

ROMAN EXPANSIONISM IN THE THIRD AND SECOND CENTURIES BC: A CASE FOR IMPERIALISM AND MILITARISM

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INTRODUCTION

Rome's rise from the status of a small state on the banks of the Tiber to that of a super power in a few years was undoubtedly a stupendous achievement; for on several occasions she had to fight for her very survival as a state among some pretty hostile neighbours. It is not surprising, therefore, that some scholars consider Rome's prominent place in human history as divinely ordained¹. However, it will be argued in this paper that Rome's place in world history neither came about by accident nor was it divinely thrust upon her, but was the result of design on the part of the Romans, and which design could be traced to the militaristic nature of their state and the imperialistic policies of the Roman government².

ROMAN EXPANSIONIST POLICY

The traditional date for the founding of Rome is given as 753BC whilst the city gained republican status in 510/509 BC. The city of Rome itself lay inside Italy, which enclosed ninety-one thousand square miles of fertile valleys and thick forests³. The general area of Italy where Rome was to hold sway initially was a narrow, low-lying strip of country enclosed between the Tiber and the Volscian highlands, and between the slopes of the Apennines and the sea. Rome itself was exactly located "north-west on the left bank of the Tiber and some fifteen miles above its mouth, with a group of low hills"⁴, the so-called Septimontium or seven hills. The Roman people were a mixture of Latin and Sabine elements and they spoke the Latin language. Right from the start, Rome was a military state with a well-structured social system on military lines, even if its army was a citizen militia. At this point in time, the Etruscans ruled Rome and a legion comprised three thousand foot and three hundred horse recruited from three tribes. Later on, Servius Tullius reformed this into four tribes (on locality) with members assessed (*censi*) according to value of property, culminating in the richest forming the first line of infantry and constituting the cavalry⁵. This new arrangement of Servius, which gave

all citizens the privilege of serving in the army, "was unmistakably military in its aim"⁶. Indeed this created an ethos of militarism in Rome where, "the army was practically identified with the whole body of Roman citizens"⁷. Under Etruscan rule, Rome held sway over Latium and controlled affairs in much of the Italian plain. However, with the overthrow of the foreign rulers, Rome's territory shrank and she "lost the hold on Latium which the Etruscans had given her". The total land size of Rome and its sphere of influence shrank to about ten miles by twenty-five⁸. This shrinkage of territory and the subsequent attacks on Rome by Tarquin and his allies probably compelled Rome to engage in aggressive warfare after she had had a breather. However the case may be, if Rome itself did not desire domination over other peoples, her wars for survival should not have metamorphosed into the requisitioning of the territory of conquered peoples. But as Errington points out Rome's expansionism:

evolved through a continual process of responding to threats, real or imagined, to Rome's ever-widening sphere of interests⁹.

Rome's imperialism began as an attempt to ensure security, which initially meant, "lying quite simply in the physical protection of the city of Rome"; but it was later regarded by the Romans as "protecting Rome's wider interests elsewhere"¹⁰. The current position of the USA which, since World War II, has spread her tentacles of influence to cover much of the free world, so as to establish her current position of being the world's only super power, illustrates a similar situation.

APOLOGISTS OF ROMAN EXPANSIONISM AND IMPERIALISM

We have seen how Rome's desire and quest for security often led to war. These tendencies ultimately brought under her control the territories of others. In this section of the essay, some views of certain scholars and authorities as to whether Rome's imperialism was willing or unwilling will be examined. Marsh tries to deny that Rome willingly sought new territories to appropriate from others, but acknowledges that she actively waged wars to defeat other peoples¹¹. In Marsh's view Roman imperial expansionism was intermittent, and that she was unwilling to pursue such an ambition. He points out that from 241 to 197 BC, although Rome had defeated Carthage

and taken over her dominions and controlled the Illyrian coastland and much of the hinterland, she annexed only four provinces; that between 197 and 146 BC, Rome annexed no provinces although this was a period of intense warfare, with Rome beating Macedonia in three wars and pacifying Greece; and that from 146 to 121 BC, Rome annexed only four more provinces. Thus, Marsh tries to show that Rome's *provinciae* were acquired unwillingly; otherwise she would have grabbed more provinces than she did in the period between 197 and 121 BC. It appears from March's argument also that it was Rome's system of government that initially inhibited the acquisition of new provinces¹². However, when new magistrates with *imperium* were appointed new provinces were created.

Petrie, arguing along similar lines also, tries to ameliorate Rome's imperialism by stating among other things that Rome expanded her territory not only through wars of conquest but also through series of alliances, planting of colonies and the granting of privileges to other peoples¹³. But as Errington points out, these (i.e. treaties, alliances and privileges) were measures deliberately taken by Rome to increase her influence and power¹⁴. Thus, by 264 BC, prior to her clash with Carthage, Rome had established a controlling interest over the greater part of Italy. However, Virgil and Polybius represent Rome's position as having been divinely ordained, either through Fate or Destiny or *tyche*. It is important that we look at their views since their writings must have influenced their contemporaries and may also have encapsulated the views that Romans held about themselves.

The greatest exponent of the destiny concept is Virgil. It has been argued that his *Aeneid* had been written to legitimize the sole rule of Caesar Augustus (Augustus – "He who reigns by divine approval")¹⁵, by tracing the divine origins of the Emperor's lineage to Venus through Aeneas the mythical founder of Alba Longa, from which sprang the city of Rome, and highlighting also Virgil's love of his native Italy and his sense of Rome's destiny as a civilized ruler of nations¹⁶. There are indeed many instances in the *Aeneid* where Virgil portrays in a poetical fashion this belief and conviction (probably the conviction of many Romans as well, hence their imperialism). But, we will point out a few instances for our purpose. In true poetic fashion, Virgil, with the benefit of hindsight, assigns divine and supernatural reasons for Rome's contest with Carthage during the Third and Second Centuries BC. In the first instance, he sings of Juno's desire to thwart the fate of Aeneas¹⁷ because the Queen of Heaven knew that it was the destiny of the progenitors of Rome to destroy Carthage, which, according to Virgil, Juno loved "best of

all cities in the world". The poet writes, referring to Juno and the destinies of Rome and Carthage:

She had, however, heard of another breed of men, tracing descent from the blood of Troy, who were one day to overthrow this Tyrian stronghold: For they would breed a warrior nation, haughty, and sovereign over wide realms; and their onset would bring destruction to Africa. Such ...

was the plan of the spinning Fates"¹⁸.

Having indicated clearly, in the lines above, that Rome's supplanting of Carthage was fated, Virgil, with an eye on the three Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage, fashions into his epic the curse of Dido. This curse ostensibly resulted in the terrible antagonism between the two great cities that lasted, with intermissions, for well over a hundred years¹⁹. In furtherance of his aim to elevate Augustus Caesar to the status of divine ruler and to show that Rome's hegemony over the then known world, in Western eyes, at 27BC was pre-destined, Virgil crafts for us the highly emotive scenes in Book VI where Aeneas visits the underworld to learn of his destiny and that of his descendants²⁰. In lines 850ff., Virgil puts the following words in the mouth of Anchises:

But you, Roman, must remember that you have to guide the nations by your authority, for this is to be your skill, to graft tradition onto peace, to shew mercy to the conquered, and to wage war until the haughty are brought low.

These lines, which bear a similarity to the words of the Athenian representatives during the Melian debate, in Thucydides, V, 105.3-5; 111.11 seem to me like a defence of Roman imperialism and expansionism. The poet, no doubt, seeks to justify the many wars that Rome had fought in her long history, many of which might have been characterised by naked aggression. This is especially so if one considers the often held notion that Rome fought only in self-defence, and that it was her victories which adhered to her provinces, and that she had had no intention of acquiring, with a view to governing, them. But certainly, the First Punic War can arguably be said to have come about as a result of the Romans' breach of their often quoted and hitherto much respected principle of *fides*. For as Thiel notes, it is ridiculous for historians to ascribe to a nation certain virtues which it assigns to itself

He contends further that the *fides Romana* was not better than the *fides Punica*, and accuses the Romans of being "great masters both of patriotism and hypocrisy"²¹.

The passages referred to above, in the *Aeneid*, seek ultimately to show that Rome's supremacy was pre-ordained. However, we need not forget that for all its incisive presentation of historical facts, the *Aeneid* remains but a poet's picture of the world, where human affairs are controlled by human, superhuman and divine influences. Therefore, irrespective of what considerations one may choose to have, it is my opinion that without a well thought out imperialistic design Rome would not have gained that pride of place in the world which engendered thoughts of pre-destination in the mind of Virgil.

One finds in Polybius also references to the role of *tyche* (Providence, Fortune or Fate) in Rome's rise to supremacy even before the historian proceeds to present his history that seeks to show how Rome managed in fifty-three years to bring the inhabited earth under its power:

Fortune (*tyche*) has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end... I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this, the finest and most beneficent of the performances of fortune. For though she (*tyche*) is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not ... ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times²².

From the above, *tyche* or Fortune appears as a power working to a definite goal, that is, the domination of Rome. No wonder one might be misled into thinking that the major historian of that period, and the first ever serious writer of universal history conceived of Rome's rise as due to divine orchestration. That assertion is far from the truth. As Walbank rightly notes, a careful look at the text of Polybius proves that Polybius' use of the term *Tύχη* (*tyche*) is consistently inconsistent, changing in meaning with each and every use²³. In fact, it comes out that Polybius' use of the term *tyche* is almost poetical and certainly colloquial to match up to the contemporary usage of the term as a matter of verbal elaboration. On one occasion *tyche* is surely intended as a chance event²⁴; on another as a sensational and capricious character²⁵; and yet on other occasions a great general like

Epaminondas or Philopoemen having risen to success on his merits may be brought low ὄçò ôõ÷çò `çòôúí (tes tuches hetton – by Fortune or Chance)²⁶. As Walbank painstakingly points out, Polybius' use of ôõ÷ç (*tyche*) and the various interpretations it yields creates a difficulty since Polybius defines *tyche* as, "a power which restricted its activity to that sphere which is not amenable to reason". However, the whole of Polybius' *Histories* is based on the assumption that Roman success can be explained in rational terms. He emphasises his conception as follows:

By schooling themselves in vast and perilous enterprises ... it is perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose²⁷.

As it can be seen from the above quotation, Rome's rise to supremacy is presumed to have come by having schooled herself in vast and perilous enterprises. In other words, militarization and expansionism as deliberate imperialism. One thing is clear though; that is, if anyone tries to make use of Polybius' *tyche*, translated variously as Chance, Fate, Providence or Fortune to show that Rome's rise was pre-destined, one is likely to experience an *aporia* (perplexity) since on several occasions Polybius' choice of the word presents or suggests a different notion altogether.

ROME AS AN IMPERIAL AND MILITARY STATE

Apart from Rome's apologists, there are others who saw Rome's rise to empire status as a well-orchestrated effort, springing from her imperialist nature. N.G.L. Hammond²⁸ argues that Rome had never, at any time in her history, been a pacifist or quietist state, but always an imperialist and aggressive one that desired power, the power of commanding other states. Not only that, Hammond also criticizes those:

who excuse the desire for power, which is the basis of imperialism, on the grounds that it is a form of defence against domination or subjugation by some other power²⁹.

He contends that apologists of Rome always try to explain away Rome's imperialism by claiming that she always acted in defence. Hammond could not have been more right because I do not see what Rome was defending when she warred against Tarentum from 282-272 BC and Carthage in the

Punic Wars³⁰. Furthermore, Jones and Sidwell³¹ also consider Rome's rise to To begin with, the costly wars of the 4th, 3rd and 2nd centuries, notably, the Latin, Samnite, Pyrrhic Wars and the Punic Wars³⁹ made it imperative for Rome to chart an imperialistic course, not only for defensive purposes but also for economic considerations. The Roman state became cash strapped after each of these wars and there was the need to re-fill the state coffers. This assertion is made keeping in mind that military pay had been introduced around 396 BC⁴⁰ and with the increasing number of battles being fought the soldiers had to be paid well; hence the huge indemnities that Rome imposed on its defeated foes especially against Carthage, Macedonia and Syria, as evidenced in Livy, XXXIV, 52 and XLV, 33; 40; 43; not to forget the systematic looting of provinces in Greece⁴¹. That is not to suggest that Rome waged war with an eye on making profit but that the Romans became conscious that war yielded its own dividends. Furthermore, the destruction of the countryside, particularly during the 2nd Punic War, affected agriculture and Rome had to look farther afield for grains to feed its populace. The fact of the matter was that Italian agriculture had declined steadily since the 2nd century BC. Here the policy of seizing arable land from the enemy and designating it as *ager publicus* (public land or domain) came in handy, since a majority of these *ager publicus* was turned into *latifundia* (ranches or large estates) worked by servile labour for the production of cereals for onward exportation to Rome. Moreover, the fertility of Carthage and North Africa, and the province which later became Africa, was never lost on some influential Roman's like Cato, who was reported to have regularly brandished figs in the Roman Senate whilst declaiming "*delenda est Carthago*" (Carthage must be destroyed)⁴². Arguably, his fear was the re-emergence of Carthage as a potential rival and a threat to Rome. As anecdotal as this may seem to serve as a catalyst for the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, I wish to point out that this course of action had never been far from the mind of the Roman Senate for Polybius in a moment of perspicacity notes thus:

The Romans had long ago decided on this course (i.e. the destruction of Carthage) in their own minds, and were looking for a suitable opportunity and an excuse to satisfy foreign opinion ...⁴³

Indeed, I am not saying, with my reference to North Africa's fertility that it was economic considerations alone that dictated Roman imperial policy towards that part of the Mediterranean, since it is apparent that "fear of recrudescing military power in North Africa ... is the only adequate explanation of Rome's decision to destroy the city of Carthage and annex the province of Africa"⁴⁴. Nonetheless, it is my contention that Africa even in the 2nd century BC was of great economic importance to be considered as a major source of food supply to Rome if even it did not as yet merit the epithet "granary of Rome", taking into consideration the fact that Roman ruled "Carthage", later called Africa Nova, produced nearly fifty thousand tons of grain every year. Even as far back as 191 BC, Carthage and Numidia, then allies of Rome, each provided five hundred thousand *modii* (bushels) of wheat and three hundred thousand *modii* of barley among others to the Roman expeditionary forces in the eastern Mediterranean⁴⁶.

Social issues and considerations also played a major role in the expansion of Roman imperialism. For instance, the long period of military campaigning contributed in no small measure to the destruction of the peasant psyche of farming culture of returning soldiers, who found themselves no longer fit for work as farmers. In addition to that, many returning veterans lost their farmlands and became unemployed. They could not even work as labourers because servile labour was cheaper. This created a mob of unemployed who trooped continually to Rome for non-existent jobs, and what better way to keep them employed than engaging them in the only activity or occupation that they were now only fit for, war. Of course, returning veterans of campaigns could, and many did, re-enlist to fight in campaigns in foreign lands. Indeed during the imperial era, the economic importance of Rome's provinces was closely tied in with its social value since Africa in Barton's words:

enabled the (Roman) government to keep the urban population contented by providing it with one half of Juvenal's prescription – "bread and shows" (*panem et circenses*). Actually ... from Africa ... wild beasts were available in large quantities for the squalid massacres in the amphitheatre⁴⁷.

There is no gainsaying the fact that with Rome still practicing a conscription policy based on property classification in the 3rd and 2nd centuries

BC, there was a threat to the manpower available for use in the army, if the Legionaries were allowed to fall to the class of the *capite censi* (citizens assessed only on their persons, not their property) because of poverty. It has been argued that it was the fear of this spectre that made Tiberius Gracchus champion the 'land redistribution programme and which also accounted for his policies as a tribune, leading to conflicts between him and the senate and other nobility'⁴⁸. One cannot help but recall the attempts of Gaius Gracchus to found the colony of Junonia near the site of derelict Carthage; an attempt which proved fatal to himself. Assuredly, the efforts of the Gracchi were not geared towards an economic end alone but a social one as well⁴⁹. Irrespective of the fact that their line of action was not official senate policy, it was Rome as a whole that was the intended beneficiary. I think that the desire to retain citizens in the property assessments for conscription into the army when the need arose, to some extent, also guided the imperialist policies of Rome in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. This is so because successful wars and annexations generated substantial *ager publicus* for resettlement of returning veterans, and also aided in the creation of colonies in the several *provinciae* (provinces) that came into existence in that period.

In addition, one cannot discount the view that the personal political ambitions of some generals, statesmen and tribunes led to the waging and conducting of wars in a manner so as to enrich themselves, their families and *clientella* (clients) and also to win fame. In the same vein, I think that the prospect of honour and benefits of provincial governorship for politicians would also have made certain Roman officials advocate for the planning and execution of campaigns to acquire more territories where up and coming magistrates could be posted to govern⁵⁰. I must admit that, apparently, this *modus operandi* was more pronounced in the last century of the republic, than in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. However, if the evidence of Sallust is anything to go by, particularly his appraisal of the conduct of the Jugurthine War by Marcus Scaurus and L. Calpurnius Bestia, then it stands to reason that personal political considerations and expediencies played a major role in the imperial designs of the Roman state⁵¹. Although some state officials acted in defiance of or contravened certain orders of the Senate, most, if not all, of their actions were determined by materialistic considerations, be they economic, social and or political, and not necessarily a desire to protect the frontiers of Rome⁵². Be that as it may, Rome as a state was the final beneficiary of whatever activities her generals and shapers of foreign policy undertook.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show above that Rome's expansion in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC could be traced to the twin policies of imperialism and militarism. As we have seen from some authorities, various factors contributed to the expansionist policy of Rome. Granted that, at first, Rome had no well-laid plans of imperialism, due to her militaristic nature, however, she won most of her wars and soon found out that wielding power and influence over other states could pay. Thus she charted an imperialistic course. Moreover, Rome's policy of acquiring for herself portions of captured territory as *ager publicus* accumulated for her territories that had to be settled upon and ultimately governed or administered. Such acquisitions were bound to compel others to fight Rome to avoid such a fate of dismemberment; but unfortunately they were defeated and Rome kept on growing until all Italy could not contain her. On the extreme side, it could be said that Rome saw the potential danger arising out of her international conduct; thus she engineered wars before they got to her. Indeed, it is a mistake to suppose that the Romans equated the extent of their empire or domain simply with the boundaries of the territory and provinces. Rather, they expected their *imperium* to be respected wherever they chose to exercise it. Thus Rome could, and did, go against the letter and spirit of treaties signed with others⁵³. Her *imperium* was a *imperium sine fine* (an empire without limits)⁵⁴.

Certainly, there is no doubt that Roman expansionism as a deliberate policy of militarization and imperialism based on economic, social and political considerations became crystallized in later centuries, especially during the last century of the Republic, and the *Principate* and Imperial era. Thus Augustus Caesar, being very mindful of this and its attendant dangers, instructed his successor Tiberius in the following words, "*consilium coercens intra terminos imperii*"⁵⁵, ("do not expand the empire" or "maintain the present boundaries").

Reference Notes

1. F.B Marsh, *The Founding of the Roman Empire*, W.Heffer and Sons Ltd., Cambridge. 1959. pp. 2 and 3; cf.R.M. Errington, *Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power*, Hamilton and Sons Ltd., London. 1971. p.3.
2. P. Jones and K. Sidwell, (ed.), *The World of Rome. An Introduction to Roman Culture*, Cambridge University Press, U.K. 1997. pp.16 and 17; cf. A Petrie, *Introduction to Roman History, Literature and Antiquities*, Oxford University Press, London. 1963. pp.15-17.
3. W.G. Hardy, *The Greek and Roman World*, Schenkan Publishing Company, Inc., Massachusetts. 1962. p.68.
4. A. Petrie, op. cit., 7.; cf. W.G. Hardy, op. cit., 68.
5. A. Petrie, op. cit., 15-17.
6. Ibidem, 17.
7. F.B. Marsh, op. cit., 21.
8. W.G. Hardy, op. cit., 70; cf. A. Petrie, op. cit., 21.
9. R. Errington, op. cit., 3.
10. For a very good, detailed discussion on the issue as to whether Rome was imperialistic or not see, E.S. Gruen, (ed.), *Imperialism in the Roman Republic*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., USA. 1970. (a collection of essays).
11. F.B. Marsh, op. cit., 1-20
12. Ibidem, 12-20.
13. A. Petrie, op. cit., 15-27.
14. R.M.Errington, op cit., 4 and 15.

15. M. Cary and T.J. Haarhoff, *Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World*, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London. 1961. p.76.
16. J. Knight, (trans.) *Virgil: The Aeneid*, Penguin Books Ltd Harmondsworth, England. 1956. (c. back cover commentary)
17. Virgil, *The Aeneid*, I, 1-22 (Penguin)
18. Ibidem, 18-22.
19. Virgil, *op. cit*, VI, 620-630ff.
20. Ibidem, 755-870.
21. J.H. Thiel, *A History of Roman Sea Power before the Second Punic War*, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam. 1954. p.14.
22. Polybius, I, 4. 1-5, Penguin Books Ltd.
23. F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1957. p.16-26.
24. Polybius, 1, 7, 4.
25. Ibidem, 37, 4; II, 7, 1-3.
26. Ibidem, IX, 8, 13; XXIII, 12, 3; cf. Walbank, *op. cit.*, 18.
27. Polybius, I, 63, 9; cf. Walbank, *op. cit.*, 27.
28. N.G.L. Hammond, "Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205 BC", *JRS* vol. LVII, 1968, 20 and 21.
29. Ibidem, 13 and 14.
30. J.H. Thiel, *op. cit.*, 4-23.
31. P Jones and K. Sidwell, *op. cit.*, 13-17.
32. Ibidem, 13 and 14.

33. Ibidem, 16 and 17; cf. Susan Raven, *Rome in Africa*, Evans Brothers Ltd. London. 1969. p.35.
34. F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, International Publishers Co., Inc. New York. 1972, pp.169; 170; 189-191
35. S.A. Handford, *Sallust: Jugurthine War and Conspiracy of Catiline*, Penguin Books Ltd; England. 1963. pp.15-22.
36. M. Cary and H.H. Scullard, *A History of Rome*, Macmillan Education Ltd., England. 1979. pp.98-106.
37. Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, 23.2-30.4; cf. M. Cary and H.H. Scullard, op. cit., 174-176; 214-216.
38. S.A. Handford, op. cit., 18 and 19.
39. The Latin, Samnite and Pyrrhic Wars were basically fought for the supremacy of Italy, whereas the Punic Wars were fought, initially, over Sicily and, later, for the control of the Mediterranean regions over which Carthage previously had control. The major Latin revolt, which led to the dissolution of the Latin League, occurred in 340-338 BC; the Samnite Wars were three in number: 343-341 BC; 328-302 BC; 298-290 BC; the Pyrrhic Wars spanned the period 280-275 BC; the Punic Wars, also three in number occurred, respectively, in 264-241 BC; 218-202/1 BC, and 149-146 BC.
40. M. Cary and H.H. Scullard, op. cit., 560.
41. Peter K.T. Grant, *The Role of the Navy in Rome's Rise to Empire: 264-146 BC*, unpublished M.Phil Thesis. Cape Coast University, Ghana. 2002. p.212 - 214; cf.M. Cary and H.H. Scullard, op. cit., 164; cf. Errington, op. cit., 225. (The Kings of Macedonia in question here were Philip V and Perseus, whereas the Syrian King was Antiochus III).
42. Susan Raven, op. cit., 32 and 35.

43. Polybius, XXXVI.2; cf. I.M. Barton, *Africa in the Roman Empire*, Ghana Universities Press, Accra. 1972. p.16.
44. I.M. Barton, op. cit., 17 and 19.
45. I.M. Barton, op. cit., 28 and 29; cf. Susan Raven, op. cit., 63.
46. Peter K.T. Grant, op. cit., 215; cf. Livy, XXXVI, 4.
47. I.M. Barton, op. cit., 33 and 34; cf. Juvenal, X.81.
48. Cary and Scullard, op. cit., 203 and 204.
49. Susan Raven, op. cit., 36; cf. I.M Barton, op. cit, 34 and 37.
50. This was in accordance with the provisions of the *lex sempronia* (the sempronian law); a law of Gaius Gracchus providing that every year before the consular elections, the Senate should designate two provinces as consular provinces; during their term of office the consuls decided, by agreement or by casting lots, which of the two provinces each should take. cf. S.A. Handford, op. cit., 63.
51. Sallust, op. cit., 23-35.
52. One ought to note that C. Gracchus' plan to create the colony of Junonia was in contravention of senatorial policy. cf. S.A Handford op. cit., 16-20, 67, 69, 70, 180-183; cf. Cary and Scullard, op. cit. 102.
53. J.H. Thiel, op. cit., 21-23; cf. footnote 55-57.
54. Jones and Sidwell, op. cit., 17.
55. Tacitus, *Annals*, I, II.