forces in Mozambique are being restructured following a Western model of civil-military relations. It is therefore pertinent to initiate this section with an examination of the general principles and mechanisms of such interaction in Western democracies.

Principles and Mechanisms of Civil-Military Relations in Stable Democracies

In mature Western democracies, social and political stability are based on a number of factors: a strong national cohesion; a relatively high degree of transparency, inclusiveness and accountability in the conduct of the affairs of the state; a considerable level of general economic prosperity and material wealth; the respect for human and individual rights; a political culture and practice of tolerance and respect for dissension; the absence of violence in the struggle for political power; and stable civil-military relations.

In those societies, armed forces are conceived and employed primarily to deter and resist external aggression, and promote foreign policy goals. The threats to internal stability and security are normally confronted by the police services.⁷ Equally, the armed services are formally barred from the process of political decision-making which is the exclusive domain of the elected civilian authorities.

As a result of their exclusive access to the legal means of violence and coercion, armed services enjoy an extraordinary degree of 'naked power' and can influence decisively the outcome of political disputes by supporting one of the factions involved. In view of this, all states seek to guarantee adequate control over their armed forces, through the adoption of certain principles and mechanisms to govern the civil-military interaction.

7 In extraordinary circumstances, such as the conflict in Northern Ireland, liberal democracies also use armed forces to deal with threats to internal security; however, that is an exception, rather than the rule.

The Principles

Depending on their historical background and legal system, liberal democracies adopt different forms of 'guarding the guardians'. However, the overarching principle of military subordination to civilian political control is a common and central feature in the relationship between the armed services and their civilian political masters.

Civilian political supremacy over the armed services entails a clear separation between civilian and military powers and responsibilities, the accountability of the armed services to the government and parliament; and the practice of transparency in the conduct of defence and security affairs.⁸

In essence, the distinction between civilian and military powers and responsibilities is captured in Samuel Finer's argument that armed forces should avoid interfering in politics other than through institutional channels. The mission, role and responsibilities of the armed forces are established by the Constitution, the Defence Act and military regulations. The military is expected to understand and uphold the value system, which underlies this legal framework and, as a consequence, operate in strict observance of the parameters defined therein.

Indeed, like other professional groups within the state bureaucracy, military leaders may provide technical expertise to policy formulation and invariably try to promote their corporate interest. However, they are obliged to do so in a way which does not challenge the authority of the elected civilian politicians who hold the prerogative of political decision making (Nathan 1994:60-64).

8 For an overview of theories on civil-military relations see Edmonds, M., 1988, *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester University Press, pp. 70-92.

In the words of Martin Edmonds (1988:74-75):

The attractiveness of Finer's approach is that it is premised on a clear, unequivocal structural distinction between what is proper for the armed services to do, and what is the power and authority of government. The relationship between armed services and society is clearly prescribed by a legal definition of the powers and spheres of responsibility of the armed services; and if democracy is to be assured, the armed services should not venture beyond... these boundaries.

In order to ensure accountability, which flows from the military subordination to civilian control, the Minister of Defence is vested with political authority over the armed forces. The Minister is answerable to the government for the management of the defence force. The government in turn is accountable to the legislature and the public for the formulation and execution of defence policy (Edmonds 1988:64-65).

By making the armed forces accountable to the civilian authorities, democratic states seek to guarantee that military power is used according to democratically established policies in the service of society as a whole, rather than in the pursuit of any sectional agenda, which may be contrary to the public interest. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such assurance is provided through the Minister of Defence and the parliamentary defence committee.

Accountability in turn requires transparency. Without the timely availability of reliable and sufficient information, decision-making in both the government and parliament may be undermined. At a more general level, citizens also have the right to be informed about military and security matters in order to assess whether or not the executive's defence and security policies promote national security.

Transparency and freedom of information are in tension with the confidential nature of defence and security policy-making and execution. The challenge lies in finding the right balance between the

risk of exposing sensitive information and the need to avoid excessive secrecy (Edmonds 1988:63).

The Mechanisms

A number of mechanisms exist to ensure the practical implementation of the above principles. These mechanisms operate within the armed services, the executive and legislative branches of the state, and the general public.

As a rule, armed forces in liberal democracies accept the principles of civil-military relations discussed above for two main reasons. First, soldiers and officers come from societies whose political culture is based on democratic values and practices. Secondly, through a process of training and orientation the military professionals are led to accept the principle of civilian supremacy and the need to refrain from taking actions which may undermine the elected authorities as core values of their profession. In this connection, it is relevant to explore further the notion of military professionalism.

This concept has been differently understood in various countries in distinct periods, reflecting the interaction of factors such as political culture, military traditions, and the level of complexity of the state bureaucracy (Edmonds 1988:38-43; Williams 1992:22-30). However, the general view is that modern military professionalism in democratic states includes the broad features of any profession and the command of legitimacy in the wider society.

Greenwood identified specialization, authority, community sanction, a code of ethics and a specific professional culture as the attributes of a profession. The following remarks draw on his discussion of professionalism (Edmonds 1988:38-41).

Specialization means that the professional combines the knowledge of a body of scientific theory with the practical ability to perform a given set of tasks. The professional's expertise results from extensive training. In the case of the armed forces, the theory and practice of warfare, or 'the managed application of violence', is the essence of specialization.

This expertise confers on the professional the authority to provide a specialized service. In the medical profession, for example, the doctor has the know-how and autonomy to cure the patient whose recovery depends on the doctor's expert diagnosis and prescription. In the case of the armed forces in a democratic state, however, the relationship between the professional and the client is more complex.

The state is both the client and the master of the armed forces. The state and society rely on military expertise to deal with threats to their security. At the same time, *armed forces are subordinate to civilian political control.*

Community sanction means that society confers on professional groups certain privileges and powers such as the autonomy to admit, train and evaluate its members; the right to confidentiality; the autonomy to set the standards of professional expertise; and the legal monopoly to practise their profession. Armed forces equally enjoy these prerogatives.

The code of ethics regulates the professional's relationship with society and with his/her peers. In the armed forces, the ethical code demands that the serviceman/woman is unconditionally committed to the defence of society and is permanently ready to carry out orders from a higher authority.

Professional culture reflects all the above attributes. It incorporates adherence to a set of values and norms, and includes symbols such as

uniforms and insignia and the use of a distinctive professional language.⁹

Finally, legitimacy is a particular component of military professionalism. The role of the armed forces as the manager of organized violence commands legitimacy in the wider society for as long as society feels that military expertise exists in an area that is crucial to the life of the entire national community and is exercised in conformity with established norms and principles. Thus, the military leadership is expected to be responsible both individually and collectively towards the government and the community.

However, this form of self-restraint is not sufficient to prevent military elites from unconstitutional interference in politics. Moved by its corporate interests or political views, the officer corp can be tempted to challenge their political masters (Edmonds 1988:81-82).

For this reason, the government and parliament introduce legal instruments of control of the military. These mechanisms presuppose that the politicians and civil servant involved therein command the necessary knowledge and skills to oversee defence policy implementation. In essence, they regulate the 'distribution of power and influence' between the civilian and the military elites and normally include:

- Legislation like the Constitution and the Defence Act, defining the powers, mission, role, organization, composition and other features of the armed forces;
- a civilian Head of State is the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces and has the power to appoint and dismiss the top military leadership;

9 For an overview of the concept of military professionalism, see Edmonds 1988, pp. 38-43.

- the power to declare war and make peace rests with the Head of State, parliament or both, but is never the prerogative of the military;
- a civilian ministry of defence that oversees, and is responsible for the activities of the military;
- multiparty parliamentary control over the defence budget, procurement and policy;
- legislation preventing excessive secrecy and ensuring 'right of information' about military matters.

At a broader level, society also has a measure of participation and indirect control through informed public debate, academic research and media inputs on issues like the military doctrine, threat perceptions, participation in peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, defence budget, weapons procurement and military co-operation. An extreme manifestation of such control is the power that the public has to vote out of office a government which pursues an unpopular defence policy. (Nathan 1994:64).

The above model of civil-military relations was developed in Western liberal democracies, over the centuries, as the underlying political system matured. Its appropriateness in the highly unstable circumstances of war-to-peace transition in African societies is discussed next through an examination of the Mozambican experience.

Obstacles to the Creation of the New Defence Force

Protocol IV of the Rome Peace Accord between the Government and RENAMO set out the guidelines for the establishment of the new Mozambique Defence Force, the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique (FADM). According to these guidelines, the FADM should result from the integration of former government and RENAMO armies. It was defined as a non-partisan, volunteer and professional

force,¹⁰ comprising 30,000 personnel in three services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. The government and RENAMO were each to contribute 50 per cent of the total strength of FADM.

In compliance with the Accord, the United Nations, Great Britain, France and Portugal, assisted with the training and integration of the High Command and a few Units of the FADM, during the period between the signing of the Peace Accord, in October 1992 and the general elections of October 1994.

For a number of reasons the creation of a defence force consistent with a democratic system is proving to be an extremely complex task that goes beyond the initial training provided by a body of instructors from well established democracies.

First, in many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, despite the fact that their officers were trained in mature democracies, armed forces have interfered in the political affairs of the state to the extent of staging coups and establishing military regimes.

Secondly, the officers and soldiers selected to integrate the FADM belonged, until very recently, to armed forces which were neither designed nor oriented to serve a democracy, and were central actors in a particularly vicious and cruel conflict. There is, therefore, a need for them to be educated in the patterns of legitimate interaction with society in a peaceful and democratic environment.

Thirdly, despite the introduction of a new Constitution in 1990, which formally defines Mozambique as a liberal democracy, it will certainly take more than a constitutional change to transform the political culture of Mozambican society. The institutional weakness of the state, the absence of a significant civil society and the severe economic, social and psychological legacy of the war ensure that the

10 See 'General Peace Agreement of Mozambique', European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA), Amsterdam, 1992, p. 28.

process of political democratization occurs without the mutually enriching interaction of a strong state with a strong civil society.

This problem will have to be addressed in a fundamental way if the current transition is to bear the desired results. Failure to do so may inhibit the democratic transformation of the armed forces, since a weak state is less effective in controlling the power of the armed forces. This in turn creates the potential for interventionist tendencies within the military, which may undermine the state and democracy.

Equally crucial, a weak civil society is unable to make substantial inputs in policy-making and keep the state and its agencies in check. In the defence realm, this means that the state is more at liberty to formulate and implement unpopular defence policies or, even worse, to use military power against the public interest.

Besides the general societal features described above, the development of democratic model of civil-military relations in Mozambique is hindered by a range of factors related to the history of the opposing military formations and the particular features of the process of war termination. These are briefly reviewed below.

Contrary to the expectations of the parties, it was difficult to identify volunteers to join the new defence force. Thus, by the end of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in December 1994 the FADM comprised a total of only 11,579 troops.¹¹

Many observers have raised concerns about the quality of the integration training provided to senior officers and generals of the new force. The officers were appointed to attend 'leadership courses' by their respective political masters, without much attention to criteria like academic or military technical qualification, years of experience, etc.

11 See *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, 1995, p. 42.

Apparently concerned with avoiding conflict with both signatories of the Peace Accord, the Portuguese instructors who provided that training did not challenge that position and accepted all candidates. Moreover, these leadership courses lasted for 6 to 8 weeks, which was clearly not enough to overcome the handicaps of most candidates. To make matters worse, all candidates qualified and received senior officer and general ranks without any form of evaluation.

It may be argued that Portugal could have done a job more in accordance with the traditions and the prestige of its own armed forces. However, it is probable that Portugal did its best, in the complex conditions of the Mozambique peace process. In any event, what matters is that the new Mozambican defence force is led by an officer corp which, at least in part, does not meet some of the basic requirements of military professionalism.

Furthermore, neither force had been conceived or oriented to serve a democratic political system. On the government side, the *Forças Armadas de Mocambique* (FAM) evolved from the guerilla formations which led the national liberation war against Portuguese colonialism and were politically aligned with the ruling party, FRELIMO. Thus, the first Constitution of the (People's) Republic of Mozambique explicitly defined the armed forces as the military extension of FRELIMO whose primary mission was the defence of the Mozambican revolution.

In addition, all heads of services and main commanders were full members of the party's central committee, the Minister of defence and his deputies, all generals, were members of the party's politburo; the party's ideological guidance and control over the military was ensured through a system of political commissars and a network of party committees; military leaders were members of the national, provincial and local legislatures; and, like in other socialist states, party affiliation and ideological reliance were major criteria for the career development of officers.

Thus, the armed forces were an essential part of the ruling party and civil-military relations were characterized by the participation of the military elite at all level of policy formulation and political decision-making. The FAM was essentially the military expression of FRELIMO, created, developed and employed to defend and promote the socialist state within the framework of FRELIMO's national project for Mozambique.

Of course the new defence force has no such formal affiliation with FRELIMO. The process of political disengagement started as early as 1991-92 with the abolition of the political commissariat and all party structures in the military, and the withdrawal of all senior commanders from Frelimo's central committee list. However, there is a perception that most generals and senior officers of FADM who served in the former government army prior to the peace settlement maintain close connections with FRELIMO.

As the military conduit of foreign interventionist interests, RENAMO was effectively a mercenary army in its own country. Despite its notorious cruelty against the civilian population, however, RENAMO drew some internal support from the peasantry, which had been disempowered by the government's antagonism to the rural cultural heritage and practices and a by a policy of forced villagization.¹² In this connection, Hall (1991:3) has commented:

As the war has progressed, destabilisation, externally mounted, has tipped over into an internally self-generating process of violence, to which the Mozambican government has been compelled to seek accommodation.

This brief examination of the history of both military formations which integrate the FADM reveals that neither was conceived to serve in a democratic state in the terms that post-war Mozambique is being

12 For an informative account of how the peasants of Erati reacted to FRELIMO's agrarian policies in the early 1980s and entered into an alliance with RENAMO, see Geffray, C., 1990.

designed. Under these circumstances, the training of the new Mozambican defence force by officers from western democracies, however important, is therefore not sufficient to ensure that FADM will be governed by democratic values. What else, then, should be done?

Towards a Defence Force Consistent with Democracy in Mozambique

As was stated in the introduction, democracy will thrive in Mozambique only if its people and its institutions acquire democratic values and develop a corresponding political culture. This is critically relevant for the armed services and in particular the military institution, and raises a number of questions: What are 'armed services consistent with a democratic system' in the Mozambican context? How can the armed services acquire a 'democratic culture' in a society with no liberal democratic traditions, and come to accept the principles of civilian control, accountability, transparency and public scrutiny? How can they develop the qualities of professional competence and political legitimacy needed to serve in a democratic order? Should their members, especially those guilty of outright terrorism, play an active role in the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure and social fabric?

This section draws from the earlier discussion of the principles and mechanisms of civil-military relations in stable democracies and explores their implications on the role, professionalism and legitimacy of the armed services and the FADM.

In the light of the history of the organizations from which the members of the new defence and security establishment were drawn, it seems obvious that while the armed services should be non-partisan with regard to party politics, they need to be politically oriented in democratic values. The purpose, cohesion and sense of loyalty of the new armed services should be built around the ideals and values of

democracy, in order to enable its interaction with the state and society to be framed by the respect for the principles upon which peace is being built in Mozambique.

Specifically, their members should undergo a programme of education, covering matters such as the constitutional provisions on basic rights and defence; the principles and mechanisms of democratic civil-military relations; international law on armed conflict; human rights; and the ethical dimensions of military professionalism. This will contribute to ensure that military power will legitimately serve the Mozambican society as a whole, rather than be misused to promote sectarian interests, be they ethnic, religious or partisan ambitions, or indeed the corporate self-interest of the military and security agencies themselves.

Moreover, for the mechanisms of civilian control over the armed services to be effective, a number of additional measures are required. First, general public debate of defence and security matters should be promoted to encourage citizens and interest groups to contribute inputs to defence and security policy making. Local researchers and the media may play a critical role in creating the civil society constituency to engage the state in such a debate.

Secondly, the politicians and senior civil servants of the ministries of defence and interior, and the members of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Public Order need to be trained in areas such as defence and security planning, budgeting and procurement, to be able of perform their task effectively.

This last aspect is particularly relevant because, like in other emerging democracies, Mozambican politicians and civil servants typically lack the experience and skills to manage defence and security policy implementation. As a result, their relationship with the military and security leadership is characterized by a considerable degree of

tension and frustration. Moreover, civilian inexperience may open the doors for military involvement in politics.¹³

Stable civil-military relations will also depend on the government's willingness and ability to fulfill its responsibilities with regard to the armed services. In this connection, a conscious effort by civilian and military leaders to build trust and mutual respect is crucial. Nathan (1994:85-86) argues that:

in this sense, the term 'confidence- and security-building measures' which usually applies to inter-state relations, also has domestic application in emerging democracies.

Just as the armed services should avoid taking actions which may undermine the position of democratically elected politicians, politicians and bureaucrats should respect the military and security chain of command and not interfere in the tactical and operational aspects of defence and security. Besides demanding that the military and security agencies observe legality, the government itself should operate within the law, refrain from using the armed services for partisan purposes, and respect their professional input and corporate interest in defence and security policy-making. In particular, the government should provide the necessary material and financial conditions to guarantee the effectiveness of the armed services (Nathan 1994:85-86).

In other words, the development of stable civil-military relations in Mozambique demands more than the uncritical application of the principle of civilian political control. It requires that military and civilian leaders consider themselves as partners, even if with unequal powers and responsibilities, co-operating towards the broader process of national reconciliation, which is a central feature of Mozambique's transition to democratic rule.

13 See Nathan L., 1994. Although these remarks were made with reference to Latin American countries undergoing a transition to democracy such as Nicaragua, they are equally applicable to Mozambique, p.66.

Nathan describes civil-military relations as ‘the distribution of power and influence between the armed services—the civilian authority’ (Nathan 1994:60). In this sense, the nature of civil military relations, that is, how power and influence are distributed between the military and the civilian authorities—reflects and shapes the political system. In the case of Mozambique, this means that just as democratic civil-military relations are essential for democracy to succeed, so the democratization of the state and society are critical to the establishment of a democratic civil-military interaction.

The Roles of FADM

The general purpose of FADM is to guarantee national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In addition, FADM may be required to protect civilians against ‘crime and violence of all kinds’ in cooperation with the police; the military may also be employed to provide assistance in emergency situations resulting from natural disasters, and in support of reconstruction and development programmes.¹⁴ A brief examination of each of these missions follows.

a) Defence against external threats

Historically, the only external military threat to the security of Mozambique and of other independent states in Southern Africa was posed by the white minority regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria. With the demise of apartheid, this threat no longer stands.

Nevertheless, South Africa will remain the regional power and will retain a considerable offensive military capacity which may be perceived as a potential threat by Mozambique. The solution to this or

14 See ‘General Peace Agreement of Mozambique’, p. 28.

any other external threat which originates within Southern Africa¹⁵ should be sought through means other than military confrontation.

To ease inter-state tension and prevent the development of violent conflicts in Southern Africa, Mozambique should contribute to promoting the establishment of bilateral and collective security cooperation arrangements within the framework of the broader regional integration project proposed by SADC. This would allow member states to concentrate their energies on the reconstruction and development of their countries. It would also mean that the FADM would not have to actively engage in defence against external aggression.

b) Internal deployment

Mozambique is characterized by a high level of social instability caused mainly by the prevailing socioeconomic conditions. In addition, a growing number of demobilized soldiers resort to violence as a means of survival. Thus, the military's key function is likely to be action to restore stability for as long as it takes to train and equip the police force to deal with the internal threats to security.

However, armed forces are trained and oriented to use maximum force to destroy the enemy in the battlefield rather than to maintain law and order in an essentially civilian environment. As matter of principle, they should be employed exclusively to fight external threats and not their fellow citizens. The internal deployment of the armed forces not only undermines their legitimacy with sections of the population and

15 Certain political and military circles in Mozambique conceive threat scenarios (highly unrealistic in the view of this writer) whereby Zimbabwe and Malawi may have territorial ambitions concerning some areas in the country, and therefore, should Mozambique be perceived to be very weak, these states could consider military action to redraw the common borders.

but also has a negative impact on their cohesion and morale, as was the case in Zimbabwe after independence (Seegers 1986:129-165).

Furthermore, as a result of a counter-insurgency function and internal policing orientation, the military invariably becomes involved in political decision-making, which, in turn, leads to a militarization of society. Apartheid South Africa is a case in point (Spence 1988:240-25). To a lesser degree, the same tendency has been evident in Mozambique since the early 1980s.

In order to minimize the above risks, if the FADM is going to be employed in counter-insurgency and internal policing roles, the training of its units should pay particular attention to issues like appropriate rules of engagement, human rights education and the use of minimum force. As a long-term strategy, the police should be developed to the point where it can contain internal conflict without military intervention.

c) Emergency assistance and reconstruction and development

The hopes of regional stability seem to be materializing and Mozambique cannot identify, currently or in the foreseeable future, a credible external military threat. Moreover, at the time of writing this paper, the level of criminality does not seem to require extraordinary measures. Under these circumstances, Mozambique can safely concentrate resources and energy on post-war peace-building, that is, national reconciliation, restoration of social capital, political democratization and economic development.

Disaster relief operations, the reconstruction of the numerous roads, bridges, hospitals and schools that were destroyed during the war, and the provision of health care, education services and environmental protection, are actions that will contribute to consolidate

peace. These actions also have a direct impact on improving the security of citizens.

The participation of the FADM in such undertakings could make it a productive force in peace-time and contribute to enhancing its legitimacy with the broader society. However, while the employment of armed forces in disaster relief is generally accepted, the desirability of on-going military involvement in typically non-military activities is questionable.

The involvement of armed forces in civilian tasks may undermine military professionalism and combat-readiness; it may help self-interested military elites to motivate the need for a large force and an inflated military budget; and, more significantly, it may lead them to believe that they have a superior ability to manage society.

In summary, the key roles of the FADM are likely to be internal deployment and involvement in reconstruction and development activities. Counter-insurgency and policing should be temporary functions of the military, while the police force is being adequately trained and equipped to deal with threats to internal stability.

Internal deployment of the FADM and its involvement in development programmes may be critically necessary functions to peace-building in Mozambique. However, in the long-term, they may also undermine the stability of civil-military relations.

There is no easy solution to this dilemma. Politicians, the military, the media, academics and the public should engage in a debate around these controversial issues, with a view to establishing what best suits the needs of the country.¹⁶

16 For a compelling motivation of military involvement in civilian tasks see for example, Harbottle, Brig M., 1991, 'What is proper soldiering? A study on new perspectives for the future uses of the armed forces in the 1990s', Report of the Centre for International Peace Building.

Legitimacy

The full achievement of legitimacy by the FADM may depend, to a significant extent, on the attitude of both the state and society at large towards those officers and soldiers who committed acts of terrorism and human rights abuses during the war. Three broad options can be identified to approach this issue, none of which is totally free from undesirable political and ethical consequences.¹⁷

As a first option, the state could decide that it is in the interest of national reconciliation and internal cohesion of the to ignore past human rights abuses. This seems to be the prevailing view. However, it will lead to war criminals being treated with impunity in the emerging democracy and, more important, being entrusted with the means of organized violence that they abused so gravely in the past.

As a result, the credibility of the FADM could be seriously undermined from the outset, and the expectations of justice of vast sections of the Mozambican society would be frustrated. Moreover, the healing of the wounds of war demands that such wounds are unambiguously acknowledged in the first place. Only after the crimes have been exposed and the perpetrators identified can amnesty and forgiveness be considered.

A second option would be therefore to tackle the issue uncompromisingly in the interest of justice and transparency by investigating thoroughly all allegations of atrocities, excluding from the new military those involved, and bringing them to justice. This would give the FADM a high moral and ethical standing but it would entail considerable political and practical difficulties.

17 For an overview of the Namibian experience in this regard, see Nathan, 1994, pp. 90-91.

First, the investigation would necessarily lead to re-opening the yet very fresh wounds of war, with negative consequences for the internal cohesion of FADM. Secondly, it would probably lead to the exclusion of most of Renamo's military leaders and soldiers, since they perpetrated acts of terrorism against the population as a matter of policy. Thirdly, taken to its extreme conclusion, it would raise questions about the ultimate political responsibility for the behavior of the men on the ground, with the inevitable destabilizing effect on peace-building.

Nathan (1994:92-93) suggests a third option which is a compromise between 'total amnesia' and the quest for 'total justice' concerning war crimes. This would entail either the exclusion from the new military of just a group of 'notorious individuals and units', rather than a complete purge, or the creation of a 'Truth Commission' to investigate alleged violations of human rights, without the imposition of sanctions upon those found guilty.

In the particular circumstances of Mozambique, the establishment of a 'Truth Commission' seems to be the most viable option. It would satisfy the citizens' sense of justice and contribute to enhancing the moral standing of the FADM and the state. Whatever option is chosen by the Mozambican authorities, this extremely complex and sensitive issue is likely to be one of the most challenging tasks in creating a legitimate FADM, trusted and respected by the citizens it is meant to serve.

Conclusion

This paper discussed the political and strategic transformations in Southern Africa, as well as the establishment of armed services consistent with a democratic system in Mozambique, as a case study of the complexities involved in war-to-peace transitions.

Examining the developments in Southern Africa, the paper highlighted the process of transformation of the regional conflict system towards a collective security regime, as a result of the demise of apartheid and the subsequent accession of South Africa to full membership of the SADC and its subsidiary structures.

The controversy around the mechanisms of regional cooperation in defence and security issues illustrate the point that this process is not entirely free of tensions. Most member states, lacking in human and financial resources and concerned with the military and economic might of South Africa, are hesitant in committing themselves to formal arrangements for the fear of being overpowered by Pretoria, whose defence and security establishment is still dominated by the 'Total Strategists'.

Should this be allowed to happen, the region would be confronted with the ironic reality that the hegemony that apartheid desperately sought through military destabilization and economic pressure might be finally achieved by the 'New South Africa', under the umbrella of regional economic and military cooperation.

Paradoxically, the potential for South African hegemony motivates the need for confidence and security building mechanisms, of which common security regimes are central elements. Only by bringing the regional giant into the fold of formal common arrangements can its power be contained and transformed into a regional asset.

Only through greater co-ordination and integration can the weaker states increase their ability to negotiate mutually advantageous deals, in a framework where the behaviour of the member states is predictable and regulated by treaties and protocols acceptable to all. And this is precisely what can be achieved through the revitalization of the ISDSC and the institution of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

The paper submitted that, while there has been substantial progress in inter-state relations in Southern Africa, domestic stability is hindered by a range of formidable problems: the lack of effective governance; political and ethnic conflict; unstable civil-military relations; underdevelopment and poverty, countless refugees, displaced people and demobilized combatants who are destitute; and endemic disease and environmental degradation.

A particularly destabilizing consequence of the long years of war in Southern Africa is a pervasive culture of violence and privatized militarization. Arguing for the need of a comprehensive demilitarization in the region, the paper underlined the importance of improving the ability of the states to maintain law and order and address the systemic causes of crime and violence.

Further, it emphasized that successful was to peace transitions require fundamental transformations at the level of attitudes, social values and practices around the approaches to conflicts. It also considered the issue of post-war reconciliation and justice, illustrating its complexity with the experiences of Mozambique and South Africa.

The paper has argued that the consolidation of internal peace and stability in Southern African countries emerging from violent conflict depends, to a large extent, on the development of civil-military relations based on a partnership between civilian and military leaders in the broader process of national reconciliation, which characterizes the democratic transformation of the states in the region.

The paper argued further that such partnership should be based on mutual trust and respect, in order to promote accountability and subordination of the armed services to the elected civilian political authorities, military professional efficiency and the acceptance by the wider society of the armed services as the legitimate managers of the state's instruments of organized violence.

These are some of the insights that can be drawn from the efforts of Southern Africa and Mozambique to build peace, stability and democratic governance. These lessons, it is submitted, can be useful to other areas in the continent notwithstanding the fundamental historical, political, social and cultural differences that characterize the distinct regions of Africa.

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Abstract: In the last few years, Southern Africa has been forced to grapple with and redefine security priorities in a more complex post-war period. Issues like demilitarisation, resettlement, and restructuring of the armed forces in a way that contained erstwhile warring groups have become more strident than ever in the region. The paper focuses on the restructuring of the Mozambican armed services, which is taking place in the context of profound political transformations both at the domestic and regional levels. Its argument evolves around two main considerations: (i) that emerging democracies in Africa should espouse a concept of national security that adequately responds to the concerns of the citizens as much as those of the state, domestically, and promotes a common approach regionally; and (ii) that in this context, the armed services should be oriented in such a way that, they do not threaten the new democratic political order but to contribute positively to the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation.
